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U.S. and Romanian forces take part in a demonstration as part of the rotation of U.S. troops of the U.S. Army 101st Airborne division at Mihail Kogalniceanu Air Base near Constanta, Romania.

The positioning of the 101st Airborne's Army combat brigade in Romania is part of an enhanced military presence along NATO's eastern flank that has taken root in the aftermath of Russia's war on Ukraine, on a mission aimed at deterring potential aggression on NATO's southeastern flank.

Soldiers take part in a demonstration of the US Army 101 Airborne division at Mihail Kogalniceanu Air Base (RoAF 57th Air Base) near Constanta, Romania on March 31, 2023.

Daniel Mihailescu | AFP | Getty Images

An Apache helicopter takes off during a demonstration as part of the rotation of US troops of the US Army 101 Airborne division at Mihail Kogalniceanu Air Base (RoAF 57th Air Base) near Constanta, Romania on March 31, 2023.

Daniel Mihailescu | AFP | Getty Images

A soldier takes part in a demonstration of the US Army 101 Airborne division during the brigade rotation at Mihail Kogalniceanu Air Base (RoAF 57th Air Base) near Constanta, Romania on March 31, 2023.

Daniel Mihailescu | AFP | Getty Images

Soldiers take part in a demonstration of the US Army 101 Airborne division during the brigade rotation at Mihail Kogalniceanu Air Base (RoAF 57th Air Base) near Constanta, Romania on March 31, 2023.

Daniel Mihailescu | AFP | Getty Images

Soldiers take part in a demonstration of the US Army 101 Airborne division at Mihail Kogalniceanu Air Base (RoAF 57th Air Base) near Constanta, Romania on March 31, 2023.

Daniel Mihailescu | AFP | Getty Images

A medevac Black Hawk helicopter flies during a demonstration as part of the rotation of US troops of the US Army 101 Airborne division at Mihail Kogalniceanu Air Base (RoAF 57th Air Base) near Constanta, Romania on March 31, 2023.

Daniel Mihailescu | AFP | Getty Images

Boeing CH-47F Chinook tandem rotor helicopters (Vertol) transport military vehicles during a demonstration as part of the rotation of US troops of the US Army 101 Airborne division at Mihail Kogalniceanu Air Base (RoAF 57th Air Base) near Constanta, Romania on March 31, 2023.

Daniel Mihailescu | AFP | Getty Images

A Romanian-made tank TR-85 'Bizonul' (The Bison) fires during a demonstration as part of the rotation of US troops of the US Army 101 Airborne division at Mihail Kogalniceanu Air Base (RoAF 57th Air Base) near Constanta, Romania on March 31, 2023.

Daniel Mihailescu | AFP | Getty Images

Different types of helicopters, among them Chinook, Black Hawk and Apache, fly during the final display formation as part of the rotation of US troops of the US Army 101 Airborne division at Mihail Kogalniceanu Air Base (RoAF 57th Air Base) near Constanta, Romania on March 31, 2023.

Daniel Mihailescu | AFP | Getty Images

Daniel Mihailescu | AFP | Getty Images

An Hour Ago

An undated ID photo of journalist Evan Gershkovich. - A US reporter for The Wall Street Journal newspaper has been detained in Russia for espionage, Russian news agencies reported Thursday, citing the FSB security services.

- | Afp | Getty Images

Several major newsrooms called on Russia to immediately release Wall Street Journal reporter Evan Gershkovich.

"We are deeply troubled by Russia's detention of Evan Gershkovich, a respected Wall Street Journal reporter whose coverage of Russia has been fair and accurate at a time when the world needs reliable information," the newsrooms of Bloomberg, Politico, The New York Times and The Washington Post wrote in a joint statement.

"Evan's detention is intended to have a chilling effect on independent journalism and deprive the public of essential news," the newsrooms wrote.

On Thursday, a Russian court decided that Gershkovich will remain in detention until May 29.

Amanda Macias

2 Hours Ago

China cannot be a mediator in the war in Ukraine as it leans too much toward the invader Russia but it could play the role of facilitator to reach a peace deal with Moscow, the European Union's top diplomat, Josep Borrell, said.

"China does not distinguish between aggressor and victim of aggression," Borrell told a panel at the Spanish capital Madrid. "China doesn't call for a withdrawal of Russian troops from Ukraine."

But China should use its influence over Russia to pressure for peace in Ukraine, he added.

In Borrell's view, the only peace plan on the table is the one presented by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy in November, including demands to withdraw Russian troops and restore Ukraine's territory to the status quo before Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014.

Borrell's comments echoed the call by Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez in Beijing for Chinese leader Xi Jinping to talk to the Ukrainian president and learn first-hand about Kyiv's peace formula.

Reuters

3 Hours Ago

Disarmed unexploded ordnance that Russia fired at Kharkiv is gathered at a collection point in the northeastern Ukrainian city.

Disarmed unexploded ordnance fired by Russia onto the city of Kharkiv are seen at a collection point in Kharkiv, Ukraine as Russia-Ukraine war continues on March 30, 2023.

Wolfgang Schwan | Anadolu Agency | Getty Images

Disarmed unexploded ordnance fired by Russia onto the city of Kharkiv are seen at a collection point in Kharkiv, Ukraine as Russia-Ukraine war continues on March 30, 2023.

Wolfgang Schwan | Anadolu Agency | Getty Images

Disarmed unexploded ordnance fired by Russia onto the city of Kharkiv are seen at a collection point in Kharkiv, Ukraine as Russia-Ukraine war continues on March 30, 2023.

Wolfgang Schwan | Anadolu Agency | Getty Images

Disarmed unexploded ordnance fired by Russia onto the city of Kharkiv are seen at a collection point in Kharkiv, Ukraine as Russia-Ukraine war continues on March 30, 2023.

Wolfgang Schwan | Anadolu Agency | Getty Images

Wolfgang Schwan | Anadolu Agency | Getty Images

4 Hours Ago

A team inspects the produce in the ship carrying wheat from Ukraine to Afghanistan after inspection in the open sea around Zeytinburnu district of Istanbul, Turkiye on January 24, 2023.

TUR Ministry of National Defence | Anadolu Agency | Getty Images

Three ships carrying 136,766 metric tons of agricultural products left Ukraine's ports of Odesa and Chornomorsk.

The vessels are destined for China and Turkey and are carrying corn and wheat.

TheBlack Sea Grain Initiative, a deal brokered in July among Ukraine, Russia, Turkey and the United Nations, eased Russia's naval blockade and saw three key Ukrainian ports reopen. The deal was extended this month for 120 days.

So far, more than 700 ships have sailed from Ukrainian ports since the deal began.

Amanda Macias

4 Hours Ago

The Olympic rings standing in front of the Olympic Stadium in Tokyo on July 20, 2021 ahead of the Tokyo 2020 Olympic Games.

BEHROUZ MEHRI | AFP | Getty Images

The International Olympic Committee's decision to allow Russian and Belarusian athletes to compete in the Olympic Games is "an attempt to turn a blind eye to Russia's crimes in Ukraine," said Dmytro Lubinets, Ukraine's Parliament commissioner for human rights.

Since Russia invaded Ukraine, more than 260 Ukrainian athletes and coaches have died, Lubinets said.He added on his official Telegram channel that at least 350 sports facilities were destroyed or damaged.

Amanda Macias

5 Hours Ago

Members of the media ask questions to U.S. President Joe Biden as he walks to the Marine One helicopter to depart for travel to Mississippi to view tornado damage, from the White House in Washington, U.S., March 31, 2023.

Jonathan Ernst | Reuters

President Joe Biden called on Russia to release U.S. citizen and Wall Street Journal reporter Evan Gershkovich, who was detained on Thursday on accusations of espionage.

"Let him go," Biden told reporters when asked what his message was to Russia.

Senior Biden administration officials spoke to Gershkovich's family following the arrest, the White House said.

Secretary of State Antony Blinken on Thursday said the U.S. State Department is seeking immediate consular access to Gershkovich.

Amanda Macias

7 Hours Ago

Moldova has said a Russian missile violated its airspace amid a fresh assault on Ukraine.

Ucg | Universal Images Group | Getty Images

Moldova's Parliament voted to extend its state of emergency by 60 days in response to what the government deemed to be persistent threats from Russia's "hybrid war."

"The extension of the state of emergency is a necessary constitutional tool because we are still facing elements of Russia's hybrid war against the Republic of Moldova," Moldovan Prime Minister Dorin Recean said in televised comments before the vote.

Moldovan President Maia Sandu warned in February of what her government believed to be Russian plans to carry out a coup d'etat and put the country "at Russia's disposal."

A small European country on Ukraine's western border, Moldova has suffered political and economic upheaval amid the war, including within its separatist, pro-Russian breakaway state of Transnistria. It is a landlocked country, and one of Europe's poorest.

Moldova has however strengthened ties with the West in recent years, and received EU candidate status last June, on the same day as Ukraine something that has angered Moscow, which sees the post-Soviet country as being within its sphere of influence.

Natasha Turak

7 Hours Ago

Norway's massive sovereign wealth fund has not been able to divest from Russia more than a year after the full-scale war in Ukraine began, the Norwegian finance ministry said.

Olso decided it must divest from its Russian holdings shortly after Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, but says that sanctions impacting the bank it uses have prevented it from doing so.

"The concrete and practical problem is that the custodian bank that we use is under sanctions, and can't assist us with settlement of transactions, and neither with voting on shares" in Russian companies, the fund's deputy chief executive officer, Trond Grande, said in late January. "So therefore the situation is deadlocked. There is no way we can either sell or buy or vote on these shares."

Norway's sovereign wealth fund, which at $1.3 trillion in assets is one of the largest in the world, holds shares in 47 Russian companies and some state bonds, which at the end of 2021 were worth a cumulative $2.4 billion, according to Reuters. Bloomberg reported in January 2023 that the value of the holdings had dropped to $292 million.

"The market for trading in Russian financial instruments is still subject to comprehensive sanctions and has not been normalized as of March 2023," Norway's finance ministry said in a document Friday.

Natasha Turak

7 Hours Ago

Karen Khachanov of Russia plays a backhand during his men's Singles Quarter Final match against Denis Shapovalov of Canada on Day Nine of The Championships - Wimbledon 2021 at All England Lawn Tennis and Croquet Club on July 07, 2021 in London, England.

Clive Brunskill | Getty Images

In 2022, Russian and Belarusian athletes were barred from competing at the Wimbledon tennis tournament in response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine.

The Lawn Tennis Association (LTA) and All England Club (AELTC) announced the reversal of the bans on Friday, allowing citizens of the two countries to partake if they compete as "neutral" athletes and comply with certain conditions. Those conditions include signing a declaration of neutrality that would forbid them from expressing support for Russia's invasion of Ukraine, accepting funding from Russia or Belarus, or receiving sponsorship from organizations linked to those governments.

The LTA had been hit with fines as a result of the previous ban, and said if it stayed in place, there was "a real prospect of the termination of our membership" which would cancel its events in other parts of the UK.

Ian Hewitt, chairman of AELTC, said: "We continue to condemn totally Russia's illegal invasion and our wholehearted support remains with the people of Ukraine. This was an incredibly difficult decision, not taken lightly or without a great deal of consideration for those who will be impacted."

"It is our view that, considering all factors, these are the most appropriate arrangements for The Championships for this year," he said, adding that "if circumstances change materially between now and the commencement of The Championships, we will consider and respond accordingly."

Read the full story here.

Natasha Turak

8 Hours Ago

NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg addresses a joint press conference with the Swedish prime minister in Stockholm on March 7, 2023, following a meeting with all Swedish party leaders who are in favor of a Swedish NATO membership.

Jonathan Nackstrand | AFP | Getty Images

NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg said he looks forward to "also welcoming Sweden as a full member" of the defense alliance "as soon as possible," following Turkey's ratification of Finland's NATO membership on Thursday night.

View original post here:
Ukraine war live updates: Wimbledon reverses ban on Russian and Belarusian athletes; Turkey approves Finland's NATO membership - CNBC

Over a year after Russias full-scale invasion of Ukraine fragmented the worlds geopolitical landscape, the strength of President Vladimir V. Putins friendships faces a test: Will world leaders who intended to host him in the coming months still be willing to welcome a wanted man?

The International Criminal Courts arrest warrant for Mr. Putin, accusing him of bearing criminal responsibility for the abduction and deportation of Ukrainian children, could thrust his allies into thorny domestic and foreign legal disputes, whether or not their countries are members of the court, international relations experts say.

Many governments staked out their positions just days after the warrant was issued. Germany, like several other I.C.C. member states within the Wests core coalition, was unequivocal in saying it would arrest Mr. Putin and send him to The Hague if he were to enter its territory, as it is obligated to do under the requirements of being party to the court.

At least one Russian ally and I.C.C. member, Hungary, declared the opposite, claiming it would not enforce the warrant because it would not have grounds to arrest Mr. Putin under Hungarian law.

The chances that Mr. Putin could stand trial soon are low. Still, the Kremlin raised the stakes with a pre-emptive warning, announcing that Moscow would consider an arrest of Mr. Putin overseas to be a declaration of war. The Kremlin has also threatened an ally, Armenia, over its moves to join the court, Russian state-owned news agencies reported.

South Africa, an I.C.C. member state, faces particular scrutiny because it has already invited Mr. Putin to the annual summit of BRICS nations Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa that will be held in the coastal city of Durban this August.

The South African government has leaned into longstanding ties with Moscow since the invasion, and it drew criticism from the United States for holding naval drills with Russia and China in February.

India, another longtime ally of Moscow, could also face scrutiny come September, when it will host the Group of 20 summit. India is not party to the I.C.C., so it will not be under the same legal pressure to arrest Mr. Putin, if he attends, as South Africa. But both nations decisions will speak volumes about how they, as emerging powers, want to be perceived, said Alonso Gurmendi Dunkelberg, a departmental lecturer in international relations at the University of Oxford.

The BRICS countries have positioned themselves as an alternative to Western-dominated alliances, and Mr. Gurmendi said that their response to Mr. Putins arrest warrant could become an early example of the blocs becoming an actual force in international affairs.

Indian officials have so far stayed silent on how they might approach Mr. Putins potential visit to their country in September, and China, which, like Russia, is not a member of the I.C.C., has expressed disapproval about the courts decision to issue a warrant.

Officials in Brazil, which is a member of the court, have kept their comments ambiguous.

But while South Africas foreign minister, Naledi Pandor, said in a radio interview that her ministry was awaiting a refreshed legal opinion on the matter, she gave a glowing endorsement of her nations relationship with Russia on Thursday.

We have made it clear that Russia is a friend, Ms. Pandor said during a meeting in Pretoria with Russias minister of natural resources that was part of regular economic cooperation between the countries.

She highlighted the help received from the Soviet Union in the fight against apartheid, adding, While we are friends with many all over the world, we cannot become sudden enemies at the demand of others.

South Africas cabinet has not yet received the legal opinion on the matter from the Foreign Ministry and hasnot yet discussed what to do regarding Mr. Putin, one of the presidents top ministers, Khumbudzo Ntshavheni, said on Thursday.

Much of the governments handling of the question of what to do about Mr. Putin seems to be entangled in internal factional politics, said Leaza Jernberg, an international relations analyst in Johannesburg. The African National Congress, the governing party since the end of apartheid, is deeply divided, and some in the party and in the governmentremain staunchly loyal to Russia, she said.

The countrys main opposition party, the Democratic Alliance, has said that South African officials should withdraw Mr. Putins invitation if they would be unwilling to arrest him. Allowing him into South Africa without arrest could tarnish the countrys reputation and lead to economic repercussions from allies, like sanctions, said Darren Bergman, a member of Parliament with the Democratic Alliance who works on international relations.

South Africa is no stranger to this dilemma.

It was at the center of a media circus in 2015 when Omar Hassan al-Bashir, then the Sudanese president, attended an African Union meeting in Johannesburg while he was under an I.C.C. warrant for war crimes, genocide and other charges linked to the conflict in Sudans Darfur region, where nearly 300,000 people were killed.

At the convention center, Mr. Bashir sat in open sessions, staring stoically as photographers crowded around him. He also posed for a group photograph with the other leaders, who would not be drawn into questions about the warrant.

At a court hearing seeking to compel South Africa to arrest Mr. Bashir, lawyers for the government argued that the Sudanese leader had diplomatic immunity and attended the meeting as a guest of the African Union. The court eventually ruled that South African officials were obliged to execute the arrest but Mr. Bashir had already left the country on his presidential jet from a military base.

That Mr. Bashir, who was ousted from power after a popular uprising in 2019, remains at large is a prominent example of the I.C.C.s limitations. But at the time, Ms. Jernberg said, South Africa had the cover of arguing that it was standing in solidarity with other African nations, who felt that their leaders were often unfairly targeted.

Mr. Putins case could play out very differently. In part because the war in Ukraine threatened Europes security, it mobilized international criminal justice efforts in a way that none of us in the human rights and accountability space have seen before, said Gissou Nia, the director of the Atlantic Councils Strategic Litigation Project.

Mr. Putins stronger presence in global affairs could also create avenues for diplomatic pressures in a way that Mr. Bashirs case did not. A potential boycott from the leaders of major democracies of the Group of 20 summit, for example, could pose a global embarrassment for Prime Minister Narendra Modi of India, who would then have to decide whether his relationship with Mr. Putin was worth it, Ms. Nia said.

I cant imagine, she added, that the leaders of world democracies are very keen to appear in photo ops with Putin.

Lynsey Chutel contributed reporting from Johannesburg.

Read the original:
The Latest: War in Ukraine: Finland Clears Last Hurdle to Join NATO ... - The New York Times

When President George W. Bush gave his mission accomplished speech on board the aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln only six weeks into the Iraq War in 2003, it quickly became a cautionary tale against declaring victory in an unpredictable war. Washington didnt withdraw most of its forces until eight years later, and the pullout resembled defeat much more than victory.

When President George W. Bush gave his mission accomplished speech on board the aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln only six weeks into the Iraq War in 2003, it quickly became a cautionary tale against declaring victory in an unpredictable war. Washington didnt withdraw most of its forces until eight years later, and the pullout resembled defeat much more than victory.

Twenty years later in Ukraine, the risk is not declaring victory prematurelybut not defining victory at all.

For more than a year now, Ukraines Western supporters have provided it with the weapons, munitions, funds, and political support to push back Russian invading forces. With this help, Ukraine has been able to regain about half the territory Russia has occupied since Feb. 24, 2022. It is a remarkable and undeniable success.

But Ukraines supporters have shied away from defining the outcome they aim to achieve with their aid. Is it for Ukraine to liberate its entire territory, including Crimea, by military force? Is it to push Russia back to the line that existed before Feb. 24, 2022, restoring a status quo ante that leaves Russia in control of Crimea and the Donbas? Is it to enable another Ukrainian push on the battlefield, followed by a cease-fire and negotiations that somehowthough it is unclear howinduce Russia to withdraw from Ukraine?

Western ambiguityleaving open what victory meansmade sense in the early phase of the war. With a wide range of possible outcomes, ambiguity allowed for a flexible framing of victory and defeat: Even if Russia were successful on the battlefield, its success could still be framed as an overall strategic defeat that isolates it in the eyes of the world. Ambiguity was also a useful way to avoid telegraphing any limitations of Western support to Moscow or demoralizing Ukrainian forces with unattainable goals or timelines. Hence the frequent Western talking point of supporting Kyiv with whatever it takes for as long as it takeswhich sounds forceful enough, until you ask what it is.

In the second year, the situation is much less uncertain. Although Ukraine is still targeted by Russian missiles and frontline battles remain unimaginably brutal, the potential trajectories of this war have narrowed. Kyiv will not fall, and Ukraine will not be overrun by the Russian army. Ukraine is also unlikely to lose the territory it has already liberated, as Russias unsuccessful winter offensive made clear. But even if there is greater clarity about battlefield contingencies, there is still no strategic clarity about what victory means.

Western publics are getting contradictory signals from their leaders on this question. Most often, Western officials say it is up to the Ukrainians to define what victory means. In reality, however, the most important factor for achieving victory is the type, quantity, and arrival date of Western weapons and munitions in Ukraine, which gives the West a major influence on the outcome. And whenever Ukraine brings up its own definition of victorya return to Ukraines lawful 1991 borders, including Crimea, by force, if necessarymany Western leaders (apart from Central and Eastern Europeans) refuse to wholly commit to this outcome, presumably out of concern that a fight over Crimea, which Russia illegally annexed in 2014, could lead Moscow to escalate in some unpredictable way.

This creates a dangerous political vacuum in the midst of a war that has been, to a great extent, fought by narratives. If Ukraines supporters fail to benchmark victory, Russia will. If the West focuses on its own fears of escalation, the Kremlin will fan those fears with renewed threats of nuclear war. Not defining victoryand, in turn, not defining Russian defeatallows Russia to negate Ukraines successes and to frame a Ukrainian victory as unattainable. Without a clear aim, Western publics will increasingly perceive the war as a protracted, indeterminate struggle, ultimately undermining Ukraines moral high ground and the Wests own morale. Ukraine and the West therefore need to provide a benchmark for victory in this stage of the war.

Continued Western ambiguity also contributes to a polarized debate between advocates for quick negotiations and those who support a full military victory for Ukraine. The sobering reality is that neither of theseearly negotiations or complete liberationis the most probable scenario. Negotiations would very likely lead to a temporary cease-fire instead of a sustainable peace, pausing a war that Russian President Vladimir Putin can resume at any time. He has committed to subjugating Ukraine as his lifes legacy. He has enshrined into law the annexation of four regions of Ukraine. It is folly to believe that Putin will let Ukraine be. He may not have started this war primarily for domestic power purposes, but keeping Russia in a constant war-like, half-mobilized state has turned into his best chance to stay in power. Reassured by Chinese President Xi Jinping that China supports his regime and fight against the West, Putin does not need an off-ramp or exit strategy.

At the same time, the Wests willingness and ability to continue providing the current massive flow of military support to Ukraine is not indefinite. Right now, Western countries are arming Ukraine to bring it into the best possible position for a spring and summer offensive. After that, contentious negotiations in the U.S. Congress over future support for Ukraine and a U.S. presidential primary season await. Meanwhile, Europe could face another winter with high energy prices. Support for Ukraine will not stop, but the peak of Western weapons deliveries may have been reached. That means 2023 is Ukraines best chance to get as far as it can. But even under these favorable circumstances, a full military victorymeaning the liberation of all of Ukraines territoryis a tall order for this year. More likely, and perhaps the best-case scenario, is a successful breakup of the land bridge between Russia and Crimea, isolating Russian forces in the south and making their position there untenable.

To right-size both overly optimistic and overly pessimistic expectations, Ukraine and the West should benchmark an interim victory that is realistic to achieve this year. Instead of giving ambiguous answers to the question of what victory means, Western leaders should state publicly that their aim for this spring and summer is a return at least to the lines before 2022 and that they will supply Ukraine with everything needed to reach this objective. While the overall goal remains restoring Ukraines full territorial integrity, setting a clear benchmark for an interim victory would provide an anchor point for Western publics in the strategic communication of this war. It fills the discursive vacuum with a specific goal that Western publics can support and counters Russias strategy of framing Ukrainian victory as unattainable.

In NATO parlance, this interim victory should be the floor, not the ceiling. If Ukraine can advance even further, that would be a huge and welcome success. If not, the pre-2022 lines are an important preliminary milestone. It would turn back the clock to Feb. 23, 2022, and apply the weapon of futility against Russia itself. With a restoration of the status quo ante, Russian sacrifices since the start of the war would appear entirely in vain. The total loss of all territories gained at such a heavy cost may plant the seeds of doubt in the minds of Russias soldiers, public, and elites: What was this war for if we are now back to where we started? In many unsuccessful wars of the pastincluding Russias in Afghanistan and the United States in Iraqa pervasive and demoralizing sense of futility turned into a powerful enemy at home and on the battlefield. The constant dripping of doubt can wear away any great power.

Of course, a return to the pre-2022 lines is a less satisfactory outcome for Ukraine and its supporters than Russias full military defeat or negotiated withdrawal. However, it is a useful, realistic, and clear-to-communicate benchmark. Defining an interim victory this way will help bolster public support in the West and undermine Putins objectives at home. It will not be possible to say mission accomplished with this outcome. But an interim victory is better than not defining any victory at all.

See original here:
How the West Should Define Victory in Ukraine - Foreign Policy

Soldiers relax at a rehabilitation course in between tours in northeastern Ukraine. Claire Harbage/NPR hide caption

Soldiers relax at a rehabilitation course in between tours in northeastern Ukraine.

KHARKIV REGION, Ukraine Vlad is one of four soldiers in his unit who survived a tour of duty defending Bakhmut, the city in eastern Ukraine that Russia has tried to capture for months.

"Bakhmut," he says, his voice breaking. "I don't know how else to describe it other than a mass grave."

Skinny, hollow-eyed and only 21, he says he felt so hopeless that his superiors realized he was likely suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder.

A few weeks later, they sent him to northeastern Ukraine for a weeklong rehabilitation course, its exact location a military secret.

The dining hall is filled with soldiers at lunch at a rehabilitation course in northeastern Ukraine. Claire Harbage/NPR hide caption

The dining hall is filled with soldiers at lunch at a rehabilitation course in northeastern Ukraine.

In an aromatherapy room scented with eucalyptus and soundtracked with calming flute music, Vlad and about a dozen other soldiers sink into puffy chairs surrounding an indoor garden.

Some fall asleep. Others are with their wives, holding hands. Vlad sits next to his older sister, Iryna, who watches him with troubled eyes. NPR is using only the first names of the soldiers interviewed and their relatives because of privacy and security concerns.

Psychologist Maksym Bayda counsels the soldiers.

"Many can't sleep. They have nightmares," Bayda says. "There is also this enormous sense of guilt. They feel guilty about their friends who died on the front line. And because many of them have never killed a living being they sometimes even feel guilty about killing enemy soldiers. They use the word 'murder.' "

Left: Vlad and his sister Iryna walk through the hallway after visiting an aromatherapy room. Right: Soldiers and their wives or relatives relax in a salt room at a rehabilitation course in a spa in northeastern Ukraine. Claire Harbage/NPR hide caption

Left: Vlad and his sister Iryna walk through the hallway after visiting an aromatherapy room. Right: Soldiers and their wives or relatives relax in a salt room at a rehabilitation course in a spa in northeastern Ukraine.

As Russia's war on Ukraine drags on, depleting the ranks of Ukrainian troops, the country's resource-strapped military is trying to find ways to care for soldiers who survive long, brutal deployments.

A lieutenant colonel and a couple of military psychologists, worried about their exhausted troops, opened this rehabilitation program last summer in the Kharkiv region to provide a weeklong break for counseling and relaxation before soldiers return to the front line.

"We first saw the effects of post-traumatic stress disorder on our soldiers back in 2014," says the program's founder, Lt. Col. Oleksandr Vasylkovskyi, referring to the year Russia invaded Crimea and Russian proxies occupied part of the eastern region known as Donbas. "I was on the front line then, and I saw it all firsthand."

Lt. Col. Oleksandr Vasylkovskyi along with some military psychologists opened the rehabilitation program last year. Claire Harbage/NPR hide caption

Lt. Col. Oleksandr Vasylkovskyi along with some military psychologists opened the rehabilitation program last year.

Vasylkovskyi knew soldiers who killed themselves. They didn't seek help, he says, because of the stigma "that they would be seen as weak and defective."

At the same time, he says, he, too, was struggling with emotional trauma.

"I did not hide it," he says. "I temporarily quit the army in 2017 to deal with it. My family, especially my wife, encouraged me to see psychologists, and with their help I pulled through."

After Russia's full-scale invasion last February, Vasylkovskyi anticipated a mental health crisis among Ukrainian soldiers, especially the tens of thousands of new recruits.

A sign for the aromatherapy room in the spa in northeastern Ukraine. Claire Harbage/NPR hide caption

A sign for the aromatherapy room in the spa in northeastern Ukraine.

Soldiers relax in the aromatherapy room in dimmed light. Claire Harbage/NPR hide caption

Soldiers relax in the aromatherapy room in dimmed light.

In the last decade, he says, the number of psychologists in the military has increased between 40% and 50%. But even that does not meet the need. And the military, by law, is only required to pay for the treatment of physical injuries.

"I decided that I had to raise money myself to help soldiers get treatment for mental trauma," Vasylkovskyi says.

Rotary clubs in Kharkiv along with donors from Western countries came through with funding for a center to, in their words, "refresh military personnel." Vasylkovskyi drafted a short rehab program with a couple of military psychologists Bayda, a major in the Ukrainian armed forces, and Ihor Prykhodko, a professor at the National Academy of the National Guard of Ukraine.

"We do not have the luxury of completely rehabilitating soldiers psychologically in a week," Prykhodko says. "Most must return to active combat. So we try to do the best we can."

Soldiers spend time swimming in the pool during the course. Claire Harbage/NPR hide caption

Soldiers spend time swimming in the pool during the course.

Prykhodko says the team consulted with Western colleagues to design a program that includes counseling, swimming, hydromassage and meditation. And speleotherapy, which recreates certain conditions in natural caves and salt mines to treat respiratory and skin conditions.

He says the program is not only designed to heal soldiers but also show them that they're valued.

"We wanted to break completely from any vestige of the Soviet past," he says, "when the individual didn't matter. In the Soviet Union, the military cared more about propaganda than the health of individual soldiers. We want to remind soldiers that we care about them as people about their health, their feelings, their lives."

A fitness instructor leads soldiers in a class that helps strengthen their backs. Claire Harbage/NPR hide caption

A fitness instructor leads soldiers in a class that helps strengthen their backs.

Like most of the soldiers here, Nazar, 25, has been deployed for at least nine months. He spent weeks defending Donbas, most recently in the town of Avdiivka, which Ukraine's military closed to civilians on Monday, likening it to "a place from post-apocalytpic movies" due to Russian attacks.

"You hear constant shelling, explosions and shooting. It's exhausting," he says. "Here it's so quiet. I've started feeling like myself again."

Earlier, in the aromatherapy room, Nazar had been sitting ramrod stiff in the puffy recliner. Now he cracks an ever-so-slight smile. He's swimming in the pool along with his friend Maksym, 24, another soldier in the program. Soon they are laughing and splashing each other. A couple of other soldiers join them for pool volleyball.

While throwing around a ball in the pool soldiers begin to smile and sometimes open up to the psychologists. Claire Harbage/NPR hide caption

While throwing around a ball in the pool soldiers begin to smile and sometimes open up to the psychologists.

The soldiers wave to Bayda, the psychologist, who motions like he's going to dive into the water.

"Sometimes the soldiers are so relaxed here that it just makes sense to jump and have counseling sessions here," he says. "Anything to help them open up and talk about what they're going through."

Later, Bayda joins an exercise class where older soldiers are working on strengthening their backs. Mykolai, who is 39, says he injured his back by jumping out of military vehicles.

"My superiors sent me here for my bad back," he says. "But I have found talking about my fears and grief in this war much more helpful. I have found that I need to talk because I know I will be on the frontline for a long time."

One soldier works on back strengthening exercises during a fitness class. Claire Harbage/NPR hide caption

One soldier works on back strengthening exercises during a fitness class.

Vasylkovskyi and Bayda say about 2,500 soldiers have already gone through the program since the summer. Vasylkovskyi says he sees improvement in the soldiers, but that there should be more programs addressing PTSD.

"They're already exhausted," he says, "and this war is far from over."

At the end of their week at this rehab center, most soldiers return to the frontline. Bayda says he always prays he will hear from them again.

"Just a hello is fine," he says, "so I know they're alive."

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This spa-like rehab revives Ukraine's traumatized troops between ... - NPR

By continuing to rely on Russias ethnic minorities and foreign labor migrants to do its dirty work in Ukraine, the Kremlin is inadvertently damaging ties to its former colonies.

A young Uzbek man named Fakhriddin has died in Ukraine after being recruited from a Russian prison, where he had been serving a five-year prison sentence, to work on a construction project in Russia-occupied eastern Ukraine. Fakhriddin, who died when a shell hit the site he was working on, is one of the latest casualties of Russias push to use Central Asian natives not only on Ukrainian battlefields, but also in the reconstruction of battle-torn occupied territories.

Hundreds if not thousands of Central Asian migrants are being hired to work in Russian-occupied Ukrainian territory, despite dangerous conditions and warnings from their governments not to go to Ukraine. Most of these migrants are used in the reconstruction of war-ravaged cities like Mariupol and Donetsk; others dig trenches and collect dead bodies on the frontlines. Female migrants from Central Asia are also offered jobs in military hospitals, canteens, and factories in occupied eastern Ukraine.

Vacancies are posted on major employment websites like Headhunter and the classifieds site Avito, as well as some regional employment websites, and shared via social media and in migrant communities or advertised by construction companies directly. Employers promise to cover travel expenses to Ukraine, accommodation, meals, and uniforms. Salaries range from $2,000 to $3,300 a month: significantly more than laborers can earn in Russia.Yet despite the enticing promises, Central Asian migrants face the same issues in Russia-occupied Ukraine as they do in Russia itself: unsanitary conditions, unheated living quarters, and poor treatment by employers. Multiple reports indicate that migrants are either underpaid or not paid at all. Some disillusioned workers who have tried to leave Ukraine were not permitted by Russian border guards to re-enter Russia, forcing them to continue working in dangerous conditions on the frontlines while facing criminal prosecution from Kyiv and their home governments for participating in the invasion.

These hostile conditions in eastern Ukraine put Central Asian labor migrants and their governments in a bind. Central Asias population continues to grow rapidly, with around half of the regions population now under thirty years old. A lack of employment options and underdeveloped education systems combined with economies wrecked by nepotism, the COVID-19 pandemic, and capital flight mean many younger Central Asians are forced to move abroad to find work.

Central Asian governments, particularly those of Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, have become accustomed to exporting excess labor capacity in order to generate much-needed revenue for households through remittances, relieve domestic pressure to create jobs, and provide public goods and services. Politically, migration serves as a pressure valve that prevents the buildup of unemployment-fueled social and political frustration and helps undemocratic regimes to stay in power.

Russia remains the primary destination for these labor migrants. Familiarity with the Russian language and culture stemming from a shared Soviet past, geographic proximity, and Russias acute need for labor migrants continues to keep Central Asia in Moscows orbit. Streamlined processes for obtaining citizenship for highly qualified personnel from former Soviet republics, such as doctors and engineers, adds to Russias allure, particularly to those from Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, the most remittance-dependent countries in the region.

After a pandemic-induced dip, the number of Kyrgyz, Tajiks, and Uzbeks registered to work in Russia is peaking again. According to Russian Interior Ministry data, as many as 978,216 Kyrgyz, 3,528,319 Tajiks, and 5,837,363 Uzbeks entered Russia intending to work in 2022. Some people are likely to have been counted twice in these figures, as they reflect the number of registered border crossings, but they are still at a five-year high.

Now the economic downturn in Russia and pressure to work in Russia-occupied Ukraine might contribute to changes in regional labor migration patternsboth at the grassroots level and from the topthat started during the pandemic. While Uzbekistan has become a popular destination for migrants from Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan has emerged as a popular alternative destination to Russia for a growing number of Uzbeks, Tajiks, and Kyrgyz (precise numbers are harder to find as many migrants take advantage of the lack of visa requirements to work illegally and avoid paying taxes).

Central Asian governments, facing domestic pressure to keep their nationals from dying in Ukraine, are also looking for ways to reduce their employment dependence on Russia by diversifying migration destinations and providing migrants with more resources. Uzbekistan has been working with Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan on the bilateral improvement of migration flows. Last December, the Uzbek and British governments discussed collaboration on labor migration during another round of economic talks. USAID has just opened a second consultation center in Uzbekistan for labor migrants, in Samarkand. In early 2022, Kyrgyzstans Labor Ministry created a center for employment abroad; later that year, the governments of Kyrgyzstan and South Korea signed an agreement guaranteeing additional employment opportunities for Kyrgyz nationals in South Korea.

This search for labor migration alternatives is part of Central Asias slow realignment away from its all-encompassing dependence on Russia: a nuanced dance the regional governments must perform without directly antagonizing the former metropole.

Central Asian governments refused to side with Russia in condemning the UN resolution to end the war in Ukraine. Russias regional integration projects are unlikely to expand, as Uzbekistan continues to decline invitations to join the Eurasian Economic Union, and Russias defeats in Ukraine have weakened the reputation of the Moscow-led Collective Security Treaty Organization. Finally, Central Asian foreign ministers in February welcomed U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken to the first ministerial-level engagement of the C5+1 Diplomatic Platformwhich represents U.S. engagement with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistanin the region since its 2015 founding.

This realignment can also be seen on the cultural front: the popularity of the Russian language is declining, while local languages are seeing growing interest in them since the invasion of Ukraine. Local governments are cutting the number of Russian language lessons in schools and renaming streets. The issue of decolonization and anti-colonial solidarity is as salient as it has ever been since the collapse of the Soviet Union.

By continuing to rely on Russias ethnic minorities and foreign labor migrants to do its dirty work in Ukraine, the Kremlin is inadvertently damaging ties to its former colonies. The longer the conflict drags on, the more incentive Central Asian republics will have to manage their dependence on Russia in exporting their excess labor. Its hard to see Central Asia quitting on Russia entirely, but the relationship is sure to grow more nuanced and less lopsided in the months to come.

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By Sending Migrants to Ukraine, the Kremlin is Damaging Ties With ... - Carnegie Endowment for International Peace