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What were a Saudi prince, a former Republican House Speaker and a former Democratic vice-presidential candidate doing together in a suburb of Paris last weekend?

Would you be surprised to discover that Prince Turki Bin Faisal, Newt Gingrich and Joe Lieberman were speaking on behalf of a group of Iranian exiles that was officially designated a Foreign Terrorist Organization by the United States government between 1997 and 2012?

Iran hawks long ago fell head over heels for the Mojahedin-e Khalq, known as the MEK, and loudly and successfully lobbied for it to be removed from the State Department list of banned terror groups in 2012. Formed in Iran in the 1960s, the MEK, whose name translates to Holy Warriors of the People, was once an avowedly anti-American, semi-Marxist, semi-Islamist group, pledged to toppling the U.S.-backed Shah by force and willing to launch attacks on U.S. targets. The MEK even stands accused of helping with the seizure of hostages at the U.S. embassy in Tehran; the group condemned the hostages release as a surrender to the United States. But after the Irans clerical rulers turned on the group in the early 1980s, its leaders fled the country and unleashed a series of bombings across Iran.

These days, the organization run by husband and wife Massoud and Maryam Rajavi, though the formers whereabouts are unknown and he is rumored to be dead claims to have renounced violence and sells itself to its new American friends as a 100 percent secular and democratic Iranian opposition group. The biggest problem with the MEK, however, is not that it is a former terrorist organization. Plenty of violent groups that were once seen as terrorists later abandoned their armed struggles and entered the corridors of power think of the Irish Republican Army or Mandelas African National Congress.

Nor is it that the MEK lacks support inside of the Islamic Republic, where it has been disowned by the opposition Green Movement and is loathed by ordinary Iranians for having fought on Saddam Husseins side during the Iran-Iraq war.

Rather, the biggest problem with U.S. politicians backing the MEK is that the group has all the trappings of a totalitarian cult. Dont take my word for it: A 1994 State Department report documented how Massoud Rajavi fostered a cult of personality around himself which had alienated most Iranian expatriates, who assert they do not want to replace one objectionable regime for another.

You think only people inside of dictatorships are brainwashed? A 2009 report by the RAND Corporation noted how MEK rank-and-file had to swear an oath of devotion to the Rajavis on the Koran and highlighted the MEKs authoritarian, cultic practices including mandatory divorce and celibacy for the groups members (the Rajavis excepted, of course). Love for the Rajavis was to replace love for spouses and family, explained the RAND report.

Iraqi security forces enter through the main gate of Camp Ashraf in Khalis, north of Baghdad, Iraq in 2012.

Photo: Hadi Mizban/AP

You think gender segregation inside of Iran is bad? At Iraqs Camp Ashraf, which housed MEK fighters up until 2013, lines were painted down the middle of hallways separating them into mens and womens sides, according to RAND, and even the gas station there had separate hours for men and women.

You might understand why a Saudi prince, former New York mayor Rudy Giuliani, or uber-hawk and former Bush administration official John Bolton who all attended the Paris rally might be willing to get behind such a weird collection of fanatics and ideologues. But what would make a liberal Democrat from Vermont such as Howard Dean who has suggested Maryam Rajavi be recognized as the president of Iran in exile want to get into bed with them? Or Georgia congressman and civil rights hero John Lewis, who spoke out in favor of the MEK in 2010?

Could it be because of the old, if amoral, adage that the enemy of my enemy is my friend? Perhaps. Could it be the result of ignorance, of senior U.S. figures failing to do due diligence? Maybe.

Or could it be a consequence of cold, hard cash? Many of these former high-ranking U.S. officials who represent the full political spectrum have been paid tens of thousands of dollars to speak in support of the MEK, revealed a wide-ranging investigation by the Christian Science Monitor in 2011.

In Washington, D.C., money talks. Whether youre a Democrat like Dean or a Republican like Bolton, a former head of the CIA like Porter Goss or an ex-head of the FBI like Louis Freeh, what seems to matter most is that the MEK can cut fat checks.

Take Gingrich, who once lambasted Barack Obama for bowing to the Saudi king but has himself been caught on camera bowing to Maryam Rajavi. The former House speaker bizarrely compared Rajavi to George Washington in his speech in Paris over the weekend.

Or Giuliani, Americas Mayor and self-styled anti-terror hawk, who nevertheless has had no qualms accepting thousands of dollars since 2010 to shill for a group that murdered six Americans in Iran in the mid-1970s; joined with Saddam Hussein to repress Iraqs Kurds in the early 1990s; allegedly worked with Al Qaeda to make bombs in the mid-1990s; and fought against U.S. troops in Iraq in 2003.

Have these people no shame? To quote Suzanne Maloney, an Iran analyst at Brookings and a former adviser to the State Department: How cheaply Gingrich/Guiliani/Bolton/Lieberman value their own integrity to sell out to MEK cult.

Meanwhile, regime change in Tehran is very much back on the agenda in Donald Trumps Washington. Candidate Trump, who blasted George W. Bushs Middle East wars of aggression, has been replaced by President Trump, who appointed Iran hawks such as James Mattis and Mike Pompeo to run the Pentagon and the CIA, respectively; counts MEK shills such as Giuliani and Gingrich among his closest outside advisers; and appointed Elaine Chao, who took $50,000 from the Rajavis for a five-minute speech in 2015, to his cabinet.

Lets be clear: The Trump administration, the Saudis and the Israelis who have financed, trained and armed the MEK in the past, according an NBC News investigation are all bent on toppling the Irans clerical rule; they long for a bad sequel to the Iraq war. And Maryam Rajavis MEK is auditioning for the role of Ahmed Chalabis Iraqi National Congress: The groups 3,000-odd fighters, according to former Democratic senator-turned-MEK-lawyer Robert Torricelli last Saturday, are keen to be the point of the spear.

That way madness lies. Have U.S. political, intelligence, and military elites learned nothing from their Mesopotamian misadventure and the disastrous contribution of Iraqi exiles such as Chalabi? Well, the brainwashed fanatics of the MEK make the INC look like the ANC.

It is difficult, therefore, to disagree with the verdict of Elizabeth Rubin of the New York Times, who visited the MEK at Camp Ashraf back in 2003 and later spoke to men and women who had escaped from the groups clutches and had to be reprogrammed. The MEK, warned Rubin in 2011, is not only irrelevant to the cause of Irans democratic activists, but a totalitarian cult that will come back to haunt us.

Top photo: Mariam Rajavi speaks at the annual meeting of the Mojahedin-e Khalqat the Villepinte exhibition center near Paris on July 1, 2017. International political leaders also made speeches to support her.

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Here's Why Washington Hawks Love This Cultish Iranian Exile Group - The Intercept

Residents and civil society activists staged a protest Friday in southern Afghanistan to denounce neighboring Iran's President Hassan Rouhani for criticizing Afghan water management and dam projects.

Hundreds of demonstrators peacefully marched through the streets of Lashkargah, capital of Helmand province near the Iranian border. They chanted, Death to Hassan Rouhani and Death to enemies of Afghanistan.

The protesters called on President Ashraf Ghanis government to not be deterred by the Iranian warning and to implement water management and storage projects along Afghan rivers.

At an international conference on sandstorms and environmental issues in Tehran on Monday, the Iranian leader warned that construction of several dams in Afghanistan could destroy civilizations in Iranian border provinces, forcing people to abandon their homes.

We cannot remain indifferent to the issue, which is apparently damaging our environment, the Iranian leader said before an audience that included Afghan delegates.

Rouhani was referring to Afghan dams such as Kajaki, Kamal Khan, Bakhshabad and Salma in provinces that border Iran.

Afghan politicians also have been criticizing the Iranian president for his comments, which they say amount to direct interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan.

Afghan media have also expressed outrage through special commentaries and editorials.

We can continue living brotherly, but the use of the things that belong to us is our immediate right. We need our waters; we need electricity, irrigation and greenery. Thus, we should be the first ones that use our rivers, English daily Afghanistan Times wrote in an editorial published Friday.

The paper went on to say that 80 percent of Afghan water flowed to Iran and neighboring Pakistan without being used inside Afghanistan.

Tehran has not commented on the criticism Rouhani's comments provoked in Afghanistan.

Afghanistan and Iran signed a water-sharing treaty in 1973, stipulating that Iran not make claims to water from the Helmand River in excess of the amount agreed upon in the treaty, even if additional water becomes available in the future.

President Ghani has recently noted that Iran continues to receive its fair share of water from the river and that the country cannot claim more than what has been agreed upon.

We want domestic production...We will manage our water and control it, Ghani said.

After assuming office in 2014, the Afghan president vowed to construct 21 new dams, calling them key to efforts to boost the troubled economy and produce jobs for unemployed youth.

The controversy over the construction of new dams comes as Kabul accuses Iran of increasing contacts with the Taliban fighting the Afghan government and international forces.

Provincial officials and politicians have alleged that Iranian security forces are arming and providing medical assistance to insurgents, allegations Tehran denies.

Afghan officials say Iran wants to bolster the Taliban to prevent Islamic State militants from threatening Iranian territory.

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Afghans Stage Rare Anti-Iran Rally, Denounce Iran's Rouhani - Voice of America

President Donald Trump likely sees Mohammed bin Salman, who in June was named the new Saudi crown prince, as a Middle Eastern leader made in his own image. The young crown princes unrelenting hostility towards Iran and take-no-prisoners censure of Qatar is consistent with Trumps emerging, aggressive posture towards Iran.

But by placing his thumb on the scale of intramural Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) squabbles and reinforcing the narrative that Iran is the primary source of instability in the Middle East, Trump could hand Tehran a strategic bonanza, much like former President George W. Bush did by taking down Iraq, a country that for good or bad had acted as a check on Iranian power since the Iranian revolution.

The Saudis will miscalculateif they take much solace from Trumps support for their regional policies. Regardless of what the United States does, sharply increasing the vitriol towards Iran while at the same time laying siege to fellow GCC member Qatar will likely weaken the Saudi position and what is left of an already compromised Arab political order. Intended to take Iran down a notch, these actions instead will likely strengthen Tehrans hand. In fact, Iranian policymakers would be forgiven for believing that Saudi Arabia had fallen prey to the judo move by which ones opponents are unwittingly maneuvered to use their own strength to harm themselves.

How does Saudi Arabia undermine its own position by escalating the conflict with Iran and working to bring Qatar forcefully into compliance? While Saudi Arabia, through its security relationship with the United States, derives many military advantages over Iran, much of Saudi Arabias political strength in the region comes from the kingdoms strong position within the Arab world. But the Arab order has become particularly fragile due to the corrosiveness of the civil wars in Iraq, Libya, Syria, and Yemen. Although Iran clearly represents a threat to Saudi interests, it is the weakness in Saudi Arabias own Arab ranks, caused by the effects of the Arab Spring and the civil wars, that poses the biggest challenge to Riyadh and the biggest opportunity for Tehran. Ratcheting up hostility towards Iran is likely to prolong these wars, running the risk of further weakening the Arab world, thereby compromising Saudi Arabias position relative to Iran. The longer the proxy battles between Saudi Arabia and Iran in the regions civil wars continue, the greater the risk that the civil wars could spread to other Arab countries like Jordan and Lebanon, the more splintered the Arab world will likely become, and the more Iran gains in the regional power game.

What is incubating in Syria right now within the Sunni opposition to President Bashar al-Assad is a metaphor for how divisions between Arab countries pose a greater threat to Saudi Arabia than the challenge from Iran. In contrast to the disciplined, tightly consolidated, Iran-led Shia coalition supporting the Syrian government, the Sunni opposition is highly fragmented. Hundreds of different opposition groups, ranging from jihadist militant groups like the al Qaedas Syria affiliate, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (formerly the Nusra Front), to non-jihadist Salafist groups like Jaish al-Islam and Ahrar al-sham, and even some of the stronger factions of the secular Free Syrian Army, are busy shaping areas of Syria still outside government control, like Idlib province. Given the propping up of the Syrian government by Iran, Russia, and its Shia militias, it is unlikely that these Sunni opposition groups will pose an existential threat to Assad (or Iran) anytime soon. But with their Syrian base threatened by Russia and Iran tipping the scale towards the Syrian government, and the recent de-escalation efforts by Iran, Russia, and Turkey, these groups, particularly Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, could ultimately turn their sights to the Arab world, further weakening the Arab political fabric, and potentially posing security and political challenges to Saudi Arabia. In other words, battle-tested Sunni groups in Syria could spill over to other parts of the Arab world, further eroding the Saudi position on Iran.

Saudi Arabia has potentially amplified this risk of blowback from Syria by dangerously using divisions within the Sunni Arab community as a flashpoint in relations with Qatar. Saudi Arabia considers the Muslim Brotherhood a terrorist organization, while Qatar has kept avenues open to this nearly century-old political organization with deep roots in several Arab countries. While one could debate the motives behind Qatars actions, conflating the Brotherhood with the threats from jihadist groups like the Islamic State and al Qaeda recklessly delegitimizes the middle ground within the Sunni ideological spectrum, something that could blow back in Riyadhs face. By pushing the Brotherhood out of the Sunni debate, Saudi Arabia (along with the United Arab Emirates) creates an opening for more extremist organizations, possibly those with deep Syrian roots like al Qaedas Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, which could pose a significant threat to the Saudis and the broader Arab world.

Moreover, the Middle East today is a dangerously pressurized regional system, with few safety valves for conflict mitigation. Qatar (with Oman and Kuwait) could be seen as providing this pressure relief function. By building bridges with the Muslim Brotherhood and Iran, it creates pathways for dialogue and conflict resolution both inside and outside the Arab world. While the Saudis bristle at the ambiguity of Qatars position, it serves a purpose of blurring some of the lines of conflict, potentially creating diplomatic pathways towards eventual normalization of relations between Riyadh and Tehran. Saudi Arabias censure of Qatar brings into sharper relief the conflict lines, threatening the pressure relief value of Qatars strategic ambiguity. Also, it potentially divides the Arab world between Bahrain, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates on the one hand and Kuwait, Oman, and Qatar on the other, splitting it into camps, ultimately weakening the Saudi position.

Another risk is that Qatar is pulled further out of its GCC orbit. While Qatar has followed an independent foreign policy, it has cooperated with Saudi Arabia on many initiatives, including the war in Yemen. The potential for Doha to become more dependent on Turkey and Iran, which now provide Qatar a lifeline, would be a net loss for Riyadh. Allowed to continue further, the Saudi-Qatar row could cement a Turkey-Iran axis, something that has already been evolving due to a common threat from the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) and tactical collaboration with each other and Russia on the Syria negotiations in Astana, Kazakhstan. Having Turkey as a bridge between Saudi Arabia and Iran has been one healthy feature of an ailing region. Having Tehran and Ankara close ranks further is neither constructive for the region nor for Saudi Arabia. There is also a risk that Pakistan, which has walked a fine line in the Saudi dustup with Qatar, would be forced to take sides in a way that would not please Riyadh.

Also, the current Saudi path could disrupt and compromise the war against the Islamic State. Recent Islamic State attacks on Iran and an increased threat of attacks on Turkey in theory create a convergence of interests between Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey. But in the current environment of hostility, it appears that the Islamic State will remain everyones second most important enemy, with Tehran and Riyadh each seeing the other as the number-one threat to its own security. Given the need for a concerted effort to ensure that the Islamic State does not effectively regroup after the liberation of Mosul and Raqqa, and other like-minded groups dont fill these spaces, this is not good news for the region or the Saudis. The Islamic State and other jihadist organizations represent an insurgency against the Arab order, and their perpetuation will do more harm to the Arab heartland than to non-Arab countries like Iran and Turkey.

Last, Saudi actions are likely to strengthen the factions within the Iranian foreign policy establishment with the greatest capacity to exploit vulnerabilities in the Arab world. The Saudis are not wrong to be worried about an adventurist Iran, as Tehran is actively taking advantage of the hollowing out of the region, through activities in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen. Qasem Soleimani, head of Irans al-Quds force, is responsible for giving Iran strategic depth by exploiting power vacuums created by the Arab civil wars. Saudi hostility will likely strengthen voices like that of Soleimani, who advocates for a confrontational stance on Saudi Arabia, and dilute voices coming from the Foreign Ministry and presidents office less inclined to see the region in zero-sum terms.

If Saudi Arabia fails to deviate from its current path, it is likely to weaken its own regional position and strengthen Iran. Like it or not, the Middle East has moved from an Arab-centric to an Arab-Iranian-Turkish region. While trying to create countervailing power to Irans adventurism within this tripartite regional system is strategically sound, working to deprive Iran of regional influence will likely fail and weaken the Saudis. Instead, Riyadh should become a constructive partner for peace in the civil wars in Syria and Yemen, in effect shoring up its base in the Arab heartland. Continuing to fight a proxy war with Iran in Yemen is like shooting up your own house to try to save it. Only by working to heal the ideological, political, and military rifts in its own Arab ranks can Saudi Arabia feel secure of its position relative to Iran.

What the United States should be doing, in addition to supporting Saudi Arabias attempt to create a balance of power against Iran, is to encourage Riyadh to open a parallel diplomatic path with Tehran and try to resolve peacefully the row with Qatar. America should be bringing out the best, not the worst, strategic instincts of the Saudis by encouraging diplomacy. In the Middle East of today, containment of Iran blended with diplomacy, along with cooperation on behalf of bringing the corrosive civil wars to an end, is the only pathway out of the current regional morass.

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Saudi Arabia Is Weakening Itself and Strengthening Iran - Foreign Policy (blog)

By Samia Nakhoul | ERBIL, Iraq

ERBIL, Iraq After almost nine months of fierce fighting, the campaign to recapture Mosulfrom Islamic State is drawing to a bitter end in the ruins of the city's historic quarter, but the struggle for Iraq's futureis far fromover.

Aside fromMosul, across the border inSyriaa battle is raging to dislodge IS from Raqqa, the second capital of its self-declared caliphate. Fighting will push down the Euphrates valley toDeir al-Zour, the jihadis last big urban stronghold.

But the fall of Mosul also exposes ethnic and sectarian fractures that have plagued Iraq for more than a decade.

The victory risks triggering new violence between Arabs and Kurds over disputed territories or between Sunnis and Shiites over claims to power, egged on by outside powers that have shaped Iraqs future since the 2003 U.S.-led invasion toppled Saddam Husseins Sunni minority-rule and brought the Iran-backed Shiite majority to power.

ForIraq, stunned by the blitz on Mosul by Islamic State in 2014 and the collapse of its army, victory could thus turn out to be as big a problem as defeat.

The federal model devised under the Anglo-American occupation and built on a power-sharing agreement between Sunnis, Shiites and Kurds collapsed into ethno-sectarian carnage spawned by the al Qaeda precursors of Islamic State.

In the three years since the jihadis swept across the border fromSyria where they had regrouped in the chaos of the rebellion against Syrian President Bashar al-Assads rule, ISwas the rallying point uniting a fracturedIraq.

But now that the group faces military defeat, the unity that held Iraqtogether is starting to come apart.

NO POST-BATTLE PLAN

One challenge is the future ofMosulitself, a city traumatized by Islamic State's brutal rule and shattered by the latest U.S.-backed offensive, with thousands dead and nearly one million people displaced.

Western, Iraqi and Kurdish officials say they are astonished that Iraqi authorities neglected to prepare a post-battle plan for governance and security.

A high-level committee formed by the Kurdish region, the Baghdad government and a U.S.-led military coalition to help Mosul leaders rebuild the city had never convened, they said.

"Prime Minister (Haider) al-Abadi kept dragging his heels. Every time we raised this issue with him, he said, 'Lets wait until military operations are over'," said Hoshyar Zebari, an internationally respected former finance and foreign minister.

"A whole city is being decimated. Look how much the government is contributing, as if they dont care."

The first indication of possible future conflict came when Masoud Barzani, president of Iraq's autonomous Kurdish region, announced a Sept. 25 referendum for an independent state.

Another omen was a push by Iran-backed Shi'ite militias, grouped under the government-run Hashid Shaabi, to deploy alongside Kurdish areas and advance towards the Syrian border, motivated byIran's desireto join Iraq and Syria and establish a corridor from Tehran to Beirut.

"Today the highway of resistance starts in Tehran and reaches Mosul, Damascus and Beirut," Ali Akbar Velayati, the top adviser to Iran's Supreme Leader, said last week.

JIHADI FIGHTERS

All this comes against a backdrop of simmering rivalries between regional powers Iran and Turkey, and above all declining U.S. influence and Irans vigorous attempts to consolidate its control in Iraq.

While theadministration of U.S.President Donald Trump regards Syria and Iraq purely in terms of the military campaign to destroy IS, local jihadi fighters will simply melt back into the population, and could regroup in a new insurgency.

Sunni and Kurdish leaders in and around Mosul largely agree with this grim prognosis, alarmed that Abadi has refused even to discuss the future governance of Mosul, and suspecting that Iran is calling the shots.

The disputed territories stretch along an ethnically mixed ribbon of land dividing the autonomous Kurdish area in the north of Iraq from the Arab-majority part in the south - more a minefield than a mosaic - at a time when both the Kurds and Sunni Arabs are giving up on Shiite rule in Baghdad.

Atheel al-Nujaifi, who was Nineveh governor when the provincial capital Mosul was captured in 2014, says: We are back to where we were before Mosul fell, (because) there is an idea among the hardline Shiite leadership to keep the liberated areas as loose areas, with no (local) political leadership, or security organizations, so they can control them.

Moderate Shiite leaders, among whom he counts Abadi, are wary of a winner-take-all logic of victory, fearing this could lead to the creation of radicalism again and they know this would destroy not only Iraq but the Shiites.

The problem, he believes, is that Iraqi Shiism is badly fractured, helpingIrancontrol almost all its factions.

The former governor, a Sunni who now has at his command an armed force trained byTurkey, says he is bowing out of office but not politics. He acknowledges there is a lack of mainstream Sunni leaders, but blamesBaghdadfor making sure none emerges.

WHITHER THE SUNNIS?

Talk of Kurdish secession has sparked discussion of whether Sunni Arabs should set up a separate state, though most officials say this is not practical, because: Sunni territory lacks the oil base the Shiites and Kurds have; the experience of Islamic State would hover like a specter over any new entity; and Sunnis are too intermingled across Iraq.

Some Sunni and Kurdish leaders believe one solution is to makeMosul a self-governing region like Kurdistan, with smaller units of self-rule to accommodate the plethora of minorities, which they say is permitted by the constitution.

Before, the Sunnis were very sensitive to believing (devolution) would lead to secession, to the breakup ofIraqbut now theyre coming to terms with it, says Zebari.

The Sunnis are not the only ones who repudiate Baghdad's Shiite-dominated government. The northern Kurdish region has called a referendum to move from autonomous self-rule to an independent state.

Kurdish leader Barzani told Reuters timing for independence after the vote was flexible but not open-ended.

Yet there is growing concern the real purpose of the referendum is not immediate secession, but to strengthen Kurdish claims over the disputed territories, such as the oil-rich region and city of Kirkuk, whose future has been in play for over a decade.

"WE LOST HOPE AND FAITH"

Zebari, a senior official in Barzanis Kurdish Democratic Party who devoted over a decade inBaghdadtrying to make power-sharing work, said the time was ripe for independence.

We lost hope and faith in the newIraqthat we had built. The government has failed us on each and every constitutional provision and article to establish a new country with equal citizenship, with no discrimination, with partnership. All those dreams have evaporated, he told Reuters.

The problem, he says, is that senior Iranian officials have left no doubt their priority a corridor for Shiite forces carved through the north and policed by Shi'ite recruits trumps everything else.

"They are breathing down our neck all along the Kurdish frontline from Sinjar to Khanaqin," he said.

"So far we have been accommodating, patient, coordinating to prevent skirmishes or flashes but this is building up."

(For a graphic on destruction in Mosul's old city, click tmsnrt.rs/2u0o515)

(Additional reporting and editing by Stephen Kalin)

HAMBURG The United States, Russia and Jordan have reached a ceasefire and "de-escalation agreement" in southwestern Syria, one of the combat zones in a six-year-old civil war, Washington and Moscow said on Friday.

HAMBURG U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson said on Friday there would not be many good options left on North Korea if the peaceful pressure campaign the United States has been pushing to curb Pyongyang's nuclear and missile programs failed.

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As Mosul battle ends, struggle over Iraq's future intensifies - Reuters

Eleven years ago, two Iraqi brothers stranded at a refugee camp in Jordan made a fateful choice they thought was really no choice at all.

Determined not to return to a country where they thought they would be killed, they obscured their relationship with a third brother, who was accused of terrorist ties, and ultimately linked to the kidnapping of a U.S. contractor and others in Iraq.

The brothers, with their wives and chidren, were allowed into the United States. And over the past decade, they built a life in Fairfax, Va., finding work and making friends, having picnics and visiting the zoo. Each brother has two children born in the United States.

Now, Yousif al-Mashhadani, 35, his brother, Adil Hasan, 39, and Hasans wife, Enas Ibrahim, 32, have been convicted in federal court in Alexandria on fraud charges. With all three at risk of deportation, friends and supporters say a good family is being torn apart and are pushing for them to be allowed to remain in the country.

Justice cries out for compassion in this case, Marie Monsen, who worked with the refugees as a church volunteer, wrote in a letter to the court.

Federal prosecutors said they pursued the cases in hopes of catching Majid al-Mashhadani, who the government believes was involved in the kidnapping and had been released from prison in Iraq after only a couple of years. But authorities have given no indication that the three refugees have provided useful information about the crime or Majids whereabouts.

Im not sure how it accomplished anything, Ibrahims attorney, Lana Manitta, said. I dont think theyre any closer to getting the answers they need.

[Iraqi refugees in Va. accused of hiding ties to a kidnapper to get into U.S.]

Judge Leonie M. Brinkema last month sentenced the brothers to only the three months they have spent in jail for their crimes, but acknowledged that they would be transferred immediately to immigration custody.

This is a tragic case, she said in court. But the law is what it is.

She questioned why Ibrahim, who has not yet been sentenced, was targeted at all. She was prosecuted in large part to give incentives for her husband and brother-in-law to give information on the kidnapping and torture of an American citizen, Assistant U.S. Attorney Gordon Kromberg said in court.

He said she was also complicit in the decision to lie to a United Nations refugee agency.

The brothers and their families fled Iraq in 2006, when sectarian violence in the country was at its height. When the family arrived in Jordan, Ibrahim was pregnant with her first child. She and her sister Rashad, Yousif al-Mashhadanis wife, both had their first children at the refugee camp.

While pleading guilty, Hasan explained his fear of being sent back to Iraq.

I am Sunni, and I will be killed by the Sunnis because I was working in the Green Zone, he said. The Shiites will kill me because I am Sunni.

Both brothers had worked for a U.S.-supported anti-corruption agency in Iraq known at the time as the Commission on Public Integrity. Dozens of their co-workers were assassinated to keep investigations from coming to fruition.

In court, Hasan said he personally knew 56 people who had been killed. According to court filings, 65 members of the watchdog agency have been assassinated. Arthur Brennan, who worked on corruption in Iraq for the State Department in 2007, wrote to the judge that Iraqis connected to law enforcement at the time were in an extremely dangerous situation.

So, knowing their brother had been arrested and accused of involvement in terrorism, Hasan and Mashhadani hid their relationship. For good measure, they exaggerated the intensity of the threats they had faced for working with Americans in Baghdad. And when they filled out their U.S. naturalization forms, they did not correct the errors.

Hasan has pleaded guilty to naturalization fraud, Mashhadani to conspiracy to commit immigration fraud. Both agreed to cooperate with immigration authorities. Ibrahim admitted lying about her income to secure a car loan two years ago, a charge that does not automatically trigger deportation proceedings. The families declined to comment for this story.

While in Virginia, the families lived a spartan existence so they would not rely on charity for too long, Monsen recalled, although they always scrounged to serve volunteers huge home-cooked meals. They went on to help new refugees as they were helped, and neighbors say they were always willing to lend a tool or offer a ride.

Yousif and his family had very little during this trying time, but this never stopped their generosity, said Aaron Weiss, who met the family as a volunteer with the International Rescue Committee.

Ninos Youkhana, whose parents fled Iraq in the 1970s, met Hasan working at the Iraqi Embassy in Washington. Only weeks later, when she was having trouble with her roommate, Hasan and Ibrahim invited her to live with them.

For six months they housed her and cooked her meals, and not once did they ever ask for any financial reimbursement from me, she wrote in a letter to the court.

She said Hasan also helped fight an attempt to block Iraqi Christians abroad from voting in 2014 parliamentary elections.

When interviewed by FBI agents this year, Hasan described a life of fear in Iraq, telling them he was once shot at while driving to work and was detained for several hours by members of a Shiite militia.

But while in Jordan applying for refugee status, the brothers fabricated a far more elaborate tale in which Hasan was kidnapped for a month and their parents home was set on fire.

Although they have admitted those lies and expressed regret, both brothers maintain that they know nothing about the actions or whereabouts of Majid al-Mashhadani, who according to prosecutors had admitted his involvement in the 2004 kidnapping of an American contractor and four others.

A paper with Yousif al-Mashhadanis fingerprint on it was found in the farmhouse where the hostages were kept. However, there is no evidence the print was left during the kidnapping and he has not been charged in connection with that crime.

Another brother, according to court filings, listed Majid al-Mashhadani on his immigration papers and is now a U.S. citizen.

Roy Hallums, the contractor who was kidnapped and rescued 10 months later, was unable to see or understand his captors. But he is sure the brothers are lying now.

In the Middle East and in Iraq, everything is based on family, Hallums said. So I dont believe for one second that these guys didnt know what was going on.

Even if they didnt, immigration foes see justice being done.

Their first interaction with the U.S. government was to lie, said Mark Krikorian of the Center for Immigration Studies, a think tank that opposes most new immigration.

Until this March, the family would not have had to worry about being sent back to Iraq. Only in April, after years of refusal, did the Iraqi government agree to start cooperating with American deportation efforts.

But a federal judge in Detroit has temporarily halted those deportations in response to a lawsuit from the American Civil Liberties Union arguing that it is too dangerous to deport people to the country .

Although it is unclear what will happen to the three refugees, in court last week Hasan spoke as if he was saying goodbye.

Thank you to the United States for hosting me for nine years, he said.

Before he was taken back to jail and then to immigration custody, he shook the hands of the prosecutors who had put him there.

Im really thankful, he said, and I love this country.

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These refugees lied to escape Iraq a decade ago. Now, the US might send them back. - Washington Post