Mediaboss Marketing

Baghdad, 02 February 2021 Today marks the 50th anniversary of the Ramsar Convention on Wetlands, which aims to protect water, livelihoods and wetlands. In 2008, Iraq ratified the Convention designating four wetlands of international importance in southern Iraq: Central Marshes (Dhi Qar and Basra governorates), Hammar Marsh (Dhi Qar and Basra governorates), Hawizeh Marsh (Basra, Missan governorates and Iran) and Sawa Lake (Muthanna Governorate). Wetlands are land areas that are saturated or flooded with water either permanently or seasonally. The Iraqi Marshlands used to be one of the largest wetland ecosystems. A rare aquatic landscape in the desert, the Iraqi marshlands were listed in 2016 by UNESCO as a World Heritage Site.

In Iraqs wetlands, the lives of the marsh dwellers, including a small Sabbean Mandean community, are intertwined with the natural environment: harvesting reeds; weaving mats; building reed houses; fishing; herding water buffalo; making cheese; and running small fish restaurants and boat tours for tourists. During her recent visit to the Hammar Marshes in Thi-Qar governorate in Southern Iraq, Danielle Bell, Representative of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights in Iraq noted that: Conservation and protection of Iraqs magnificent marshlands not only promotes biodiversity and sustainability but is intricately linked to the realization of many human rights concerning environment, health and livelihoods. Thus, the marshes are a critical resource of great economic, cultural, scientific, and recreational value, the loss of which would be irreparable.

This years theme, Wetlands and Water, sheds light on the contribution of wetlands to the quantity and quality of freshwater on our planet.

Dr. Salah ElHajj Hassan, FAO Representative in Iraq highlighted the significance of the wetlands in Iraq by saying The wetlands in Iraq has been inhabited by rural families for centuries, diverse communities have been living and practicing traditional methods of agriculture, and it is critical to address challenges faced in these areas.

FAO is committed to achieve a more resilient food system and support the efforts of the Iraqi Government to improve food security and nutrition and increase the resilient livelihoods for Iraqs rural population in South of Iraq including the marshlands. This is achieved through improving sustainable local agricultural productivity and income generation in strategic priority value chains for the rural poor while enhancing land and water resources and biodiversity.

The Marshlands of Mesopotamia are a rare aquatic landscape; a biodiversity hotspot for key migratory birds and once the largest wetland in the Middle East. UNEP has been supporting the Government of Iraq since 2004 in its efforts to manage key biodiversity areas in Iraq from the inscription of the Iraqi Marshlands as a World Heritage Site and the development of an Environmental Management Plan for the area. Today, UNEP is working closely with the Ministry of Health and Environment and other key stakeholders on the establishment of a network of Protected Areas in the country with the declaration of two key biodiversity areas as protected sites Dalmaj, a natural wetland rich in biodiversity, and Teeb. The establishment of a network of Protected Areas in Iraq is a key step towards meeting obligations and targets of biodiversity conservation notwithstanding the positive impact of such a network on livelihoods and human well-being, said Sami Dimassi, Regional Director for UNEP Regional Office for West Asia.

Resident Representative of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in Iraq, Zena Ali Ahmad, said: Historically, these diverse wetlands have played a key role in urban development and the emergence of societies. Preserving this rich part of Iraq's natural biodiversity and cultural history is essential to building forward better. At UNDP, we stand committed to working with local communities in the wetlands to build resilience and adapt to climate change challenges, while also creating sustainable livelihood opportunities for communities.

With appropriate support the marshes can become a source of development of a tertiary sector based on site management, tourism and hospitality, which in the longer term will contribute to protection and sustainability of ecosystems and the landscape of the marshlands. UN-Habitat will soon be launching a two-pronged initiative: on the one hand it will closely collaborate with UNDP to build community infrastructure and facilities that will improve the accessibility of tourists to the Hawizeh and Eastern Hammar Marshes and provide basic facilities for the marketing of local goods. On the other hand, it will work with local authorities to develop a Strategic Spatial Plan for the socio-economic revitalization of communities living in the marshlands in Maysan Governorate, aimed at increasing the number of visitors to religious and nature sites located south of the city of Amarah and enhance livelihood opportunities in tourism and service sectors.

Climate change in Iraq is expected to reduce annual rainfall and increase water salination by rising sea levels, which will lead to a surge in dust storms, a reduction in agricultural productivity, and increased water scarcity. All of these challenges will have severe implications for the preservation of the marshlands. The Iraqi marshes are of fundamental importance and their unique environmental space combined with their biodiversity, an international treasure. Without increasing efforts to preserve this UNESCO World Heritage Site, we would be at risk of losing the marshes during our lifetime. says Resident Coordinator for Iraq, Ms. Irena Vojackova-Sollorano. She urged for more protective measures to ensure the sustainability of the marshes and increased efforts to fight the climate crisis overall.

Media contacts:

OHCHR: Ali Omran Saidi, Human Rights Officer | saidi1@un.org| +964-(0)790-1947425

UNESCO: Husamaldeen El-Zubi, Public Information Officer | h.el-zubi@unesco.org

UNDP: Mohammed Al-Bahbahanee, Communications Specialist | mohammed.al-bahbahanee@undp.org |+964 770 439 9222

UNHABITAT: Aryan Star Muheddin, Communication Specialist | aryan.al-jammoor@un.org |+964 (0)751 103 9494

FAO: Lubna AlTarabishi, Program Support Specialist | lubna.altarabishi@fao.org | +964 (0) 774 080 4002

Office of the DSRSG/RC/HC for Iraq, Zainab Salih, Communications Officer, zainab.salih@un.org

More here:
Water, conservation and human rights are inseparable in the Iraq's marshlands: A call for action on World Wetlands Day [EN/AR/KU] - Iraq - ReliefWeb

Baghdad, Iraq on 31 January 2021-- The World Health Organization (WHO) in Iraq on Sunday denied claims from a local media source that it disclosed information on the COVID-19 vaccination plan in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq.

In a post for Al Shafaq News, the media misquoted a WHO technical employee and posted a misleading statement describing details on the type and plan for the COVID-19 vaccination in Iraq, the fact that contradicts the role of the organization in all member state countries.

The Organization would like to emphasize that WHO is a technical agency concerned with providing Iraqs Ministry of Health on both Central and Regional levels with the technical advice required and do respect the sovereign decision of the Central as well as Kurdistan Regional Ministries of Health on all health issues including the COVID-19 vaccine and national inoculation plans.

###

For more information, please contact:

See more here:
WHO refutes claims of unveiling information on COVID-19 vaccination plan in Iraq [EN/AR/KU] - Iraq - ReliefWeb

Situation Overview

In 2019 and 2020, the numbers of internally displaced persons (IDPs) returning to their area of origin (AoO) or being re-displaced for a second time increased, coupled with persisting challenges in relation to lack of services, infrastructure and - in some cases - security in areas of origin. The need to better understand the sustainability of returns, conditions for the (re)integration of IDPs and returnees, and the impact of their presence on access to services and social cohesion has been an identified need for humanitarian and development planning. Decisions related to the closure of all IDP camps by the end of 2020 have also impacted these dynamics.

The International Organization for Migration (IOM) Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM)s Emergency Displacement Tracking recorded around 6,394 households returned to non-camp locations between 31 August and 31 October 2020, 60% of which were recorded in Ninewa Governorate. Sinjar District witnessed 57% of the returns in the governorate, representing 34% of the total returns during the mentioned period.

Markaz Sinjar Sub-district

Markaz Sinjar is a sub-district of Sinjar District, located in the western area of Ninewa Governorate close the Iraq-Syria border. Key informants (KIs) reported that Markaz Sinjar Sub-district was housing an average of 16,781 households (HH) before 2014.

In August 2014, the the so-called Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) undertook military activities in the district of Sinjar, threatening minority groups and resulting in the displacement of over 200,000 people.5 While ISIL was dislodged from Sinjar in 2017, the return of those who fled has been hindered by the districts disputed status between the Federal Government of Iraq (GoI) and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG).5 In October 2020, the GoI and KRG signed an agreement on the status of Sinjar District in preparation for the return of the displaced populations originally from the district.

Read this article:
Rapid Assessment on Returns and Durable Solutions, Markaz Sinjar Sub-district - Sinjar District - Ninewa Governorate, Iraq, November 2020 - Iraq -...

In a December 2020 New York Times interview, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky welcomed Joe Bidens election as U.S. president. Zelensky observed that Biden knows Ukraine better than the previous president and will really help strengthen relations, help settle the war in Donbas, and end the occupation of our territory.

While Zelenskys comments may prove overly optimistic, there is little reason to doubt that the Biden presidency will be good for Ukraine. The incoming president knows the country, and he understands both the value of a stable and successful Ukraine for U.S. interests in Europe and the challenges posed to Ukraine and the West by Russia. That mightmight, not will, but mighthelp break the logjam on the stalemated Donbas conflict, which Zelensky of course would welcome. Perhaps less welcome to the Ukrainian president may be Bidens readiness to play hardball to press Kyiv to take needed but politically difficult reform and anti-corruption steps. Ukraines success as a liberal democracy depends not just on ending its conflict with Russia but also on combating corruption and advancing still necessary economic reforms.

In one sense, U.S. policy toward Ukraine during the Trump administration had its strengths. It continued political and military support for Kyiv, including the provision of lethal military assistance that the Obama administration had been unwilling to provide. It maintained and strengthened Ukraine-related sanctions on Russia. And it took further steps to bolster the U.S. and NATO military presence in central European states on Ukraines western border.

However, Donald Trump never seemed committed to his administrations policy. His primary engagement on Ukraine was his bid to extort Kyiv into manufacturing derogatory information on his Democratic opponent, a bid that led to his impeachment.

Beyond that, Trump showed no interest in the country and consistently refused to criticize Vladimir Putin, who has inflicted more than six years of low-intensity war on Ukraine.

The Biden presidency will end this dichotomy in Washingtons approach to Kyiv. The president and his administration will align on policy. That new predictability will mean that Ukrainian officials no longer have to worry about late night presidential tweets or the subjugation of U.S. policy interests to the presidents personal political vendettas.

As Biden takes office, two principal challenges confront Ukraine. The conflict with Russia poses the first. In March 2014, in the aftermath of the Maidan Revolution, Russian military forces seized Crimea. Weeks later, Russian security forces instigated a conflict in Donbas, masked poorly as a separatist uprising. The Kremlin provided leadership, funding, heavy weapons, ammunition, other supplies and, when necessary, regular units of the Russian army. Now in its seventh year, that conflict has claimed the lives of some 13,000 people.

While Moscow illegally annexed Crimea, it has not moved to annex Donbas. It appears instead to want to use a simmering conflict in that eastern Ukrainian region as a means to put pressure on, destabilize and disorient the government in Kyiv, with the goal of making it harder for the government to build a successful Ukrainian state and draw closer to Europe. (Moscow has interfered elsewhere in the post-Soviet space to try to maintain a Russian sphere of influence.)

Without the Kremlins cooperation, Kyiv on its own cannot resolve the conflict in Donbas, and Crimea poses an even harder question. However, meeting the second of the challenges facing Ukraineimplementation of reforms and anti-corruption measures needed to build a fair, robust and growing economylies largely within Kyivs purview. Unfortunately, after a good start by Zelensky and his first government, reforms have stagnated, oligarchs retain undue political and economic influence (including within Zelenskys Servant of the People party), and the judicial branch remains wholly unreconstructed. Among other things, this depresses much-needed investment in the country.

The Biden presidency might well play a more active role in the moribund negotiating process regarding Donbas. As co-chairs of the Normandy process, German Chancellor Angela Merkel and French President Emmanuel Macron have had little success of late in implementation of the 2015 Minsk agreement, which laid out a path to a settlement and restoration of full Ukrainian sovereignty over Donbas. Unfortunately, it appears that the Kremlin calculates that the benefits of keeping Kyiv distracted currently outweigh the costs, including of Western sanctions.

Zelensky believes that a more active U.S. role could change that calculation and inject momentum into the process. At a minimum, the Biden presidency should appoint a special envoy to coordinate with the Germans and French, and, more broadly, with the European Union, Britain, Canada and others on Western support for Ukraine and sanctions against Russia. That position has gone unfilled since September 2019.

Whether Biden, who will face many demands on his time, will choose to engage personally is a different question. He knows Ukraine, having traveled there six times when he served as vice president. And, unlike Trump, who sought quick victories, Biden understands that solving a question like Donbas would require an investment of his time over a sustained period. It would make sense if it became clear that his engagement would shake up things in a way that would increase the prospects of a settlement and return of Donbas to Ukrainian sovereignty.

At first glance, the Kremlin might not welcome that kind of U.S. involvement, but there are good arguments for it. First of all, the United States is Ukraines strongest Western supporter, and Washingtons voice carries considerable weight in Kyiv. Second, Russias current conflict against Ukraine is not just about Donbas; it is also about Ukraines place in Europe, that is, where the country fits between Russia and institutions such as the European Union and NATO. Addressing that question will require diplomatic finesse. Given the trans-Atlantic relationship, which will be revived under Biden, it is difficult to see such a geopolitical discussion taking place without American participation.

As for Crimea, Ukraine cannot at present muster the political, diplomatic, economic and military leverage to effect the peninsulas return. Still, the U.S. government knows how to do non-recognition policy. It did so for five decades with regard to the Baltic states incorporation into the Soviet Union. The Biden presidency will remain supportive of Kyivs claim to Crimea and not recognize its annexation by Russiaand the White House will express this view.

After an encouraging start on reform, Zelensky wavered in 2020. He has to do more, and Biden can be helpful, though in a manner the Ukrainian president may not appreciate. A big part of the problem is that Zelensky himself seems to have lost his way. Ruslan Ryaboshapka, his reformist first prosecutor general, observed that Instead of fighting oligarchs, [Zelensky] chose to peacefully coexist with them. Biden could well prove the kind of friend that Ukraine needs now: supportive but direct with Zelensky on what must be done, and ready to push him to take politically hard measures that he might prefer to avoid.

Biden has already shown that he can do this. As vice president in the Obama administration, he had the lead on U.S. engagement with Ukraine. When necessary, he applied tough love, famously withholding a one-billion-dollar loan guarantee until then-President Petro Poroshenko fired a prosecutor general who was viewed widely, inside and outside of Ukraine, as corrupt.

A dose of such tough love now seems necessary with Kyiv. One question concerns access to low interest credits under Ukraines stand-by agreement with the International Monetary Fund. The IMF conditions disbursements of those credits on how Ukraine implements reform commitments that it made to secure the agreement. The Biden administration should, and almost certainly will, back the IMF in insisting that Ukraine needs to deliver on its commitments in order to secure additional disbursements.

Likewise, the Biden administration should make more bilateral U.S. assistance conditional on Ukraine tackling particular reforms. In doing so, it should consult and coordinate closely with the European Union, which has greater assistance resources available. Introducing a higher degree of conditionality to Western assistance programs could usefully ratchet up the pressure on the leadership in Kyiv to take reform steps that are in the countrys broader interest but opposed by key oligarchs or political groups who stand to lose from such reforms.

Priority should go to encouraging reform of the judicial branch, including the Constitutional Court, which has a core of judges who appear beholden to special interests. The high court reversed earlier laws requiring members of parliament and government officials to disclose their assets and could threaten other reforms.

At home, the Biden administration can assist Ukraine by implementing a ban on anonymous shell companies by requiring disclosure of who actually forms companies in the United States as contained in the Corporate Transparency Act, part of the National Defense Authorization Act. This will make it more difficult for corrupt Ukrainians to shelter ill-gotten gains in U.S. assets.

The Biden presidency is good news for Ukraine and those who wish to see it develop into a modern European state. It will mean more high-level but hard-nosed U.S. support. That could lead to greater progress on reform within the country. And, with some imaginative diplomacy and luck, it might even help break the logjam with Russia over resolving the fate of Donbas.

See the original post:
The Biden presidency and Ukraine - Brookings Institution

Ukraine is interested in cooperation with Finland in combating hybrid threats in order to increase resilience to information and military challenges.

Deputy Foreign Minister of Ukraine Vasyl Bodnar said this at a meeting with Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Republic of Finland to Ukraine Pivi Laine, the Foreign Ministrys press service reported.

"Vasyl Bodnar expressed the interest of the Ukrainian side in intensifying cooperation with the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats in Helsinki and exchanging experience in this area. The parties agreed that this cooperation would promote better resilience to information and military threats," the statement reads.

The parties discussed the ways to step up political dialogue between Ukraine and Finland, in particular holding in the near future of bilateral political consultations between the two foreign ministries, as well as cooperation in the framework of the international organizations.

ish

See the rest here:
Ukraine, Finland discuss cooperation in countering hybrid threats - Ukrinform. Ukraine and world news