Mediaboss Marketing

KEY UPDATES:

A major explosion in Kabul on 31 May killed at least 150 people and in- jured hundreds

The deteriorated security situa on resulted in the closure of more health facili es in the Southern and Eastern regions15 health facili es report- ed being either closed or only par ally open

61 disease outbreaks were reported in May 40% of outbreaks were a ributed to measles and 25% to Crimean-Congo haemorrhagic fever (CCHF)

The Na onal Disease Surveillance and Response (NDSR) system con- rmed 65 cases of rabies in May the outbreak was inves gated and responded to by the Emergency Preparedness and Response (EPR) team in Laghman Province

PROGRAMME ACTIVITIES AND ACHIEVEMENTS:

To support health response to the major explosion in Kabul, WHO provid- ed the Wazir Akhbar Khan hospital with Trauma Kits A+B and the Jamhu- riat Hospital with Interagency Emergency Health Kits (IEHK).

The na onal blood bank, supported by WHO and ECHO, collected over 1500 units of blood and made 900 units available for transfusion to pa- ents who su ered injuries in the Kabul blast.

WHO supported primary health services for returnees and refugees at the Torkham border in Nangarhar, including vaccina on, tuberculosis (TB) and HIV screening, reproduc ve health and referrals.

In May, over 16,000 returnees were provided with emergency health services such as OPD, TB and HIV screening, maternal and neonatal health services and over 25,000 children were vaccinated against polio and mea- sles.

Pre-hospital and hospital Mass Casualty Management (MCM) Plans for 30 provinces were thoroughly reviewed and revised.

Gap analysis of trauma care services in 39 provincial and district hospitals was conducted to support the upgrading of trauma care services in high- risk areas.

A five-day Basic Life Support (BLS) training for 31 doctors and nurses from 10 provinces (Takhar, Badakhshan, Saripul, Faryab, Mazar, Ghor, Badghis, Ghazni, Zabul and Nangarhar) was conducted by Emergency NGO with WHO support.

WHO conducted a training on blood bank standard processes and blood safety for 30 par cipants from 26 provincial and district blood banks.

A five-day anaesthesia training for 30 anaesthesia doctors and technicians from provincial hospitals was organized at the CURE Hospital with WHO support.

Assessment for MCM and trauma care services (TCS) conducted in six national hospitals and one provincial hospitalMCM and TCS plans are currently being drafted.

See original here:
WHO Afghanistan Monthly Programme Update: May 2017, Emergency Humanitarian Action - ReliefWeb

Donald Trump predicted back in 2013 that the US would eventually go to war with Iran. At the time, Trump was merely a rich guy and right-wing gadlfy criticizing Secretary of State John Kerry on Fox News, but later, as a presidential candidate then a president, his rhetoric and policies have been strikingly antagonistic.

Trump promised to renegotiate Barack Obama's signature deal with Iran on nuclear weapons during the 2016 campaign, and though he hasn't done that, he has staffed his White House with people hostile toward Iran. That includes Secretary of Defense James Mattis, who has implied that Iran and ISIS are on friendly terms.

Shortly after Trump took office, Iran-backed Houthi rebels in Yemen attacked a Saudi ship, killing two peopleand in pretty a wild leap leap of logic, the White House described it as an Iranian attack. In April, Trump said Iran wasn't "living up to the spirit" of the nuclear deal. During a May trip to the Middle East, Trump appeared to side more aggressively with Saudi Arabia against Iran than past presidents, then continued that anti-Iran rhetoric in Israel.

Over the weekend, a report claiming that the Saudi coastguard had killed an Iranian fisherman, an announcement by Iran that it had fired multiple ballistic missiles into eastern Syria to target ISIS in retaliation for an attack in Tehran, and the shooting down of a Syrian plane by a US-led coalition only heightened tensions in the region.

This state of affairs has some people very worried. In The Independent, businessman and human rights activist Andrew McCleod warned that Trump is on track to nuke Iran inside of two years. That's probably an exaggeration, but how much of an exaggeration?

Related: What Would Happen in the Minutes and Hours After the US Attacked North Korea?

Ahmad Majidyar is director of the Middle East Institute's IranObserved Project. In a recent paper, he described the US and Iran as being on a "collision course" in Iraq and Syria. The idea is that once ISIS is defeated, Iran-backed militias and the US military will no longer have a common enemy. The risk, Majidyar told me, is "some sort of possiblenot very likelyconfrontation by the IRGC-led forces, and US-led forces in Mosul."

But even without the conflict in Syria/Iraq, tensions remain between Iran and the US, tensions that have only been exacerbated by the Trump administration's foreign policy. So the question remains: If the US were to actually bomb Iran itselfas has been advocated by plenty of mainstream Republicans like Arizona Senator John McCainhow and why would that happen? And how exactly would that conflict play out?

I posed these hypotheticals to Majidyar as well as international relations scholar Stephen Zunes, and Omar Lamrani, a senior military analyst at the military intelligence firm Stratfor. Here's a map of the locations we discussed, for reference:

While Iran does provoke the US a bit by opposing Saudi Arabiaa close American allyin Yemen, Syria is the likeliest potential flashpoint to any serious US-Iran conflict. According to Lamrani, Iran's dream is to have a steady flow of commercial traffic clear to the west coast of Lebanon, which it plans to achieve by creating a supply route that goes from Tehran to Baghdad to Syria to Lebanon. In Iran's view, the US is blocking this effort.

With this tension in the air, Trump could jeopardize the nuclear agreement by sanctioning Iran in a way Iran thinks is unfair. "The agreement is on tenuous ground, and if it does collapse, and the Iranians [could] go forward with more ballistic missile testing," Lamrani said, adding that fallout from that testing could potentially trigger a war.

(It's important to note here that no one I spoke to felt that an actual war was in any way likely, barring some black swan event to trigger it.)

The main scenario Zunes thinks could result in war is a terror attack perceived as having been sponsored by Iran and carried out against a target such as a US embassy in Europe.

"Iran has cells across the world," Lamrani told me, citing Iran's well-known connections to the terrorist group Hezbollah. He added that Iran would most likely only activate its Hezbollah cells if it were attacked first.

But according to Zunes, a terror attack wouldn't have to be carried out by Iran or one of its proxies. Instead, the whole conflict might be triggered by "an attack by some unknown Salafi groupan al Qaeda, ISIS type," he told me. Frustrated by Iran's belligerent behavior, he says, "Trump could blame [the act of terror] on an Iranian-backed group, and use that as an excuse to attack Iran." This isn't unheard of. There was speculation just after 9/11 that a 1996 attack in Saudi Arabia, pinned on Iran, was actually the work of al Qaeda. (The US still officially blames Iran.)

Watch: These Young Radicals Are Fighting the Alt-Right in America's Streets

"The idea was that we just bomb, and bomb, and bomb, and try to destroy as many strategic assets as possible," Zunes told me.

This was a plan proposed by Republican Senator Tom Cotton in 2015. Rather than an invasion, he said on a radio show, "It would be something more along the lines of what President Clinton did in December 1998 during Operation Desert Fox," a series of strikes on Iraqi military targets.

During this phase of our hypothetical conflict, Lamrani told me, US intelligence will have information at hand designed to make sure the attacks constitute "a very very comprehensive plan," relying on air power, not just cruise missiles fired from the sea. "B-2s with those massive ordnance penetrators" would be involved, Lamrani said, referring to the MOABthe largest non-nuclear bomb ever dropped.

Iran is very adept as using its navy to taunt American vessels. In 2016, speedboats buzzed around the Persian Gulf, forcing a US ship to change course. A couple days later, Trump the presidential candidate said he would blow up any Iranian boats that tried that against his navy. Then they tried it again in March and Trump's navy didn't blow them up.

But the US Navy is very good a blowing things up, and doing so in extremely dramatic fashionsomething Trump obviously knows. "The Iranians are vulnerable when they're all bunched up in their ports, and not at sea," Lamrani told me. "For them to have any chance at all, they have to be very, very fast."

Before the US could even nail down the specifics of its strategy, he said, the Iranians would "disperse their units, so their minelayers are already at sea, dropping mines, and their forces are already attacking before the US brings in all its forces to completely annihilate the Iranians."

If Iran can't knock out a US cruiser with its navy, what can its navy do?

It can interrupt international business. If you think of the Persian Gulf as the hallway that takes you to the vital ports belonging to Bahrain, Kuwait, Iraq, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates, then the door to that hallway is the 21-mile-wide Strait of Hormuz, where part of the Arabian Peninsula juts off and almost pokes into Iran. Imagine Iran closing that door.

"That's a massive shock to the global economy," Lamrani said. He doesn't think Iran would try anything so drastic given that it would cut off not just the oil trade, but food to countries like Qatar and Bahrain, bringing down the wrath of the entire Arab world.

But if you're a container ship captain, Lamrani said, a war in the area is enough to keep you out of there unless you know it's safe. So one way or another, until the US shows up with ships to clear the strait, "Technically, the threat, and the position of their anti-ship missiles, is going to be a de facto block," he told me.

The United States operates a lot of bases in the region. Iran can't do much to stop the units stationed at these bases from launching assaults, but it could at least hurt them back with its medium-range non-nuclear missiles. Iran could use one of the missiles that really freaked out Israel last year with its 2,000-kilometer range. That range means major US bases in Qatar, Bahrain, and Iraq are vulnerable.

But of course, attacking the US by attacking those countries would have consequences. "If the Iranians are suddenly launching missiles, obviously that brings those countries into conflict as well," Lamrani told me.

According to Zunes, Israel would want to stay out of this nasty little war, but it wouldn't be able to. Hezbollah would take the opportunity, he thinks, to attack Israel from its strongholds just past Israel's border in Lebanon. "Whether or not Israel is involved," Zunes told me, "Hezbollah would unleash a huge range of missiles on Israel." Some analysts think Israel could even get invaded by Hezbollah ground troops next time a conflict gets sparked.

Tom Cotton can insist all he wants that this conflict wouldn't escalate into a ground invasion, but the experts I spoke to think at least a few boots would probably touch Iranian soil. The Iranian nuclear program, Lamrani said, is "so big and dispersed" that "it's hard to imagine a full US strike that does not lead to significant conflict between Iran and the United States."

Zunes also imagines "a few commando type operations to blow up a few strategic facilities," as well as to target nuclear scientists. "They'd try to kill as many nuclear scientists as they could," he told me. "The civilian death toll would be pretty high, because a lot of these things are in urban areas."

One factor to consider is that Trump appears to have de-prioritized rules of engagement that would spare civilians in Syria in Iraq, leading to a drastic spike in civilian deaths, according to human rights groups.

But let's not forget that Iran has its terror-sponsoring fingers in a whole lot of geopolitical pies. Iran's moderate president, Hasan Rouhani, might advocate for diplomacy, but if the Supreme Ayatollah disagrees, Rouhani doesn't get any say in the matter. Nor does Rouhani control Iran's powerful Revolutionary Guard Corpsand they're the ones tied to Hezbollah and the Houthis in Yemen. Lamrani points out they're also tied to "Iraqi and Syrian militias, plus cells in Afghanistan, and even beyond the region."

"It can become very messy very very quickly, and spread the conflict across the world," Lamrani told me.

Continue reading here:
What Would Happen in the Hours and Minutes After the US Bombed Iran? - VICE

The Drive

US Fighter Jet Shoots Down Syrian Warplane New York Times A handout provided by an official Iranian news site shows a missile launched by the Revolutionary Guards Corps from western Iran, toward Islamic State bases in Syria. Credit Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting, via Agence France-Presse Getty Images. Iran Launched An Unprecedented Ballistic Missile Attack On Syrian CityThe Drive Iran's Missile Launch and US Downing a Syrian Jet - ExplainedHaaretz Iran fires missiles at militant groups in eastern SyriaThe Jerusalem Post Fox News -International Business Times all 220 news articles »

More here:
US Fighter Jet Shoots Down Syrian Warplane - New York Times

The threat posed by the Iranian regime was one focus of a recent Academic Exchange (AE) retreat of International Relations specialists and international lawyers. Even with the reelection of President Hassan Rouhani, the Iranian regime poses a two-pronged threat to the Persian Gulf and the Middle East. For one thing, Iran is poised to gain on the ground in Syria, Yemen, and elsewhere. The need to counter Irans ground game is the catalyst for President Trumps efforts to collaborate with Persian Gulf states. Countering Iran seems even more urgent after news that Iran has sponsored Shia militias in the Syrian Golan Heights, abutting Israel (see report here). Moreover, Iran is also fighting a war of ideas, contesting the Wests legitimacy.

The U.S., Israel, and Persian Gulf states should recognize that countering Iran has two components: 1) gains on the ground from tangible measures, including sanctions and, where necessary, the use of force, and, 2) gaining the moral high ground of legitimacy in the war of ideas. Tensions between these two elements are inevitable, but manageable.

Lets start with the legitimacy tourney. Here, the U.S. and its allies have some work to do. Consider one action that has recently triggered substantial U.S. litigation: President Trumps revised executive order (EO) pausing travel from six countries, including Iran. Ive written before about why I believe the revised EO is legal (see my analysis here and Josh Blackmans New York Times op-ed here), but nevertheless constitutes bad policy. The EOs effects on Iranian nationals vividly demonstrate the policy point. Iranian immigrants to the U.S. confer substantial advantages on the U.S. population, through service as doctors and other professionals (in addition, a significant number of doctors in the U.S. hail from Syria, another one of the six countries listed by the EO, as this New York Times story shows). While Irans moves in the Middle East are indeed troubling, there is no reason to think that Iranians who wish to emigrate to the U.S. endorse those moves. Indeed, a Homeland Security study of terrorist-related crimes committed by foreign-born individuals in the U.S. shows precious little activity in this sphere by persons born in Iran (only three out of approximately ninety cases).

While the policy rationale for pausing admissions from any of the six countries is modest, the weakness of the justification regarding Iran is salient. The Administration may be right as a legal matter that the Iranian regimes role as a state sponsor of terror justifies a pause in admissions to ensure that U.S. immigration authorities are receiving accurate data from Iran. However, the collateral damage of the EO for Iranian people and the U.S. individuals who benefit from services provided by Iranian doctors and other professionals provides a strong basis for rethinking the EOs policy underpinnings. Count the EO as a victory for Iran in the legitimacy tourney.

The U.S. and its allies are heading for another defeat on the legitimacy front in the Saudi intervention against Iran-sponsored Houthi rebels in Yemens civil war. As Mike Newton and Ryan Goodman have rightly indicated, the Saudis have engaged in repeated violations of established law of war norms, including violations of the rule of proportionality. That rule bars attacks with expected harm to civilians that is excessive given the military advantage anticipated, when judged from the perspective of a commander prior to the attack. The U.S. has been trying to rein in Saudi forces for well over a year. I believe the U.S. has been sincere; some of the nations most capable military lawyers have invested substantial time and effort in working with the Saudis on compliance with the law of war. However, the results of this tutelage continue to be disappointing. At some point soon, unless the Saudis substantially improve their compliance, the U.S. may bear both policy and legal responsibility for Saudi violations. Although the jury is still out, score this as a preliminary win for Iran in the legitimacy tourney.

As to the score on the ground, consider the activities of pro-Iran Shia militias such as Harakat al-Nujaba on the Syrian Golan Heights. As I can testify based on a recent visit to the portion of the Golan Heights now held by Israel, this area presents commanding views of both Syria and Israel. Prior to the 1967 war, Syrian forces regularly shelled Israeli towns from positions on the Golan Heights. For good reasons, Israel is determined not to be put in this vulnerable position again. That is why Israel is intensely concerned about al-Nujabas announcement that it is moving militia units into the portion of the Golan Heights still controlled by Syria. Israel has made it clear that, if necessary, it will take military action to prevent opening up this new front in the Syrian conflict. The militia activities continue, although their precise scope is unclear.

Suppose Israel were to use force to hold the Shia militia at bay. How would Israeli action fare under international law? Three theories could support Israels action. It could be, (1) merely another episode in a continued state of war with Syria since 1967, (2) a response to a material breach by Syria of the 1974 post-Yom Kippur War disengagement agreement, or, (3) a form of self-defense under the U.N. Charter.

Theory (1) receives support from the preeminent international law scholar Yoram Dinstein, who outlined the theory in his essential treatise, War, Aggression and Self-Defence. This theory allows each party to the armed conflict substantial leeway, since no triggering action by one party would be required as a justification for the other partys action. It is logically true that if a state of war continues to exist, Israel would be within its rights in taking military action against Shia militias on Syrias portion of the Golan Heights. The Shia militias commander has made it easier for Israel to situate the militias activities within the Israel-Syria conflict. Speaking of his militia, which has collaborated in Syria with Irans Quds force, al-Nujaba leader Akram al Kabi said earlier this year that the group would undertake to liberate the portion of the Golan annexed by Israel if Syria so requested.

The difficulty with the continued-war theory is its disconnect from facts on the ground. While the relationship between Israel and Syria over the past 43 years has not exactly been harmonious, sustained military encounters have been rare. Against that relatively uneventful backdrop, it seems counterintuitive to insist that a turn toward force does not require some triggering event. While this theory is buttressed by Professor Dinsteins estimable support, it may be another loser in the legitimacy tourney.

Option (2) arguing that Syrian consent to Shia militias activities in the Golan constituted a material breach of the 1974 disengagement agreement suffers from a different problem: its inconsistency with the U.N. Charter framework governing the use of force. Article 2(4) of the Charter bars the use of force against another state. Absent Security Council authorization, the only exception is the use of force in self-defense against an armed attack, pursuant to Article 51. Some distinguished commentators, including Professor Dinstein, have argued that a material breach theory is viable despite the Charter (including in the case of the 2003 Iraq War). However, other experts strongly disagree. (See Sean Murphys rebuttal here.) The U.N. played a substantial role in implementing the 1974 Israel-Syria disengagement agreement by providing peacekeepers (including four Austrians who died when a mine exploded in the demilitarized zone created by the agreement; see Robert Morrisss piece [behind pay wall] here). It seems incongruous to accept the U.N.s help, but then reject the U.N. Charters framework governing the use of force. Score another loss in the legitimacy tourney.

On balance, the best option is theory (3): arguing that Israeli action against al-Nujaba would constitute self-defense. International law, going back to then-Secretary of State Daniel Websters 1841-42 correspondence with the British regarding their targeting of the U.S.-owned steamship The Caroline for aiding Canadian rebels, has held that a state can use force to thwart an imminent attack, as long as that force is necessary and proportionate to address the threat. (For current glosses relevant to nonstate actors, see UK Attorney General Jeremy Wrights January 2017 speech, the important 2012 article by Sir Daniel Bethlehem and this insightful piece by the U.S. Naval War College International Law Departments Alan Schuller.)

In the self-defense context, the uneventful climate of the past 40-plus years on the Golan would favor Israel. Dropped into this atmosphere of relative calm, the presence of a powerful Shia militia would itself be a marked departure from the status quo. Since Israel has not signaled any aggressive designs on Syrian territory, the mere presence of the militia suggests the kind of massing of troops that is consistent with the early phases of an attack. Intelligence information obtained by Israel that is consistent with this apparent hostile intent would reinforce the case, already strengthened by al-Nujaba leader Akram al Kabis stated plan to liberate the portion of the Golan controlled by Israel (which annexed that portion in 1981). The combination of forces massed on the ground and specific manifestations of hostile intent moves the current situation in the Syrian Golan Heights closer to the situation that prevailed just prior to Israels Six Day War fifty years ago, when Egypts President Gamal Abdel Nasser massed troops in the Sinai, instructed U.N. peacekeepers to quit the area, and blockaded the Straits of Tiran.

Of course, the reading of imminence outlined here is not free from controversy. (See the recent post by Charlie Dunlap here on alleged Israeli airstrikes in Syria targeting Hezbollah arms shipments and Kevin Jon Hellers response here). However, relying on a self-defense justification would acknowledge the primacy of the U.N. Charter and put Israel on solid footing along with the U.S. and United Kingdom. Score this as the West holding its own in the legitimacy tourney.

In sum, containing Iran requires both action on the ground and maintaining legitimacy under international norms. In some areas, such as the inclusion of Iranian nationals in President Trumps revised refugee EO and U.S. assistance to Saudi efforts in Yemen, the West has suffered blows to its legitimacy. Israels response to Shia militias in the Syrian Golan Heights presents another test. Careful attention to the justification for the use of force will be central to containing the Iranian regimes regional ambitions and recouping ground on the legitimacy front.

Read more:
Containing Iran and Maintaining Legitimacy - Lawfare (blog)

Trump Tower stands along 5th Avenue in Manhattan.

Manhattans Fifth Avenue packs a world of intrigue into a few blocks. Trump Tower at 57th Street was the launch pad for Donald Trumps run to the White House. Four blocks south, 666 Fifth Ave. is a white elephant that has pushed owner Jared Kushner, Trumps son-and-law and adviser, into a well-scrutinized hunt for rich investors.

Then theres the nearly decade-long legal melodrama over a 36-story building across the street from Kushners tower. U.S. prosecutors are in the home stretch of an attempt to seize 650 Fifth Ave. and related assets from a charity that owns it, alleging the organization is a front for Irans government and that it violated economic sanctions against Iran since 1995.

In a trial entering its fourth week in Manhattan federal court, prosecutors say the buildings primary owner, the Alavi Foundation, has illegally funneled millions of dollars to Iran under cover of its charitable activities. They hope to recapture more than $500 million with the proceeds going to victims of Iranian-sponsored terrorism.

Alavis lawyers maintain that the foundation is independent of Irans government and spends its money on schools, health care and higher education, as well as promoting Persian culture and supporting interfaith studies.

Prosecutors first moved in 2008 to seize 650 Fifth Ave. Five years later, U.S. District Judge Katherine Forrest granted the governments request, but she was slapped down by appellate judgeslast year who sent the case back to her for trial. The case has unfolded as the U.S. relationship with the Islamic Republic of Iran has gone from axis of evil territory during the administration of President George W. Bush, through a period of dtente under President Barack Obama, and back to a state of hostility under Trump.

The likelihood of getting a jury sympathetic to Iran in New York is pretty slim, said Barbara Slavin, acting director of the Future of Iran Initiative at the Atlantic Council. Assuming this case goes against the foundation, it will be yet another brick in the wall that this administration is trying to rebuild with Iran.

The trial may prove be a further irritant to U.S.-Iranian relations as prosecutors dredge up the acts of current Iranian officials. Prosecutors are expected to argue that a $4 million legal settlement paid by Alavi in 2004 was hush money designed to keep a former charity official from revealing the true nature of the organization.

That payment was allegedly ordered by Mohammad Javad Zarif, who was then Irans UN ambassador in New York. Zarif was the lead negotiator who worked with John Kerry,Obamas Secretary of State, on the 2015 agreement limiting Irans nuclear capabilities in return for lifting of some economic sanctions.

The trial will cap a range of investigations that have already cost European banks more than $18 billion in fines, penalties and forfeitures. When Alavi was originally investigated by the office of then-Manhattan District Attorney Robert Morgenthau, a young attorney determined that many of Wall Streets largest European-based banks removed the names of Iranian clients from transactions. This allowed the banks to wire money in and out of the U.S. through correspondent bank accounts in violation of U.S. sanctions, prosecutors said.

The District Attorneys office used that evidence to launch cases against such banks as Lloyds Banking Group Plc, Credit Suisse Group Plc, Barclays Plc, Standard Chartered and others, culminating in an $8.9 billion settlement with BNP Paribas SA in 2014.

The Alavi Foundation has assembled a legal team that is top-flight as well as top-priced, from the firms Debevoise & Plimpton and Patterson Belknap Webb & Tyler. The Debevoise team features Matthew Fishbein, Sean Hecker and John Gleeson, a former federal judge who oversaw the Justice Departments $1.9 billion deferred prosecution agreement with HSBC in 2012, a settlement that involved violations of Iran sanctions.

Another set of lawyers in the courtroom is representing the victims of terrorist attacks sponsored by Iran. If the government prevails, victims of the 1983 bombing of the Marine barracks in Lebanon and other attacks tied to Iran stand to benefit from a share of the forfeiture proceeds.

The most important market news of the day.

Get our markets daily newsletter.

To convince the jury that Alavi is controlled by political leadership in Tehran, prosecutors have laid out the history of the foundation, which serves as a time capsule of American-Iranian relations during the past 40 years. Elements of spy-thriller intrigue include government agents who recovered relevant records from a trash bin at a Yonkers, New York, strip mall and hidden in the attic of a Mineola, New York, townhouse.

It began as the Pahlavi Foundation in the 1970s, created on behalf of Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, the Shah of Iran, a staunch American ally. Funded by $42 million in loans from Tehran-based Bank Melli in 1975, the foundation erected a tower at the corner of 52nd St. and Fifth Avenue, kitty-corner from St. Patricks Cathedral and near Rockefeller Center.

After the shah was deposed in 1979, Irans next supreme leader, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, created the Mostazafan Foundation in Tehran, which took control of assets and businesses seized from the Shah and his allies.

The charity struggled financially in its early years. It was sitting on a valuable asset, but because it needed office rent to make payments on its mortgage, the foundation owed more than $1 million in taxes each year, ensuring years of red ink.

The Iranian government, which essentially controlled Bank Melli, approved the creation of a company, Assa Corp., which would eventually be given 40 percent of the building as a way of removing the mortgage. The restructuring created the 650 Fifth Avenue Partnership, which owned and operated the building.

Assa was a front company for the government of Iran, Assistant U.S. Attorney Martin Bell said in his opening statement, noting that in 1995, President Bill Clinton imposed wide-ranging sanctions against Iran. When the law changed and providing services to the government of Iran became illegal, the 650 Fifth Avenue Partnership kept on sending rental income to Bank Melli Iran, Bell said.

Prosecutors showed dozens of documents to the jury suggesting that from 1980 onward, the foundation was largely controlled or guided by Irans ambassador to the United Nations in New York.

Assistant U.S. Attorney Michael Lockard, who has been on this case since its inception, read from a letter writtenin 1991 by anAlavi director affirming that he would step down from his position in line with a directive from the supreme leader, Ali Khamenei, who succeeded Khomeini in 1989.

Under the worst and most sensitive of political conditions between America and Iran, we have succeeded in fully protecting and expanding the foundations interests, which in truth belongs to the people of Iran, the director wrote. We were also able to successfully carry out cultural and Islamic activities in the country of the Great Satan.

The jury is expected to get the case later this week. If the government prevails, it would be in the position to sell Alavis 60 percent stake of the building. That job would presumably fall to U.S. marshals, a branch of the Justice Department that reports to the owner of the other Fifth Avenue tower a few blocks away, President Trump.

The case is 650 Fifth Avenue and related properties, 08-cv-10934, U.S. District Court, Southern District of New York (Manhattan).

Read more from the original source:
Fifth Avenue Highrise Trial Pulls Iran Standoff Into Trump Era - Bloomberg