Mediaboss Marketing

Exclusive: The U.S. mainstream medias narrative of the Ukraine crisis hailing the 2014 Maidan uprising and blaming the ensuing conflict on Russia is facing challenge in some early historical accounts, writes James W. Carden.

By James W. Carden

While the good folks of the Washington establishment have been keeping themselves busy trying to invent new ways to cripple and delegitimize the presidency of Donald J. Trump, the war in Ukraine, now entering its fourth year, has, of late, gone largely unremarked upon.

Yet it continues. A report by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights published on June 13 finds that over the past three months there have been ceasefire violations committed by both parties to the conflict. According to the report, the routine use of small arms and light and heavy weapons in the conflict zone has resulted in damage to critical infrastructure, including schools, hospitals and water facilities. To date, over 10,000 people, including roughly 3,000 civilians, have been killed since the conflict began in 2014.

This past February marked the three-year anniversary of Euro-Maidan uprising, which saw Ukraines democratically elected President Viktor Yanukovych overthrown and replaced by a pro-Western coalition government made up of his political opponents.

As the drama played out, a small but influential coterie of Western journalists, who had previously shown themselves susceptible to the charms of regime-change wars, by and large shaped what became the mainstream narrative of the Ukraine crisis.

The narrative boils down to this: had it not been for the actions of Vladimir Putin following the glories of the Euro-Maidan protests, Ukraine would have, peacefully and in due course, joined the European family of nations. But Putin, so the story goes, was infuriated that Ukraine rejected his vision of a neo-Soviet Eurasian Economic Union, and took revenge by annexing Crimea. Having stolen Crimea, Putin then turned his sights on the Russophone eastern part of Ukraine where forces under his control have been waging hybrid war ever since.

It is often said, that journalism especially the version coming from The New York Times, The Washington Post and other mainstream newspapers serves as the first draft of history. And, if that is true, the mainstream narrative of Ukraines post-Maidan innocence and Russian perfidy sums up the first draft in a nutshell. Since then, that first draft has evolved into a second draft published by big-name authors, such as Imperial Gamble by Marvin Kalb, a former Moscow bureau chief for NBC News. Ambitious in scope, Kalbs book reflects the widely held, but erroneous, view that Putins Russia was the principal driver of the crisis and subsequent war.

A Mixed Bag

To his credit, every now and then Kalb breaks free from the Official Washington narrative. Describing the neo-fascist flavor of the Maidan protests, Kalb writes that a number of far-right groups who were increasingly at the center of the action would have made the Nazi-era Gestapo look like a happy band of bigots and bandits.

Kalb, unlike many of his peers in the think tank community (Kalb is a nonresident fellow at the Brookings Institution) also notes with distaste that a leader of the neo-Nazi Azov battalion was named chief of police in post-Maidan Kiev. Instead of reining in far-right militias, writes Kalb, Kiev has actually been providing them with tanks and armored personnel carriers.

Kalb is equally clear-eyed about the tactics that Ukraines new leaders employed to garner Western aid. A number of unethical Ukrainian politicians seem to have found the magic formula, which, according to Kalb, is this: bedazzle the West into believing that Ukraine is a vital strategic asset in a continuing East-West struggle between democracy and autocracy, between freedom and oppression

Toward the end of Imperial Gamble, Kalb begins to sounds a lot like a foreign policy realist, writing that because Putin holds all the cards in the Ukraine crisis, the current president of Ukraine, Petro Poroshenko, will have to accept the best deal he can get. Indeed, Kalb flirts with outright apostasy when he concludes that any real solution to the current crisis must first satisfy the interests of Russia and then those of Ukraine.

Yet for all of its strengths, Kalbs account is marred by problems both large and small.First, there are the factual errors. Describing the aftermath of Yanukovychs decision not to sign the European Union Association Agreement (AA) in November 2013, Kalb writes that hundreds of thousands of disenchanted Ukrainians rushed to the streets and days later Yanukovych fled.

In fact, most accounts put the initial number of Maidan protesters at around a 2,000 or so, while Yanukovych did not flee days later he fled three months later on Feb. 22, 2014, after weeks of increasingly violent riots, which led to the deaths of more than a dozen police and scores of protesters.

Exaggerated Claims

Kalb writes that on Feb. 23, Crimea was about to change ownership. Eastern Ukraine was about to descend into civil war. Yet the civil war did not begin until April 6. After Crimea held a referendum to secede from Ukraine and join Russia in March 2014, Kalb writes that the anti-Maidan rallies that took place in Donetsk, Kharkiv, Luhansk, Maiupol and Odessa were instigated by Moscow and organized by Russian special forces in the region a claim he makes repeatedly throughout the book.

Yet as the University of Ottawas Paul Robinson points out, the idea that Russian special forces were active as far as Kharkiv and Odessa is quite unsubstantiated.

Kalb often asserts things for which there is precious little evidence. Readers are informed that historians in Putins Russia no longer adhered to the standards of objective scholarship. Of Putins allegedly longstanding plan to retake Crimea, Kalb writes, Putin circled Crimea on an imaginary map. Here Russia would act.

Kalb writes that Putin lives in a strange corner of the Kremlin where fear and hubris coexist in an awkward embrace and where, presumably, he hatches his plans for world domination. And he is a crusher of dissent. Kalb repeats the usual litany of abuses attributed to Putin: He has tried to freeze political debate, he approves the assassination of political critics, he has been, without a doubt, the strongest Russian autocrat since Stalin, yet oddly, the most vulnerable.

Nor is that all. Putin, strong and vulnerable, is also like a spoiled child who does not like being ignored or scolded. Yet delivering speeches in the Kremlin does wonders for his ego. Indeed, Putin cannot imagine life without an autocratic grip on political power.

Yet by the end of Imperial Gamble, Kalb suddenly strikes a note of caution, telling readers that we should stop personalizing East-West differences, laying all our problems on Putins shoulders. While true, this wouldve been a bit more convincing if the author hadnt spent the previous 100 pages doing just that.

A Glaring Flaw

Yet the books most glaring flaw is its premise: that Russia is solely to blame for the crisis. As Rajan Menon and Eugene Rumer point out in Conflict in Ukraine, the idea that Russia caused the crisis exemplifies the single factor fallacy. Scrupulously even-handed, Menon and Rumer depart from Kalbs analysis by identifying causes of the crisis other than those originating out of Moscow.

Moreover, whereas Kalbs narrative is marred by errors and an over-reliance on hyperbole (calling post-coup Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk an international superstar) and clich (on Feb. 22 the earth shook), Conflict in Ukraine is a crisply written overview of the crisis which serves as a successful rebuttal to the entrenched idea that the crisis was all Putins doing.

Another strength of Menon and Rumers offering is that it puts the crisis into the larger context of East-West relations. In addition to being a manifestation of the centuries-long divide within Ukraine, the crisis is also a symptom of an even larger problem for Europe. The inability of Western leaders to find a satisfactory answer to the problem of Russias place in Europe has been exacerbated by two separate, but related, issues.

The first has to do with NATO expansion. The original iteration of NATO was driven by a desire, in the words of NATOs first Secretary-General, Lord Ismay, to keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down. Menon and Rumer note that once the Cold War ended, NATO was robbed of its raison dtre and, in search of one, decided to expand both its membership and its writ. And so, between 1999 and 2009, NATO added 12 new members, expanding the alliance to Russias western border.

According to Menon and Rumer, the Wests decision to expand was met with perplexity and resentment in Russia. NATOs expansion to Russias doorstep is, according to the University of Chicagos John J. Mearsheimer, the taproot of the current crisis.

And indeed, the failure to build a sustainable post-Cold War security architecture lies at the heart of the crisis. Menon and Rumer note, what was done for Germany in the 1950s was not done for Russia in the 1990s. Still worse, to do so never even seemed to cross the minds of Western policymakers: NATO membership for Russia was never seriously considered, and if it came up, it was only as a far-fetched, theoretical possibility.

Downturn in Relations

If NATO expansion played a central role in the downturn in relations between Russia and the West, the role played by the European Unions expansionist agenda has been no less significant. Menon and Rumer are particularly critical of the E.U.s Eastern Partnership initiative (EaP), which, staring in 2009, sought to bring six former Soviet republics into the E.U.s orbit. And it was Ukraine, which was, as the neocon functionary Carl Gershman once put it the biggest prize.

Menon and Rumer demonstrate that the EaP was deeply flawed from the start. Given Ukraines importance to Russia, the idea that any Russian leader, no less Vladimir Putin, would countenance Ukraines absorption into the E.U. strikes the authors as fanciful.

The E.U.s myopic focus on expansion caused its leadership to fail to see what should have been perfectly clear all along: that Moscow did not view E.U. membership for Ukraine as benign. It saw a link between E.U. membership and NATO membership. And in fact, there is a link: the Association Agreements acquis communautaire has specific foreign policy and security protocols embedded within it. Simply put: E.U. membership sets the stage for NATO membership.

Nevertheless, the E.U. continued down its perilous course, giving, according to Menon and Rumer, little thought, if any at all, to how it would deal with the eventuality of Russian resistance. Indeed, this apparent failure is nothing less than a manifestation of what the historian Richard Sakwa has described as the E.U.s tendency toward geopolitical nihilism.

In Frontline Ukraine: Crisis in the Borderlands, a uniformly excellent treatment of the crisis and its attendant causes, Sakwa decries what he views as a reckless rush to isolate Russia from the rest of Europe. Sakwas bitingly describes the crisis as a festival of irresponsibility.

Two Views of Ukraine

Sakwas account is straightforward. According to Sakwa there are two aspects of the Ukraine crisis: internal and international. The internal crisis is marked by a division between those who see Ukraine as a monolingual, culturally autonomous state that should align itself with Europe and NATO, and those, primarily in the east, who believe the state should embrace ethnic and linguistic pluralism. For them, Ukraine is an assemblage of different traditions where Russian is recognized as an official language and economic and security ties with Russia are maintained.

According to Sakwa, the international aspect of the crisis stems from the unwelcome transformation of the E.U. from an institution which, in its early years sought to transcend the logic of conflict to one which is now functions as the civilian wing of NATO. Like Rumer and Menon, Sakwa decries the failure of Western policymakers to establish a genuinely inclusive and equal security system in the post-Cold War era.

While Sakwa places the bulk of the blame for the crisis on the hubris of the E.U., in Ukraine: Zbigs Grand Chessboard and How the West Was Checkmated, Natylie Baldwin and Kermit Heartsong cast a gimlet eye on the role the U.S. has played in the crisis. Heartsong and Baldwin demonstrate that the project to wrest Ukraine out of Russias orbit owes a great deal to the ideas of the late Zbigniew Brzezinski the neoconservative wing of the U.S. foreign policy establishment.

Baldwin and Heartsongs denunciation of U.S. foreign policy also serves as a primer on the roots of the conflict, which includes a detailed account of how the color revolutions of 2002-2009 served as a trial run for the events that later swept the Maidan. As the authors note, what was true for the first color revolutions, holds for the Maidan today: despite lofty expectations, the revolutions brought social, political, and economic suffering in their wake.

The newest addition to the literature comes courtesy of the Dutch journalist Chris Kaspar de Ploeg, who refuses to go along with the mainstream Western narrative that has studiously ignored the ultra-nationalist, neo-fascist aspects of post-Maidan Ukraine. De Ploegs Ukraine in the Crossfire is a deeply researched account that lets no one in this sordid drama off the hook. Hunter Bidens shady business dealings, Valerie Jareskos greed, Victoria Nulands imperial pretensions, and Petro Poroshenkos gross criminality are each given their due.

What makes De Ploegs account particularly valuable is his detailed examination of the role of the far right in perpetuating not only the violence which racked the Maidan but in then launching a brutal war (the so-called anti-terrorist operation) against the Russian-backed rebels and the civilian Russophone population of eastern and southern Ukraine. The atrocities carried out by neo-Nazi militias like Right Sector and the Azov battalion are glossed over in the Western press almost as a matter of course, but, as De Ploeg shows, ignoring their influence and reach makes a rational understanding of the conflict impossible.

Edmund Wilson once wrote that it is all too easy to idealize a social upheaval which takes place in some other country than ones own. And this is an illusion that has plagued the mainstream narrative regarding the Ukrainian revolution from the start. Yet with the appearance of several of these titles, we can begin to discern a shift away from the triumphalist one-note narrative of the Ukraine crisis toward one which recognizes the complex reality of a crisis that is now in its fourth year.

James W. Carden served as an adviser on Russia policy at the US State Department. Currently a contributing writer at The Nation magazine, his work has appeared in the Los Angeles Times, Quartz, The American Conservative and The National Interest. He has reported from both rebel- and government-held eastern Ukraine.

View post:
Sorting Out Ukraine Conflict's History - Consortium News

WASHINGTON U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson signaled on Wednesday that the United States could back away from the Minsk agreement to end fighting in Ukraine, telling a congressional hearing the Trump administration does not want to be "handcuffed."

Tillerson said it was possible that the Ukrainian government could come to an agreement with Moscow outside the structure of the 2015 accord.

"I think it is important that we be given sufficient flexibility to achieve the Minsk objectives. It is very possible that the government of Ukraine and the government of Russia could come to a satisfactory resolution through some structure other than Minsk," Tillerson told the House Foreign Affairs Committee.

"My caution is I wouldn't want to have ourselves handcuffed to Minsk if it turns out the parties decide to settle this through another, a different, agreement," he said.

The Minsk peace agreement, brokered by France and Germany and signed by Russia and Ukraine in February 2015, calls for a ceasefire, the withdrawal of heavy weapons from the front line and constitutional reform to give eastern Ukraine more autonomy.

As Washington focuses on potential Trump administration ties to Russia, lawmakers have been insisting that no sanctions on Russia be lifted until it complies with the agreement.

Tillerson was responding to Representative Eliot Engel, the committee's ranking Democrat, who asked if it was in the U.S. interest to relax sanctions on Russia before it fully complied.

Engel said the approach suggested by Tillerson would send the wrong signal to Russia.

"If they think that we're somehow willing to relax the sanctions on them before they've complied with the Minsk framework and left Crimea, I think it just will encourage Putin to continue his bullying," Engel said.

"And who knows where he'll strike next."

Tillerson spoke at a wide-ranging budget hearing in which he also discussed Trump's China policy and said he expected the administration to complete a review of Afghan policy in the coming weeks.

Many members of the U.S. Congress, including some of Trump's fellow Republicans, disagree sharply with his proposal to slash foreign aid and spending on diplomacy.

Trump, who wants sharp increases in military spending, sees the proposed cuts as a way to help balance the budget. His critics say such that approach would pose a threat to the country's security by weakening so-called "soft power" programs that win international support.

(Additional reporting by Arshad Mohammed; Editing by Chizu Nomiyama and Cynthia Osterman)

WASHINGTON U.S. President Donald Trump lashed out on Thursday after a report that he was under investigation for possible obstruction of justice and he dismissed as "phony" the idea his campaign colluded with any Russian effort to sway the 2016 U.S. election.

WASHINGTON President Donald Trump on Friday will tighten rules on Americans traveling to Cuba and significantly restrict U.S. companies from doing business with Cuban enterprises controlled by the military, according to U.S. officials who have seen a draft presidential memorandum.

Originally posted here:
US doesn't want to be 'handcuffed' to Ukraine agreement - Reuters

KYIV -- A Belarusian man who was one of the first protesters killed during the Euromaidan protests in Kyiv in 2014 has been posthumously awarded a Hero of Ukraine medal.

President Petro Poroshenko handed the medal to Mikhail Zhyzneuski's parents in Kyiv on June 13, making him the first foreigner awarded the high honor.

Poroshenko thanked the parents for raising a man he hailed as "a hero who was a great Belarusian and a great Ukrainian in his heart."

"He gave his life for our and your liberty," Poroshenko said at the ceremony.

The protests erupted late in 2013, after President Viktor Yanukovych scrapped plans for a landmark pact with the European Union and vowed to strengthen trade ties with Russia instead.

Zhyzneuski and another protester Serhiy Nihoyan, a Ukrainian of Armenian origin, were shot dead in central Kyiv on January 22, 2014.

A third protester, Roman Senyk, was severely wounded that day and died three days later.

As the number of protesters shot by snipers or killed in clashes with police grew, the victims became known as the Heavenly Hundred.

Yanukovych abandoned power in February 2014 in the face of mounting protests and fled to Russia, while a Western-oriented government was ushered in in Kyiv.

Russia reacted by seizing the Crimean Peninsula from Ukraine and fomenting anti-Kyiv unrest in eastern Ukraine, where the ensuing war between Russia-backed separatists and government forces has killed more than 10,000 people.

Zhyzneuski's mother, Nina Zhyzneuskaya, told RFE/RL that the award was important to her and her husband and gave them a sense of "closure."

Read more from the original source:
Belarusian Killed On Kyiv's Maidan Honored As Hero Of Ukraine - RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty

By:UNHCR staff in Stanytsia Luhanska, Ukraine |14 June 2017

Mykola Ivanovych, who worked as a bus driver for 54 years, must present himself at the state-run bank in Stanytsia Luhanska, which checks his identity to allow him to receive his monthly payment of USD$53.

Inside the bank, he waits patiently while his wife joins the queue to carry out the verification process.

Mykola Ivanovych, who is his 70s, suffered two strokes after his son was killed by an artillery shell in 2014 the first year of the Ukraine conflict, which has cost nearly 10,000 lives.

For hundreds of thousands of elderly and disabled people in the conflict-torn Donbas region of eastern Ukraine, the state pension is their only means of support. However, some 160,000 retired people lost this income after the government limited access to state pensions for residents of the area outside its control in December 2014.

Further restrictive measures introduced last year led to an additional 400,000 peoplelosing access to their pensions.

Currently, people livingin non-government controlled areas are required to register as internally displaced persons with the Ukrainian authorities in order to continue to access their rightful pension benefits.

Pensions are an acquired right of all citizens and should not be connected to their IDP registration.

Payment of pensions should be resumed to all retired people, regardless of their place of residence, whether they are registered as IDPs (internally displaced persons) or reside at their homes, said Pablo Mateu, UNHCR representative in Ukraine. Pensions are an acquired right of all citizens and should not be connected to their IDP registration and the fact of displacement.

Olena Grekova, head of the Severodonetsk-based office of Right to Protection, a UNHCR partner NGO that helps internally displaced persons in Ukraine, said many bedridden people had received no pension payments since the start of the conflict because they were unable to travel to government offices for identification.

People who live in the conflict-torn Donbas region of eastern Ukraine cross a damaged bridge into government-controlled territory so that they can receive their pension. OSCE SMM/Evgeniy Maloletka

Some have lost their payments because of mistakes. Tetiana Kovalenko, 83, had to leave the city of Donetsk after her house was bombed. Since 2015, she has lived in government-controlled Myrnograd and is registered as an internally displaced person..

Kovalenko, a former mine worker, stopped receiving her pension of USD$73 per month in April after the social security service decided that she lives in non-government-controlled territory.

This is my pension, which I earned. Why do I have to feel like a second-rate person?

Another woman, Olga Burkalo, 38, who has suffered from a severe form of diabetes since the age of 11, has up to 10 injections of insulin daily and needs her pension of USD$50 per month to pay for her treatment.

Tetiana Kovalenko, 83, fled Donetsk city after her house was bombed. Since 2015, she has lived in Myrnograd and is registered as an internally displaced person. In April, she stopped receiving her pension. UNHCR/David Gasparyan

Social security inspectors visited her in December and March to check if she lives at her address in government-controlled Selidove. In February, she underwent an identification process at a bank.

However, in April she stopped receiving her pension. She was mistakenly suspected of living in non-government controlled territory when, in fact, she had not been there for more than a year.

Burkalo, who trained as a biology teacher, is now too weak to work.

I used to work, I paid taxes, she said. This is my pension, which I earned. Why do I have to feel like a second-rate person?

* Surname withheld for protection reasons

More:
Thousands in eastern Ukraine lose access to pensions - UNHCR

( CNN ) It's one of the biggest countries in Europe, but even when it isn't hosting the annual song spectacle that is the Eurovision Song Contest, Ukraine struggles to attract visitors.

Recent political, territorial and economic difficulties have done little to burnish the image of a former Soviet nation struggling to find its identity between Russian and western European influences.

Nevertheless, Ukraine is home to a host of beautiful places with a great range of tourist activities. And while some regions are advised as off-limits due to separatist clashes, most of this vast country is open for business.

Vibrant cities, ancient castles, stunning countryside, diversity of landscapes and a welcoming attitude all help make it a special destination, regardless of its troubles.

The lack of mass tourism lends Ukraine a charm and authenticity often missing elsewhere.

Here are 11 places that will make you fall in love with this eastern European country.

The Black Stone House, built in 1588, is one of Lviv's most famous buildings.

Seen as Ukraine's cultural capital, Lviv has the most western architecture of all the country's cities.

It boasts a splendid UNESCO-protected Old Town renowned for beautiful narrow streets, magnificent churches, fascinating museums and charming atmosphere.

It's cozy and welcoming, offering a wide range of themed restaurants, cool bars and great nightlife.

No matter the season, it's popular with Ukrainians who come here for a weekend to feel the Old Town vibes.

Nicknamed Little Vienna for the rich Austro-Hungarian architectural heritage, Chernivtsi is one of the gems of western Ukraine.

Lovers of Art Nouveau architecture can explore the elegant frescoes and beautiful interiors of the Chernivtsi Museum of Art (Teatralna Square, 10, Chernivtsi; +380 3722 26071).

With a history of multiculturalism and constantly changing jurisdictions, the city is one of the most interesting destinations in the country.

It was founded by Polish noble Stanisaw Potocki as a birthday gift to his wife Sofia.

The extensive park is home to waterfalls, lakes, statues, fountains, antique grottoes and artificial ruins, and is a perfect place to enjoy a relaxing walk surrounded by natural beauty.

Ukraine extra: Another picturesque example of 18th-century landscape design is Olexandriya Park in Bila Tserkva, a small town near Kiev.

Kiev, Ukraine's capital, is a vibrant destination filled with golden-domed churches.

Golden domes of superb churches, a long and rich history, eclectic architecture and nonstop city life make Kiev a go-to spot for all travelers visiting Ukraine.

There's also the Andriyivskyy Descent -- a steep and historic street paved with cobblestones -- and the awe-inspiring and gargoyle-smothered Art Nouveau-style House with chimaeras.

Ukraine extra: A good authentic local street snack is perepichka -- a fried bun with sausage inside. It's served from the window on Bohdana Khmelnytskoho Street, easily recognized by the long line (Kyivska Perepichka, Bohdana Khmelnytskoho St, 3, Kiev).

This charming little destination in the western Zakarpattia region has a compact old town full of Austro-Hungarian architecture overlooked by the impressive castle that stands on a nearby hill.

Once one of the most important fortresses in the kingdom of Hungary, Palanok Castle is now a highlight of Ukrainian tourism.

Mukacheve is also a great starting point for exploring the natural wonders of the Carpathian mountains, including Synevir Lake and picturesque Shypit waterfall.

Ukraine extra: Dessert with a coffee at Bondarenko Confectionery House will complete any Mukacheve experience. (Dostoyevskoho St, 11, Mukacheve)

Often referred to as the City of Museums, Pereiaslav-Khmelnytskyi, about 50 miles southwest of Kiev, is home to no fewer than 24 venues hosting a wide variety of artifacts.

Among them are the Museum of Bread, the Museum of Rushnyk (traditional Ukrainian ritual cloth), the Museum of Space and the Museum of Ukrainian National Dress.

But the most impressive of them all is a large open-air Museum of Folk Architecture and Rural Life exhibiting unique objects from ancient times until the beginning of the 20th century.

Ukraine extra: Across the mighty Dnieper River that divides east and west Ukraine sits the little city of Kaniv.

Here can be found the Shevchenko National Reserve, devoted to one of the greatest Ukrainian writers Taras Shevchenko. The hills of the reserve offer breathtaking views over the river.

The Mirror Stream is a UNESCO-protected site in Kharkiv surrounded by a picturesque park.

Once the capital of Ukraine and now its second city, Kharkiv is a city of students who drive the thriving restaurant and bar scene.

There are enough museums and culture to make Kharkiv an interesting eastern Ukrainian destination.

Freedom Square is one of the largest squares in Europe, while the Derzhprom building is one of the most famous examples of constructivist architecture.

Completed in 1928, it was the most spacious single structure in the world at the time.

Chernihiv is one of the oldest cities in Ukraine, and was once a prospering and important center of medieval Kievan Rus, the first East Slavic state.

There are unique examples of medieval Slavic ecclesiastical architecture, and one of the oldest churches in Ukraine -- the Transfiguration Cathedral, which was completed in the 11th century and features stunning frescoes and ancient interiors.

Chernihiv is home to a third of all the eastern European historic landmarks period before the Mongol invasion.

Ukraine extra: One of the best places to try varenyky (traditional Ukrainian filled dumplings) is the Varenychna restaurant.

The 18th-century Kachanivka Palace is a popular excursion from either Chernihiv or Kyiv. It's a beautiful neoclassical mansion surrounded by well-preserved English gardens with a lake and artificial antique ruins.

Varenychna, Myru Ave, 21, Chernihiv, Ukraine

Odessa celebrates the Humorina Carnival, or festival of humor, each year on April 1.

As one of Ukraine's largest seaports and trade hubs with a beautiful historic district, Odessa has plenty of treasures waiting to be discovered.

The central part of the city is packed with sights, while architecture lovers can admire the splendid palaces and unique blend of building styles.

For sea enthusiasts, Odessa offers kilometers of Black Sea beaches and lots of entertainment both during the day and night.

This little city right on the border with Slovakia has belonged to five different countries in the last 100 years.

Its historical affiliations can be seen throughout Uzhhorod's central district where you'll find Czech functionalist buildings standing next to classical Hungarian mansions, or Russian Orthodox, Catholic and Greek-Catholic churches in close proximity.

Uzhhorod is the vibrant hub of the Zakarpattia region and the gateway to the Carpathian mountains, easily reached from the major central European cities.

For spectacular views and cozy old-town vibes, Kamianets-Podilskyi is worth further exploration.

This little town in the western part of the country has one of the most breathtaking fortresses in eastern Europe. It stands majestically on an island surrounded by a canyon and encircled by the Smotrych River. Apart from the castle, Kamianets-Podilskyi is famous for the festival of hot-air balloons that is usually held in the late spring.

Original post:
Ukraine: 11 best places to visit - CNN