On March 3, 2015, Benjamin Netanyahu took a major gamble. Two weeks removed from Israels election day, sagging polls showed the prime minister narrowly behind the opposition Zionist Union. For the first time in a long while, it seriously looked like Netanyahu might losewhich made his presence in a foreign country, an ostensible break from the campaign trail, all the riskier.
That day, late in the morning, Netanyahu became only the second foreigner to address a joint meeting of the U.S. Congress three timesthe other being Sir Winston Churchill. But unlike Churchill, Netanyahu arrived for this third speech without an invitation from the sitting president and fully intending to denounce the administrations signature foreign policy priority at the time: the Iran nuclear deal.
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The entire trip was something of a diplomatic slap in the face. President Barack Obama pointedly did not meet with Netanyahu during his March 2015 stay in Washington. House Speaker John Boehner had invited the prime minister to speak before Congress without first informing the White House, and Netanyahu had accepted the invitation in the same manner. His address before the House chamber had one major themebranding the product of the Obama-backed nuclear negotiations with Iran as a very bad dealand one clear goal: giving his own reelection efforts a jump-start in the closing weeks of the election.
In the end, Netanyahus speech did not prevent the implementation of the nuclear deal with Iran; Obama won that fight. But it did help him recover in the polls and, against all odds, win another term as Israels prime ministera victory that ensured Netanyahus political career would outlive that of his American rival.
This week, as Netanyahu visits the United States for the first time in post-Obama Americahis first trip here since the inauguration of President Donald Trumphe arrives with virtually the same mission he had when he met with Obama in 2009. His agenda abides, even as Netanyahu himself is a man transformed by the Obama yearsa leader whose global standing and approach to leadership is genuinely different than it was eight years ago.
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As Obama began his presidency, his team expected to pressure Israel into making major concessions that would speed up the creation of a Palestinian state in the West Bank. Netanyahu, however, had other ideas.
In the spring of 2009, the Netanyahu-Obama dance around the IsraeliPalestinian peace process began. Like a cagey boxer in the ring, Netanyahu didnt want to make the first move against an unfamiliar competitor; he waited for Obama to telegraph his intent.
The two leaders met at the White House on May 19, 2009, after the new administration sent its customary invitation to the Israeli prime minister. During the course of the meeting, Obama focused his attention on Israel and Palestine, arguing that continued Jewish settlement in the West Bank was unacceptable. He wanted Netanyahu to commit to the two-state solution, but the prime minister resisted making any such declaration in Washington. For Netanyahu, the meeting with Obama was all about Iran and making the case for military action against it sooner rather than later.
Their differing priorities did not bode well for U.S.-Israeli relations for the subsequent years. Obama talked of hope, Netanyahu of fear. It wasnt just their agendas that werent coordinated; their outlooks on the world were miles apart.
Early in his presidency, Obama aimed to try to repair some of the damage caused by his predecessors policies in the Middle East. He threw down the gauntlet to Netanyahu during a major speech on June 4, 2009, at Cairo University in Egypt. Though the address was intended to reconnect the United States with the Muslim world, it was Obamas comments on Israel and Palestine that drew the greatest attention, setting out his policy on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in the clearest manner possible.
Obamas remarks on the topic began on a fairly anodyne note. For decades, there has been a stalemate: two peoples with legitimate aspirations, each with a painful history that makes compromise elusive, he said. [I]f we see this conflict only from one side or the other, then we will be blind to the truth: the only resolution is for the aspirations of both sides to be met through two states, where Israelis and Palestinians each live in peace and security.
As the Cairo speech was broadcast live across the globe, Netanyahu listened intently as Obama expressed sympathy for the plight of the Palestinians and condemned Israel in strikingly harsh terms. Israelis must acknowledge that just as Israel's right to exist cannot be denied, neither can Palestines, he said. The United States does not accept the legitimacy of continued Israeli settlements. This construction violates previous agreements and undermines efforts to achieve peace. It is time for these settlements to stop.
Netanyahu fully understood this would not play well with his right-wing constituency, even as Obama challenged the wider Arab world to recognize Israel. The speech was a triumph for Obama and remains, arguably, one of the best of his first term in office. It was well received in its target market, the Muslim world, and in particular among the many Palestinians who saw it as evidence that Obama would bring a more critical approach toward Israel.
Now, in his pragmatic way, Netanyahu started carefully to prepare his rebuttal.
One thing that impressed Netanyahu about Obamas speech was its sense of drama and history. He wanted to imbue his response with similar sweep and grandeur, giving any concessions hed offer the largest possible amount of publicity around the world.
On June 14, 10 days after Obama spoke at Cairo University, Netanyahu took the stage at Bar Ilan University in Tel Aviv. Predictably, the order of the subjects in Netanyahus speech was the opposite of Obamas, reflecting their different political agendas. Starting with Iran, Netanyahu talked about the countrys nuclear program in the troubling context of the encounter between extremist Islam and nuclear weapons, which he called the greatest danger to Israel, to the Middle East, and to all of humanity. He quickly moved on to a brief discussion of the challenges the global economic crisis caused for Israelis, followed by a call for Arab states to help foster a stable regional peace.
Only then did he turn to the subject most people were waiting to hear about: the resolution of the conflict with the Palestinians. From their first meeting, Netanyahu was perceptive enough to understand that that Obama saw maintaining the status quo on the Palestinian peace process as unacceptable. His speech was crafted with that reality in mind. After a preamble about the impact of the conflict on peoples lives, including a reference to the loss of his own brother, an Israeli commando who was killed decades earlier in a hostage-rescue raid against Palestinian and German terrorists, the prime minister came to his main point: He was accepting the two-state solution.
Palestinians ripped the speech as a carefully constructed ruse. Benjamin Netanyahu spoke about negotiations, but left us with nothing to negotiate as he systematically took nearly every permanent status issue on the table, wrote Saeb Erekat, the Palestinian negotiator, in response. Nor did he accept a Palestinian state. Instead, he announced a series of conditions and qualifications that render a viable, independent and sovereign Palestinian state impossible.
Reaction from the White House, however, was much more favorable. Officials in the Obama administration saw Netanyahu as having caved in to American pressure over the question of the two-state solution, glossing over the important point that Netanyahu had rejected Obamas demands for a complete freeze on Israeli settlements in the West Bank.
In Israel, the speech was viewed as careful and balanced, even while for Netanyahu personally, it represented a major shift and a pragmatic acceptance of political realities in Israel and in the Obama-led United States. He had been careful not to be seen to have given the Americans everything that Obama had demanded in his speech in Cairo; there were important domestic reasons for holding back on some issues. In selling the two-state solution to his right-wing constituency, it would be essential for Netanyahu to be seen as not having surrendered entirely to the Americans. Even so, many on Israels right wing still considered the acceptance of the establishment of a Palestinian state as an act of collective national suicide.
Once Netanyahu had given the Americans what they wanted in terms of accepting the possibility of a Palestinian state, the U.S. administration concentrated its efforts on the other item Obama had outlined in his Cairo speech: the settlements. On this issue, Netanyahu proved a tougher nut to crack, making it clear in meetings that he would not agree to a permanent freeze on settlement construction.
Eventually, a compromise agreement was reached. On Nov. 25, 2009, Netanyahu announced a halt to all new residential construction in the West Bank for a period of 10 months. While both leaders could point to the agreement as evidence of meaningful good-faith efforts to restart the peace process, the early Netanyahu-Obama relationship was initially characterized by Obamas demands, which Netanyahu, a little reluctantly and only partially, met.
It was a win for Obama. Netanyahu, however, was in for the long haul, and part of his strategy relied on waiting and watching while Obamas wave of goodwill and optimism receded, which it inevitably would.
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The onset of the Arab Spring, from December 2010 onward, became the catalyst for the deteriorating relationship between Netanyahu and the Obama administration. The fallout from the events surrounding it helped entrench Netanyahus power in Israel. At first, it appeared the Arab Spring might help push the Middle East forward, rapidly democratizing states while weakening the regions powerful autocracies. But in the short term, at least, it pushed the region backward.
The rapid souring of the Arab Spring, and its takeover by radical elements, appeared to illustrate that Netanyahus caution had been well founded. His plan for effectively trying to sit out the Arab Spring before making any potential concessions toward the Arabs also resonated well among many Israelis, who were focused on security rather than peace.
Netanyahus outlook, while increasingly accepted in Israel, was not welcomed in Washington. Early in 2011, Netanyahu and Obama had experienced a clash of visions over the IsraeliPalestinian conflict and the impact of the Arab Spring. The slow-burning disagreement resulted in one of the most extraordinary news conferences of Obamas first term, following his meeting with Netanyahu in the Oval Office on May 20, 2011.
One day earlier, at the State Department in Washington, Obama made a keynote speech on the Middle East, an apparent update to his Cairo address that would take into account the dramatic events sweeping the Arab world. During his speech, which was timed to coincide with the arrival of Netanyahu in Washington the next day, Obama announced a significant shift in U.S. policy: The pre-Six-Day War 1967 borderswith minor land swaps to reflect the large Israeli settlement blocks in the West Bankwould be the foundation for a negotiated agreement between the Israelis and Palestinians. This went well beyond what Netanyahu had in mind for the borders of any state for the Palestinians.
The timing of it, just hours before Netanyahus trip to Washington, gave the impression that the prime minister was coming to America to try to right a wrongwhich gave his meeting with the president a sense of drama and high-stakes diplomacy. As Netanyahu arrived in Washington, he felt Obamas speech had laid an ambush for him. For those eager to witness drama, the meeting and news conference did not disappoint.
Everything about this Obama-Netanyahu encounter telegraphed that things had changed. Even the time of the meeting was different: By design, the White House had insisted it be held much later in the day than the two leaders six previous meetingslate enough to ensure that the meeting wouldnt be done in time for the election-season evening news in Israel.
The first part of the news conference that followed went more or less by the book, with the president taking just over seven minutes to summarize the meeting in the most positive light possible. Obama was something of a master at the art of turning difficulties into positives. As he handed over to the prime minister, he expected Netanyahu, also a master at this art, to do the same. Netanyahu had other plans.
The prime minister rebuked the president for trying to create a peace that was not based on political realities. I think for there to be peace, the Palestinians will have to accept some basic realities, Netanyahu said. The first is that while Israel is prepared to make generous compromises for peace, it cannot go back to the 1967 lines, because these lines are indefensible. Obama sat, stone-faced. Netanyahus refusal to accept Obamas position meant, in reality, the end of serious attempts by the Americans to address the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
Afterward, aides de camp on both sides described the meeting as difficult, with the two men outlining their different visions of the Arab Spring, their positions on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the Iranian nuclear program. And the iciness of the Obama-Netanyahu relationship would only grow chillier over the course of Netanyahus U.S. visit, as the prime minister received ample opportunity to address his problems with Obamas positionswhich he did, repeatedly, whether in media interviews, speeches to pro-Israeli lobby groups, and even in a speech to a joint session of Congress on May 24, 2011.
Even after this most difficult of meetings, the Obama-Netanyahu relationship, while never personally warm, had its ups and downs. The peak came in September 2011, when Obama helped secure the release of Israelis who were trapped in their embassy in Cairo, during an Egyptian protest march. Netanyahu, in turn, went out of his way to pay tribute to Obamas personal intervention, which he saw as having been vital to securing the release of the Israelis.
Arguably the deepest trough came on Nov. 3 of the same year at the G-20 Summit in France, when Obama was overheard on an open microphone in conversation with French President Nicolas Sarkozy. I cannot bear Netanyahu, hes a liar, Sarkozy told Obama, both apparently unaware that the microphones in the meeting room had been left on. Youre fed up with him, but I have to deal with him every day, Obama replied.
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For Netanyahu, being seen as standing up to Obama was a political gift. Obama, despite professing his admiration for Israel and the historical ties between it and America, was never really able to connect emotionally with many Israeliswhich foreclosed his ability to talk past the prime minister and appeal directly to the Israeli people, as President Bill Clinton had done so successfully in the 1990s.
Partly for this reason, and also because most Israelis disagreed with Obamas position of an Israeli return to 1967 borders, Obama was much less of a danger to Netanyahus political fortunes than was generally perceived. Moreover, Netanyahu was careful to cultivate close ties with key members of Congress from both parties, whose vocal support insulated him from Obamas pressure tactics. As a result, Obama found himself facing a leader of a foreign country who was expert at playing American political games and whose power base in Congress was so strong that he could not be dismissed as just any old foreign leader.
For Netanyahu, defeat at Obamas hands over Iran was compensated for by a victory in the other divisive split in U.S.Israeli relations: the thorny issue of the Palestinian peace process. Although reluctant to admit it publicly, Netanyahu prioritized the Palestinian problem over the Iranian one, and in this area, he was far more successful in resisting pressureindeed, he used his position on the one issue as leverage when it came to the other. The possibility of an Israeli military strike against Iran became a means of getting the U.S. to take the heat off Israel on the Palestinian front.
Netanyahu outmaneuvered Obama. But Netanyahus success wasnt entirely a product of his own achievementmuch of it was the result of Obamas self-inflicted damage.
Netanyahu understood that Obama was merely dangling his feet in the water at the prospect of a peace process, and was not risking any substantial political capital. The Obama administration made lots of noise but took no real action until it was too late. It was a route Obama took up into his last full month in office, when, on Dec. 23, 2016, the U.N. Security Council voted to condemn Israeli settlements. Rather than using its power to veto the resolution, the U.S. abstaineda classic case of taking action at a point when it no longer much mattered.
With the Obama era now over, Netanyahu knows that he has seen off yet another political rival and has emerged with a deep understanding of the importance of tactical maneuvers and political trade-offs in order to achieve his major strategic goals and aims. And while nobody is entirely sure what challenges President Donald Trump will bring to the Middle East, Netanyahu understands that he beat Obama on the most important issue, Palestine. He sees the fruits of his success whenever he travels across the West Bank in his helicopter: Jewish settlements scattered across the land, and the chances of a viable Palestinian state receding by the day. For many observers around the world, this is an unacceptable reality; for Netanyahu, it represents evidence of a mission accomplished.
Neill Lochery is the Catherine Lewis professor of Middle Eastern & Mediterranean Studies at University College London, and author of The Resistible Rise of Benjamin Netanyahu.
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How Netanyahu Beat Obama - POLITICO Magazine