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KYIV, UKRAINE

Like its neighbor Russia, Ukraine is currently struggling against epidemics of dangerous contagious diseases, such as HIV, Hepatitis C, and multi-drug resistant tuberculosis. While the country has made remarkable progress thanks to the partnership of the post-2014 government with civil society organizations, Ukraine also faces an added burden. It must care for those at-risk citizens who live under Russian occupation, both in the Crimean peninsula and in the Russian occupied territories of the warzone in the east.

On Wednesday and Thursday, United Nations Special Envoy for HIV and AIDS in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, professor Michel Kazatchkine, held a conference at Kyivs Alliance for Public Health and then visited some of the citys harm-reduction organizations specializing in activities including needle exchanges, free medical testing, and condom distribution.

Speaking at the conference, Kazatchkine explained that the main vector for the spread of HIV in Ukraine and other Soviet countries was intravenous drug use, and that virus experienced rapid growth in the former Soviet Union area between 2005 and 2015.

Most prevalent

According to Kazatchkine, the phenomenon is a concentrated epidemic, meaning that the epidemic is prevalent among certain sub-groups of the population, but not the general population as a whole.

One of main reasons for the prevalence of the epidemic is the poor healthcare system inherited from the Soviet Union. Approximately 30 percent to 35 percent of HIV-positive people in Ukraine have access to treatment, though only 50 percent know about their HIV-positive status.

Despite the discouraging statistics, Kazatchkine said he sees progress in Ukraine thanks to the work of NGOs in partnership with the government. Unfortunately, a significant portion of Ukraines territory is under control of Russia and its proxies, and this has created serious obstacles for those trying to help fight the spread of HIV and AIDS.

The Crimean peninsula, for example, was formally annexed by the Russian Federation in 2014. As such, it has become fully subjected to Russian law. This has led to problems for patients in opioid-substitution therapy programs. While such programs operate successfully in Ukraine, Russian law does not permit opioid-substitution therapy. The program managed to continue in the occupied territories of the Donetsk and Luhansk, but eventually had to be terminated when supplies of the substitute drugs ran out.

Other harm-reduction programs in the eastern occupied territories have had more success, as Russia disavows any authority over the so-called Donetsk and Luhansk Peoples Republics (DNR and LNR).

Complications

Natalia Hurova works in occupied Luhansk as a coordinator for harm-reduction programs with the All-Ukrainian Public Health Association. We have been operating since 2014 in Luhansk and three small towns, Hurova told VOA.

We actually perform operations the same way we did before the conflict. We have contacts with the local authorities and they let us perform our activities, she said.

Despite official permission, the situation remains complicated by the front line, along which fighting still occurs daily. In the case of Luhansk, there are no official crossings directly into the city. Instead, supplies must first come through Donetsk, and then cross a state border between the two self-proclaimed republics. Hurova said this actually requires filling out customs papers for shipments.

For Hurova, the biggest challenge is maintaining opioid-substitution therapy, as the local authorities do not support the program. Some addicts enrolled in the program managed to travel to government-controlled territory to continue their treatment, but this is not possible for everyone. Some of those who could not make the move went back to illegal drugs, many of which are homemade and extremely dangerous, such as desomorphine, commonly known as krokodil.

Despite the setbacks, programs like needle exchanges and condom distribution still manage to function in the occupied territories thanks to special arrangements.

We have a corridor through which we receive supplies, said Hurova.

Positive outlook

In spite of seemingly overwhelming challenges coming from a hopelessly outdated and corrupt medical system along with foreign occupation, and war workers in the fight against HIV and other epidemics remain positive about the future.

Andriy Klepikov, executive director of the Alliance for Public Health, told conference attendees that his country has seen a number of positive signs and successful programs.

The APH still works in Crimea and the occupied part of the Donbass region, and has set a goal of 90/90/90 for HIV and AIDS, meaning 90 percent of the population tested, 90 percent access to treatment, and 90 percent successful results of viral suppression among treatment recipients.

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E. Ukraine Conflict Impacts War Against HIV - Voice of America

Without visas! reads this poster in Kyiv, celebrating Ukraines visa-free regime with the European Union, which comes into force this month. Photo (c) Serg Glovny/Zuma Press/PA Images. All rights reserved.After a rollercoaster ride of seemingly endless delays, foot-dragging and dashed hopes, visa-free travel to the EU has finally become a reality for Georgian and Ukrainian citizens.

A political climate hostile to immigration among EU states turned the rather technical procedure of lifting restrictions on short-term visas into a highly politicised ordeal. Concerns over the supposed threat of increased irregular migration and organised crime based largely on anecdotal evidence were used as an excuse by certain EU member states to stall the process and push through a much harsher visa suspension mechanism for all third countries that enjoy visa-free travel to the EU. As part of its strategy of externalising migration controls to third countries, the EU can now swiftly reinstate visa requirements if third countries fail to, for example, accept rejected asylum seekers or effectively prevent the transit of irregular migrants.

A political climate hostile to immigration among EU states turned the rather technical procedure of lifting restrictions on short-term visas into a highly politicised ordeal

Despite these concessions, Georgia and Ukraine have undoubtedly scored a significant symbolic victory. After all, it was Yanukovychs refusal to sign the EU Association Agreement that acted as the initial catalyst for the Euromaidan protests. While the visa waiver for citizens of these post-Soviet states represents a welcome opening in Europes soft paper curtain with its eastern neighbours, there is little impetus for states in the region to continue European integration or uphold human rights given the EUs preoccupation with protecting its external borders from migrants and asylum seekers.

Delivering on visa liberalisation may be a short-term win for the current governments in Georgia and Ukraine. But this new relationship can neither ensure public support for the EU, nor prevent democratic backsliding in the future.

Visas are the subject of endless online and offline discussions for citizens of post-Soviet countries that happen to be beyond the EUs pale of free movement. Although there is officially a common visa policy among Schengen states, there are also discrepancies between these formal rules and informal practices at various EU embassies. This has generated much confusion and uncertainty among applicants.

Obtaining that coveted multi-entry Schengen visa became a competitive sport for many independent travellers, with people posting tips and exchanging advice on how to deal with different EU embassies on social media and dedicated travel forums. From Belarus to Kazakhstan, young people posting grinning selfies of themselves next to Schengen visas in their passports is a testament to the extent to which visas have become fetishised objects in their own right.

To add insult to injury, Ukrainians in particular were subject to regulations that required them to check-in in person at EU embassies and get their passports stamped upon returning from their trip abroad. Back in 2011, there were multiple reports of consulates forcing Ukrainian citizens to leave behind deposits (in the form of personal documents or money) to ensure they would not overstay their visas. These measures, which were condemned by Ukrainian civil society organisations such as Europe Without Barriers, made obtaining a Schengen visa a thoroughly humiliating, time-consuming and frustrating procedure, particularly for young, independent travellers and those with limited financial means.

The Old World at the end of the tunnel: what the visa-free regime with the EU will give Ukraine." RT Russian article on Ukraines new visa regime. Source: RT.As hard as Kremlin-sponsored media are trying to downplay visa liberalisation as a minor accomplishment that will supposedly only benefit the countrys wealthy, globalised elites, the mere fact that an entire restrictive and complex bureaucracy will practically disappear is by itself a momentous occasion for Ukrainians and Georgians. While EU border guards will retain the right to refuse entry to visa-free travelers who fail to present evidence of an intent to return, experience shows that these regulations are only sporadically enforced.

Since the entry into force of the Moldova-EU visa-free travel agreement, for example, less than two percent of Moldovan travellers were denied entry to the EU and just 0.23% of Georgian visitors were turned around at the border since visa liberalisation became a reality for Georgia. The Russian government, which itself has engaged in visa liberalisation talks with the EU in the past, is very much aware of how coveted visa-free travel is for many of its citizens. The lifting of visa restrictions is undoubtedly a PR victory for pro-European forces in Georgia and Ukraine at least in the short term.

Visa liberalisation is undoubtedly a cause for celebration for regular Georgians and Ukrainians. But their respective governments should not expect to indefinitely ride on the coattails of this success

The road to visa liberalisation for Georgia and Ukraine was arduous and plagued by delays as the EU appeared to shift the goalposts for finalising the deal on multiple occasions. Whereas Moldova was granted visa liberalisation on schedule based on broad support at the EU level, visa liberalisation negotiations with Georgia and Ukraine were hampered by hardening stances on immigration and mobility on the part of many EU member states in the context of the so-called refugee crisis.

In fact, resistance on the part of some of the most influential EU member states such as France, Germany and the Netherlands threatened to sabotage the entire process, sapping the patience of Georgian and Ukrainian officials and weakening public trust in the prospect of imminent visa liberalisation. Unsubstantiated arguments about the dangers of an influx of irregular migration and criminality was used as justification for stalling negotiations in the same way as France, Germany and Netherlands had stalled visa liberalisation for the Western Balkans several years prior on the basis of the high number of asylum claims emanating from the region.

As with Western Balkan countries, the EU developed detailed visa liberalisation road maps for Ukraine and Georgia. These required the implementation of a broad package of reforms on external security, migration governance, defence of fundamental rights and the fight against corruption. These prerequisites for visa free-travel fit into a broader logic of conditionality whereby the prospect of the lifting of visas should be used as an incentive for upholding democratic norms and the rule of law.

While at least rhetorically, the EU has tied visa liberalisation to respect for democracy and human rights, the main emphasis of the required reforms is harmonisation with the EU on security and migration control. Thus, as part of the EUs push to externalise immigration control to neighboring countries, Georgia and Ukraine were forced to sign readmission agreements. These agreements oblige them to readmit not only their own citizens, but also third-country nationals a potential burden in the case of an uptick in the irregular transit of persons across their territories.

The EU also used the opportunity of visa liberalisation negotiations with Georgia and Ukraine to revise existing regulations by pushing through a much stricter visa waiver suspension mechanism that now applies to all existing visa liberalisation agreements. This would allow for visa-free travel to be frozen on short notice upon the recommendation of the Commission or an EU member state. This threat acts as a negative incentive for Georgia and Ukraine to stringently police irregular migration and uphold strict border controls. The negotiation procedures have clearly demonstrated that for the EU conditionality is first and foremost about cooperation on migration enforcement and border protection.

A resident of Luhansk presents a Ukrainian passport at a polling station during elections for members of the Peoples Council of the self-declared republic in November 2014. Photo (c): Valery Melnikov / RIA Novosti. All rights reserved.The symbolic value of visa liberalisation as a tangible benefit of European integration has meant that Georgian and Ukrainian officials were extremely motivated to fulfill the technical requirements for joining the visa-free club. Once the goal has been reached, however, governments have little incentive to actively pursue reforms and further integration.

As the first Eastern Partnership country to successfully obtain visa-free travel to Europe, Moldova is both a poster child and a warning for visa-free candidates. For Georgia and Ukraine, Moldova acts as an example of the extent to which the prospect of visa-free travel can act as an incentive for people living in breakaway republics and occupied territories to apply for passports of the respective internationally recognised governments. Indeed, Tbilisi had hoped that visa liberalisation could make Georgian passports a more attractive prospect for residents of breakaway Abkhazia (officials in Sukhumi turned up their noses).

There are precedents, however. Throughout the year after Moldovas visa-free regime with the EU entered force, some 27,000 citizens of Transnistria applied for new biometric Moldovan passports. Time will tell whether residents of Russian-occupied Crimea are also as enthusiastic (unless they have officially renounced their Ukrainian citizenship, they are also free to apply).

Visa liberalisation is neither a guarantee of further European integration, nor a vaccine against authoritarianism

But while both Georgia and Ukraine have reaffirmed their commitment to allow people living in breakaway regions to obtain biometric passports, it is questionable to what degree the utilitarian benefit of visa-free travel to Europe will lead to a change in allegiances among populations living in unrecognised republics. Set against the background of a smoothly functioning visa-free agreement with the EU, Moldova has concurrently witnessed a rise in Euroscepticism and anti-western attitudes amid democratic backsliding in the country. Visa liberalisation is therefore neither a guarantee of further European integration, nor a vaccine against authoritarianism.

Ukraine and Georgia may have successfully fulfilled all the technical requirements for visa liberalisation. But concerns remain about the extent to which these reforms will be structural rather than superficial. In Ukraine, for example, it took several attempts and strong pressure from civil society, the EU and President Poroshenko for the parliament to finally pass (albeit through gritted teeth) a watered down anti-discrimination amendment to the countrys Labour Code explicitly prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexuality and gender.

December 2015: Buildings across Georgia are lit up with the European Union flag as the government pushes for visa-free. Source: Youtube.

While these perfunctory changes to legislation were enough for the EU to give Ukraine the final green light for visa liberalisation, they will do little to actually protect LGBT rights. In fact, ever since it became clear that the visa-free liberalisation was irreversible, rumours have been circulating that these amendments could be reversed. Anti-corruption campaigners and human rights activists in Ukraine are already raising their voices about an ongoing effort by some members of the Ukrainian government to undo or sabotage ongoing reforms with the passing of a new amendment imposing a heavy administrative burden on NGOs combined with attempts to undermine the National Anti-Corruption Bureau (NABU).

After delivering on the promise of visa-free travel, Ukrainian and Georgian governments lose an important incentive to deepen reforms, uphold the rule of law and protect human rights. Indeed, we have seen this pattern in the Western Balkans. Here, governments have backpedalled on promises to uphold democratic values with recent crackdowns on the media in Serbia and violence erupting in the Macedonian parliament to impede the peaceful transition of power.

Embroiled in its own political crisis, the EU remains dangerously aloof and has failed to forcefully condemn anti-democratic developments in partner states

Embroiled in its own political crisis, the EU remains dangerously aloof and has failed to forcefully condemn anti-democratic developments in partner states. Instead, the EU appears to be primarily preoccupied with cracking down on irregular migration, keeping the number of asylum applicants low and the rate of return high all with the help of neighbouring countries. In its drive to limit migration at all costs, the EU has recently signed an agreement with Belarus to manage migration flows (a thinly veiled euphemism for keeping out migrants and refugees). This is despite the Lukashenka regimes abysmal human rights record and its policy of cooperating with repressive regimes in the post-Soviet space on the extradition of political dissidents and asylum seekers.

As long as countries like Georgia and Ukraine cooperate on migration, the EU will likely look the other way when it comes to democratic norms and human rights. The recent illegal extradition of an Azeri dissident from Georgia to Azerbaijan, allegedly by Azerbaijan's security services, is a worrying example of the type of human rights abuses that could increase in number in the absence of diplomatic pressure from the EU.

Moreover, the flagrant violations of international law with regards to asylum seekers on the part of EU member states such as Poland and Hungary further erodes the credibility of the EUs willingness to protect fundamental human rights both internally and abroad.

While the current euphoria over visa-free travel to the EU will continue into the summer, the question of labour migration to the EU remains the awkward elephant in the room.

Indeed, the EU remains unwilling to expand legal migration channels to the EU, but access to the European labour market remains a priority of job-seekers from Georgia and Ukraine. A former member of Saakashvilis government has already called on Ukrainian and Georgian officials to actively push for privileged access to the European labour market. Poland, for example, already has simplified employment procedures for citizens from Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. With over 1.3 million Ukrainian citizens currently working on its territory, Poland is increasingly dependent on migrant labour from the east despite the current governments xenophobic hostility towards refugees and non-white migrants. It is possible that other EU states, particularly in Central and Eastern Europe, will follow suit and provide bilateral access to their labour markets in the future.

Given the lack of opportunities in Georgia and Ukraine, pushing for access to the EU labour market will remain an uphill battle in a Europe less interested in promoting labour mobility

Visa liberalisation is undoubtedly a cause for celebration for regular Georgians and Ukrainians. But their respective governments should not expect to indefinitely ride on the coattails of this success. Governments should aim to keep citizens updated about the nature of visa-free programmes; data last year revealed that many Georgians remained poorly informed.

Given the continued lack of economic opportunities in Georgia and Ukraine, pushing for access to the European labour market will remain an uphill battle in the context of an EU that is increasingly less interested in promoting labour mobility. Furthermore, when migration control objectives take precedence over human rights considerations and democratic values (as is currently the case when looking at the EUs external policies), there is a real danger of post-Soviet states walking back on their commitments to meaningful democratic reforms.

Ultimately, using Georgia and Ukraine as buffer zones against irregular migration not only jeopardises these countries futures, but undermines the credibility and legitimacy of the EU as a political actor.

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Terms and conditions apply: Georgia and Ukraine's visa-free victory - Open Democracy

Don't look now, but Vladimir Putin's war in Ukraine isn't going how he expected.

While the Ukrainian army and its allied militias continue to skirmish with the Russian-backed separatists (and sometimes the Russian army itself) in the Donetsk and Luhansk regionsalmost 100 Ukrainian soldiers have been killed so far this year according to a Ukraine's defense ministry spokesman Andriy Petrenkothe larger contest is being decided in, of all places, Brussels.

To borrow from George W. Bush, Putin likely "misunderestimated" the Western response to Russian aggression. In late May, the Netherlands became the last country to ratify the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areathe key part of the Association Agreement that Viktor Yanukovich abandoned under pressure from Moscow, leading to his ouster.

European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker heralded the deal, saying it "sends an important signal from the Netherlands and the entire European Union to our Ukrainian friends: Ukraine's place is in Europe. Ukraine's future lies with Europe."

Once all the paperwork is signed, Ukrainians will have visa-free non-business travel within the EU. Ukrainian president Petro Poroshenko called the treaty a "divorce from Russia."

Meanwhile, the Ukrainian legislature is dividing up the assets. A new bill would allow individual parishes of the Orthodox Church to choose whether to associate with the Moscow Patriarchate or the Kiev Patriarchate. In a conflict that both sides see as a nation-state rejecting the hegemony of an ancient empire, allowing churches to choose a national affiliation can be a powerful ideological weapon.

Already, some signs point to a win for the Ukrainians. According to Ukrainian Razumkov Center, 92 percent of Ukrainian nationals consider themselves ethnic Ukrainians, up 6 percent from 2015 and 13 percent from 2001. Among respondents age 18-22, the majority tops 96 percent. Notably, the rate of "Ukrainianization" increased after the onset of Russian aggression, partially because ethnic Russians in Crimea weren't counted in the new survey, but also because people who once considered themselves bi-ethnic now consider themselves fully Ukrainian.

Just in case that's not enough to drive parishioners from the Moscow Patriarchate, another bill would place restrictions on any religious organization associated with an "aggressor state." (Any guess who that might be?) In addition to mandating that the religious group recognize Ukrainian territorial sovereignty, the bill would also allow the Ukrainian government to choose the group's leadership.

Recently, Poroshenko issued an executive decree blocking popular social media services VKontate and Odnoklassniki, and Yandex, Russia's version of Google. The Kremlin's famous propaganda outfits, RT and Sputnik, had become adept at using social media to spread disinformation.

Russia has twice shown its willingness to use military power to curb NATO and EU expansion. In 2008, when Georgians started pursuing NATO and EU membership too vigorously, Russia invaded, claiming it wasprotecting the interests of two separatist regions. When Yanukovich was forced from power in 2014 for failing to follow through in his pro-EU policies, Russia first seized Crimea and then semi-invaded Donetsk and Luhansk, claimingyou guessed itthat it was protecting the interests of two separatist regions.

Since then, things haven't gone so well. Sanctions leveled against Russian individuals and businesses for the theft of Crimea were bothersome, but not enough to worry the Kremlin. After Malaysian Airlines flight MH-17 was shot down, the United States, EU, Australia, and other Western countries imposed broader sectoral sanctions, which hurt the economy enough for the average Russian to feel it.

Russia still claims that the missile came from separatists, but how two-bit militias were able to obtain, train on, and use a sophisticated BUK anti-aircraft system is beyond explanation. The recent identification by Twitter-tracker Askai of Russian air defense officer Captain Mikhail Us, posing in social media photos with separatist militias in Ukraine, doesn't help the Kremlin's story, either.

Despite his best efforts, and largely due to his poor judgement, Putin has driven Ukraine and the EU to their closest relationship yet. That's bad for Putin, good for Europe, and good for us.

Read more here:
Amid Conflict With Russia, Ukraine Moves Closer to EU - The Weekly Standard

The engine for North Korea's newly developed intermediate range ballistic missile is suspected to have been sourced from foreign countries like Ukraine or Russia, a U.S. missile expert said Thursday. The North successfully test-fired the Hwasong 12 missile on May 14, demonstrating a big stride in its pursuit of an intercontinental ballistic missile capable of reaching the continental U.S. On that day experts predicted that by 2030 North Korea may have the capabilities to strike a U.S. city directly. A new article from Yonhap News quotes a much earlier date.

Yonhap News reports that the North said that it fired the missile at the highest angle and the missile reached the maximum altitude of more than 2,111.5 kilometers before landing in the East Sea 787 km away. Experts said the missile could have flown about 4,500 km if it had been fired at a normal angle.

Michael Elleman, senior follow for missile defense at the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), said that the missile's engine is very much different from that of the Musudan intermediate-range ballistic missile that the North was believed to be working on as a step toward ICBM development.

"This, to me, is a big deal," Elleman said during a briefing organized by 38 North. "It's highly unlikely that it was indigenously designed, developed and produced. My working hypothesis at this point, given the performance of the engine, its appearance, it likely is derived from an old Russian engine called the RD-250."

The expert also said that the North could have sourced it from Ukraine.

"What is important here is it comes from a different manufacturer than all the other engines that we've seen, and missiles we've seen, used in North Korea," he said. "We could be in for surprises in the future. It's very difficult to bound their capabilities and what might occur in the future, because we don't know if they have access to new and improved engines."

Elleman said that the Hwasong 12 is the "first step" towards developing an ICBM capable of striking the U.S. Asked how close the North is to developing such an ICBM, the expert said that the North would need at least three years to conduct enough tests if they want to have 75 percent confidence in an ICBM.

"So I don't foresee an operationally viable ICBM before 2020, maybe 2021," he said. "For emergency use, they could shorten that timeframe, but at the risk that one or a large fraction of their missile force would fail."

Yonhap News copy / TRUNEWS contribution.

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N. Korea's New IRBM Missile, Ukraine or Russia? - TRUNEWS

In the early days of 2014, little green men, irregular paramilitary forces, began popping up across Crimean outposts. The West assumed they were Russian soldiers, but could they be sure?

Putin claimed these obscured troops were pro-Russian local defense forces, indigenous to the Ukraine but fans of the Kremlin. But Mike Mariani explained in his recent expose how the Kremlin carefully orchestrated an elaborate political spectacle to create the appearance of strong support for the annexation. This spectacle is known in Russian as dramaturgia, or theater craft.

Only a few days later, these insurgents laid the groundwork for the Russian invasion and seizure of Crimea. The chaos created by little green men delayed Western responses to a surprise Russian invasion providing the Kremlin the upper hand militarily and creating what appeared to be legitimacy to the March 2014 Crimean referendum.

Today, Vladimir Putin, during an interview in St. Petersburg, changed his previous denials admitting Russians might have meddled in the U.S. election in 2016. Similar to obfuscation in Crimea, Putin said patriotically minded Russians may have conducted the cyber attacks.

Hackers, he contended, are like artists who choose their targets depending on how they feel when they wake up in the morning. He added that Russian hackers fight against those who say bad things about Russia.

This response reiterates a Russian pattern, tacit omission of Russian involvement with plausible deniability with regards to Kremlin responsibility. Whether its on the ground in Crimea or online in social media, Russias dramaturgia seeks to mask overt government actions as grassroots nationalism.

In both cyberhacking and cyberinfluence, the Kremlins layering of proxies and agents mask Russias responsibility, confuse fact and fiction, and frustrate Western efforts to stop the march of Russian Active Measures.

Russian Active Measures to sway the U.S. election, by design, sought to obscure attribution through denial and deception. Whether a physical incursion or a digital revolution, the Kremlin confuses reality to push their preferred perception of strength and widespread support.

Here at The Daily Beast last summer, Andrew Weisburd and I showed how Russia created fake news of a terrorist attack at the U.S. airbase in Incirlik, Turkey to influence U.S. audiences. The Kremlin created the equivalent of little cyber green men creating accounts that look like grassroots Americans and amplifying messages through automated bots designed to create the impression of larger discussions.

Russia pairs these covert bots and personas with real people and media outlets, physically placed outside of Russia, that spew and promote Russian propaganda. These grey entities of uncertain attribution create the virtual world impression of grassroots Russian nationalism in Western countries. Deeper examination of these rabble rousers and their outlets yields a familiar patternRussian emigrants, educated by the Kremlin, who want to reside abroad but preach for Putin. After all, if theyre so motivated by Russian nationalism, why live abroad?

Critical in the creation of cyber dramaturgia and for the Kremlin to maintain plausible deniability are physical actors doing Russias preferred bidding. As I noted during my recent testimony to the Senate Armed Services subcommittee on cybersecurity, the Kremlin cultivates Useful Idiots who unwittingly promote Russian positions, and recruits Fellow Travelers, like-minded and witting supporters of Putin, amongst foreign populations to further Russian aims and solidify their legitimacy.

These real-world actors become propaganda tools that Russias cyber propagandists promote leading to the growth of supportive communities amongst U.S. populationsnotably the alt-rightwho join in promotion and potentially hacking unwittingly at the behest of Russia.

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Putins backhanded confession resembled the traditional Russian playbook and mirrors claims in the Christopher Steele dossier on page eight, where a source reported the intelligence effort against the Clinton campaign used Russian migr and associated offensive cyber operators based in the US; and state sponsored cyber operatives working in Russia.

From the start, the Kremlin prepared to be caught in the act and prepared their response.

Russian intelligence provides Putin plausible deniability by creating little cyber green men through contract and coercion rather than recruitment and training. Whereas the NSAs cyberoffensive capability must be developed endogenously by identifying, training, and retaining top cybertalent wearing the American credentials, Russias military intelligence arm, the GRU, builds their hacker cadres from Russian cybersecurity companies and the criminal underground.

Rather than drape them in military fatigues, the Kremlin keeps these hackers and cyberexperts in the civilian world. Contracting cutouts and criminals keep attribution to the Kremlin a step removed. Unsurprisingly, the Obama administration on Dec. 29 of last year sanctioned a Russian company, Zor Security known for offensive security research, alongside the GRU. Russian intelligence pressure cybercriminals to conduct hacking as needed on their behalf in exchange for a vacated prison sentence or co-opt bots when needed as a proxy for Russian intelligence activities.

President Trump appears to be the only one who is not convinced Russians, either officially or unofficially, hacked and influenced the U.S. election. Seventeen intelligence agencies and the Kremlin agree that Russia, not China or someone in a basement, broke into the DNC and many other Americans private databases and email servers.

"Putins timing also seems strange, coming the day after revelations that President Trump is negotiating the return of Russian compounds in the U.S.the same ones that were taken by the Obama administration in response to Kremlin election meddling. Is Putin trying to help Trump move past the controversy, or is he taking credit for swaying American minds?

The Russian meddling investigations, numbering three, will only ramp up in the coming months and Putin appears to play from the outside. Will his comments seek to ease tensions or further promote Active Measures to foment conflict in U.S. politics? We dont know which one it will be, but we can be sure he has a plan. Unlike America, the Kremlin always does.

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Putin's Hidden Insurgency Tore Up Ukraine. Now It's Coming for Your Inbox. - Daily Beast