Archive for March, 2017

Gorsuch and the Fourth Amendment – SCOTUSblog (blog)

During his nearly 30 years on the Supreme Court, the late Justice Antonin Scalia was perhaps best known for his commitment to originalism the idea that the Constitution should be interpreted as it would have been understood by the Founders. Scalias dedication to originalism extended to the Fourth Amendment, which protects against unreasonable searches and seizures by the government. And it often meant that a justice whom many regarded as conservative reached pro-defendant results. For example, Scalia wrote the courts 2012 decision in United States v. Jones, holding that a search took place when police officers attached a GPS device to the car of a suspected drug dealer and then used the device to track the cars movements. Scalia and four other justices agreed that the installation and use of the device were no different, for constitutional purposes, than if the government had gone onto Joness property to collect information to use against him.This kind of trespassing would have been a search when the Fourth Amendment was first adopted in the 18th century, and so it is still a search today.

Judge Neil Gorsuch, the presidents nominee to succeed Scalia on the court, also describes himself as an originalist. And he too has adhered to originalist principles in reaching pro-defendant results in several cases, all implicating privacy issues. In one such case, United States v. Carloss, a federal agent and a local police officer went to Carloss house to speak with him. The house had several no trespassing signs scattered around the property, including one on the front door. Carloss allowed the officers to enter the house, where they saw drug paraphernalia and residue that appeared to be methamphetamines, but would not permit them to go any further. When the officers later returned with a warrant, they found multiple methamphetamine labs, a loaded gun and more drug paraphernalia.

When Carloss was prosecuted on drug and weapons charges, he moved to suppress the evidence found in the house. On appeal, two of the three judges affirmed the trial courts ruling denying Carloss motion. Despite the no trespassing signs, the majority concluded, the general public and police officers had an implied right to enter the homes curtilage the area immediately around the house protected by the Fourth Amendment from unreasonable searches and seizures to knock on the door and seek to speak with the homes occupants.

Gorsuch filed a lengthy dissent from the ruling. He began by observing that, when the officers went to Carloss door to investigate a possible crime, they were indisputably conducting a search. The only question, in his view, was whether Carloss had, as the majority ruled, impliedly agreed to allow the officers to approach his front door and knock on it. Under the governments rule, Gorsuch suggested, law enforcement officials would effectively have a permanent easement to enter a homes curtilage for a knock and talk whatever the homeowner may say or do about it.

But this line of reasoning, Gorsuch continued, seems to me difficult to reconcile with the Constitution of the founders design. The protections provided by the Fourth Amendment, he explained, parallel the protections available under the common law at the time of the founding. And at that time, the common law allowed government agents to enter a home or its curtilage only with the owners permission or to execute legal process. There was no permanent easement, he emphasized, for the state. If anything, he added, the Supreme Courts decision in Florida v. Jardines holding that the use of a drug-sniffing dog on a homeowners porch was a search for purposes of the Fourth Amendment reaffirmed the fact that the implied license on which the knock and talk depends is just that a license, not a permanent easement, and one revocable at the homeowners pleasure.

In United States v. Ackerman, the defendant was indicted on child pornography charges after an automatic filter on his Internet service provider identified images attached to his email as pornography and then notified (as required by law) the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children, which reviewed the images to confirm that they contained pornography and then in turn notified the police. The district court denied Ackermans motion to suppress the evidence against him, ruling both that NCMEC could not violate the Fourth Amendment because it is not a government actor and that its search had not gone beyond the ISPs.

On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit, in an opinion by Gorsuch, reversed. First, the court determined that NCMEC was either a government actor or, at the very least, acting as a government agent. On the latter point, Gorsuch noted that, since time out of mind the law has prevented agents from exercising powers their principals do not possess and so cannot delegate. That is a rule of law the founders knew, understood, and undoubtedly relied upon when they drafted the Fourth Amendment.

Turning to the question whether NCMECs actions constituted a search for purposes of the Fourth Amendment, the federal government pointed to the private search doctrine the idea that there is no search when the government would not have learned anything significant beyond what the private actor had already told it. But even if that doctrine applied (and Gorsuch expressed doubt that it did), the Supreme Courts 2012 decision in United States v. Jones also pointed to NCMECs actions being a search. In Jones, Gorsuch emphasized, the court explained that government conduct can constitute a Fourth Amendment search either when it infringes on a reasonable expectation of privacy or when it involves a physical intrusion (a trespass) on a constitutionally protected space or thing to obtain information.

Ackermans case, Gorsuch reasoned, involved the warrantless opening and examination of (presumptively) private correspondence that could have contained much besides potential contraband for all anyone knew. And that seems pretty clearly to qualify as exactly the type of trespass to chattel that the framers sought to prevent when they adopted the Fourth Amendment. The court of appeals therefore sent the case back to the lower court.

And in United States v. Krueger, a three-judge panel of the 10th Circuit upheld the district courts order granting Kruegers motion to suppress evidence child pornography found on a computer seized pursuant to a warrant issued by a magistrate judge in a different state. The majority relied on the governments violation of the federal criminal procedure rule governing searches and seizures, without addressing whether the problems with the warrant violated the Fourth Amendment.

Gorsuch agreed with the majoritys conclusion, but he took on what he described as the governments phantom warrant argument: the idea that the warrant was valid even if it did not comply with the law. Here Gorsuch once again relied on originalist principles. He noted that looking to the common law at the time of the framing it becomes quickly obvious that a warrant issued for a search or seizure beyond the territorial jurisdiction of a magistrates powers under positive law was treated as no warrant at all. It did not matter, Gorsuch stressed, whether for example another judge in the appropriate jurisdiction would have issued the same warrant if asked.

Gorsuch also rejected the idea that enforcing territorial boundaries on the effectiveness of warrants is inefficient and arbitrary. Citing (among other authorities) The Federalist, he reasoned that our whole legislative system is predicated on the notion that good borders make for good government, that dividing government into separate pieces bounded in both their powers and geographic reach is of irreplaceable value when it comes to securing the liberty of the people.

To be sure, although Gorsuch has sometimes relied on originalist principles to reach pro-defendant results, most of the opinions he has written rule or, when he dissents, would rule in favor of the government (often affirming a district court ruling) without specifically relying on originalism. For example, in United States v. Nicholson, a police officer believed (erroneously, it turned out) that a driver had violated a traffic ordinance. When the officer stopped the driver and smelled marijuana, he issued a traffic citation and seized the car, in which the police found (among other things) methamphetamines, a loaded gun and marijuana seeds. The driver argued, and the majority of a three-judge panel agreed, that the Fourth Amendment required the evidence to be suppressed because the police officers mistake was objectively unreasonable.

Gorsuch dissented. He acknowledged that, in many cases, searches and seizures initiated because of an officers mistake about the law should be held unreasonable and therefore unconstitutional. But here, he continued, the court did not have enough information to determine whether the officers mistake was reasonable with any degree of confidence. Moreover, he added, the rigid rule that the rest of the panel had adopted was contrary to the normal Fourth Amendment practice of being sensitive to the totality of the circumstances.

A little over a year later, in Heien v. North Carolina, the Supreme Court largely agreed with Gorsuch. By a vote of 8-1, in a decision by Chief Justice John Roberts, the court ruled that an objectively reasonable mistake of law can nonetheless give rise to the reasonable suspicion necessary to uphold the seizure under the Fourth Amendment.

In United States v. Rochin, a traffic stop prompted a police officer to pat down the driver. When the officer felt something in the drivers pocket, but couldnt identify it, he pulled the drivers pockets out and found glass pipes containing drugs. Rochin, the driver, moved to suppress the drugs, arguing that the officer violated the Fourth Amendment when he removed the pipes without knowing what they were. The district court denied that motion, and the 10th Circuit affirmed.

Gorsuch seemed to regard the officer as having a fair amount of leeway in these kinds of protective pat-downs, explaining that the Fourth Amendment isnot a game of blind mans bluff. It doesnt require an officer to risk his safety or the safety of those nearby while he fishes around in a suspects pockets until he can correctly guess the identity of and risks associated with an unknown object. Instead the Fourth Amendment only requires reasonableness, not such potentially reckless punctiliousness.

Although Gorsuch may be willing to give some deference to law enforcement officials, he proved less willing to defer to technology in United States v. Esquivel-Rios. In that case, a state trooper tried to verify a Colorado temporary tag, but the dispatcher told him that the tag wasnt returning. Based on that information, the trooper pulled the car over; a search revealed over a pound of methamphetamine. During a trial for drug charges, the district court rejected Esquivel-Rios motion to suppress the drugs, finding that the trooper had reasonable suspicion that the tag was false.

On appeal, Gorsuch wrote for the three-judge panel that vacated the district courts ruling and sent the case back to the district court for further proceedings. He concluded that the district courts ruling was right as far as it went, but it had failed to account for another, potentially important piece of information: After telling the trooper that the cars tag hadnt returned, the dispatcher also warned that Colorado temporary tags usually dont return which at least suggested that the failure to return was the result of a database shortcoming or snafu, rather than a sign that the tag was false. And that, Gorsuch continued, raised questions about the reliability of the database and whether the officer could have in fact had reasonable suspicion.

Gorsuch acknowledged that the law expects and takes account of human (and computational) frailties. And he conceded that the standard for legally sufficient grounds for a traffic stop are relatively low. But because the state trooper relied on exclusively on the database report to stop Esquivel-Rios, and because so little information is available about how the database operates and how reliable it might be in these circumstances, he concluded, the district courts ruling cannot stand as issued. The court thus ordered the district court to reconsider whether the trooper had the reasonable suspicion required by the Fourth Amendment. And if he did not, the court continued, the district court should also consider what the remedy for the violation of the Fourth Amendment might be specifically, whether exclusion is an appropriate remedy.

Posted in Nomination of Neil Gorsuch to the Supreme Court, A close look at Judge Neil Gorsuchs jurisprudence, Featured

Recommended Citation: Amy Howe, Gorsuch and the Fourth Amendment, SCOTUSblog (Mar. 17, 2017, 1:35 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/03/gorsuch-fourth-amendment/

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Gorsuch and the Fourth Amendment - SCOTUSblog (blog)

Just crazy: Top NSA official ridicules Trump for British …

NSA Deputy Director Richard Ledgett answers questions during the Senate Intelligence Committee hearing on the House-passed Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act reform bill while on Capitol Hill in Washington, June 5, 2014. REUTERS/Larry Downing

Allegations from the United States that British spy agency GCHQ snooped on Donald Trump during his election campaign are arrant nonsense, the deputy head of the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA) said in an interview on Saturday.

President Trump has stood by unproven claims that the Obama administration tapped his phones during the 2016 White House race. On Thursday his spokesman cited a media report that Britains GCHQ was behind the surveillance.

Richard Ledgett, deputy director of the NSA, told BBC News the idea that Britain had a hand in spying on Trump was just crazy.

It belies a complete lack of understanding of how the relationship works between the intel community agencies, it completely ignores the political reality of would the UK government agree to do that?', Ledgett said.

There would be no advantage for Britains government in spying on Trump, given the potential cost, he said.

It would be epically stupid, said Ledgett, who is due to retire shortly.

Current and former NSA officials have described an acrimonious relationship between intelligence agencies and the Trump administration.

Trump, who became president in January, tweeted earlier this month that his Democratic predecessor Barack Obama had wiretapped him during the late stages of the 2016 campaign. The Republican president offered no evidence for the allegation, which an Obama spokesman said was simply false.

Fox News analyst Andrew Napolitano on Tuesday accused the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) the British equivalent of the NSA of having helped Obama to spy on Trump.

White House spokesman Sean Spicer quoted Napolitanos comments on Thursday.

GCHQ said the claims it spied on Trump were utterly ridiculous and should be ignored, in a rare public statement.

On Friday, Trump said questions on this should be asked of Fox News, not him.

(Reporting by Andy Bruce; Editing by Dale Hudson)

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Just crazy: Top NSA official ridicules Trump for British ...

NSA official: Trump’s British spying claim is ‘nonsense’ – New York Post

Allegations from the United States that British spy agency GCHQ snooped on Donald Trump during his election campaign are arrant nonsense, the deputy head of the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA) said in an interview on Saturday.

President Trump has stood by unproven claims that the Obama administration tapped his phones during the 2016 White House race. On Thursday his spokesman cited a media report that Britains GCHQ was behind the surveillance.

Richard Ledgett, deputy director of the NSA, told BBC News the idea that Britain had a hand in spying on Trump was just crazy.

It belies a complete lack of understanding of how the relationship works between the intel community agencies, it completely ignores the political reality of would the UK government agree to do that?', Ledgett said.

There would be no advantage for Britains government in spying on Trump, given the potential cost, he said.

It would be epically stupid, said Ledgett, who is due to retire shortly.

Current and former NSA officials have described an acrimonious relationship between intelligence agencies and the Trump administration.

Trump, who became president in January, tweeted earlier this month that his Democratic predecessor Barack Obama had wiretapped him during the late stages of the 2016 campaign. The Republican president offered no evidence for the allegation, which an Obama spokesman said was simply false.

Fox News analyst Andrew Napolitano on Tuesday accused the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) the British equivalent of the NSA of having helped Obama to spy on Trump.

White House spokesman Sean Spicer quoted Napolitanos comments on Thursday.

GCHQ said the claims it spied on Trump were utterly ridiculous and should be ignored, in a rare public statement.

On Friday, Trump said questions on this should be asked of Fox News, not him.

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NSA official: Trump's British spying claim is 'nonsense' - New York Post

Top NSA officials deny ‘blanket’ surveillance during Salt Lake City … – Salt Lake Tribune

In the sworn declarations, however, Murphy and Hayden argued no such thing occurred.

"Neither the PSP (President's Surveillance Program), nor any other NSA intelligence-gathering activity, at any time has involved indiscriminate 'blanket' surveillance in Salt Lake City or the vicinity of the 2002 Winter Olympic venues, whether during the 2002 Winter Olympic Games or otherwise," Murphy wrote.

He noted that NSA collection of communications did and does continue to exist but was "targeted at one-end foreign communications where a communicant was reasonably believed to be a member or agent of al-Qaeda or another international terrorist organization."

Murphy noted he wouldn't reveal more specific details about NSA surveillance techniques including the PSP program, which expired in 2007, because it remains classified in order "to protect sensitive intelligence sources and methods."

Even making a decision to deny the allegations of blanket surveillance was a decision "not taken lightly" within the NSA, Murphy said. Usually, he said, the NSA would neither "confirm nor deny" such allegations regarding intelligence gathering.

"Indeed, the very existence of the PSP was a closely guarded state secret for over four years, until a wave of unauthorized public disclosures about the (terrorist surveillance program) were reported by the media in December 2005," he wrote.

Murphy in his declaration also said it was untrue that the NSA had stored the contents of communications, or metadata, obtained as part of any blanket surveillance.

Hayden added that it was untrue that there was both blanket surveillance of email, text messages, and metadata of phone calls during the Olympics, and he denied that he was the one who "personally" caused the NSA to engage in such a practice.

"All of these allegations are false," Hayden said.

The plaintiffs are represented by former Salt Lake City Mayor Rocky Anderson. Anderson in 2015 told The Salt Lake Tribune that the Olympics surveillance "was the most immense, clearly illegal and unconstitutional, indiscriminate wholesale surveillance of the content of communications of people in this country by our government in our nation's history."

Anderson could not immediately be reached for comment Saturday.

The Wall Street Journal, citing unnamed sources, was the first to report in 2013 that the NSA and FBI "monitored the content of all email and text communications in the Salt Lake City area," around the 2002 Games.

lramseth@sltrib.com

Twitter: @lramseth

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Top NSA officials deny 'blanket' surveillance during Salt Lake City ... - Salt Lake Tribune

The NSA’s foreign surveillance: 5 things to know – PCWorld

A contentious piece of U.S. law giving the National Security Agency broad authority to spy on people overseas expires at the end of the year. Expect heated debate about the scope of U.S. surveillance law leading up to Dec. 31.

One major issue to watch involves the way the surveillance treats communications from U.S. residents. Critics say U.S. emails, texts, and chat logs -- potentially millions of them -- are caught up in surveillance authorized bySection 702of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA).

U.S. residents who communicate with foreign targets of the NSA surveillance have their data swept up in what the NSA calls "incidental" collection. The FBI can then search those communications, but it's unclear how often that happens.

A primer on Section 702:

Section 702 of FISA is the authorization the NSA needs to run programs like Prism and Upstream, revealed in 2013 by former agency contractor Edward Snowden. The U.S. intelligence community has called Section 702 surveillance its "most important tool" in its fight against terrorism, noted Representative Bob Goodlatte, a Virginia Republican, during a March 1 congressional hearing.

Section 702 surveillance is "critical" in the U.S. governments fight against terrorism, added April Doss, a lawyer at the NSA for 13 years.

At the agency, "I had the opportunity to witness firsthand the critical importance of robust intelligence information in supporting U.S. troops and in detecting terrorist plans and intentions that threatened the safety of the U.S. and its allies," she said in testimony March 1.

In the Prism program, the NSA and FBI allegedly gained access to the servers of Google, Facebook, Microsoft, Yahoo, and other internet companies as a way to collect audio, video, emails, and other content.

Upstream collectionallegedly involved the NSA intercepting telephone and internet traffic by tapping internet cables and switches.

Under 702, FISA allows the U.S. attorney general and the director of national intelligence to authorize "the targeting of persons reasonably believed to be located outside the United States to acquire foreign intelligence information." The U.S.Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court reviews the targeting and minimization procedures adopted by the government and determines whether they comport with the statutory restrictions and the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.

The Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) says it conducts its surveillance with the "knowledge of the service provider," although several internet companies have denied cooperating with the NSA.

Doss and other defenders of Section 702 surveillance say that it's targeted, not so-called "bulk" surveillance. But the descriptions of both Prism and Upstream from the Snowden leaks and subsequent government descriptions suggest the surveillance is widespread. The intelligence community has long arguedthe legal definition of "bulk" surveillance is very specific.

The NSA also collected U.S. telephone records for several years under a separate program. The NSA and the FBI pointed to a different provision of FISA, Section 501, as authorization for the controversial metadata collection program. Congress curtailed the phone metadata collection program in the USA Freedom Act, passed in mid-2015.

Congress is certain to extend the surveillance authority in some form, even though many tech companies and privacy groups are pushing lawmakers to rein in the NSAs surveillance programs, both in the U.S. and abroad.

Most lawmakers see value in extending Section 702, although many Democrats and some Republicans have talked about ending or limiting the ability of the FBI and other intelligence agencies to search for U.S. communications swept up in the surveillance.

Given that Section 702 is one of the main authorizations for the NSA to conduct foreign surveillance, not even the most ardent privacy advocates believe Congress will let the provision expire.

Section 702 prohibits the NSA from targeting people inside the U.S., but the agency, in "incidental" collection, gathers information from U.S. residents who are communicating with the agencys overseas targets.

The law then allows the FBI and other intelligence agencies to search those U.S. communications for evidence of crimes, including crimes not connected to terrorism. Many digital rights groups, along with some lawmakers, want to end this so-called backdoor search of Section 702 records.

This collection of U.S. communications without a warrant is, "in a word, wrong," Representative John Conyers Jr., a Michigan Democrat, said during the March 1 hearing.

Details about the incidental collection are fuzzy. Going back to 2011, lawmakers have repeatedly asked for numbers of U.S. residents affected but have received no details from the ODNI.

In addition to the incidental collection of U.S. residents' communications, privacy advocates complain about an expansive surveillance of foreigners allowed under Section 702.

The provision allows the NSA to collect foreign intelligence information from "anyone" outside the U.S. not just suspected agents of foreign powers, said Greg Nojeim, senior counsel at the Center for Democracy and Technology. "Intelligence information" is also defined broadly, he said.

"Once you remove that, it's open season on many foreigners who pose no threat to U.S. national security," he added.

House members, in their March 1 hearing, talked little about the impact on people outside the U.S. At this point, it seems unlikely that U.S. lawmakers will limit the provisions foreign data collection.

Privacy advocates have an ace up their sleeves, however. Several privacy groups have encouraged the European Union to get involved in the debate and threaten to revoke Privacy Shield, the cross-Atlantic agreement that allows U.S. companies to handle EU residents'data, unless significant changes are made to 702.

The European Commission "has made it clear that it takes seriously its obligations to review the Privacy Shield Agreement," said Nathan White, senior legislative manager at Access Now, a digital rights group.

EU nations understand surveillance is can be necessary, but "surveillance must respect human rights," White added. "Surveillance doesnt trump human rights responsibilities."

The U.S. intelligence communitys surveillance programs have stirred up new controversies in recent weeks. In early March, President Donald Trump, in a series of tweets, accused former President Barack Obama of wiretapping Trump Tower in New York City during the last presidential campaign.

While Trump has provided no evidence of the bombshell charge, it appears that the NSA intercepted some of his campaign staffers' communications when they talked to foreign surveillance targets. That type of surveillance would likely be authorized by Section 702.

A few days later, WikiLeaks published more than 8,700 documents that it says came from the CIA. The documents describe the spy agency's efforts to compromise iPhone, Android devices, smart TVs, automobile software, and major operating systems.

The CIA, however, runs separate surveillance programs from the NSA. CIA surveillance is supposed to be focused on specific foreign targets, as opposed to the widespread surveillance that the NSA does under the authority of Section 702. The CIA says it is "legally prohibited from conducting electronic surveillance targeting individuals here at home, including our fellow Americans."

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The NSA's foreign surveillance: 5 things to know - PCWorld