Archive for the ‘Ukraine’ Category

Russia is poised to take advantage of political splits in Ukraine – The Economist

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AN OFFER TO become culture minister should have been a no-brainer. As head of Ukraines Institute of National Memory, Anton Drobovych had the background. And for many of the previous months, hed been stuck fighting in the most dangerous operations of Ukraines counter-offensive in the Zaporizhia region, or recuperating from serious injuries in hospital. Mr Drobovych did not reject the proposal outright; but his understanding of the political scene in Kyiv was enough to sow doubts. Could he survive re-emerging ideological tussles, briefings and bureaucratic battles? No, he resolved to return to the ranks of his assault-forces unit. I decided I had more important work on the front lines.

Mr Droboych is one of a number of Ukrainians straddling two increasingly distinct worlds: the grim reality of a trench war; and an ever more waspish political battleground in Kyiv. When Russia began its invasion in February 2022, competitive politics went into hibernation. They returned as the existential threat to Ukraine decreased later that year. Yaroslav Zhelezhnyak, an opposition MP, says there is still broad agreement on fundamental matters of national security. But a prominent MP in the presidents own party says jostling has already made Ukraine unstable. Mistakes are being made on all sides. And presidential attempts to centralise decision-making and shut down dissent are having the opposite effect.

Read more of our recent coverage of theUkraine war

Cracks have emerged not only along political lines but, most worryingly, between the military and political leadership. Relations between President Volodymyr Zelensky and his commander-in-chief, Valery Zaluzhny, are understood to be terrible. The differences of opinion were first reported in summer last year. A recent interview by The Economist with the general, in which he declared that Ukraines war had reached a stalemate, brought that problem into the open. Mr Zelensky publicly rebuked his general for the headlines. In a later interview he appeared to warn Mr Zaluzhny to stick to military affairs rather than do politics.

A senior government source suggests the open conflict in the leadership was a predictable result of a stalled counter-offensive operation that had not gone to plan. The official says Mr Zaluzhny was possibly unwise to contradict the more optimistic public positions of his president, but few inside the government could quibble with his sober conclusions. A blame game is now under way about who is responsible for the failure. The politicians are saying their generals are Soviet-trained twits. And the generals are saying the politicians are interfering twits. Victory has many fathers, but no one wants to parent a stalemate.

Another factor at play is a reported criminal investigation into the defence of southern Ukraine. This was the one area where Russian forces were able to establish a quick and hugely important victory in February and March of 2022, creating a new land corridor to Crimea in a few weeks. Ukrainian turncoats assisted the advance. Bridges were not blown up as they should have been. The army was also ill prepared. Mr Zaluzhny is, say some reports, currently named only as a witness to the probe; but that may change into something more serious. Allies say the possibility of a criminal charge is designed to keep him in line. His media engagement could be seen as an insurance policy, a general-staff source suggests.

Mr Zaluzhny has not declared any political ambitions, and his few steps into the political arena have been anything but deft. That does not mean he poses no threat to Mr Zelensky. The president, a comic performer as recently as 2019, knows how quickly Ukrainian society can make and break its leaders. Internal polling seen by The Economist suggests the president, once lauded for his role in defending the country, has been tarnished by corruption scandals in his government and by concern over the direction of the country. The figures, which date from mid-November, show trust in the president has fallen to a net +32%, less than half that of the still-revered General Mr Zaluzhny (+70%). Ukraines spychief, Kyrylo Budanov, also has better ratings than the president (+45%).

The same polling suggests Mr Zelensky risks losing a presidential election were he ever to go head to head with his commander-in-chief. Ukrainian society would probably not welcome any unprovoked challenge. For now, eight out of ten Ukrainians are against the very idea of holding elections, originally due next March. The president has also ruled them out, citing martial law. But the downward drift of his ratings may yet persuade him to change his mind. Russian propaganda will doubtless make hay if the elections do not take place.

Ukrainian intelligence sources say Russia is already trying to capitalise on the ambitions and tensions. Andriy Cherniak, a spokesman for HUR, the military-intelligence agency, claimed evidence that showed new Russian strategies for different constituencies: one to shore up support in Russia; another to undermine confidence in the West; and a third to amplify grievances in Ukraine. There is a separate disinformation campaign for Ukrainian soldiers, he says, with deep-fake videos purporting to show commanders of various levels encouraging their subordinates to surrender. Russia has not been able to do what they need to do on the battlefield, but they are having real success here.

The senior government source suggests Russian propaganda has gained traction because it has material to play with. There is corruption, he admits. Management is often ineffective. Ukraine has not put its economy on enough of a war footing. But only Russia stands to gain if the president were forced out. Some of our politicians dont worry enough about the Russian threat, and it makes me angry. They think they can challenge for power, destroy Zelensky, and it will be of no consequence. The security services had effectively eliminated most levers of Russian influence since the start of the war, he added. The most effective levers were now Ukrainians themselves.

On the front lines, Russia is enjoying a relatively good period of the war. It is satisfying much of its manpower needs by recruiting from the poor and prisons; a convicted cannibal was recently pardoned to fight. Ukraine, in contrast, is struggling to mobilise from the general population. Army bosses are recruiting at a level that just about covers natural losses on the frontline. But if the majority of those mobilised at the start of the war knew what they were fighting for, few of the new recruits are as willing, and filling the recruitment quotas is getting harder. Political tensions are unlikely to help that process.

Doubts at home and abroad about the direction of the war are also beginning to reach soldiers on the front lines. They do not appear to have changed behaviour or morale in any significant way, at least not yet. People under fire couldnt give a damn if Zaluzhny had a quarrel with Zelensky or not, one commander says. Mr Drobovych agrees. When he chats to his comrades at the front, no one is talking about the need to return to Kyiv to fix politics. The only discussion is about staying alive. For this cohort of Ukrainians, there is no doubting the risk the enemy still poses. Russia is asking a simple question of us: life or death. That will keep us fighting, regardless of what happens in Kyiv or Washington.

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Russia is poised to take advantage of political splits in Ukraine - The Economist

ISW: Kremlin concerned about how shifting Russian views on Ukraine war might impact 2024 presidential election – Yahoo News

Russian dictator Vladimir Putin will likely center his presidential campaign on Russias alleged domestic stability and increased criticism of the West instead of focusing on the war, the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) said in its latest report.

Putin and other Russian government officials have already signaled their intention to intensify censorship efforts by claiming that some Russian citizens who left Russia and others still in Russia have begun efforts to discredit the upcoming Russian presidential elections and that Russia will do everything necessary to prevent election meddling.

Russian authorities have also attempted to consolidate control over the Russian information space and have intensified measures encouraging self-censorship.

The ISW indicated that the war in Ukraine has created "new social tensions and exacerbated existing ones within Russia," which remain highly visible in the Russian information space despite ongoing Kremlin censorship efforts.

Russian military bloggers suggested that Russian political officials financing Telegram channels ordered bloggers to cease debates and criticisms about the Russian military prior to the Russian presidential elections. "The Kremlin has likely attempted to shore up popular support for Putin throughout Russia by establishing a network of proxies to campaign on Putins behalf," the ISW said.

Read also: Ukraine war latest: Zelensky visits Kharkiv, Zaporizhzhia oblasts as harsh winter looms on front line

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ISW: Kremlin concerned about how shifting Russian views on Ukraine war might impact 2024 presidential election - Yahoo News

Why Russians and Belarusians are unlikely to serve in Ukraine’s Azov Brigade – Yahoo News

Citizens of Russia and Belarus are unlikely to pass the selection process for the Azov brigades of Ukraines National Guard.

Source: Lev Pashko, an officer of the Azov Special Operations Detachment of the National Guard of Ukraine and Hero of Ukraine, in an interview with Ukrainska Pravda

Quote: "This is a complex issue. If we discover during the interview that the candidate is from Russia or Belarus, and there are certain subtleties, put it this way, in the conversation, then although we could arrange it, I think the unit would decline [to accept this person ed.].

If a person has close ties with the Russian Federation or with some dubious individuals, then that person may also not get through the internal verification by our security service."

Details: Pashko added that foreign citizens in general can apply to be selected for Azov, because this is permitted by law.

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Why Russians and Belarusians are unlikely to serve in Ukraine's Azov Brigade - Yahoo News

Shahed drones launched from Crimea drift through Ukraine Ukraine’s Armed Forces – Yahoo News

The Russian forces based in occupied Crimea have launched the Shahed attack drones in the direction of mainland Ukraine.

Source: Ukraines Air Force on Telegram

Quote: "The launch of Shahed attack drones from Chauda (Crimea) has been recorded."

Details: Ukraines Air Force has advised people to follow its reports and not to ignore an air-raid warning.

Updated: At 20:04, the Air Force reported that there was a threat of Russian forces attacking Dnipropetrovsk Oblast with attack UAVs.

An air-raid warning was issued in the region.

Soon later, the Air Force also reported that a threat of using attack drones had emerged in Kirovohrad Oblast.

As of 22:35, an air-raid warning was issued in Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhzhia, Kirovohrad, Mykolaiv and Kherson oblasts. The Air Force reported that Shahed UAVs were moving towards Mykolaiv through the north.

Background:

On 29 November, a Shahed-131/136 attack drone launched by the Russian invaders towards the south of Ukraine crashed in occupied Crimea as a result of extreme weather on the sea coast.

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Shahed drones launched from Crimea drift through Ukraine Ukraine's Armed Forces - Yahoo News

Shahed-136 With Cellular Modem Found In Ukraine: What It Means – The War Zone

The largest single attack against Ukraine by Russian Shahed-136 type drones last week led to an unusual discovery. Technicians from a Ukrainian drone training and development company said they found a 4G modem with a SIM card from the Ukrainian Kyivstar telecom firm inside some of the downed drones. This could have implications of varying degrees of impact.

The Victory Drone company initially suggested on Telegram that the SIM card and modem could be used by Russia to track the remains of down drones, gain additional navigation via cell phones or telemetry to adjust the flight mission in real-time.

A subsequent post added more detail about what they found.

On the night of the extreme mass attack of the Shahed, we intercepted a strong signal from the air as the Shahed flew through observation points, Victory Drone said. Several downed bombs were equipped with [Long Term Evolution] LTE mobile modems with [multi-input, multi-output] MIMO antennas. Everything was mounted on tape.

From observing the drones seemingly jury-rigged innards, the Victory Drone technicians concluded we are dealing with Russian Federation experiments, and not a serial product.

As to why Shahed-136s would be equipped with cellular communications, there are a number of possibilities. Doing this to track drones after they crash, assuming they remain intact at all and this modification is not noticed, seems unlikely, although it's possible. Using cell towers to help navigate may be possible, but that would require integration with the drone's autopilot among other modifications. Still, even updating the drone's position intermittently using network-provided geolocation could help correct for GPS disruption and error. This is especially relevant as Russia is trying to overcome GPS-denial tactics.

But using cellular networks to enhance drone capabilities is not a new idea, it's something we have discussed for years. Drones can leverage cellular data in lieu or in addition to traditional datalinks. In urban environments, where cellular coverage is very robust, this can be highly beneficial as the dense urban environment means line-of-sight datalinks are severely limited in range, especially when operating very near or even inside structures. A drone that requires constant man-in-the-loop control can get that via the commercially available bandwidth phone companies provide anywhere in a city. This greatly expands the flexibility of drone operations in these environments. Obviously, there are also emerging security risks when it comes to how nefarious actors could potentially leverage this off-the-shelf capability.

But there are other applications, as well. Just taking advantage of cellular connectivity opportunistically throughout a drone's flight, especially long-range ones like Shahed-136s execute, can allow for burst updates to be sent back to their launch units telling their position and status. This connectivity would be highly intermittent, but that is not an issue.

Using this very basic concept of operations, units can track the drone's movement over time, even if sporadically, to ensure they make it to or very near their target. If they stop responding, it can be assumed they were shot down. This can provide near real-time intelligence as to which routes are proven to be safe, even if temporarily, and which are not, for follow-up attacks. In addition, if a drone makes it to its intended target while connecting to cellular networks, it can be assumed it likely hit its target, thus providing immediate mission success information.

Albeit imperfect, Russia's limited reconnaissance capabilities, especially far forward into denied territory, means rapid bomb-damage/mission success assessments for its drones and missiles are a major challenge. By having a good indication a Shahed-136 made it to its target means follow-up attacks are not needed.

Actually changing the Shahed-136's route in real time via cellular connectivity could be possible, but only in very simple terms. There is no man-in-the-loop and beyond-line-of-sight communications with the drones, so simply commanding it on a different pre-programmed route mid-flight based on actionable intelligence could be useful, but this is a more complex affair.

There are other possibilities, like this setup being paired with a basic onboard electronic surveillance system. This way the drone can send back signatures of air defense systems it detects and their azimuths via a cellular network. This would be simple data, but if multiple drones over an area are providing it, those emissions could potentially be triangulated to give away the location of air defense radars, for instance. Once again, this is less likely and there has been no talk of such a system being installed onboard the drone, but it is certainly not an exotic application. In fact, Shahed variants and similar drones they are loosely based on exist for homing in on these active emissions and destroying the emitter.

Regardless of the goal, there is a major drawback to this functionality though. These drones give off little electromagnetic radiation as they fly pre-programmed routes and have no active sensors. This is one of their greatest advantages. When you put a cellular communications system on them, they emit a telltale signature, one that is omnidirectional and moving through the air at relatively high-speed (compared to say cars on the ground). Electronic surveillance measures (ESM) can detect and even geolocate these emissions, giving away the drone's presence and even its general position. This can allow for air defenses to more easily be brought to bear on the intruder.

The most common way to detect lower-end drones today is via this type of passive electronic surveillance, not radar, for instance, although usually these systems are looking for the frequencies used by two-way datalinks. Still, its a major vulnerability.

While this modification is certainly interesting, it isn't surprising for reasons stated above and because we have seen the rapid evolution of the Shahed-136 since their initial use well over a year ago. This has included new warhead designs and changes to the type's manufacturing processes, as well as new countermeasure paint, and more. With major dollars flowing to Iran to build and improve the drones, and Russia now working to produce them itself, we are seeing far more complex derivatives appear, including jet powered models with multiple seekers, which you can read all about here.

So, whether this is just an experiment or something greater, it is just another battlefield innovation and evolution of the Shahed-136 system. And it certainly will not be the last we will see.

Author's note: modified the navigation section to include cellular positioning updating as a solid possibility.

Contact the author: Tyler@thedrive.com and Howard@thewarzone.com

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Shahed-136 With Cellular Modem Found In Ukraine: What It Means - The War Zone