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It was bitterly cold. Soldiers huddled together wearing heavy winter jackets and black, Army-issued beanies underneath their helmets. The engines of Humvees and trucks hummed collectively, a cacophony of noise that drowned out conversations. The battalion convoy was ready to step off from Germany for a NATO exercise in Latvia. My battalion commander approached as I hopped into my Humvee. Somewhat jokingly, over the din of running engines and soldiers preparing to move out, he asked, Which day do you think it is going to happen? I think Friday. I responded, My bet is on Wednesday, sir. The date was February 13, 2022.

Both of our guesses missed the mark, but not by much. The following week, on Thursday, Russia began its invasion of Ukraine, kicking off the war that has raged for nearly two years.

During the six-day convoy I read a book that I had started in December 2021 as the Russian military buildup along the border with Ukraine continued. Titled Appeasing Hitler, the historical work by Tim Bouverie provides insight into the rationale behind the British policy of appeasement in the period leading up to World War II. It also serves as a cautionary tale of the appeasement strategys failure. A policy premised on acquiescing to a tyrants demands in the hopes of avoiding war accomplished the opposite. Instead, appeasement served to increase Hitlers appetite for conquest and contributed to the eruption of the most destructive conflict in human history.

There have been many comparisons between Russian President Vladimir Putins words and those of Adolf Hitler in the 1930s since the onset of Russias full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Both asserted the importance of reclaiming historical lands, protecting their respective countries ethnic populations living in the near abroad, and the fact that their aggressive actions were defensivethat they were the victims instead of the aggressors. And although it is understandable why many compare Putins invasion of Ukraine to the actions of Adolf Hitler in the lead up to World War II, Bouveries Appeasing Hitler provides an opportunity for a different comparison, to a much lesser-known war.

The Italo-Abyssinian War of 1935 is an obscure conflict, overshadowed by the world war that would shortly follow. However, the parallels between Benito Mussolinis invasion of Abyssinia (modern-day Ethiopia) and Putins invasion of Ukraine are striking. Historical comparisons are inherently imperfect. We cannot replicate the political, economic, social, and technological conditions that existed in the past. However, we can extract and examine themes and notable decisions in history to provide the foundation for important lessons for todays leaders. A reexamination of the Italian conquest provides such lessons that underscore mistakes to avoid and the possible consequences the West faces if support for Ukraine falters.

First, however, a basic understanding of Italys imperial war is necessary. Before Mussolini and Hitler officially formed an alliance, Italy actually worked alongside Britain and France in the early 1930s. Mussolinis Italy even joined the Stresa Front in April 1935 alongside Britain and France to counter Nazi Germanys Versailles Treaty violations. But despite pledging to maintain peace in Europe, Mussolini had other intentions in Africa. Disregarding warnings of an Italian offensive in late 1934 and early 1935, the British government refused to confront Mussolini. Britain viewed Nazi Germany as the threat of the future and believed Italy was a crucial ally.

Britain and Frances refusal to deter Italian aggression threatened more than the sovereignty of Abyssinia. Following World War I, the League of Nations emerged and introduced a new age of international law. The league, which Abyssinia had joined in 1923, provided the protection of Article 16. This article stipulated that all members would join in common action against states that made war against another member.

The British political leadership, however, did not want to embroil Britain in a war with Italy. Britain, they argued, had no vital interests at stake. Thus, convinced neither France nor Britain would intervene, Mussolini launched the invasion of Abyssinia in October 1935.

In November 1935, France and Britain sought a negotiated end to the conflict that would have ceded the majority of Abyssinian territory to Italy. News leaked of this backdoor diplomacy and league members were outraged. France and Britains fiasco meant the death of the credibility of the league and the abandonment of Abyssinia to its fate at the hands of a stronger power. By May 1936 Italian forces entered Addis Ababa and declared victory.

Throughout the entire Italian-Abyssinian conflict, there was one keen observer: Adolf Hitler. He watched as the authority of the League of Nations vanished before his eyes. Most importantly, he witnessed Italy use aggression to achieve political goals and face no severe consequences.

As we return to the present day, one may argue that the United States now fits Britains role as the declining global power. The specter of a looming global threat is no longer Germany, but China. Vladimir Putins Russia, challenging international norms, is Mussolinis Italy. The state sovereignty threatened is not Abyssinias, but Ukraines. It is not the League of Nations at risk, but the pillars of the US-led postWorld War II orderthe United Nations, NATO, and even the international norms that have ruled since the conclusion of World War II.

We can draw numerous lessons from the Italian-Abyssinian debacle: from the necessity of major global powers abstaining from negotiating away the sovereignty of smaller states, to the importance of conventional military deterrence in complicating the political calculations of would-be aggressors, to the need for preemptive and sustained economic punishments for aggressor states in violation of international norms and laws. But there is one main lesson that is most important and applicable to our world today.

A successful deterrence now may prevent the next aggressor. Hitler watched gleefully as the League of Nations self-imploded. Mussolinis success in Abyssinia emboldened Hitler along his path toward European domination. The primary modern comparison that comes to mind is the threat of China and President Xi Jinping deciding to employ military force to reclaim dominion over Taiwan. By understanding the dynamics in play in 1935, it becomes clear that if the United States and other members of the international community want to deter aggression against the island, then it is in their collective security interest to continue to support Ukraine. But the China-Taiwan scenario is far from the only risk. Other potential aggressors, such as Iran and North Korea, are also watching to see whether Ukraines international supporters will remain steadfast over the long term.

Turning specifically to the United States, the debate continues in Washington with respect to passing a new aid package for Ukraine. There are legitimate reservations within Congress on passing this funding. Concern over the accountability of aid provided to Ukraine is reasonable and the desire to have an end-game strategy for the conflict is understandable. But the fear that continued aid to Ukraine will only increase the likelihood of direct conflict between NATO and Russia misses the mark. It is the absence of continued aid, which would precipitate a weakened Ukraine and potential collapse that enables a larger Russian victory, that raises the risk of a NATO-Russia, US-China, or other large-scale war. The only lesson Vladimir Putin and other potential aggressors will learn from an end to US aid to Ukraine and a complete Russian victory in Ukraine is that aggression works and that authoritarian systems can outlast the West.

Britain declared it had no vital interests at stake in Abyssinia. Some argue the same with respect to US interests in Ukraine today. But maintaining support for Ukraine through the continuation of military and economic aid may not only guarantee a more just peace in Ukraine; it may also help prevent the next, larger war from occurring.

First Lieutenant Dean D. LaGattuta is a 2020 graduate of the United States Military Academy at West Point, majoring in political science and minoring in Eurasian studies. He serves as a military intelligence officer in the United States Army.

The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.

Image credit: kremlin.ru, via Wikimedia Commons

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Putin Isn't Hitler, He's Mussoliniand Ukraine Is His Abyssinia - Modern War Institute - West Point

North Koreas new arsenal of ballistic missiles are set for their first real-world test on the battlefield in Ukraine. But based on the success of US interceptor systems in that conflict, Kim Jong-un may be worried.

Burning through his stockpiles as the war in Ukraine nears the two-year mark, Russian President Vladimir Putin has turned to Kim to provide short-range ballistic missiles and more than 1 million rounds of artillery. The North Korean missiles sent so far are similar in size and flight dynamics to Russias Iskander series, weapons experts have said.

A report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies showed that the US Patriot air defence system has so far been largely effective in countering Russias missiles. In June, when Russia tried to take out a Patriot battery protecting Kyiv, the system shot down all 34 Iskander and Kinzhal missiles Russia fired, CSIS said.

Thats a warning to Putin about the KN-23 and KN-24 missiles Kim is believed to be supplying. The systems are designed to be deployed quickly, manoeuvrable in flight and reliably hit targets with a degree of precision. That might not be enough.

Missile test a sign North Korea more willing to challenge South, US

The Patriot missile defence system should be able to intercept North Koreas short-range ballistic missiles, given its effectiveness against Russian Iskanders, said Shaan Shaikh, a fellow in the Missile Defense Project at CSIS, a Washington-based think tank.

Kims military has fired off about 120 of its missiles in tests since 2019 and is likely aiming to build an arsenal that could eventually run into the thousands. North Koreas missiles are priced at about US$5 million each, according to data compiled by the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses and released in 2022 by South Korean lawmaker Shin Won-sik, but the costs to Kim have likely dropped since then as he ramped up production.

That makes sales of the weapons a potentially significant driver of foreign revenue or crucial goods from abroad, something the sanctions-hit North Korean economy badly needs. Yet Kims isolated regime, which has long used suspect activity to generate hard cash, isnt just providing the missiles to Putin for commercial reasons.

The use of the North Korean missiles appears to be quite new, and data is likely sparse on their performance. Any information Kim can glean about his weaponrys performance in real-world combat could also help his regime refine future designs and attack strategies.

02:12

Kim Jong-un vows to accelerate war preparations, while the South holds rare defence drills

Kim Jong-un vows to accelerate war preparations, while the South holds rare defence drills

Russias use of DPRK ballistic missiles in Ukraine also provides valuable technical and military insights to the DPRK, the US State Department said in a joint statement this month that included about 50 countries, referring to North Korea by its formal name.

Wreckage thought to be from North Korean missiles was in the debris from strikes in Kharkiv in early January, when it wasnt likely under Patriot protection. Dmytro Chubenko, a spokesperson for the Kharkiv prosecutors office, told reporters the missiles were different in key aspects from Russian models, and he believed they were from North Korea, the Associated Press reported.

The transfer of such missiles from North Korea, with ranges of 400-800 kilometres (250-500 miles), increases the pool of weapons the Kremlin can draw upon to attack Ukraine as the war grinds on.

Kim, meanwhile, is trying to modernise his arsenal even more. His regime started the year by firing off a new type of warhead it said moves at high speeds and turns in the air, which is mounted on an intermediate-range missile designed to hit all of Japan and US bases in Guam.

South Korea and Japan both deploy Patriot batteries to protect key areas from the likes of North Korea. South Korean forces operate 8 PAC-2 and PAC-3 batteries around Seoul and US forces operate PAC-3 systems in Japan at US military bases, particularly Okinawa, according to a report from the Arms Control Association.

The Patriot system has a powerful radar that is able to track up to 100 targets including cruise missiles, ballistic missiles and aircraft, according to a report from the Congressional Research Service.

Nevertheless, Russia has used heavy barrages of missiles to overwhelm Ukraines defences. In late December, Russia ramped up its bombardment campaign, firing hundreds of missiles at cities across Ukraine, killing dozens. The US determined Russia probably used North Korean missiles in that attack.

What are solid-fuel missiles, and why is North Korea developing them?

The influx from North Korea is likely to draw down the stocks of missiles for Patriot batteries and other air defence systems in Ukraine, in a strategy of attrition that could increase the changes for successful strikes.

As a result, Nato members pledged in January to ramp up production and procurement of 1,000 Patriot missiles to bolster Ukraines air defences, at a cost of US$5.5 billion.

Patriot is the only system that can deal with all types of Russian missiles, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said in October when Germany pledged to provide a Patriot battery to protect Ukraine. Now hell see if that includes the newer North Korean varieties as well.

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North Korean missiles face reality check on Putins battlefield - South China Morning Post

Its winter in Ukraine again. The snow is piling up, the temperature is dropping, and the days are short. During the long nights, nearly two years into the full-scale war, the skies above the entire 600-mile frontline are filled with Ukrainian and Russian drones. In past centuries, the machinery of war would grind to a halt when harsh conditions pushed human endurance to its limits. The two most famous military campaigns in this part of the worldNapoleons invasion of Russia in 1812 and Hitlers in 1941succumbed to devastating casualties as the season changed. Today, the hapless infantry who still fill trenches and strongpoints across Ukraine are contending with the same unforgiving winter. But the drones that have come to dominate this war are limited only by their battery livesshortened by the coldand the availability of night-vision cameras.

In the early months of the war, the frontlines shifted rapidly as Ukrainian forces pushed back the Russian offensive. Ukraine held the upper hand in drone warfare, adapting commercial technologies and introducing new weapons to keep Russian forces on the back foot. Since October 2022, however, little territory has changed hands. The Ukrainian army has scored some recent wins, including precise attacks on Russias Black Sea Fleet and on targets deep inside Russian territory. The Russian army, too, has faced headwinds, losing the equivalent of almost 90 percent of the soldiers and equipment it began the war with, according to some reports. But Russia has also adjusted its strategy, and the conflict is now moving in its favor. Moscow shifted its defense industry to a war footing, and current military spending is more than twice prewar levels. It has also launched thousands of dronesincluding the Iranian-designed Shahed model now assembled in both Iran and Russiawith new capabilities to target expensive Western-supplied defenses in Ukraine.

After Russian troops first marched on Kyiv, Ukrainian forces were praised for the technological ingenuity that helped them thwart their more powerful invader. Now, Russia has caught up in the innovation contest and Ukraine is struggling to maintain the flow of military assistance from its external partners. In order to undercut Russias advantage in this phase of the war, Ukraine and its allies will need to not just ramp up defense production but also invest in developing and scaling technologies that can counter Russias formidable new drones.

I first visited Ukraine in September 2022 at the invitation of the Ukrainian-based Yalta European Strategy forum. Witnessing firsthand the devastation of the Russian invasion, I was blown away by the determination, resilience, and resourcefulness of the Ukrainian people, culture, and tech industry. The trip inspired me to dedicate time and resources to Ukraines battle for democracy, supporting both humanitarian causes and Ukraines tech ecosystem. I have since returned to Ukraine several times to learn from Ukrainian partners. Conversations during my most recent visit, in December 2023, emphasized the value technology has brought to Ukrainian offensives and the challenge presented by Russias new materiel and drone tactics.

The use of drones has underpinned many of Ukraines recent successes on the battlefield. In its campaign in the Black Sea, the Ukrainian military has relied largely on drones and, as of November 17, claimed to have destroyed 15 Russian naval vessels and damaged 12 more since the initial 2022 invasion. Ukraines attacks on Russias maritime forces have kept sea lanes in the region clear enough for grain shipments, which are vital to Ukraines economy, to resume. The drone strikes have also denied Russia the option to fire missiles on Ukrainian territory from offshore ships and have weakened Russias defense of Crimea and position in the Black Seaa symbolic, economic, and military victory for Ukraine.

Ukrainian drone strikes have also reached deeper and deeper into Russia in recent months. Over one week in August, a series of attacks targeted six Russian regions and set a military airfield ablaze. Ukraine has proved that it is willing and able to extend the range of its military operations, and Ukrainian officials have warned that as the war continues they will take more of the fight to Russian territory.

For now, drones are most heavily concentrated along the frontlines in eastern Ukraine. When asked to identify the best tank-killing weapon in their arsenals, Ukrainian commanders of all ranks give the same answer: first-person-view drones, which pilots on the ground maneuver while watching a live feed from an onboard camera. These drones have made tank-on-tank engagement a thing of the past. A Ukrainian battle commander also told me that FPV drones are more versatile than an artillery barrage at the opening of an attack. In a traditional attack, shelling must end as friendly troops approach the enemy trench line. But FPVs are so accurate that Ukrainian pilots can continue to strike Russian targets until their fellow soldiers are mere yards away from the enemy.

In other ways, however, Kyiv has lost its advantages in the drone war. Russian forces have copied many of the tactics that Ukraine pioneered over the summer, including waging large coordinated attacks that use multiple types of drones. First, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance drones hover high above the ground to survey the battlefield and identify targets from afar. They then relay the enemys location to pilots operating low-flying, highly maneuverable FPV drones, which can launch precision strikes against both stationary and moving targets, all from a safe distance from the frontline. After these drones eliminate initial targets, military vehicles fight through minefields to begin the ground assault. Since late 2022, Russia has used a combination of two domestically produced drones, the Orlan-10 (a surveillance drone) and the Lancet (an attack drone), to destroy everything from high-value artillery systems to combat jets and tanks. Ukraine surpassed Russia in drone attacks early in the conflict, but it has no combination of drones that match Russias dangerous new duo.

At the same time that the Orlan-Lancet team has become decisive in battle, Russias superior electronic warfare capabilities allow it to jam and spoof the signals between Ukrainian drones and their pilots. If Ukraine is to neutralize Russian drones, its forces will need the same capabilities. A limited number of Ukrainian brigades have acquired jamming equipment from U.S. suppliers or domestic startups. Without it, the combination of Russian attack drones and Russian jamming of Ukrainian drones threatens to push Ukrainian forces back into the territory that they fought so hard to free early in the war.

Most Western-supplied weapons have fared poorly against Russias antiaircraft systems and electronic attacks. When missiles and attack drones are aimed at Russian sites, they are often spoofed or shot down. U.S. weapons in particular can often be thwarted via GPS jamming. A small number of U.S. F-16 fighter jets are set to arrive in Ukraine later this year, and they should quickly get to work targeting Russias own jets, which are currently devastating Ukrainian defenses with guided bombs. But it is not clear how even the F-16s will perform amid active electronic warfare and against the long-range missiles deployed by Russian aircraft.

Russia has ramped up its military offensives in spite of the harsh winter weather, and increased production capacity has played a big role in the latest advance. Ukrainian officials estimate that Russia can now produce or procure around 100,000 drones per month, whereas Ukraine can only churn out half that amount. International sanctions have not stopped other types of Russian military production, either. Russia has doubled the number of tanks built annually before the invasion, from 100 to 200. Russian companies are also manufacturing munitions far more cheaply than their Western counterparts, often compromising on safety to do so: a 152-millimeter artillery shell costs around $600 to produce in Russia, whereas a 155-millimeter shell costs up to ten times that much to produce in the West. This economic disadvantage will be difficult for Ukraines allies to overcome.

After months of relative calm in Kyiv, Russia has also resumed regular drone attacks on Ukraines capital. So far, Ukrainian forces have managed to detect and shoot down nearly all the incoming aircraft, but this protection will be difficult to sustain as Moscow introduces technological upgrades to drones, increases domestic production, develops new ways to evade detection, and launches high-volume attacks that simply overwhelm Ukrainian air defenses. Here, too, Ukraine is at an economic disadvantageone of Russias drones of choice, the Shahed, is far less expensive than the air defense systems required to neutralize it.

Even though Russian cyberwarfare has had relatively little effect so far, the Ukrainian militarys reliance on mobile data and smartphones to coordinate operations leaves it vulnerable to future attacks. A recent uptick in Russian attempts to shut down cellular networks across Ukraine could have severe consequences. With Russian capacity expanding on multiple fronts in this fight, Ukrainian commanders have become less optimistic than they were just a few months ago. Their focus has turned from offensive operations to defending their current positions and keeping their forces intact.

The next few months will be difficult for Ukraine. When I visited Kyiv in December, the government officials and military officers I talked to shared their fear that Russian President Vladimir Putin would announce a second round of mass conscription and a major offensive in eastern Ukraine after Russias election in March. Russias resilient war economy, expanded materiel production, and population edge, combined with uncertainty about the Wests continued support of Ukraineespecially in a U.S. election yeargive Putin reason to double down. Meanwhile, the home-field advantage that Ukraine enjoyed in the early days of the invasion has eroded. Russian troops have settled in on Ukrainian soil and littered eastern Ukraine with land mines, which injure and kill Ukrainian combatants and civilians alike even in areas that the Ukrainian army has won back. The growing strength of Russias defenses in eastern Ukraine helps explain the disappointing outcome of Ukraines long-heralded summer offensive, too. As Russian forces now probe parts of the frontline for weakness, the Ukrainian military has adopted an active defense position. It has been able to stymie Russian assaults, but that success often comes at a high cost.

In this phase of the war, as the frontlines stabilize, the sky above will fill with ever-greater numbers of drones. Ukraine aims to acquire more than two million drones in 2024half of which it plans to produce domesticallyand Russia is on track to at least match that procurement. With so many aircraft deployed, any troops or equipment moving on the ground will become easy targets. Both armies will therefore focus more on eliminating each others weapons and engaging in drone-to-drone dogfights. As technological advances increase the range of drones, their operators and other support systems will be able to stay hundreds of miles from the battle.

But remote operation of a drone-centric war will not necessarily lower the human cost. In fact, developments so far suggest that the opposite is true. As Ukrainian military officials explained to me in December in Avdiivka, a city in the Donetsk region, ground assaults remain an integral part of Russias drone targeting strategy. The Russian army sends groups of poorly trained draftees and convicts to attack the Ukrainian frontline, forcing Ukrainian troops to respond and reveal their camouflaged positions. Now visible to the drones overhead, the Ukrainian positions are then pounded by Russian artillery. I heard estimates of around 100 to 200 people dying on each side every day in this type of combatand the number could rise as the lethality and quantity of drones increase.

Meanwhile, in both Europe and the United States, war fatigue is setting in and support for Ukraine is beginning to crack. Waning financial and military aid from the West could turn the conflicts fragile stalemate into an opening for Russia. Russia has enough ammunition stocks and production lines to continue fighting for at least another year; Ukraine will need to secure additional Western ammunition supplies if it is to plan that far into the future. Ukraine also needs antiaircraft and attack missiles to strike fast-moving airborne targets. Recognizing that U.S. weapons that rely on GPS may not stand up well to Russian electronic warfare, Ukrainian startups are working around the clock to develop advanced drones that can resist spoofing and jamming. Only with more and better weapons systemsboth offensive and defensivecan Ukraine turn the tide on the battlefield. Filling this gap in innovation and procurement will require sustained financial and technical support from Kyivs allies.

The prognosis could change with a decisive shift on the battlefield, but for now neither Russia nor Ukraine is expecting a swift end to the fighting. To avoid a protracted war, the West needs to back a concerted military effort to push back Russian forces and a diplomatic effort to bring the parties to the negotiating table. The alternative is years of further suffering for those in the war zone. While I was in Kyiv in December, ten Russian missiles were launched and intercepted by air defenses, including U.S.-supplied Patriot missiles, in the middle of the night. Fifty-two people in my neighborhood were injured by falling debrisincluding six children.

Ukrainians deep love for their country fuels their resilience and determination, even as they face constant reminders of the deadly reality of war. Putin is betting that internal divisions and divided attention will turn Western capitals away from the Ukrainians fight for survival as the conflict enters a difficult new phase. Only by neutralizing the advantages that Russia has gained can Ukraine and its allies prove him wrong.

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Ukraine Is Losing the Drone War - Foreign Affairs Magazine

KYIVThere arent enough volunteers in Ukraine to make up for the constant flow of dead and wounded soldiers, filling the countrys graveyards and hospital beds.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky says his military commanders seek an additional 450,000 to 500,000 men to compensate for casualties and expand the army in 2024. Finding men to replace the fallen is becoming more complex.

As peoples hope of a quick victory has faded and horror stories fill living rooms, some Ukrainian men are hiding to avoid mobilization.

Some stay home and avoid the streets, where police or military officers hand out draft notices and take men to military bases. Others flee Ukraine with falsified documents.

All healthy men between 18 and 60 are prohibited from leaving the country, so you need fake medical records to cross the border. The Daily Beast, for example, knows of one couple who bought fake documents stating that their child is disabled in order to let the father to flee the country.

A Ukrainian military member and a police officer looking for men to check in western Ukraine.

In a city in Western Ukraine, The Daily Beast met a 31-year-old man who is trying to avoid being drafted into the army. He spoke to The Daily Beast on the condition of anonymity as he worries that he will be dragged to the military after publication.

I cannot trust that they will not bring me directly to the frontline.

Sergei

I dont want to die. I hear that a lot of soldiers who come back from the frontline have psychological issues. They are different men, says the man who The Daily Beast will call Sergei. Some will probably have drinking problems and a lot of other issues and no future. I want to have a future.

Sergei, who has no children and isnt married, says that he understands the need for more men and supports a free Ukraine. Howeverlike some of his friendshe doesnt feel like a soldier and isnt sure he would do well at the frontline. Last year, he received a draft notice on the streets from military officers ordering him to report at a nearby military base.

He never went. Sergei knows he might be taken directly to a base if the authorities find him.

I hear a lot of stories of people who are being taken on the streets and are pushed to the frontline without much training, and I have even heard stories of people being sent without training and being killed after just a few days, says Sergei, who works as a delivery person, I will try to avoid that for as long time as it is possible. I want to have a future.

The overall number of people like Sergei, who dont want to join the army, is unknown. People are often afraid to raise their voices in public and simply stay at home to avoid being detected. It is estimated that around 20,000 men have fled Ukraine illegally since the Russian invasion began, according to the BBC. At least three men are reported to have drowned trying to escape Ukraine into the European Union or Moldova, according to the State Border Service of Ukraine.

On social media, there are often videos of what appear to be Ukrainian military men handing out draft notices on the streets and checking young men at checkpoints. Videos of fighting-age men being pulled into vans to be sent to bases for check-ups have gone viral. People often dont stay at their registered addresses, making it harder for the military to find them.

Those who try to avoid mobilization are about 1-5%. They are definitely not critical to the defense of Ukraine, said Fedir Venislavskyi to the BBC in November, when he was the president's parliamentary representative.

Western observers have said that one of Ukraine's major issues is its ability to find more men for the war effort, as the Russian population is around 3.5 times larger than Ukraine. Recently, General Valeriy Zaluzhnyi, head of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, wrote an Op-Ed in The Economist, arguing that Ukraine needs more men at the frontline.

Our capacity to train reserves on our own territory is also limited We cannot easily spare soldiers who are deployed to the front, (and) Russia can strike training centers. And there are gaps in our legislation that allow citizens to evade their responsibilities, he said.

As of now, no Ukrainian man between 18 and 60 can leave Ukraine. Men between 27 and 60 can be mobilized to the army, while men between 18 and 26 can only join voluntarily. Volodymyr Zelensky is considering lowering the mobilization age to 25.

The Ukrainian parliament is also considering other legislative changes to increase the number of people eligible for military service. Among other things, people are now only categorized as either fit or unfit for service. Previously, people could be partly suitable, such as those with minor health issues like asthma. These proposed changes are making men, who were previously only partly suitable, worried about their future.

In December, the Ukrainian Defence Minister Rustem Umerov told DW that all Ukrainian men between 25 and 60, living abroad will be asked to report for service. According to the European statistics agency Eurostat, 19.9 percent of the 4.2 million Ukrainians who have received temporary protection status in the European Union since the invasion are men.

We are still discussing what should happen if they dont come voluntarily, said Umerov.

Ukrainian soldiers on the frontline take part in a medical training in Donetsk Oblast.

At the beginning of the invasion, Sergei considered volunteering for the army like thousands of his fellow citizens, but the fear of what he might encounter made him hesitant. Sergei then tried to find a way to leave Ukraine legally but failed. He says that he doesnt want to leave Ukraine illegally as he would be afraid of the repercussions.

In Ukraine, so-called guides offering to help men cross the border can be found on Telegram's social media site for about $1,300 and up. Sergei often keeps updated on the situation on Telegram, where people share stories.

He has friends fighting at the frontline and can understand why some soldiers are angry at people like him for not doing what they consider a man's duty.

Sergei knows that people might be angry at him for not joining the army but says that he wants a future and that he wouldnt make a good soldier.

But I dont think that it is reasonable that we should all be fighting. Some are more scared and not fit for it, says Sergei. I understand that these soldiers are angry because they see their friends dying. They are full of anger against everyone.

I might be able to help the army in some ways, which is not at the frontline, but I cannot trust that they will not bring me directly to the frontline, says Sergei, who adds that he has heard stories of people with diabetes or asthma, who are taken to the front.

The Daily Beast also spoke to another man on condition of anonymity. The 27-year-old, who we will call Alex, volunteered for the army last year but was sent home due to too many volunteers. He has a heart condition and tells The Daily Beast that he wants to help the army but that he is reluctant to volunteer again due to the risk of being sent to the front.

He is worried that everyone being taken now will simply be used as cannon fodder at the frontline and that the army wouldnt mind sending people with disabilities to the frontline.

On social networks, you can hear things are incorrectly done. Some people, who are taken to the army to serve other functions, end up at the frontline after a few months anyway because a commander changes his mind, says Alex.

Alex wants to help the Ukrainian army but is worried that they will just send him to the front with very little training in places where he will have problems with his heart condition.

The army knows where I am, so they can come to my home and pick me up. So, if the war lasts very long, I will probably end up in the army, but I know that many people now also wish for peace. I hope peace will come soon, says Alex, who adds that the military often drives around his city in busses, picking up men on the streets to serve.

He says a fair and transparent mobilization system would calm people and potentially provide more volunteers. Alex argues that there are too many stories of people being sent to the front with minimal training and disabilities, which makes everyone scared.

Now, they are establishing these recruitment agencies, where they promise you can come and volunteer and receive three months of training, not only a few weeks. Make a real soldier out of you, but you cannot trust that, he says.

The criticism of the mobilization systems comes from various parts of Ukrainian society. Some argue that Ukraine should introduce a lottery system, where people are drafted depending on their birthday. Others say that Ukraine should only mobilize people not vital to the Ukrainian war effort. Recently, on Facebook, a Ukrainian officer named Yuriy Kasyanov criticized what he calls an inefficient system.

He fears that Ukraine might lose the war if something isnt changed to make the system more fair and increase the number of men willing to serve in the army.

The first thing I can say is that the situation is awful at the frontline. Very bad, and I know it very well. Maybe this is not so visible in the rear. Still, we are holding on with all our strength, Kasyanov, a drone expert in the army, told The Daily Beast, The most important thing is that, finally, euphoria and blindness are beginning to subside in society. We understand, including commanders and government officials, that something needs to be done.

Yuriy Kasyanov says that the current mobilization system is idiotic.

Kasyanov says that mobilization has been a mess for a long time, with people in critical civilian positions being taken to the army. He knows examples of people producing much-needed drones for the army being taken despite a lack of military training.

We now have very few specialistswelders, turners, not to mention high-class engineers. And in the field of drone engineering, you can count them on your fingers, said Kasyanov, who advocates for a mobilization system that considers peoples abilities.

People who might not be fit for frontline duty or have special skills should work with military production instead of risking their lives in the muddy trenches. He also advocates removing some of the exemptions from duty. Today, students are exempt from mobilization. He wants that removed to help reduce the average age in the army, which he says is over 40.

Now the situation is such that, for various reasons, our level of support from Western countries has decreased. There was still no defense industry of its own. There are not enough people, and no one wants to take responsibility for mobilizing the youth. At the front, the troops are having difficulty holding back enemy pressure, Kasyanov said.

The Daily Beast also spoke to a 28-year-old man who only wants to be identified by his first name, Andriy. He left Ukraine in 2023 and is now in Europe. He crossed the border legally due to his mother's disability, which enabling him to go as her guardian. Andriy told The Daily Beast that he and his mother decided to use this loophole to avoid being drafted into the army and risking his life at the frontline.

Andriy has health issues, making him exempt from military duty in peacetime, but he cannot trust that it will shield him now during the invasion if he gets picked up on the streets.

I just decided not to leave it to chance. Not to believe that I would be let go if the military picked me up on the streets because I will not survive on the frontline, says Andriy, who is trying to live an anonymous life abroad so as not to attract too much attention.

He says that the stories he heard from the frontline affected his decision. He might be able to help the military in functions away from the frontline, but he doesnt trust the system.

All this new legislation makes mobilization stricter and stricter. The opportunity today might not be there tomorrow, says Andriy, I have a responsibility to care for my mother and myself. I did not want to be taken, and I have a lot of friends who feel the same.

I will not come back until after the war. If I have to pay some fine for avoiding mobilization after the war, it will be okay, and I will pay it, but if there is a criminal case and I need to do real-time in jail, I will not come back, says Andriy.

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The Real Reason Thousands Are Fleeing Conscription in Ukraine - The Daily Beast

Russia has more Arctic land area than any other nation. But since the invasion of Ukraine, it has been harder for Russian scientists to share data about how climate change is affecting the region. This tiny chapel is on the grounds of the Northeast Science Station near the Russian town of Chersky. Arthur Max/AP hide caption

Russia has more Arctic land area than any other nation. But since the invasion of Ukraine, it has been harder for Russian scientists to share data about how climate change is affecting the region. This tiny chapel is on the grounds of the Northeast Science Station near the Russian town of Chersky.

Lack of data about conditions in the Russian Arctic is already hampering climate science, and will cause ever-growing gaps in our understanding of how climate change affects the fastest-warming region of the planet, scientists warn.

The Arctic is warming up to four times faster than the Earth as a whole. And Russia has more Arctic land than any other nation. But, since Russia invaded Ukraine, it's been increasingly difficult for climate scientists in Russia to collaborate or share data about conditions in the country's vast frozen areas.

That includes basic measurements of temperature and snowfall in the Russian Arctic, as well as more sophisticated details about greenhouse gas emissions and what's happening to plants and animals in the region.

Excluding such data from climate models makes them less accurate, and the problem will get worse over time, a new study warns. "By neglecting Russian sites, we decrease our chances to mitigate the negative consequences of climate change," says Efrn Lpez-Blanco of Aarhus University in Denmark, who is one of the authors of the paper, published in the journal Nature Climate Change.

In order to build climate models that can accurately predict what will happen to the Arctic in the future, scientists need measurements from across the Arctic. If the available data is concentrated in a few places, like Alaska, Canada and Scandinavia, and excludes Russia's vast Arctic expanses, then the models will be increasingly inaccurate, the study finds.

"It's a huge landmass," says Ken Tape, an ecologist at the University of Alaska Fairbanks. "You can't ignore it."

Beaver access has been cut off for western scientists

Tape is already seeing the negative effects of the war on his area of research. He studies beavers, which are moving into the tundra and are often unpopular neighbors.

"It's like an intruder," he says. "The connotations are not positive, you know? Especially if fish is a big resource for you, you're going to be very skeptical of someone who comes in and dams up fish-bearing streams."

Scientists like Tape are studying where beavers are showing up, and trying to understand how far North the population will move, how quickly and at what scale. Such research can help local communities manage the animals: beavers are notorious for turning streams into bogs, for example, which can affect water quality for humans nearby.

The research is also important because when beavers build dams, they can disturb frozen ground, which can release trapped greenhouse gasses as it thaws.

A few years ago, Tape helped start the Arctic Beaver Observation Network, so scientists all around the Arctic could collaborate and share data. But with the invasion of Ukraine, the dream of Russian collaboration in the project stalled, he says. "We're having a meeting at the end of February," he says, "and it's basically Alaska, Canada and Scandinavia. There's no one from Russia coming."

On top of that, western scientists no longer have access to field sites in Russia, he says. Instead, they have to rely on what they can see from space, from satellite images of beaver dams. "You can do a lot from space, but you need to have some boots on the ground confirming what you're seeing," Tape explains.

People walk next to a cracked panel apartment building in the eastern Siberian city of Yakutsk in 2018. Climate change is causing permafrost, or permanently frozen ground, to thaw across the Arctic. When the earth thaws, it can destabilize building foundations, roads, pipelines and other infrastructure. Mladen Antonov/AFP via Getty Images hide caption

People walk next to a cracked panel apartment building in the eastern Siberian city of Yakutsk in 2018. Climate change is causing permafrost, or permanently frozen ground, to thaw across the Arctic. When the earth thaws, it can destabilize building foundations, roads, pipelines and other infrastructure.

For some, it's a reminder of Cold War science

For Russian climate scientists who started their careers in the Soviet Union, the current situation can feel eerily familiar.

"In the past like, Soviet Union past the data from this part of the world was also limited," says Vladimir Romanovsky, a permafrost expert at the University of Alaska Fairbanks who trained in Moscow. In the mid-1970s, young scientists had virtually no contact with western collaborators, he remembers.

But when things opened up in the 1990s, he says, his field exploded. "During that time, lots of data became available from the Russian permafrost regions," he remembers. International scientists started collaborating with Russian scientists to investigate how permafrost was changing.

And the research findings were explosive. Permafrost is the permanently frozen ground found across the Arctic. As it thaws, it creates massive problems for infrastructure built on top of it, causing roads to buckle, building foundations to crack and pipelines to break.

It can also release enormous amounts of planet-warming gasses that are trapped within the frozen earth. Scientists now warn that virtually all surface permafrost could be gone from the Arctic by the end of the century.

But now the data that is so crucial for permafrost science is drying up, Romanovsky says.

In the past, he and other western scientists received temperature and soil measurements from Russian research facilities. "This year, there may not be any data," he says. "If this will continue into the future, eventually it may have some impact on our understanding [of permafrost changes.]"

Romanovsky is also concerned about young Russian scientists who are important to the future of climate research in the region. "It's very discouraging," he says. "Eventually, I believe that we will be able to communicate openly again."

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The Russian invasion of Ukraine is hurting climate science - NPR