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National Security Agency analysts under the Obama administration improperly searched Americans' information, but the searches were conducted largely out of error, according to a review of publicly available intelligence documents reported on by Circa last week.

The website reported that Obama's NSA violated privacy protections by searching a subset of intelligence for Americans' information. The story draws in part from a partially declassified April 2017 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court opinion, which says that the NSA repeatedly and inappropriately queried, or searched, "U.S. person identifiers" within a swath of data. The data was collected under Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, meaning that it targeted a foreigner, on foreign soil, for a foreign intelligence purpose.

The NSA at the time was not allowed to search a chunk of intelligence, known as "upstream," using U.S. person identifiers (like an American's email address)but it did, and "with much greater frequency than had previously been disclosed" to the FISC. Upstream data is obtained from "providers that control the telecommunications "backbone" over which telephone and Internet communications transit," according to an independent government oversight agency.

Of this, Circa wrote:

The admitted violations undercut one of the primary defenses that the intelligence community and Obama officials have used in recent weeks to justify their snooping into incidental NSA intercepts about Americans.

Circa has reported that there was a three-fold increase in NSA data searches about Americans and a rise in the unmasking of U.S. person's identities in intelligence reports after Obama loosened the privacy rules in 2011.

Officials like former National Security Adviser Susan Rice have argued their activities were legal under the so-called minimization rule changes Obama made, and that the intelligence agencies were strictly monitored to avoid abuses.

The intelligence court and the NSA's own internal watchdog found that not to be true.

This sounds nefarious, especially against the backdrop of a months-long controversy over unmasking and leaks. But as Circa hints some paragraphs later, the incidents, which were self-reported by the NSA to Congress and the FISC, were in part the result of a system design quirk.

"The system automatically includes in a search all authorities an analyst's credentials permit the analyst to access," Adam Klein, a senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security, told THE WEEKLY STANDARD. "That meant that analysts with access to upstream data had to opt out of querying upstream when setting their search criteria. That system design apparently resulted in non-compliant queries."

A January notice to the FISC also said that "human error was the primary factor" in a portion of these improper queries. The NSA in an announcement also claimed that the incidents were "not willful." And as Klein told TWS, "There have been no reported incidents of intentional misuse of Section 702 by the agencies responsible for implementing it."

The NSA inspector general report read:

For the queries into FAA 702 upstream data, SV concluded that analysts had not removed the FAA 702 upstream authority from their search criteria (that automatically defaulted on the basis of their credentials) or had not included the appropriate . . . limiters to prevent FAA 702 upstream data from being queried.

The NSA told the FISC about the incidents as the court conducted its annual review for 702 certifications. The non-compliance triggered a broader NSA review, and ultimately resulted in the agency declaring the end of "about" collectionor the gathering of communications that mention a target. "About" collection often scooped up entirely domestic communications, drawing the ire of civil liberties advocates. The NSA also announced that it would purge much of its upstream data, and the FISC gave the go-ahead for analysts to query upstream using U.S. person identifiers, now that "about" has ended.

The court's late March certification reflected that change. But the court was not pleased with the non-compliance. The FISC in October described it as "a very serious Fourth Amendment issue" and attributed the agency's delayed disclosure to "an institutional 'lack of candor.'"

Still, the incidentincluding the NSA's self-reporting and public announcementsexemplifies the extent of 702 oversight, Klein said.

"The program is subject to extensive oversight, including judicial supervision by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court. The recent end of "about" collection in response to FISC oversight shows that it has real teeth," he said.

If you have questions about this fact check, or would like to submit a request for another fact check, email Jenna Lifhits at jlifhits@weeklystandard.com or The Weekly Standard at factcheck@weeklystandard.com.

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Fact Check: Why did the NSA breach privacy protections? - The Weekly Standard

(TNS) -- A group of Silicon Valley tech giants are urging Congress to reform National Security Agency authority that empowers the agency to potentially spy on millions of Americans incidentally while surveilling foreign targets.

Facebook, Google, Microsoft, and Twitter are among the 30 tech companies, trade groups, and lobbyists asking Congress to reform Section 702 of the 2008 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) Amendments Act authority the agency uses to tap the physical infrastructure of the internet, such as undersea fiber cables, to surveil the content of foreigners emails, instant messages, and other communications as they exit and enter the U.S.

The law legalizes broad electronic surveillance programs like Prism, leaked by NSA contractor Edward Snowden in 2013. Privacy advocates say such incidental collection facilitates a loophole that lets NSA incidentally sweep up unrelated data belonging to Americans in the process, and likely amounts to millions of warrantless interceptions.

The legal authority underpinning such upstream surveillance expires in December, and lawmakers have already held hearings on the law a mixed bag of Republicans and Democrats support and oppose.

We are writing to express our support for reforms to Section 702 that would maintain its utility to the U.S. intelligence community while increasing the programs privacy protections and transparency, companies wrote to House Judiciary Chairman Bob Goodlatte.

Instead of a blanket reauthorization companies asked lawmakers to require NSA to get court authorization before querying the contents of 702 material for the communications of U.S. persons (given that U.S. persons are not the target of 702).

Companies asked for legal permission to release more details about the requests for data they receive from the government, including the number and type of information requested and declassification of warrants granted in secret by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court.

They want Congress to curtail the definition of foreign intelligence information under FISA to reduce the likelihood of collecting data belonging to U.S. citizens not suspected of wrongdoing and codify a recent change to NSA policy ending so-called about collection.

In April, NSA ended the upstream practice of collecting Americans email and text messages exchanged with overseas users that simply mention search terms like an email address belonging to a target but isnt to or from a target.

Finally, there should be greater transparency around how the communications of U.S. persons that are incidentally collected under Section 702 are searched and used, including how often 702 databases are queried using identifiers that are tied to U.S. persons, the letter reads.

The law expires Dec. 31 and lawmakers still have not received an estimate from NSA on the number of Americans swept up in 702 surveillance. Oregon Democrat Sen. Ron Wyden has been asking NSA and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence for the number since 2012, and recently renewed that request to Daniel Coats, President Donald Trumps director of national intelligence.

In a letter sent ahead of Coats nomination signed by Goodlatte, lawmakers asked for the number again, with Coats later pledging to do everything I can to work with Admiral Rogers in NSA to get you that number. In a later hearing after getting the job, Coats said quantifying the number was harder than he initially expected after meeting with Rogers, and asked for more time.

Elizabeth Goitein, co-director of the Liberty and National Security Program at NYU Laws Brennan Center for Justice, says such incidental collection likely amounts to millions or tens of millions of warrantless interceptions.

While Goitein says she hasnt seen the authority abused (though Snowden disputes that), she and other advocates say they have seen the agencys mission creep, so that a law designed to protect against foreign threats to the United States has become a major source of warrantless access to Americans data and a tool for ordinary, domestic law enforcement.

Austin Carson, executive director of the center-right D.C. think tank TechFreedom says companies shouldnt have to fear their government is breaking that trust with their users.

These proposed reforms represent a good-faith compromise to one of the most significant issues Congress must resolve this year, Carson said of the letter. They would maintain important national security tools while minimizing the impact on Americans.

Carson said President Donald Trumps own concerns about his campaign coming under surveillance during the 2016 election and having campaign associates identities unmasked in intelligence community reports, along with the authoritys looming expiration, should fuel the argument for timely reform.

2017 InsideSources.com, Washington, D.C. Distributed by Tribune Content Agency, LLC.

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Facebook, Google Urge Congress to Reform NSA Surveillance - Government Technology

Health + Tech /02 Jun 2017

On December 23, 2016, Congress passed the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017. This in itself is nothing extraordinary. What came as a shock was the news that US Cyber Command (CYBERCOM) would be elevated to the unified command plan (UCP) as the fourth functional combatant command, pending review of CYBERCOMs efficacy by the Pentagon of course. The National Defense Authorization Act allocates $75 million a year to CYBERCOM for upkeep of current facilities, training of personnel, acquisition of hardware, and development and deployment of new programs.

Since its inception in 2009, CYBERCOM has occupied a unique position within the Department of Defense. On one hand, it was a subordinate combatant command of US Strategic Command (STRATCOM), the same command responsible for military affairs in space and the nuclear arsenal. On the other hand, it has been and is still headed by the director of the National Security Agency, an intelligence organization separate from the conventional military hierarchy.

CYBERCOMs elevation is important for three reasons. First, as a part of the UCP (Unified Command Plan), the combatant commander (CCDR), Admiral Mike Rogers, can directly appeal to the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) and the President (POTUS). Second, Admiral Rogers has a seat at the table so to speak regarding budgeting decisions. Finally, the elevation of CYBERCOM into the UCP is symbolic. It is a signal of intent for both domestic and international audiences and indicates that the US considers cyber security a major aspect of national security and that it will continue to invest in its cyber capabilities in the future.

As significant as this elevation is, this is actually just the first step on the road to an independent CYBERCOM. Recall my mention of the NSA. There have been voices calling for the end of the dual-hat arrangement, most notably former President Obama, and these voices are growing louder. After all, if CYBERCOM can stand alone as a combatant command, perhaps it is ready to stand apart from the NSA. Ending the dual-hat arrangement would mean that Admiral Rogers would most likely lead CYBERCOM while a new director for the NSA is chosen, possibly a civilian, but that is a discussion for another time.

Initially, the dual-hat arrangement made sense. Simply put, CYBERCOM was a fetus incapable of surviving on its own without the constant nourishment of its mother and this arrangement was the umbilical cord. As a fledgling command, CYBERCOM lacked the funding, personnel, hardware, and leadership to operate effectively so command was given to Lt. General Alexander as a means of quickly bringing CYBERCOM to operational status.

Some are afraid that splitting the two organizations will lead to needless rivalry, competition for resources and authority, and a decline in overall cooperation between the two organizations. So why are others encouraging a split?

Like many issues in the DOD, its complicated and cannot be adequately covered in the length of one article, but those who advocate for the end of the dual-hat arrangement come generally in three flavors.

The first group maintains that CYBERCOM is mature enough to act without NSA input. These individuals argue that with adequate funding, CYBERCOM possesses the leadership and the groundwork for programs needed to operate independently. They seem to be in the minority. Even Admiral Rogers believes that CYBERCOM and the NSA should split eventually, but he stated explicitly that now is not that time.

The second group advocates for the split on functional grounds. The NSA is an intelligence agency that focuses on signals intelligence (SIGINT). CYBERCOM is a military organization with the mission to protect DOD information networks and conduct operations in cyberspace. Saying all operations done in cyberspace are the same is like saying that a firecracker, pistol, and cruise missile are the same because they are based on the same medium: gunpowder. A split is necessary to highlight the different functions of CYBERCOM and the NSA.

The final group seeks a split based on legal motives. CYBERCOM, and all military branches, take their authority from Title 10 of the federal regulations. Title 10 is what outlines the conditions and appropriate conducts of war; it tells the US military what powers it has and does not have.

The NSA is not a strictly military agency despite the fact that an admiral is its current director. Instead, as an intelligence agency, it gathers its authority from Title 50, the part of the federal regulations dealing in national defense and intelligence. The basic argument is that no individual should have command over so much of national security; thats too much power concentrated into one man. Having a clear separation of legal authority will keep both organizations more accountable.

Most experts in Washington are of the opinion that CYBERCOM needs its independence. The question is now a matter of time and method. When will CYBERCOM be mature enough to stand on its own legs? How will we know? What can we do to make the transition as smooth as possible? The elevation of CYBERCOM and its likely separation from the NSA will mark a new age in cyber security, recognition of its place as a combat discipline by the most powerful nation in the world.

Read more here:
Should CYBERCOM Split From the NSA? - International Policy Digest (press release) (blog)

Cybersecurity

How much would you pay for access to stolen hacking tools developed by some of the NSA's most elite computer scientists? The enigmatic entity calling itself TheShadowBrokers thinks that $23,000 is a fair price.

The mysterious group that first appeared in August 2016 claiming to have a trove of tools pilfered from the Equation Group, which has been identified as an NSA hacking operation, have been periodically releasing bits of that stash for free.

In April, TheShadowBrokers dumped tools and exploits that led to the WannaCry ransomware attack as well as other malware that has been used in recent attacks.

The group then issued a long blog post written in pigeon English, complaining that no one had offered to buy the stolen data and make them "go dark," and contemplating the launch of a "wine of month" style subscription service.

In a new blog post, TheShadowBrokers announced that interested subscribers can sign up during the month of June for a fee of 100 ZEC or Zcash cryptocurrency worth about $235 a share -- and then in the first two weeks of July patrons will receive the next dump of hacking tools.

TheShadowBrokers said they have not decided what will be in the next release, but said it will include "Something of value to someone."

"The time for 'I'll show you mine if you show me yours first' is being over," states the post. "Peoples is seeing what happenings when theshadowbrokers is showing theshadowbrokers' first. This is being wrong question. Question to be asking 'Can my organization afford not to be first to get access to theshadowbrokers dumps?'"

In the May 15 blog post, TheShadowBrokers stated that future releases of tools could include, "web browser, router, handset exploits and tools; select items from newer Ops Disks, including newer exploits for Windows 10; compromised network data from more SWIFT providers and Central banks; compromised network data from Russian, Chinese, Iranian, or North Korean nukes and missile programs."

Cybersecurity experts continue to speculate over who is or are TheShadowBrokers and how they acquired the NSA data -- possibly from an insider such as former contractor Hal Martin, who has been charged under the Espionage Act with stealing classified data from the NSA and CIA.

About the Author

Sean Carberry is an FCW staff writer covering defense, cybersecurity and intelligence. Prior to joining FCW, he was Kabul Correspondent for NPR, and also served as an international producer for NPR covering the war in Libya and the Arab Spring. He has reported from more than two-dozen countries including Iraq, Yemen, DRC, and South Sudan. In addition to numerous public radio programs, he has reported for Reuters, PBS NewsHour, The Diplomat, and The Atlantic.

Carberry earned a Master of Public Administration from the Harvard Kennedy School, and has a B.A. in Urban Studies from Lehigh University.

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ShadowBrokers launch subscription service for stolen NSA tools - FCW.com

The Shadow Brokers are not going away. Earlier this month, the group of self-described hackers said it planned to launch a paid "subscription" service, where customers could apparently gain access to more exploits allegedly stolen from the NSA.

On Tuesday, the Shadow Brokers provided some more details of this service in an online post and said that June's cache of exploits would cost 100 Zcasha more privacy focused cryptocurrencyor around $23,000 at the time of writing. In response, a few information security researchers are trying to crowdfund enough funds to get in on the action. The point, according to the researchers, is to inform affected vendors and get any lingering security vulnerabilities fixed.

"What's better: the tool everyone, including the good guys and bad guys, know about, or the one which only your adversaries have?" Matthew Hickey, co-founder of UK cybersecurity company Hacker House, and who is one of the researchers trying to raise funds, told Motherboard in a Twitter direct message.

Along with the security researcher known as x0rz, Hickey has launched a Patreon campaign. At the moment, 11 people have pitched in, raising just over $1,200. If the campaign doesn't reach its goal, the researchers will donate the funds to an as of yet undecided human or digital rights charity.

"This patreon is a chance for those who may not have large budgets (SME, startups and individuals) in the ethical hacking and whitehat community to pool resources and buy a subscription for the new monthly released data," the Patreon reads.

Since last year, the Shadow Brokers have publicly released a variety of exploits for hardware firewalls, Unix, and Windows systems. In a previous post, the group claimed they have access to exploits for popular web browsers, Windows 10, and routers, although the group has not presented concrete evidence for these alleged tools yet.

Hackers have incorporated some of the released Windows exploits into new, powerful pieces of malware. WannaCry, a ransomware variant, infected networks in Spain, Russia, China, and elsewhere, and hit the UK's National Health Service (NHS) particularly hard.

Indeed, this what the researchers want to avoid by purchasing the alleged exploits.

"By paying the Shadow Brokers the cash they asked for we hope to pool resources and avert any future WannaCry type incidents," the Patreon page explains. (According to a report in The Washington Post, the NSA provided Microsoft with details of the Windows exploits, including those used in WannaCry. In turn, the company issued patches for an array of different operating systems).

"As a harm reduction exercise it is important that any compromised parties are notified, vulnerabilities in possession of criminals are patched and tools are assessed for capabilities. We will release any and all information obtained from this once we have assessed and notified vendors of any potential 0days," the Patreon adds.

Of course, this episode brings up all sorts of ethical questions: should researchers pay criminals for exploits at all? What if the intention is ultimately to patch systems?

However, those questions also rest on the premise that the subscription service is genuine. The Shadow Brokers have ostensibly tried to sell exploits before: first, in an auction, and then individually, with little to no success. But the group ended up dumping the hacking tools anyway, making it plainly obvious that this isn't about the money at all. Instead, this increasingly bizarre, public showmanship is about a feud between the Shadow Brokers, whoever they are, and Equation Group, a hacking unit allegedly part of the NSA.

"TheShadowBrokers is not being interested in stealing grandmother's retirement money. This is always being about theshadowbrokers vs theequationgroup," the group wrote in a recent post.

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Hackers Are Crowdfunding Cryptocurrency to Buy Alleged NSA Exploits - Motherboard