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IN JULY 2021 Vladimir Putin published an essay with arguments he would later use to justify Russias invasion of Ukraine. It raced through 1,000 years to argue that Russians and Ukrainians are one people, cruelly divided by external forces with an anti-Russian agenda. Mr Putins war is supposed to fix that. There is truth in his claim that Ukraine and Russia are close kin, as the following maps demonstrate.What is nonsense is the assertion that their separation into two countries is the result of some external plot, imposed on the Ukrainians against their wishes.

For Mr Putin the origin of Russian-Ukrainian identity is Kyivan Rus, a confederation of princedoms that lasted from the late 9th to the mid-13th century (see map 1). Its centre was Kyiv, now Ukraines capital. Its rulers were the Rus, Scandinavian Vikings who gradually established dominance over the region and merged with local Slavic tribes. (Rus is the origin of the word Russia.) When it comes to political and cultural tradition, Kyivan Rus is indeed the cradle of Russia and Ukraine, as well as the country now called Belarus. It was a refined European civilisation with roots in the Byzantine empire and its Orthodox Christian religion.

In the mid-11th century, however, Kyivan Rus began to fragment into semi-autonomous principalities (see map 2). These included Galicia-Volhynia, which covered parts of modern Ukraine and Belarus, Novgorod in north-western modern-day Russia, and Vladimir-Suzdal, in western Russia. In 1240 the Mongol empire besieged Kyiv, finally destroying what remained of Kyivan Rus as a single entity.

When the Mongol empire and its successors began to decline in the 143th century, rival polities rose to fill the vacuum. In the east of the region power eventually accumulated in Moscow, leading to the creation of the Grand Principality of Muscovy. To the west, what had become the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania joined forces in 1569 to create the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.

In 1648 the Cossacks, settlers on the steppe who amalgamated into disciplined military units, led an uprising against the commonwealth. This led to the formation of their own state, the Hetmanate (see map 3). Many Ukrainians look back to the Hetmanate as the origin of their identity as an independent state. Indeed, the original Cossack lands were often called Ukraine, a Slavic word meaning borderland.

Early Cossack warriors practised a limited form of democracy, a contrast to Muscovys autocratic regime. That Hetmanate came about as an act of resistance to larger neighbouring powers is a history that resonates with Ukrainians today. In the 19th century, the folk memory of the Cossacks state helped inspire the birth of a recognisable form of Ukraines cultural nationalism.

But the Cossack state had a hard time. In 1654, threatened by the Poles as well as the Ottomans to the south, Cossack leaders pledged allegiance to the tsar of Muscovy. A few decades later intellectuals in Kyiv wrote what is believed to be one of the oldest texts outlining the basis of a Slavo-Rossian nation. They hoped to convince the tsar to defend them, not only because of their shared history and Orthodox religion, but also in the name of ethno-national unity.

By the end of the 17th century the Hetmanates territory had split into two: Muscovy took control of the east bank of the Dnieper river, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth seized the west. In 1708 Ivan Mazepa, a Cossack leader, led a failed uprising against Tsar Peter the Great. (Russia regards Mazepa as a traitor; in Ukraine he is a hero.) Peter went on to become Russias first emperor in 1721.

In the late 18th century the Russian empire broke up the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, with help from Austria and Prussia. The Russians also seized territory from what is now southern Ukraine from the Ottomans. This included Crimea, annexed to Russia by Catherine the Great in 1783. She oversaw the final dismantling of the Cossack Hetmanate.

On the eve of the first world war the Russian empire stretched from the Sea of Japan to the Baltic (see map 4).

In 1917, weakened by the war, Russia experienced two revolutions. The first overthrew the Romanov dynasty. The second was the seizure of power by Vladimir Lenin and his Bolsheviks. After the first revolution officials in Kyiv founded the Ukrainian Peoples Republic (UPR), a state in union with Russia. After the second, the UPR declared independence. Eventually Lenin took the UPR by force. But the strength of Ukrainian national identity compelled him to create a socialist Ukrainian republic, and to allow the use of the Ukrainian language. In 1922 Ukraine became one of the four founding members of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR)or Soviet Union.

Ukraines territory expanded during the Soviet period. Under the Soviet Unions non-aggression pact with Nazi Germany, signed in 1939, the two countries carved up eastern Europe. In the ensuing fighting, what had been parts of Poland that were settled by Ukrainians were added to Soviet Ukraine. In 1954 the Soviet Union transferred the administration of Crimea from Soviet Russia to Ukraine.

But Ukraine also experienced great suffering. In the 1930s Josef Stalins policy of forced collectivisation of agriculture led to a famine, known in Ukraine as the Holodomor, which killed millions of people. In the mid-20th century Ukraine found itself part of what Timothy Snyder, a historian at Yale, later called the bloodlands: territory in which Hitler and Stalin, though enemies, enabled each others crimes against locals. Co-operation between some Ukrainian nationalists and the Nazis during the war is adduced by Mr Putin as evidence for his claim that the Ukraine of today is run by fascists. In 1986, in the dying days of the Soviet Union, the worlds worst-ever nuclear accident took place at Chernobyl in Ukraine. The damage, and the ensuing cover-up, heightened Ukrainians anger towards the Kremlin.

In the 1980s Mikhail Gorbachev, the last Soviet leader, set out to reform the Soviet Union through openness and reformglasnost and perestroika. But eastern Europeans, subject to Soviet control through the framework of the Warsaw Pact, took the opportunity to demand their freedom. In 1991 the Soviet Union itself collapsed, bringing independence to its 15 constituent republics (see map 6). Mr Putin has called this the biggest geopolitical tragedy of the 20th century.

Ukraine suddenly became home to the worlds third-largest nuclear arsenal. In 1994 it agreed to denuclearise in exchange for security assurances from America, Britain and the Russian Federation. (Ukraine used this agreement, known as the Budapest memorandum, to ask America and Britain for aid on the eve of Russias invasion in 2022.)

In 2004-05 the Orange revolution highlighted Ukraines democratic ambitions. Thousands protested against a rigged presidential election that gave victory to a pro-Russian candidate. Ukraines democratic resolve was even more visible during the Maidan revolution in 2013-14. This was a reaction to the refusal by Viktor Yanukovych, Ukraines president, who was chummy with Russia, to sign an association agreement (an extensive free-trade deal) with the European Union. Thousands of Ukrainians took to the streets; Mr Yanukovych fled to Russia. Ukraines new government signed the agreement, infuriating Mr Putin.

His response to the Maidan marked Russias first military incursions into independent Ukraine. In 2014 the Kremlin illegally annexed Crimea and sent troops into the Donbas, a predominantly Russian-speaking region in eastern Ukraine (see map 7). Russias separatist proxiesled by the Russian intelligence officers declared peoples republics in Donetsk and Luhansk. By December 2021, just before Russias full-scale invasion in February 2022, the conflict had killed more than 14,000 people. The war continues.

Link:
A short history of Russia and Ukraine - The Economist

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Its hard to ignore the sense of desperation in Ukraines corridors of power. Nearing two years since Russia launched its full-scale invasion, authorities in Kyiv maintain their long-standing entreaty to partners in the West: Deliver us more arms, more aid, more political commitments.

President Volodymyr Zelensky toured Western capitals at the end of last year, pleading for support amid growing international fatigue with the conflict and paralysis in U.S. Congress over new supplemental funding for Kyiv. Around the same time, his top general, Valery Zaluzhny, bemoaned the stalemate that had set into place after the much-anticipated Ukrainian counteroffensive in 2023 failed to make strategic headway against Russias deep defensive lines.

U.S. officials and their Western counterparts, as my colleagues reported over the weekend, anticipate a lean year ahead, where Ukraines increasingly exhausted forces focus more on consolidating their defense than chipping away at Russias land-grabs. The Kremlin controls roughly a fifth of Ukraines internationally-recognized territory including Crimea, which it illegally annexed in 2014, and a broad sweep of Ukraines southeast. The U.S. view of the course of the conflict undercuts Zelenskys stated ambition of driving Russia out by this October.

Last week, Pentagon officials came empty-handed to a monthly 50-nation coordinating meeting for Ukraine, with future U.S. money for arms and aid snared by domestic politics. On the front lines, reports indicate stocks of ammunition and artillery shells are running low for many Ukrainian units.

We get asked whats our plan, but we need to understand what resources were going to have, Ukrainian lawmaker Roman Kostenko told my colleagues. Right now, everything points to the possibility that we will have less than last year, when we tried to do a counteroffensive and it didnt work out. If we will have even less, then its clear what the plan will be. It will be defense.

Looming far away from the battlefield is the political drama in Washington. House Republicans have already stymied the latest tranche of funding that President Biden is trying to allocate for Kyiv. Analysts believe Russian President Vladimir Putin is holding out for a potential return to power of former president Donald Trump, the likely Republican presidential candidate for the November election. Trump may scale back support for Ukraine and take a friendlier view of the Kremlins security concerns in Eastern Europe.

As my colleagues reported, the Biden administration and European allies are working on a longer-term, multilateral plan aimed at warding against this scenario and future-proofing support for Ukraine. That includes pledges of economic and security assistance that stretch into the next decade, and may pave the way for Ukraine to get integrated into Western blocs like the European Union and NATO. Biden is set to unveil the U.S. plank of this strategy in the spring.

The policy holds risks, including political ones, if Ukrainians begin to blame their government for stagnant front lines, my colleagues wrote. Likewise, in Western capitals, officials are keenly aware that their citizens patience with funding Ukraines war is not infinite. Amid the planning, Washington also seems to be readying the argument that, even if Ukraine is not going to regain all of its territory in the near term, it needs significant ongoing assistance to be able to defend itself and become an integral part of the West.

But, in the near term, both the shortfalls on Ukraines front lines and divisions in Washington may cement the fate of the war. While the first half of 2024 may bring few changes in control of Ukrainian territory, the materiel, personnel training, and casualties that each side accrues in the next few months will determine the long-term trajectory of the conflict, wrote Jack Watling, a senior research fellow at the Royal United Services Institute, a British think tank. The West in fact faces a crucial choice right now: support Ukraine so that its leaders can defend their territory and prepare for a 2025 offensive or cede an irrecoverable advantage to Russia.

The West may have already squandered its best chance to enable Ukraine to fully liberate its territory. In his new book, Our Enemies Will Vanish: The Russian Invasion and Ukraines War of Independence, Wall Street Journal international correspondent Yaroslav Trofimov outlines how Western governments slow-rolled military support to Ukraine out of fear of triggering a possible nuclear-armed escalation with Russia. The United States and its allies have sent Ukraine an unprecedented flow of aid, but critics say the overly careful calibration of that support undermined the Ukrainian war effort.

The United States and its partners held back from supplying Ukraine with Western-made capabilities at a time when they would have had the biggest effect, and prohibited Kyiv from using Western weapons to strike military targets on Russian soil, Trofimov wrote, in an adapted excerpt from his book published in The Washington Post. By the time many of these Western systems did arrive, in the second year of the war, Russia had built up defenses, mobilized hundreds of thousands of troops and switched its industries to wartime footing. The best window of opportunity for a clear and quick Ukrainian victory had disappeared.

Other experts arent so sure, and contend that the Biden administration had a responsibility to avoid a spiraling confrontation with Russia. More aid, sooner, would have been better but theres no guarantee it would have brought a decisive Ukrainian victory, wrote Bloomberg Opinion columnist Hal Brands. The best guarantee of that outcome would have been threatening direct military intervention, a strategy that virtually no one wanted to pursue because the risks were so obvious and, potentially, so severe. Indeed, it would have required Biden to more aggressively cross Russias red lines at the very moment when uncertainty about Putins response was at its peak.

Instead, Ukrainians and their boosters lament what could have been after Ukrainian forces surprised virtually everyone in repulsing Russias initial offensive on Kyiv and defiantly standing their ground in the early months of the war. He opened his mouth like a python and thought that were just another bunny, Zelensky told Trofimov in a 2022 interview, referring to Putin. But were not a bunny and it turned out that he cant swallow us and is actually at risk of getting torn apart himself.

Russia, though, has also stood its ground, withstood international sanctions and is preparing for fresh offensives in Ukraine, on top of its incessant, indiscriminate missile barrages into Ukrainian cities. Kyiv knows its ability to resist hinges on foreign backing. We wouldnt survive without U.S. support, its a real fact, Zelensky said in a television interview this month.

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Analysis | Ukraine's hopes for victory over Russia are slipping away - The Washington Post

Kyiv currently uses what money it can raise domestically to run its own arms industry, pay its soldiers and other security personnel, and protect pensioners and the internally displaced. Western loans and grants cover outlays on the procurement and maintenance of foreign arms, as well as essentialsocial osts, such as salaries for public servants, and medical and educational workers.The government is planning for $37 billion in financial aid this year that would all-but cover a budget deficit estimated at $39 billion.

Western backers have provided some $73.6 billion in financial aid since Russia invaded in February 2022, according tocalculationsfrom the Center for Economic Strategy in Kyiv. Through the International Monetary Fund, they expect to provide a total of $122 billion between 2023-2027.

But the flow of Western money has slowed to a trickle in recent months, as conflict in the Middle East, the onset of election year in the U.S. and a grinding economic slowdown have all pushed the biggest war in Europe in 80 years down the news agenda. So far this month, Ukraine has received no official financial aid at all.

Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban and SlovakiasRobert Ficohavebothresistedproviding any more aid to Ukraine from the EU budget,arguingthat the funding should be divided into four tranches, eachblockableat any time.Orban in particular is now facing increasedpressureto drop his resistance.

In the U.S., meanwhile,financial aid to Ukraine has become a hostage in thefight betweenRepublicans and Democratsover border policy. Despite President Joe Bidenssupport, House of RepresentativesSpeaker Mike Johnsonhasdemandedthat the White House explain its end goal in Ukraine before votingon new aid to Kyiv.

And while the fights in Washington and Brussels play out,Kyivisholdingits breathinsilence, hoping not tohurtits chancesof getting crucial support.

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Ukraine hopes to avoid economic doomsday of not getting Western financial aid - POLITICO Europe

Ukraine said on Monday its troops were trying to expand their foothold on the Russian-occupied eastern bank of the Dnipro River, despite fierce resistance from Moscow's forces.

Kyiv has managed to hold a thin bridgehead on the eastern bank of the river in the southern Kherson region since November but its forces have not claimed substantial progress since.

Ukraine will "continue measures aimed at expanding its bridgehead" on the left (eastern) bank of the Dnipro, the army said in a daily briefing.

"Despite significant losses, the enemy continues to try to drive our units from their positions," it said.

Both Moscow and Kyiv have been entrenched on opposite sides of the vast river since November 2022, when Russian forces retreated from the western bank.

Pushing Russia back from the river's shores has been a priority for Kyiv, which has been trying to protect the city of Kherson from Russian shelling.

The Ukrainian air force said it downed eight Russian attack drones across the country overnight on Monday, including in western regions.

Russia fired rockets at Ukrainian army positions and civilian areas a total of 86 times over the past day, and launched at least seven missile strikes, Ukraine's army said.

The rest is here:
Ukraine Says Aims To Expand Foothold on Bank of Dnipro - The Moscow Times

Ukrainians have endured war for nearly two years. Since the Russian invasion of Feb. 24, 2022, more than 6.3 million Ukrainians have fled the country, while an estimated 3.7 million are internally displaced.

The war has had damaging geopolitical and ecological consequences. But it is ordinary Ukrainians, those who stayed to endure and fight, who experience its strains and horrors daily.

As the war enters its third year, what is the mood among these Ukrainians? As a political geographer who has worked with colleagues on surveys in the region for years, I know that measuring public opinion in wartime Ukraine presents many challenges.

Nearly 1 in 4 Ukrainians have had to move from their homes. And while the 1,000-kilometer (620-mile) front line has largely stabilized, missile and drone attacks are a daily occurrence. Patriotic feelings are high, and so also is distrust, especially in places formerly occupied by Russia.

Most public opinion research today in Ukraine is conducted by telephone interview. Survey companies make calls to randomly selected functioning numbers and ask citizens over the age of 18 to participate.

Response rates can be low. Nonetheless, survey companies manage through persistence.

The latest survey by the National Democratic Institute released on Jan. 26 provides insight into how Ukrainians are coping. Administered by the reputable Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, this telephone survey recorded the views of 2,516 Ukrainians from Nov. 14-22, 2023. Four findings stand out:

Since the outset of the war, the National Democratic Institute has asked Ukrainians if they have experienced the loss of family and friends from the war. In May 2022, one-fifth of respondents indicated that they had. In November 2023, almost half said they had lost loved ones, with higher rates among middle-aged and young respondents.

The mental health costs to Ukrainians of war are considerable. Many are forced to flee to shelters at all hours. Almost three-quarters of women and half of male respondents report a deterioration of their mental health, according to the latest poll.

Lack of sleep is the single largest reported health cost of the war. But lost income, deteriorating physical health and family separation are also commonly reported.

Any post-war Ukraine will be a society where significant parts of the population are living with physical and mental disabilities. Human rehabilitation needs are already considerable and will grow.

Since the war began, the National Democratic Institute survey has asked if Ukraine should engage in negotiations with Russia to try to achieve peace.

A majority (59%) said yes just a few months into the war in May 2022. But, by August 2022, in the wake of accumulating Russian assaults and alleged war crimes, sentiment had flipped with a majority against. By January 2023, the share of those in favor had dropped 30 points to a low of just 29%.

Since then, this percentage has climbed upward. In November 2023, it rebounded to 42%.

As it stands, the majority of Ukrainians are opposed to seeking negotiations with Russia. Talks, in any case, are not on the agenda. In the current war climate, there appears little prospect of negotiations with Vladimir Putins Russia at a time when it is deepening the militarization of the state, economy and society.

Academic research, largely based on the U.S. experience since World War II, suggests that as casualties increase, public support for war declines.

Wars of defense against an invasion appear to be different, with greater public tolerance of loss because the conflict is perceived as necessary and just.

But as Ukraine drives to recruit 450,000 to 500,000 new soldiers to replace its fallen and wounded, this proposition will be significantly tested.

From the outset of the war, Ukrainians have been surveyed to elicit what they would accept as the price of peace. The question is difficult for Ukrainians who rightly feel victimized.

Research by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology since the outset of the war reveals overwhelming sentiment among Ukrainians against territorial concessions for immediate peace.

My own research with social psychologist Karina Korostelina in front-line southeastern Ukrainian cities revealed the overwhelming belief that Ukraines territorial integrity is sacred.

But so too, of course, is human life. Ukrainians are understandably divided over what should be prioritized: preserving territory or preserving lives.

Wartime experiences also matter. Earlier research suggested that those most affected by the war through displacement and most concerned about their immediate security are more likely to prioritize a cease-fire.

Russia occupies approximately 18% of Ukraine today, a figure composed of territories it controlled before February 2022 (Crimea and the Donbas) and territories it subsequently seized and retained. Some, but not much, territory has shifted hands this last year.

To most Ukrainians, it is unacceptable to hold only the territory it currently controls as the price for peace 71% strongly reject this, another 13% less strongly in the survey.

Only 12% see peace based on current territorial control as acceptable.

Meanwhile, a majority declare it is fully unacceptable to return to the pre-2022 borders. Slim majorities also say it is unacceptable that Ukraine renounces its aspirations to join NATO and the European Union as the price of peace.

These attitudes restrain Ukraines leadership, as U.S. officials signal that they do not foresee Ukraine retaking lost territory in 2024. Right now, it is safer politically to fight than confront an ugly peace.

Ukrainians do not think the conflict will end any time soon, with 43% saying that war will go on for an additional 12 months, at least. A third responded that they simply do not know when the conflict will end.

In May 2022, just a few months into the conflict, 1 in 4 Ukrainians thought the war would end within three months. In November 2023, only 3% had that expectation.

War, paradoxically, generated a surge of optimism about Ukraines future as Ukrainians processed suffering into hope. That sentiment remained high in November 2023, with 77% of respondents saying they were optimistic about the countrys future, though fewer Ukrainians said that they were very optimistic. Data on this important metric in 2024 will be revealing.

Ukraine war fatigue is growing among the countrys Western backers. But no group is more tired of this war than Ukrainians. The costs being paid by ordinary Ukrainians are enormous in terms of lives lost, settlements destroyed, environments poisoned and futures compromised.

And these costs come across in public opinion surveys. But so too does an enduring desire to have their war resistance mean something, to have it affirm Ukraines independence and territorial integrity.

Continued here:
What latest polling says about the mood in Ukraine and the desire to remain optimistic amid the suffering - The Conversation