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The decision of a Russian court to keep Wall Street Journal reporter Evan Gershkovich in jail suggests a few reflections. I put court in scare quotes for reasons to be explained below. Political economists are interested in such issues because they widely consider an impartial justice system as one of the essential institutions of a free and free-market society.

The Wall Street Journal writes (Russian Court Upholds WSJ Reporter Evan Gershkovichs Detention, April 18, 2022):

The hearing was held behind closed doors, as is typical for most hearings connected with espionage charges. It is also exceedingly rare for defendants to win appeals or be acquitted in such cases in Russia, where espionage laws are increasingly wielded for political purposes, according to Western officials, activists and Russian lawyers.

Russias Federal Security Service, the successor to the KGB, said the journalist acting on the instructions of the American side, collected information constituting a state secret about the activities of one of the enterprises of the Russian military-industrial complex.

Thats what journalists from free countries do, isnt it, even without instructions of the American side?

In my review of Volume 2 of Friedrich Hayeks Law, Legislation and Liberty, I emphasize why the Nobel economist considered a socialist (or fascist) judge as a contradiction in terms (see also his The Constitution of Liberty):

Hayek wages a frontal attack against the doctrine of legal positivism, represented by Hans Kelsen, John Austin, and other legal theorists. The doctrine claims that law is simply what is decreed by the sovereign. As Thomas Hobbes put it, no Law can be Unjust. In the same vein, Soviet legal theorist Evgeny Pashukanis, wrote that under socialism laws are converted into administration, all fixed rules into discretion and utility. Not protected by law, Pashukanis was later eliminated by Stalin. Contrary to state decrees, Hayek argues, law can only be made of general rules that meet general agreement among the public.

Quoting Hayek directly Volume 1 of the same work:

[A judges] task is indeed one which has meaning only within a spontaneous and abstract order of actions such as the market produces. A judge cannot be concerned with the needs of particular persons or groups, or with reasons of state or the will of government, or with any particular purposes which an order of actions may be expected to serve. Within any organization in which the individual actions must be judged by their serviceability to the particular ends at which it aims, there is no room for the judge. In an order like that of socialism in which whatever rules may govern individual actions are not independent of particular results, such rules will not be justiciable because they will require a balancing of the particular interests affected in the light of their importance. Socialism is indeed largely a revolt against the impartial justice which considers only the conformity of individual actions to end-independent rules and which is not concerned with the effects of their application in particular instances. Thus a socialist judge would really be a contradiction in terms.

In my review, I wrote:

I would add that this crucial point would also apply to a fascist judge, and Hayek would certainly agree.

This is why Russian courts are courts in name only. They are instruments of government policy. For the same reason, what the apparatchiks call law is synonymous with government commands, its not law in the classical sense. When Vladimir Putin is said to be a trained lawyer, the second term also cries for scare quotes. When Putin said that he wanted a dictatorship of the law, he meant nothing more than a dictatorship of the dictator (and perhaps of the majority). In Russia, this is not new. Their plagiarism of Western law is a Potemkin village.

Was Gershkovich a spy for the American government? I dont know, but I know two reasons why it is very unlikely. First, the Wall Street Journal has a reputation and a brand-name value to maintain, which serving as a CIA cover would destroy. After all, the WSJ is not Fox News even if, alas, the two publications have shared a common ownership since late 2007. To sell information, as opposed to entertainment or confirmation bias, a financial newspaper needs to be, and perceived to be, independent. The second reason is that we cannot count on the unrestricted liars in the Russian government nor on their judicial minions to tell us anything useful about journalistic activities.

It is true that, over the last 100 years or so in history of the free world, the law has not moved in the right direction, as Hayek detected long ago, even crying wolf too early in the opinions of some. Like virtually everything, the liberal rule of law is a matter of degree, at least up to a point. But there is no doubt that Western countries are still freer than Russia, which is why you read this blog. Like many economists who have studied the question (including James Buchanan and, yes, Anthony de Jasay too), we should continue to defend the endangered ideal of (classical) liberalism.

See the original post here:
A Socialist Judge Is a Contradiction in Terms - Econlib

Last week, the New Left Reviews Dylan Riley published a brief, barbed polemic against those adherents of neo-Kautskyite socialism a tendency with which this magazine is reputed to be associated who cling to illusory visions of new New Deals, green or otherwise.

Riley was categorical: No socialist should advocate an industrial policy of any sort. Any future attempted New Deals will prove self-defeating. And those who dont see this have fallen victim to a fatal error: theyve failed to reckon with the structural logic of capital.

Rileys admonition is a reminder of the strange itinerary that the structural logic of capital has traced over the past century and a half. Karl Marx was the great pioneer of the concept of course. His lifelong intellectual project was to uncover the systems inner laws of motion and then to ask: If you have a society propelled by such inner dynamics, in what direction is it likely to go?

His answers to that question almost always involved some mechanism by which capitalism could be shown to be undermining itself or preparing the ground for socialism: Competition bred ever-bigger factories that required ever-more sophisticated planning of production. Capital accumulation gathered up scattered proletarians from the global countryside and concentrated them in crowded factory towns where they could learn of their common interests and organize against the system. And so on.

For Marx, reform was another of these dialectical boomerangs. Capitalism could not stop breeding movements to reform capitalism. These movements had the effect of strengthening the political muscles and sense of self-efficacy of the working class, and this, for Marx, was yet another example of the system putting shovels in the hands of its own gravediggers.

The leading instance of such reforms in Marxs writings was the English Ten Hours Bill (in its several iterations), the object of a great working-class movement in the era of Owenism and Chartism a thirty-years struggle fought with admirable perseverance, as Marx recounted in his 1864 inaugural address to the International Workingmens Association.

And he was unequivocal about the outcome: the reform legislation limiting the length of the working day had been a smashing success. The immense physical, moral, and intellectual benefits hence accruing to the factory operatives, half-yearly chronicled in the reports of the inspectors of factories, are now acknowledged on all sides.

But besides all this, the movement yielded another great benefit.

Throughout the struggle for ten hours, a constant line of attack by bourgeois writers opposed to the reform had been that, if enacted and enforced, the legislation, by driving up production costs, would spell economic calamity for British industry harming the very factory hands it was designed to protect.

In other words, though they may not have used the phrase, the bourgeois opponents of the Ten Hours Bill were appealing to the structural logic of capital to demonstrate the folly of the reform.

For Marx, one of the great achievements of the ten-hours agitation on a par with the actual improvements in the health and happiness of the workers that resulted was precisely how it discredited that kind of critique, and how it vindicated the idea of social production controlled by social foresight even within the bourgeois mode of production:

There was something else to exalt the marvelous success of this workingmens measure. Through their most notorious organs of science, such as Dr. Ure, Professor Senior, and other sages of that stamp, the middle class had predicted, and to their hearts content proved, that any legal restriction of the hours of labor must sound the death knell of British industry, which, vampirelike, could but live by sucking blood, and childrens blood, too. . . .

This struggle about the legal restriction of the hours of labor raged the more fiercely since, apart from frightened avarice, it told indeed upon the great contest between the blind rule of the supply and demand laws which form the political economy of the middle class, and social production controlled by social foresight, which forms the political economy of the working class.

Hence the Ten Hours Bill was not only a great practical success; it was the victory of a principle; it was the first time that in broad daylight the political economy of the middle class succumbed to the political economy of the working class.

If any structural logic of capital was at work in the saga of the ten-hours movement, for Marx, it lay in capitals endemic tendency to generate reform movements in opposition to itself not, as the middle-class sages of science had claimed, in condemning any reform measure to futility.

If we fast-forward a century or so, however, we find these intellectual positions drastically reconfigured.

By the middle of the twentieth century, the political economies of the industrialized world had been transformed by forms of state intervention that Marx and his comrades in the International Workingmens Association could scarcely have imagined. Wide swathes of industry were nationalized. Wage schedules were set in national agreements. Capital-controlled banking systems were under the thumb of national central banks, now accountable to finance ministries that answered to parliaments elected by universal suffrage. Governments committed to full employment held jobless rates to levels once thought impossible.

Intellectuals on the right wing of the socialist and labor movements neo-revisionists like the British author and politician Anthony Crosland began claiming that in this new era of full employment and uninhibited economic management, capitalism had ceased to be capitalism and the workers movement no longer needed to push for any deeper transformation beyond an endless series of piecemeal reforms.

It was in this context, in the 60s and 70s, that self-consciously revolutionary writers on the Left seized on the notion of a structural logic of capital as a weapon in the fight against the new revisionism.

If the capitalist mode of production can ensure, with or without government intervention, continual expansion and full employment, then the most important objective argument in support of revolutionary socialist theory breaks down, wrote David Yaffe, a key figure in the capital logic current of intellectual Marxism, in a 1973 article.

It was thus vital to furnish arguments showing why such a stabilization was impossible, and this was done in works by such writers as Paul Mattick and Roman Rosdolsky by plucking out of relative obscurity a suggestion that could be found in scattered passages of Marxs voluminous economic writings but had, until then, only occasionally been the focus of sustained consideration from Marxists: the idea of a lawlike tendency for the profit rate to fall.

The great nineteenth- and early twentieth-century defenders of Marxist orthodoxy, most prominently Karl Kautsky and Rosa Luxemburg, had been dismissive of falling-profit-rate theories on the rare occasions when they felt the need to acknowledge them at all, and certainly did not believe that such a tendency could be granted a central role in Marxist crisis theory. (Luxemburg was especially biting in her disdain for the idea. Responding to an enthusiast of the theory who had reviewed her Accumulation of Capital in a German socialist newspaper, she wrote: There is still some time to pass before capitalism collapses because of the falling rate of profit roughly until the sun burns out.)

But since the 1970s, the canonical status of falling-profit theory in the corpus of orthodox Marxism has become a kind of invented tradition. Its centrality in the pantheon of Marxist ideas, though widely seen as primordial, is no more than a few decades old, and its function has always been ideological: to demonstrate the futility, perversity, or jeopardy of social democratic reforms.

Ill save for a subsequent article a more thorough discussion of the various theories of falling profit including the novel version advanced by the UCLA economic historian Robert Brenner, which has become something of a house theory at the New Left Review over the past twenty-five years.

Suffice it to say that when the New Left Review invokes it to warn that the structural logic of capital will somehow render futile measures to promote green technologies, due to a massive exacerbation of the problems of overcapacity on a world scale, it illustrates the rhetorical dilemma of an anti-reformist left whose struggle against anachronism has forced it to stand Marx on his head.

Link:
Karl Marx Knew That the Struggle for Reforms Was Part of the ... - Jacobin magazine

Her least talked about blunder is the decision to nationalise the wholesale trade in food grains in April 1973.

Yashwant Deshmukh & Sutanu Guru

Published: 18 Apr 2023, 6:53 PM IST

The transformation of the late Indira Gandhi from a Goddess Durga-like figure in 1971 to an unpopular autocrat who imposed the Emergency in 1975 is a case study of historical blunders.

(Photo: Vibhushita Singh/The Quint)

(This is Part Two of a four-part 'April' series that revisits significant historical events or policies and how the lessons learned from them continue to be of relevance in present-day politics and society. Read the first part here.)

The transformation of the late Indira Gandhi from a Goddess Durga-like figure in 1971 to an unpopular autocrat who imposed the Emergency in 1975 is a case study of historical blunders. In hindsight, contemporary historians and pundits talk more about her political missteps that led to mass protests against her regime. But the real blunders she committed after her famous election victory in 1971 were in the arena of economic policy making.

Arguably, her least talked about historical blunder is the decision to nationalise the wholesale trade in food grains in April 1973. The reverberations of that decision are still felt in India after 50 years. There are three aspects here.

The first is the perception that traders and hoarders habitually fleece and loot farmers of their legitimate dues. The second is the stubborn belief of many Indians that market forces are not good for farmers and consumers. The third is the persistence of a crisis-like situation in Indian agriculture.

The withdrawal of the three farm laws by the Narendra Modi government in November 2021 is a powerful symbol of all the above-mentioned legacy hangovers.

What really happened in April 1973? It is well known that Indira Gandhi adopted hard socialism in the economic policy-making arena. The mistrust of the private sector that was cultivated since independence in 1947 became a credo under her. Her advisors believed that the state had the answer to all economic problems. So, when repeated failure of monsoons triggered a massive supply problem of food grains, Indira Gandhi and her advisers blamed private sector hoarders for shortages of wheat and rice, and thought the state could fix the problem.

The crisis was genuine. Food grains output in India was 108.4 million tonnes in 1970-71. It plummeted to 97 million tonnes in 1972-73; recovered somewhat to 104 million tonnes in 1973-74 and crashed again to 99.8 million tonnes in 1974-75.

One vividly recalls standing for hours outside a ration shop in unruly queues for wheat and rice. Those less fortunate than the authors often had to skip meals because they couldnt access wheat or rice; like the hapless citizens of Pakistan today. Shortages triggered double-digit inflation. The sky-high popularity of Indira Gandhi that had soared after the 1971 war against Pakistan and the creation of Bangladesh started to plummet in 1973.

The legendary journalist cum author Khushwant Singh wrote for The New York Times in 1973: Soon the buffer stock was almost exhausted, but the Government was loath to take around the begging bowl to affluent nations, particularly to the United States, which had supported Pakistan against India in the Bangladesh affair. Once again this spring, the dream of India's becoming selfsufficient in food seemed to be turning to a nightmare; drought and famine stalked the land and the old lament was heard: India's prosperity is a gamble with the rains.

The prime minister's response was to nationalise the wholesale trade in food grains; an extreme example of her garibi hatao chant that led to her sweeping victory in the 1971 Lok Sabha elections. The logic appeared simple: private traders cheated and exploited poor farmers leading to a shortage of food grains. The state would not only pay more remunerative prices to farmers but also eliminate the scourge of hoarding that resulted in shortages and high prices of food grains, particularly those of wheat.

Jospeh Stalin in the Soviet Union and Mao Zedong in China had done the same. No wonder, the Marxists applauded the revolutionary decision. Mind you, there was popular support for the move as traders were a hated community as displayed so evocatively by Bollywood movies of that era. But Indira Gandhi perhaps forgot that the road to hell is paved with noble intentions. The food grains crisis actually worsened after nationalisation and shortages became even more acute.

Within one month of her nationalising the food grains trade, food inflation soared as the Rabi harvest of wheat was far lower than expected. One of the worst four months of inflation seen in independent India was seen from April to July 1973, immediately after the revolutionary decision.

The Arab-Israeli war and the decision by OPEC (Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries) to raise crude oil prices in late 1973 delivered a knockout punch, as inflation in December 1973 was 26 percent higher than in December 1972. There is a growing tribe of analysts that argue now that the events leading to mass protests by students in Gujarat and Bihar culminated in the Total Revolution called by Jayaprakash Narayan, and that the imposition of Emergency were triggered more by economic hardships than political factors. The authors think the analysts have a compelling case to make as the data does back them up.

Within a year, a chastened Indira Gandhi realised the folly of her revolutionary decision, and the policy was abandoned. Private traders went back to their traditional task of cheating and looting poor farmers. Fifty years down the road, the aftermath of the Green Revolution has ensured that food shortages in India are a thing of the past. But attitudes and prejudices prevalent fifty years ago still persist.

Too many Indians are still convinced that Indian farmers cannot survive and thrive without the clutches offered by a Mai Baap Sarkar. It is a mystery why this perception still persists.

There is no doubt that private sector players are not angels or dripping with generosity. Yet, there is ample evidence since 1991 to show they have created near miracles in many sectors.

We have all been asking a question since the early 1980s without getting an answer: if Bajaj can selltwo-wheelers anywhere it wants in India, why cant the Indian farmer do the same with their produce?

(Yashwant Deshmukh & Sutanu Guru work with CVoter Foundation. This is an opinion piece and the views expressed are the authors' own.The Quintneither endorses nor is responsible for them.)

(At The Quint, we are answerable only to our audience. Play an active role in shaping our journalism by becoming a member. Because the truth is worth it.)

Read more from the original source:
April, Indira, and Nationalisation of Grain: The Failure of 'Hard Socialism' - The Quint

'I feel so uneasy about the tone of the recent deluge of letters published here...Let's all dial back the personal rhetoric and attacks'

The author writes in response toLetter: Chippewa renaming issue is symbolic of a deeper problem.

To the editor:

I promised myself that I would try to be a more private, introspective person this year. I deleted my social media. I don't have many friends. I work. I generally keep to myself. But I just can't leave Monday's opinion pieceby Ian Saundersunaddressed.

Firstly, I have to disclose three things.

1) I haven't followed the issue closely. And the naming of the school, I'm sure, isn't what makes me feel compelled to respond publicly. Frankly, when the decision was made in 2017, it seemed like a reasonable thing to do after combining two schools into one. That there is a consultation process with Indigenous representation to help create greater cultural understanding, I thought, was a bonus.

2) I know Erika and her family.

3) While I'm still learning and I don't fully understand the meaning (or usefulness) of such political terms, I would not defend myself against the charge of being a socialist or "woke." In fact, if I do understand them correctly, I would be proud to earn such labels.

That said, I feel the need to respond publicly because I can't shake the feeling that this issue is personal. This issue has struck a chord deep in the weeds of the culture wars and Erika has become a target. I also feel like our local media, and BayToday in particular, in a search for issues that generate "engagement" ($$), has contributed to a hyper-focus on Erika.

I want to remind everyone that the people in these roles are real people who live in our community. I feel so uneasy about the tone of the recent deluge of letters published here. Never mindthat she wasn'teven on the board in 2017. Or that a committee is in place to provide recommendations to the board. Let's all dial back the personal rhetoric and attacks.

And while I'm at it, remind me why we're so excited as a community to demonize Erika. The writer of Monday's piece told us that she represents a serious threat to our community (even though the authordoesn't live here) because of her "wokeness" and her socialism.

Is she accused of trying to improve a system for people facing real and historic social barriers?

I thought that's what we meant by "woke."How dare she

Socialist? She thinks there's too great a divide between the rich and the poor and would like to use our public institutions to improve that gap. Isn't that what public policy solutions from the left look like?

Have we completely lost our way? Why do I feel like what is really threatening to people like Ian Saunders is a smart, assertive, super hard-workingwoman who challenges existing power structures from the left side of the political spectrum? If Erika is a "woke"socialist, then I hope to have the courage to be more like her one day.

Scott RobertsonNorth Bay

Editor's note: Robertson is a former North Bay city councillor and federal NDP candidate inNipissingTimiskaming.

Originally posted here:
Letter: In defence of 'woke' and 'socialist' school board chair - BayToday.ca

One year after the brutal invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022, those who have opposed Russia and NATO stand vindicated. The Eastern European country is a battleground for United States and NATO ambitions to reassert their hegemony in the world and for Russias failing hopes to stamp its authority over its near abroad. The stakes are incredibly high for both sides.

Vladimir Putins regime continues to unleash death and destruction on Ukraine. However, in the process, it has sunk Russia further into a military disaster that threatens the very opposite of Putins war aims. Far from increasing its standing in the eyes of its neighbours, the war has weakened Russias ability to intervene in other parts of its near abroad. Its military prowess has been humiliated. Its economythough surviving Western sanctionslacks the industrial and technological base to sustain offensive war. Yet, precisely because Putin knows how high the stakes are, he needs to be able to claim some sort of victory. This means he remains determined to hold on to the Ukrainian territory in the south and east of the country that has been annexed to Russia. As he said in his New Years address, This is what we are fighting for today: protecting our people in our historical territories in the new regions of the Russian Federation.

US president Joe Biden views the war as an inflection point in the world. Less than a month after the Russian invasion, he told a group of business leaders, Theres going to be a new world order out there, and weve got to lead it. The US sees the war in Ukraine as an opportunity to weaken Russiaand send a signal to Chinawithout a direct military confrontation with Russian units. In April 2022, US defence secretary Lloyd Austin told a press conference in Kiev, We want to see Russia weakened to the degree that it cant do the kinds of things that it has done in invading Ukraine. This means denying Russia the capability to very quickly reproduce the military forces that it has lost so far.

The strategy of US imperialism is to bleed Russia dry through a managed escalation of the conflict. The US has so far pledged $113 billion worth of aid. Congress voted for four packages in 2022$13 billion in March, $40 billion in May, $14 billion in September and $45 billion in December. At the present rate of spending, another tranche will most likely be required in July. The Biden administration has a high degree of flexibility to specify how this money is spent after congressional approval, and some of it has not yet been allotted. However, of this total, some $50 billion has gone on military aid, including new equipment, training of personnel and transfers of US equipment to the Ukrainian armed forces.

The White House has sought to coordinate Western aid through the Ukrainian Defence Contact Group, which is made up of some 54 countries, comprising the 3o NATO member states plus Austria, Australia, New Zealand and a number of others. The Ukraine Support Tracker, launched by the Kiel Institute for the World Economy, a research centre in Germany, shows that the US has provided the lions share of the aid to Ukrainearound 62 percent. Nonetheless, military aid from other countries was substantial, standing at around $41.4 billion. There are differences in the types of aid that various Western states send; for example, Britain and Poland provide substantially military support, but the European Union and Canada provide relatively more financial and humanitarian aid.

It is not just the scale of military aid that is significant. US aid has been shifting in two ways. First, the sorts of weaponry have been changing, based on battlefield requirements. Second, there is a move towards an emphasis on long-term aid and integration of the Ukrainian military into NATO infrastructures. At the start of the invasion, the US focused on anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons, such Stinger and Javelin missiles. After Ukrainian forces repelled the initial offensive on Kiev in April, Russia turned to huge artillery barrages across the east and south of the country. US-supplied aid then shifted towards artillery. The first shipment of M777 howitzers in April introduced NATO-standard artillery pieces to Ukraine for the first time. The HIMARS multiple rocket system played a decisive role in the Ukrainian counter-offensive in September and October 2022. In the weeks preceding it, Ukrainian forces were able to target ammunition stores and bases 70 miles behind Russian lines. In 2023, the US is so far prioritising supplying a combination of air defence systems and more offensive weaponry such as tanks. For example, in January, the US pledged 100 M13 armoured personal carriers, which will be necessary to retake further territory in the spring. On 3 February, the US approved future supplies of its precision-guided small diameter bombs, which can be fired by the HIMARS rocket systems but have an enhanced range of some 93 miles.

The largest component of this aid is short-term military support, which stood at around $18 billion in November 2022. Yet, on top of weaponry, the US has sent over $10 billion in long-term military support, which the Ukrainian state can use to buy weapons. This will not have an immediate impact on the battlefield due to the long turnaround time between the procurement and delivery of military kit. Instead, the aim is to rebuild the Ukrainian armed forces and further integrate them into NATOs military infrastructure. In November 2022, Austin, speaking at a meeting at a US air base in Germany, argued the West had to work together to train Ukraines forces:

Well work together to help integrate Ukraines capabilities and bolster its joint operations for the long haul. Well work together to upgrade our defence industrial bases to meet Ukraines requirements for the long haul.

However, the US and Germany, the most powerful European state, have sought to resist pressure to give other offensive weaponry to Ukraine. Colonel Alexander Vindman, former director of Europe affairs for the US National Security Council, who has pushed for a more aggressive stance since before the Russian invasion, argued in the Foreign Affairs journal that the US had failed to embrace the goal of a Ukrainian victory. He says this was a result of efforts to avoid destabilising Russia too much. Some experts fear that a Russian loss, or some other inglorious outcome for Moscow, may precipitate a broader war or nuclear escalation. Vindman complained that the US has committed aid to Ukraine in fits and starts and has sought to avoid an escalation with Russia at the expense of more uncompromising support for Ukraines defence.

Despite Washingtons strategy of managed escalation, the conflict is driven by chaotic inter-imperialist rivalries. The logic of competition pushes further escalation in decidedly unmanaged and deadly directions. So, the US and Germany resisted supplying main battle tanksthen they backtracked. Now, the pressure is on to supply fighter aircraft. Beyond Ukraine, European states are being drawn into rival, nuclear-armed camps, with once-neutral Finland and Sweden on the road to joining NATO. The Polish president, Andrzej Duda, has called for NATO to give Ukraine the same status as Israel after the war, a move that would commit the US, Britain and other member states to military assistance in case of any future attack.

In the West, the war has been fought under the banner of defending Ukrainian self-determination, but it has increasingly subsumed its independence to rival imperialist powers. The countrys leaders, under President Volodymyr Zelensky, have tied Ukraines fate to the Wests aims; they urge more military support by saying its future lies in becoming a big Israel, an outpost of US power in Eastern Europe. In his 2022 New Year speech, Zelensky said, We helped the West return to the global arena and feel how much the West prevails. No one in the West is afraid of Russia anymore and never will be.

The Russian invasion marked the beginning of a new and bloody chapter in the inter-imperialist rivalry between the West and Russia, which has torn Ukraine apart since the 2000s. Hence, it did not just mark a dangerous turning point for Ukraine; it was also a menacing milestone in world politics.

Since the end of the Cold War in 1991, the US has waged a series of wars against weaker states in order to maintain its hegemony. Largely, though not exclusively, these have been in the Global South. They include, for example, its wars in Somalia and Yugoslavia in the 1990s, and the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq in the 2000s. Today, however, we face a a world of competing great powers, in which the most powerful states are moving into more direct confrontation with one another. This process is not just being played out between the US and Russia but also between the US and China. Indeed, the competition between the US and China is the main rivalry in the global system.

The shift towards more explicit confrontation between the biggest powers was given an official stamp at the NATO summit in Madrid in summer 2022, with the alliance agreeing a new strategic concept. Speaking at the beginning of the summit, NATO secretary general Jens Stoltenberg promised a fundamental shift to our deterrence and defence, including more forward deployed combat formations, more high-readiness forces and more prepositioned equipment. He explained that this marked the biggest overhaul of our collective defence since the end of the Cold War, and stressed that China, not just Russia, was the target of these changes:

The strategic concept will also reflect a new reality in other ways. China is not mentioned with a single word in the previous strategic concept. China will be part of the concept we agree at this summit, and I expect allies will agree that China posesa challenge to our values, our interests and our security.

An official review group, appointed by Stoltenberg, reiterated the shift to inter-state rivalry in the wake of Russias invasion:

The main characteristic of the current security environment is the re-emergence of geopolitical competitionthat is, the profusion and escalation of state-based rivalries and disputes over territory, resources and values. In the Euro-Atlantic area, the most profound geopolitical challenge is posed by Russia. Although Russia is by economic and social measures a declining power, it has proven itself capable of territorial aggression and is likely to remain a chief threat facing NATO over the coming decade.

However, the review goes on to make clear that China is the major, long-term rival to NATO:

The growing power and assertiveness of China is the other major geopolitical development that is changing the strategic calculus of NATO. China poses a very different kind of challenge to NATO than Russia; unlike the latter it is not, at present, a direct military threat to the Euro-Atlantic area.

Nevertheless, China has an increasingly global strategic agenda, supported by its economic and military heft. It has proven its willingness to use force against its neighbours, as well as economic coercion and intimidatory diplomacy, well beyond the Indo-Pacific region. Over the coming decade, China will likely also challenge NATOs ability to build collective resilience, safeguard critical infrastructure, address new and emerging technologies such as 5G, and protect sensitive sectors of the economy, including supply chains. Longer term, China is increasingly likely to project military power globally, including potentially in the Euro-Atlantic area.

The strategic concept document, described by Stoltenberg as a blueprint for a more competitive world, pledged:

We will individually and collectively deliver the full range of forces, capabilities, plans, resources, assets and infrastructure needed for deterrence and defence, including for high intensity, multi-domain warfighting against nuclear-armed peer-competitors.

Meanwhile, Chinas response to the Ukraine war too flows from its inter-imperialist competition with the US. The Chinese Communist Party leadership in Beijing has not condemned Russias invasion. Indeed, it has avoided calling it an invasion, reflecting Kremlin propaganda that refers to the war as a special military operation. Nonetheless, Chinas leaders have not wholeheartedly supported Russia either, instead calling for peace talks. This attitude is motivated by three factors.

First, China wants to avoid inviting Western sanctions on its own economy, which is, of course, very much integrated into global capitalism. Second, it still needs European markets, and it hopes to drive wedges between the US and Europes big powers (although this strategy is now very damaged). Third, the war in Ukraine has weakened Russia and made it geopolitically and economically more dependent on China. This has certain advantages for China, for instance, strengthening its hand in Central Asia, where Russias prestige and influence has declined. However, this process is also underlining some of the tensions between the two powers. Yes, China and Russia have cooperated, but their relationship is marked by imperialist competition too.

Yet, despite all of this, China does not want to see Russia humiliated. Such an outcome would strengthen the power of the US, Chinas main rival, on the Eurasian land mass. Thus, China is seeking to balance between a number of different and sometimes contradictory aims: preventing total Russian defeat in Ukraine, avoiding tying itself to Russias fate and bolstering its own position against the US.

The mainstream media paints Ukraine as a war between democracy and authoritarianismor, increasingly and ridiculously, fascism. Tories, Labour Party right wingers, liberals and former left wingers such as journalist Paul Mason have all lined up behind the notion of the West as a bulwark of freedom. They say the anti-war movement are Putin apologists for daring to talk about the role of the US and NATO in stoking the war.

Meanwhile, some on the radical left see the bloodshed purely as a Russian war of imperialist conquest and a Ukrainian war of national defence, downplaying NATOs role. For example, the Lebanese Marxist Gilbert Achcar, whom Alex Callinicos has debated in Socialist Worker, puts forward this view in what he calls a radical anti-imperialist position. This argument suggests socialists should support, or not oppose, NATO pouring arms into Ukraine.

However, in order to understand the roots of the Ukraine war, we need to investigate two questions. First, what is imperialism? Second, what are US and Russian imperialism up to in Ukraine?

A popular view of imperialism sees it merely as stronger nation-states dominating weaker ones. This has taken place across history and, of course, remains a feature of contemporary imperialism. Empires, armed conflict and geopolitical competition between states existed in class-based societies before capitalism. However, at a certain stage in the development of capitalism in the late 19th century, geopolitical rivalry and capitalist economic competition fused in a novel way. The British liberal economist J A Hobson, whose work Lenin drew on, described a cut-throat struggle of competing empires in his influential 1902 book, Imperialism: A Study. He surveyed the European powers colonial land grabs in Africa and Asia during the late 19th century, contrasting it with previous eras. He argued that the leading characteristic of modern imperialism was the competition of rival empires, and that the very notion of a number of competing empires is essentially modern.

The Marxist theory of imperialism sought to understand what was driving this competition. It was developed most notably by Lenin in Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism in 1916 and Nikolai Bukharin in Imperialism and World Economy in 1917. Of course, there are parts of what Lenin and Bukharin wrote that no longer hold up, but arguing for the relevance of the classical Marxist theory of imperialism is not an exercise in dogma. The foundations of the theory are indispensable to understanding the world of rivalries we face today. Crucially, Lenin and Bukharin grasped imperialism as a capitalist phenomenon involving a system of competing capitalist states and capitals.

Capitalist development in the 19th century saw a process that Karl Marx described as the concentration and centralisation of capital. The capitalist system is driven forward by competition between firms; they invest to get ahead of rivals and grab a larger share of the markets. As firms compete, the most successful ones swallow up rivals and drive them out of business. So, instead of hundreds of small companies, a handful of corporations come to dominate key sectors of the economy. This tendency drove the growing internationalisation of production and circulation, and the growing interdependence of state and capital. Even though corporations operate internationally, they cluster around their own national states, depending on them in the struggle against rivals. States can use military means to project their power and further the interests of their capitalist corporations. However, these states are also dependent on the development of capitalist firms to enable them to develop the military and industrial base necessary to sustain modern warfare.

Some within the Marxist tradition have argued that internationalisation of production would make war less likely, claiming armed conflict would become increasingly irrational from the point of view of the capitalist class. The German Marxist and Social Democratic Party leader Karl Kautsky put forward this sort of position in his theory of ultra-imperialism, which he wrote, with a staggering lack of prescience, in the run-up to the First World War. A less intelligent version of this idea was articulated by US political commentator Thomas Friedman, a champion of globalisation in the 1990s, when he argued that no two countries in which the McDonalds fast food chain operates could go to war with one another.

Such hopes of capitalism somehow abolishing war are patently misguided. Because capitalism does not develop equally across the world, there is constant fluctuation of the relative power of the different nation-states within the global imperialist system, and this drives a logic of imperialist competition that can build towards war. Lenin grasped the importance of this uneven development:

The only conceivable basis under capitalism for the division of spheres of influence, interests, colonies and so on is a calculation of the strength of those participating, their general economic, financial, military strength and so forth. The strength of these participants in the division does not change to an equal degree, because the even development of different undertakings, trusts, branches of industry and countries is impossible under capitalism.

Ukraine is at the centre of a much bigger faultline of imperialist rivalry running down the Eurasian landmass between the US and Russia and many other regional powers. This great fissure starts in northern Europe on the border between Russia and the Baltic statesEstonia, Latvia and Lithuania. From here, it cuts down into Moldova and Ukraine, runs through the oil-rich Caucasus region on Russias southern tip, and extends into Central Asia.

Speaking as a former leading official in the US National Security Council between 2018 and 2020, Colonel Vindman made clear that US imperialism had a strategic interest in Ukraine before the invasion. In November 2021, Vindman praised US leaders for some recognition of Ukraines strategic value to NATO. However, he also complained that this was well short of where we should be weighing Ukraine in terms of regional and geopolitical standing. This weight, Vindman argued, could enable US and Euro-Atlantic aspirations for competition with Russiaand with China.

Vindmans thinking prevails in the Biden administration. In autumn 2022, a White House statement argued that the USs relationship with Ukraine serves as a cornerstone for security in the broader region. To this end, the US is committed to Ukraines implementation of the deep and comprehensive reforms necessary to fulfil its European and Euro-Atlantic aspirations. This involves what is known in military jargon as interoperability between NATO and Ukrainian armed forces, and it comes along with defence sector reforms and a broader free market package.

Tensions are rising right along the Eurasian faultline. The US is determined to defend its place in the world, but other states see its relative decline as an opportunity to jockey for position. After the end of the Cold War, the US was the worlds only superpower. In 1991, President George H W Bush proclaimed a new world order, saying its principle would be simple: What we say goes. Yet, the situation was far more complex than that. Serial war criminal Henry Kissinger warned that the US was still in no better position to dictate the global agenda unilaterally than it was at the beginning of the Cold War. He wrote that the US would face economic competition of a kind it has never experienced from rising powers such as China.

In response to this challenge, sections of the US ruling class advocated for the assertion of the countrys global hegemony through brute military force, and these elements clustered around the new Republican administration of George W Bush, who took office in 2001. Senior policy makers had laid out this vision in the publications of the Project for the New American Century think tank. Their big chance came after the 9/11 attacks on the Twin Towers in New York City and the Pentagon building in Washington DC in September 2001. Under the guise of a War on Terror, the US launched brutal invasions of Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003. The aim was to gain control of the Middle Easts vast oil reserves, sending a signal to potential rivals such as China that its economic growth was dependent on US goodwill. A military success in Iraq would show the USs rivals that it was still top dog in the world. However, the result was the opposite. The USs humiliating defeats on the battlefields of Iraq instead signalled that it might be possible for weaker powers to assert their own interestseven when they went against US wishes. Russia is one such power.

In 1991, the Soviet Union split apart into the Russian Federation and 14 other states, including Ukraine. For much of the following decade, Russian power was a shadow of its former self. President Boris Yeltsin sought to work with the US to force through the transition from state capitalism to free market capitalism. Moreover, significant sections of the Russian ruling class thought they could become a junior partner to the US within global capitalism. Nonetheless, Russia was still determined to push its own set of imperialist interests.

From 1991, Russia tried to reassert its influence in the former Soviet republics. The deputy minister for nationality affairs, Kim Tsagolov, was very clear about the position of the state: Russia is participating in this confrontation between world powers in disadvantageous conditions. In spite of this, we must defend our position on the Caucasian bridgehead.

Attempting to improve Russias weakened status, Yeltsin stirred up a series of separatist and ethnic conflicts in Moldova, Georgia, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Ingushetia, Armenia and Azerbaijan. The aim was to destabilise its neighbours, and the result was 170,000 people dead and 1.5 million refugees. In Chechnya, located at the heart of the Caucasus, it took two brutal wars to subdue a revolt after the small republic declared independence in 1991. In 1999, Putin, recently made prime minister (and soon to be president), overwhelmed the Chechen resistance. His military victory, and the spike in world oil prices in the 2000s, underpinned the regimes stability. Putin built up the armed forces and used Russias oil and gas resources to grow its economic and political strength. He could now assert Russias dominance in the near abroad, and Ukrainea buffer between the West and Russiawas one of the most important of these neighbouring countries.

Meanwhile, the US, NATO and the EU had also been trying to extend their influence in Russias near abroad, and this became an area of growing rivalries. The US broke its promise to Mikhail Gorbachev, the last leader of the Soviet Union, that NATO would not expand eastwards. Things came to a head in 2008 when NATOs Bucharest summit agreed that Ukraine and Georgia would be able to join the alliance. Russia invaded two separatist regions within Georgia, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, to stop it joining NATO.

There was an economic side to the rivalry. The EUa regional bloc of capital and would-be imperialism that is aligned with the USsees parts of the near abroad as its own backyard. Russia set up the Eurasian Customs Union to compete with the EU (and also to strengthen its hand against China in Central Asia). To make this a viable economic bloc, Ukrainian membership was crucial.

In 2014, when Ukraine seemed like it would pivot toward the West, Russia annexed the Crimea and backed separatist insurgencies in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions in the south east. This aggression was not simply down to Putin and a small clique of generals and spooks around him. Rather, it flowed from the Russian state pursuit of its own set of imperialist interests.

The same is true of Russias full-scale invasion of Ukraine today. The assault on Ukraine flowed from the competitive pressures the Russian state was experiencing before the war. In 2015, the Minsk peace process froze the Ukraine conflict, but the tug of war between the West and Russia continued. By autumn 2021, it was becoming clearer that Russia was losing in the face of the Wests superior weight. At the same time, the near abroad has seen a series of uprisings in recent years, with rebellions in Belarus, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan. These were popular revolts, but liberal and nationalist political forces in those countries looked to the West as an alternative to dictatorship, and Western powers hoped to gain from the fall of regimes more closely aligned with Moscow.

The Russian statenot just Putinwanted to signal to its neighbours that it can still dominate. Losing Ukraine to the Western camp would be disastrous for the Russian state, its ruling class and its influence across the region.

In response to Russias invasion of Ukraine, many socialists argue that all that is taking place is a war of Ukrainian national liberation or national defence. They point to Ukraines long history as a subordinate state of the Russian Empire between 1793 and 1918, as well as its absorption into the Soviet Union from the 1920s until independence in 1991. Therefore, so the argument goes, talking about the USs and NATOs role is a distraction, as left-wing Labour MP John McDonnell put it when he withdrew from speaking at an event organised by the Stop the War Coalition. Mark Serwotka, general secretary of the PCS civil service union, opposed a conference motion that categorised the war as a proxy conflict between NATO and Russia. As NATO poured fuel onto the fire, Serwotka argued, Theres plenty of time for people to discuss the role of NATO, including whether Britain should be a member of it, but now is the time to stand with those people who are being occupied, being murdered and being besieged.

For those who take this view, characterising the war as an inter-imperialist, proxy conflict between the US and Russia is a denial of Ukrainians agency and their countrys right to national self-determination. As the Ukrainian sociologist Volodymyr Ishchenko writes in the New Left Review journal:

For this politics, the problem is Russian imperialism, not imperialism in general. Ukraines dependency on the West tends not to be problematised at all.

At its worstand most cynicalthis narrative is cloaked in the language of identity politics. It claims that opposition to NATO amounts to Westsplaining and ignores Ukrainian voices. Ishchenko continues:

Ukrainian identity politics primarily targets the West, which is held to be culpable for allowing the Russian invasion, trading with Russia, appeasing Putins regime, providing insufficient support for Ukraine and reproducing Russian imperialist narratives about Eastern Europe. Yet, if the West is to be blamed for Ukraines suffering, it could relatively easily redeem itself by providing unconditional support for the Ukrainian and unconditional rejection of the Russian.

Meanwhile, some socialists pay lip service to an inter-imperialist dimension, but end up in the same position of lining up behind the West. Achcar argues that talk of a proxy war and opposition to NATO arms obliterates the Ukrainians agency. Yet, the political tradition associated with this journal recognises the dimension of national liberation in the war:

For Ukrainians it is a war of national self-defence. At the same time, from the side of Western imperialist powers led by the United States and organised through NATO, it is a proxy war against Russia. The war is both an imperialist invasion of a former colony and part of an inter-imperialist conflict between the US and Russia with their allies.

Nevertheless, it has also taken a position of opposing both Russia and NATO. Understanding this requires a clear grasp of the Marxist approach to national self-determination so it can be applied to the concrete situation in Ukraine.

At the beginning of Russias invasion, Putin blamed Lenin and his associates for creating Ukraine by separating and severing what is historically Russian land. Putin was here referring to the Bolsheviks positive attitude towards Ukrainian national rights. He was right that Lenin was a staunch supporter of oppressed nations right to self-determination. Indeed, Lenin argued against other revolutionary socialists, such as the Polish Marxist Rosa Luxemburg, who thought that supporting Polands right to self-determination from the Russian Empire was a divisive distraction from the working classs struggle for socialism.

The bulk of the left views the current war in Ukraine through the prism of national self-determination. Some socialists argue that, if we are really to follow Lenins approach to national self-determination, this means characterising Ukraine as a national struggle and not opposing the shipping of NATO arms to the warzone. In Tempest, a US online magazine, some of whose contributors come from the same political tradition as this journal, Ashley Smith argues:

With all its contradictions, Ukraine is engaged in a struggle for national liberation. Against Russias imperialist invasion, Ukraine has waged a national popular struggle for self-determination. It is fighting for its right to exist as a nation with its own government. This war is between Russia and Ukraine, not between Russia and the US. It is not an inter-imperialist war.

However, such arguments do not derive from Lenins approach to the issue of national self-determination. For Lenin, there were two main reasons socialists should support self-determination. First, convincing the working class in the imperialist county to support the right of the oppressed nation to self-determination would help break the hold of reactionary ideas. If Russian workers, for example, supported national freedom for Ukraine, it would help to undermine the Great Russian chauvinism that ideologically bound ordinary people to the Tsar and the ruling class. These same principles are true in modern Russia, where Putin is using Great Russian chauvinism as an ideological glue between ordinary people and the regime. However, there is a difference between supporting the right to national self-determination and championing secession. As Lenin wrote, This demand for the right of national self-determination is not the same as a demand for separation, fragmentation and the formation of small states. This was a question of revolutionary strategy and tactics.

Second, oppressed nations winning independence would be a blow to imperialism, aiding working-class peoples struggle against the ruling class. Lenin pointed to the Easter Rising against British rule in Ireland in 1916, which threatened to weaken the British state at a time when it was fighting an inter-imperialist war against Germany. This meant that, in some cases, socialists in the imperialist countries should not only support the right to self-determination, but also be part of the fight for national freedom. Lenin argued, If we do not want to betray socialism, we must support every revolt against our chief enemy, the capitalist class of the big states, provided it is not the revolt of a reactionary class. It should be noted, though, that this never means painting a communist colouring on nationalist forces, nor does it require socialists in oppressed countries to subordinate their class interests to national independence.

However, the right to self-determination was never an abstract question for Lenin, and he always understood it in the context of imperialism. He was well aware that demands for self-determination could and have served, under certain circumstances, as an instrument in the hands of the bourgeoisie for deceiving the workers.

Thus, Lenin argued that socialists had to look at concrete circumstances:

The bourgeoisie, which naturally assumes the leadership at the start of every national movement, says that support for all national aspirations is practical. However, the proletariats policy in the national question (as in all others) only supports the bourgeoisie in a certain direction, but never coincides with the bourgeoisies policy.

The proletariatassesses any national demand, any national separation, from the angle of the workers class struggle.

So, how can we apply Lenins approach to an inter-imperialist war?

Of course, the Russian invasion of Ukraine is not the first time socialists have had to grapple with the relationship between an inter-imperialist war and national self-determination. Marxists were confronted with the same problem in relation to Serbia and Poland when the First World War broke out in 1914. How did they react? Can the positions they developed help us respond to the war in Ukraine?

On 28 July 1914, using the pretext of the assassination of the heir to the Austrian throne by a Serb nationalist in Sarajevo, the Austro-Hungarian Empire invaded Serbia, precipitating the First World War. On one side stood the Triple Entente, comprising the British, French and Russian Empires; on the other was the Central Powers, made up of Germany, Austria-Hungary and the Ottoman Empire. Each armed camp sought to pull other states, such as Italy, into the bloodbath for the redivision of Europe and the colonies.

The socialist parties of the Second International were committed to peace, pledging a general strike if war broke out between imperialist powers. However, no sooner had the First World War begun, the majority of these parties collapsed into supporting their own ruling classes in the slaughter. The honourable exceptions were the Russian Bolshevik Party, the Bulgarian socialists (after the Bulgarian state joined on the side of the Central Powers in October 1915) and the Serbian Social Democratic Party, which refused to vote for war credits.

Duan Popovi was a leading member of the Serbian Social Democrats. In spring 1915, he wrote a letter to Christian Rakovsky, a Bulgarian-born socialist and an associate of Leon Trotsky who would go on to become a Bolshevik after 1917:

For us, it was clear that, as far as the conflict between Serbia and Austria-Hungary was concerned, our country was obviously in a defensive position. Austria had been carrying on a policy of conquest against Serbia long before the latter became an independent state Basically Serbia is defending its life and its independence, which Austria was constantly threatening even before the Sarajevo assassination. If Social Democracy had a legitimate right to vote for war anywhere, then certainly that was the case in Serbia above all.

Yet, despite this, Popovi goes on to argue, However, for us, the decisive fact was that the war between Serbia and Austria was only a small part of a totality, merely the prologue to universal, European war, and this latter (we are profoundly convinced of this) could not fail to have a clearly pronounced imperialist character.

Popovi wrote that the socialist parties of Austria Hungary, Germany and other states backing the war was a terrible moral blow for us, the hardest blow in our lives as militants. Nonetheless, it has not shaken our profound conviction that we have acted as socialists, and in the only way possible for socialists, by not voting for war credits in an inter-imperialist war. He added that the events that occurred later have merely reinforced our opinion about the nature of the war.

So, Popovi acknowledges two aspects of the war: the Serbian states defensive position and the pronounced imperialist character of the wider clash among Europes great powers. The same was true of revolutionaries such as Lenin, Luxemburg and Trotsky. Yet, this did not lead Popovi to say there were two warsperhaps connected, but ultimately discretehappening. He argued that socialists had to analyse the overarching nature of the war, grasping it as a totality.

In such situations, the question is thus, What is the dominant character of the war? As Lenin asked, is it defined by the continuation of the politics of self-determination or the continuing of the politics of imperialism? In a 1915 essay, The Collapse of the Second International, Lenin argued:

If this war were an isolated one, that is, if it were not connected with the general European war, and with the selfish and predatory aims of Britain, Russia and so on, it would have been the duty of all socialists to desire the success of the Serbian capitalist class. This is the only correct and absolutely inevitable conclusion to be drawn from the national element in the present war.

However, the national element in the Serbo-Austrian war is not, and cannot be, of any serious significance in the general European war. To Serbia, that is, to perhaps 1 percent or so of the participants in the present war, the war is a continuation of the politics of the bourgeois liberation movement. To the other 99 percent, the war is a continuation of the politics of imperialism. If anyone recalls that the war is not purely imperialist when we are discussing the flagrant deception of the masses of the people by the imperialists, who are deliberately concealing the aims of undisguised robbery with national phraseology, then such a person is either an infinitely stupid pedant or a pettifogger and deceiver.

Rosa Luxemburg, who had clashed so sharply with Lenin over the national question, put forward a similar line of argument in the Junius Pamphlet:

If ever a state, according to formal considerations, had the right of national defence on its side, that state is Serbia. Deprived through Austrian annexations of its national unity, threatened by Austria in its very existence as a nation, forced by Austria into war, it is fighting, according to all human conceptions, for existence, for freedom, and for the civilisation of its people.

Nonetheless, Luxemburg emphasised that socialists should not view the Austro-Hungarian occupation of Serbia in isolation from the wars dominant, inter-imperialist character:

Above all this we must not forgetbehind Serbian nationalism stands Russian imperialism. Serbia itself is only a pawn in the great game of world politics. A judgement of the war in Serbia from a point of view that fails to take these great relations and the general world political background into account is necessarily without foundation.

Popovi and his Serbian comrades had, quite rightly, concluded that the First World War was an inter-imperialist war. Dragia Lapevi, who would later oppose Lenin and the Bolsheviks and clash with the left of the Serbian Social Democratic Party, also refused to support war credits in 1914. He saw that imperialist powers rivalries had driven them to a situation where guns must thunder between them. The Russian Empire claimed it had joined the war to protect Serbias sovereignty, and Britain similarly pretended that its motivations lay in defending plucky little Belgium (which, with a colonial empire of almost 2,500,000 square kilometres, was not so little). Lapevi warned, however, that these great powers would now thunder not for the sake of the small nations but against the small nations. Speaking to the Serbian parliament a few days after Austria-Hungary Empire declared war, he warned that the Serbian government is now being used as a plaything in the hands of certain Great Powers. In such a general settling of accounts between the Great Powers, small countries can only be the losers.

Serbia in 1914 and Ukraine in 2022 are not the same; there are no one size fits all blueprint for understanding wars. The current situation in Ukraine does not fit Lenins 1 percent to 99 percent formula. However, the Serbian socialists, as well as Lenin, Luxemburg and Trotsky, still provide a framework for grasping the relationship between inter-imperialist wars and wars of national defence. Today, Ukraine is defending its life and independence, which is threatened by Russia. However, that is neither the totality nor the dominant characteristic of the war. Rather, Ukraine is the keystone in an arc of inter-imperialist competition that stretches across the Eurasian landmass. Rivalry between the West and Russia has driven the war and now sees NATOs and Russias guns thundering on Ukrainian soil.

The Ukrainian government is being used as a plaything in the hands of the West and Russia. The West hopes to use Ukraine to reassert its global hegemony and humble a rival, Russia, which wanted to increase control over its near abroad and stem NATO expansion. Moreover, in this general settling of accounts between the Great Powers, Ukrainians are the losers. Inter-imperialist competition is the dominant feature of this situation, defining the nature of the war. For socialists, this means standing against the Russian invasion, but also not collapsing into support for NATO and their man, Zelensky.

Western politicians and pundits present Zelensky as a freedom fighter leading a national liberation struggle. These claims were at their most ridiculous when Tory Party grandee Malcolm Rifkind and former BBC journalist Andrew Marr said he was the new Nelson Mandela and the nearest equivalent to Mandela.

However, some socialists who acknowledge an inter-imperialist dimension lean into this narrative. Political economist Yuliya Yurchenko argues that, to recognise the national dimension, You have to put on your decolonial thinking cap:

Of course, there is an inter-imperialist dimension to all of this. Thats obvious. But there is also a national dimension to it that must be recognized. You have to draw on all the lessons learned from national liberation struggles in Africa and elsewhere. Even in those cases where competing powers were involved, there was also the struggle for national liberation of oppressed people. Anti-colonial thinkers and leaders taught us to give voice to them and their struggle. Ukraine is in a similar struggle.

Indeed, the recent history of Ukraine is a more complex story than merely one of imperialist manoeuvring and inter-imperialist rivalries taking place in the shadows. Zelensky has come to represent a particular Ukrainian nationalist project and is waging a national struggle against Russia.

Moreover, it is true that national liberation struggles such as those in Algeria and Vietnam took place against the backdrop of the inter-imperialist competition between the US and Soviet Union during the Cold War. Many anti-colonial movements looked to the Soviet Unions state capitalism as a model for national development. However, for two reasons, these national liberation struggles could not be characterised as inter-imperialist wars. First, they were not subsumed into the inter-imperialist rivalry of the Cold War. Second, these nationalist movements retained their own goals, interests and political independence, even while adopting Stalinist ideology.

It is the case, for instance, that US involvement in Vietnam flowed from military and economic competition with the Soviet Union and China. US foreign policy strategists justified the war with a domino theory; according to this argument, if Vietnam fell to the Communists, then Thailand, Burma and its other neighbours would soon follow. This meant the US had to brutally assert its power and send a signal to the entire region. Nonetheless, the dynamic driving the Vietnam War was not the US and the Soviet Union confronting one another in South East Asia and seeking to encroach on each others spheres of influence. Rather, it was the battle between the US and the Vietnamese nationalist movement, which had already fought the French, Japanese and the French again before taking on Washington. Yet, there is a long history of nations rights to self-determination becoming the plaything of imperialist powers and a weapon of inter-imperialist rivalry. In other cases, nationalist movements with their own interests have sometimes sought to become allies of imperialist powers. Marxist theorist Chris Harman wrote:

Imperialist wars almost invariably involve great powers trying to use for their own ends national movements directed against their opponents. In some cases, this amounts simply to providing a few weapons to movements that retain their own independence and follow their own goals, as with the attempts of the Kaisers Germany to help the Irish uprising in 1916 or the help the Vietnamese received from Russia and China in the late 1960s. Yet, in other cases, once independent national movements have become mere playthings of imperialist powers. This was true, for instance, of the Slovak and Croatian governments established by Germany between 1939 to 1945 and the Polish government set up in German-occupied Warsaw during the First World War. For socialists to support national movements that have acquiesced in such a role would be to help strengthen imperialism.

Another example is the short-lived Ukrainian State (also known as the Second Hetmanate) between April and December 1918. This regime was set up by the German military authorities and ruled by a Ukrainian aristocrat, Lieutenant General Pavlo Skoropadskyi.

A proxy war does not necessarily imply no agency on the part of Zelensky and Ukraine. In 1914, Popovi acknowledged that the Serbian government had agency, but this did not change the dominant character of the war and socialists opposition to it. He described how the Serbian government had subordinated itself willingly to the struggle between the imperialist states before 1914. He said it had conducted a policy of enslaving itself to Petrograds diplomacy and to the Paris Stock Exchange. Yet, Petrograds diplomacy and the Paris Stock Exchange have only the interests of Russian Tsarism and French finance capitalists in mind and not under any circumstances Serbian interests. He told the Serbian National Assembly, I find support for my fear, if not my belief in it, in passages from the crowns address, which says that this is not a Serbian conflict, but a conflict between the major interests of the Great Powers. Furthermore, he called for Serbia to change its policy and stop being an instrument of the Great Powers.

Today, it is Zelensky who has enslaved the Ukrainian government to Washingtons diplomacy and the European stock exchanges. They have only the interests of Western imperialism in mind, not Ukrainian interests. Zelenskys addresses provide ample evidence that the war in Ukraine is an inter-imperialist conflict. He has, as he has declared, helped the West find itself again.

The role of the US, Britain and NATO in the war has only grown as the Russian invasion has continued. Greater and greater volumes of arms have poured into the country, but there have also been other, more direct forms of military assistance from the NATO powers. As liberal journalist Tom Stevenson writes in the New York Times:

There is no denying that the US, Britain, Poland and other European NATO members have been parties to the conflict from the outset. It is not just military transports and trucks carrying tens of thousands of anti-aircraft and anti-armour weapons to Ukrainian fighters. The US has also provided real-time intelligence, reportedly including targeting information on the location of Russian forces. Though the Pentagon has disputed the extent of intelligence sharing, leaks have been remarkably revealing. We now know the US provided tracking intelligence that led to the sinking of the Moskva, the flagship of Russias Black Sea fleet. More striking still, US intelligence agencies provided critical targeting for battlefield assassinations of Russian generals.

Of course, Ukrainian forces still retain a certain degree of autonomy on the battlefield, but this is tempered by the USs broader strategy of managed escalation, which Ukraine does not control. Despite this role, the US does not want a head-on clash with Russia or a wider war, and Washington is thus keen to downplay its involvement in Ukraine. However, the USs denial of its operational role is based on a sleight of hand. Scott R Anderson, a former official at the US Department of State who also worked in Iraq, explains, If the US were providing targeting information to a foreign party, and were closely involved in targeting decisionswere directing those forces and theyre acting as a proxy for us. He says this would be risky: It might be seen as getting close to the line of actually attacking Russia, at which point Russia could arguably respond reciprocally. However, this is a fine line. As explained in the Washington Post:

The US has a rule against providing what officials call targeting information to Ukraine. The US will not, officials said, tell Ukrainian forces that a particular Russian general has been spotted at a specific location, and then tell or help Ukraine to strike him.

But the US would share information about the location of, say, command and control facilitiesplaces where Russian senior officers often tend to be foundsince it could aid Ukraine in its own defence, officials said. If Ukrainian commanders decided to strike the facility, that would be their call, and if a Russian general were killed in the attack, the US wouldnt have targeted him, officials said.

Not targeting Russian troops and locations but providing intelligence that Ukraine uses to help kill Russians may seem like a distinction without a difference. But legal experts said the definition of targeting provides meaningful legal and policy guidance that can help the US demonstrate it is not a party to the conflict, even as it pours military equipment into Ukraine and turns on a fire hose of intelligence.

The US did play a decisive role in the Ukrainian counter-offensive in autumn 2022and not just in the supply of HIMARS. Another article in the Washington Post on 3 February revealed:

Continued here:
Death rides out: NATO, Russia and the war in Ukraine International ... - International Socialism Journal