Archive for the ‘Libya’ Category

BMZ Funding Toward the COVID-19 Pandemic Response in Libya – Libya – ReliefWeb

Tripoli, 26 April 2020 - The Government of Germany, through its Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) contributed US$ 5,973,716 (EUR 4,938,859) to UNICEF for containment of the spread of COVID-19 and mitigate its impact on children, families, health workers, teachers and people on the move in Libya. The programme aims to reach 4.8 million people (70.6 per cent of the local population), including some 409,000 migrants and refugees, and 274,000 internally displaced persons.

Key areas of focus of the programme are to strengthen national Risk Communication and Community Engagement efforts in municipalities; conduct community awareness-raising sessions and campaigns to promote child protection and prevent violence against children; improve the provision of water, sanitation and health services in health facilities, detention centres, internally displaced persons/collective shelters, communal spaces, and schools; provide lifesaving and essential supplies; and provide COVID-19 related and online learning materials for children, teachers and facilitators in the targeted schools and centres.

The programme will be implemented in partnership with Libyan Government counterparts, national and international organisations, and the private sector.

The UNICEF Special Representative to Libya, Mr. AbdulKadir Musse reiterated, We are grateful to the German Government and its people for the partnership and continued support toward curbing the spread of the COVID-19 virus and mitigating its impact in Libya. This contribution made possible the support towards the continuity of health, water and sanitation, and education services, while keeping all the service providers safe by having the right information and protective equipment.

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BMZ Funding Toward the COVID-19 Pandemic Response in Libya - Libya - ReliefWeb

Russia’s Strategic Transformation in Libya: A Winning Gambit? – RUSI Analysis

On 15 April, Libyas Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Dbeibah travelled to Moscow for the first time. During his trip, Dbeibah engaged with senior Russian officials, including Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin, Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu and Secretary of the Security Council Nikolay Patrushev, on intra-Libyan dialogue and energy sector investments. After meeting Dbeibah, Shoigu extolled the Libyan people as Russia-friendly and called for a resumption of full-scale cooperation between Russia and Libyas defence ministries. Dbeibah vowed to build new bridges with Russia and emphasised Moscows ability to play a key role in Libyas economy.

At first glance, the cordial nature of Dbeibahs meeting with Russian officials is surprising. Russia provided extensive material support for Libyan National Army (LNA) chieftain Khalifa Haftars offensive against the Tripoli-based Government of National Accord, which was the predecessor of the Dbeibah-led Government of National Unity (GNU). On 12 March, Dbeibah described foreign mercenaries, which included Russian Wagner Group private military contractors, as a stab in our back and a threat to Libyan sovereignty. Since the GNUs establishment on 9 March, Russia has embraced Libyas interim government and supports Libyas plans to hold national elections in December 2021. However, Russia also maintains residual links with anti-systemic actors, such as Khalifa Haftar, the al-Kaniyat armed group and Saif al-Islam Gaddafi, in case the GNUs authority weakens. This balancing strategy could allow Russias influence in Libya to remain impervious to political changes on the ground and yield lucrative reconstruction contracts for Russian state-owned companies.

Much like other international actors involved in Libya, the Russian Foreign Ministry immediately endorsed the GNUs legitimacy. On 15 March, Russias charg daffaires in Libya, Jamshed Boltaev, held talks with members of the Libyan parliament and announced plans to reopen a Russian embassy in Tripoli. This is noteworthy, as Russia relocated its diplomatic presence to Tunisia in October 2013 after its embassy in Tripoli was attacked by protesters. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov alsoemphasised Russias support for Libyas December 2021 parliamentary elections and its desire to promote political inclusivity in Libya. These diplomatic gestures were reinforced by the shipment of 100,000 Sputnik V vaccine doses to Libya on 4 April. These vaccines were the first to arrive in Libya, and Dbeibah showed his appreciation to Russia by calling the shipment the first drop of rain.

In tandem with its establishment of closer ties with the GNU, Russia has also preserved its relations with anti-systemic partners in Libya. In recent weeks, the LNA has faced dissension within its ranks, which was exemplified by the outbreak of clashes between Haftar-aligned militias in Benghazi on 21 April. To demonstrate Russias solidarity with Haftar at a moment of vulnerability, the Wagner Group will dispatch 300 new Syrian mercenaries to Libya at the end of April. Russia also blocked the UN blacklisting of Mohammed al-Kani, the head of the al-Kaniyat armed group, on the grounds that there is insufficient evidence of his involvement in civilian casualties. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Vershinin has also emphasised the need for Khalifa Haftar and Gaddafi loyalists, who support the rehabilitation of Saif al-Islam Gaddafi, to influence Libyas future political system and electoral process. As Haftar and other anti-systemic actors could see their influence rebound if the Libyan election process falters, Russia is ensuring that its wartime partnerships persist into the post-conflict reconstruction phase.

Russias diverse array of local partnerships in Libya might also help it secure nationwide reconstruction contracts. Due to Muammar al-Gaddafis overthrow in 2011, Russia lost $4 billion in extant arms contracts and hundreds of millions of dollars in gas exploration revenues, and abandoned a $3 billion national railway contract operated by Russian Railways. Since 2017, Russia has taken preparatory steps to establish a major foothold in Libyas reconstruction process. Russian oil giant Rosneft signed an oil offtake deal with Libyas National Oil Corporation in February 2017, and in October 2018, Libyas Minister of Economy and Industry Nasser Shaglan held talks with Russian officials about reviving the BenghaziSirte railway project. The Wagner Groups seizure of El-Sharara oil field in western Libyas Murzuq Desert in June 2020 further ensconces its presence in the countrys oil sector. If the UN arms embargo on Libya is eventually lifted, Russia could also receive fighter jet and missile defence contracts.

Taking a long-term perspective, Russias influence in Libya is challenged by competition from external stakeholders and soft power limitations. Although the UAE allegedly paid the Wagner Groups salaries and Egypts logistical assistance facilitated Russias entry into Libya, this cooperation might not extend to the post-conflict period. The UAEs orchestration of Haftars walk-out from the January 2020 Moscow peace conference and its blockage of Kremlin-aligned Algerian Foreign Minister Ramtane Lamamras appointment as UN Special Envoy to Libya reveal divergent diplomatic interests. Egypts Trans-African railroad project, which seeks to link Benghazi to Congo, could stymie the return of Russian Railways to Libya. Russia also faces stiff competition from Turkey, which has $16 billion in backlogged contracts with Libya; France and Italy, which have substantial stakes in Libyas oil industry via Total and Eni; and China, which sees Libya as an important vector in its Belt and Road Initiative.

Russia also suffers from a soft power deficit in Libya. The erosion of Russias image in Libya began with Gaddafis death in October 2011, as the newly empowered National Transitional Council eschewed commercial contracts with countries that opposed the NATO-led regime change, such as Russia and China. The Wagner Groups use of landmines in the Sirte-Jufra region, which still claim civilian lives on a frequent basis, and Libyan Interior Minister Fathi Bashaghas accusations of chemical weapons use by Wagner Group forces have tarnished Russias image. The perception that Russia supports authoritarianism in Libya, which was crystallised by the July 2019 arrest of two Yevgeny Prigozhin-aligned Fabrika Trollei operatives for political interference, has further sullied Moscows reputation in western Libya.

To overcome these headwinds, Russia could establish a military base in Libya and empower pro-Kremlin candidates in the Libyan elections. Since Muammar al-Gaddafi offered Russia a naval base in Benghazi in November 2008, Moscow has viewed Libyas eastern Mediterranean coast as a strategically significant location. If Russia could leverage its local ties in eastern Libya to establish an air base in Tobruk or a naval base in Benghazi, it would be able to legitimise its military presence and constrain Western influence in Libya. While Russias failed intervention in the 2018 Madagascar presidential elections and the December 2020 crackdown on Russian social media accounts in the Central African Republic highlight the limits of Kremlin election interference efforts, RT Arabics standing as one of Libyas most-viewed media networks could help Moscow influence public opinion ahead of the elections. Given that Khalifa Haftar might launch a presidential bid or back a sympathetic figure in Libyas December 2021 elections, Russia could rally its disinformation machinery behind candidates that are most amenable to its interests.

As the GNUs domestic and international legitimacy strengthens, Russias strategy in Libya is undergoing a drastic transformation. Russia wishes to preserve a diverse array of local partnerships and leverage its standing as a Mediterranean power to secure lucrative reconstruction contracts. The success of Russias strategy hinges on its ability to rebuild its depleted soft power and outbid stiff competition from rival international stakeholders in Libya.

Samuel Ramani recently completed his doctorate in International Relations at the University of Oxford and is writing a book on Russian foreign and security policy towards Africa, which will be published in 2022.

The views expressed in this Commentary are the author's, and do not represent those of RUSI or any other institution.

BANNER IMAGE: Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin and Libyan Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Dbeibeh at a meeting on 15 April. Courtesy of Government of the Russian Federation/Wikimedia Commons/CC BY 4.0

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Russia's Strategic Transformation in Libya: A Winning Gambit? - RUSI Analysis

These rescuers want to save refugees fleeing Libya by sea. But they’re trapped on shore by red tape – CBC.ca

From a distance, the vessels bobbing in the azure waters off the port of Augusta, Sicily, present a comforting tableau.

Sunshine bounces off the waves as the plume of smoke rising from the snow-capped Mount Etna scatters in the wind.

But in this small port, the latest chapter of Europe's realpolitik approach to migration is playing out with deadly consequences.

Among the vessels idling in Augusta, including two ships upon which rescued migrants are quarantined for COVID-19, is Sea-Watch 3.

The ship, part of a German NGO,returned to the port in early March with its crew of 14, after a rescue mission to save 363 migrants in the sea between Sicily and Libya.

After its crew quarantined for two weeks, the Italian coastguard carried out a lengthy safety inspectioncalled a state port control. It then announced it was placing the vessel under administrativedetention, citing irregularities in how the crew communicated their entry in port, waste management and safety regulations.

Italian authorities say the inspections ensure naval safety. But humanitarian rescuers say the constant checks and bureaucratic delays are just the latest tactic Italy is using to keep such humanitarian boats from bringing migrants to a Europe that doesn't want them.

Daniel Bebawi, a former car mechanic who worked on cargo ships before joining Sea-Watch, says safety inspections are normal and necessary. What's not, he says, is the frequency with which the Italian coast guard carries out the lengthy checks out on NGO vessels, the range of discrepancies inspectors find and the constant blocking of the boats in port.

"Normally a port state control is not allowed to be more frequent than once every 12 months," he said. "They basically keep looking until they find something that they can write about and detain the ship over. It's a kind of weaponization of the system to detain the ships."

Five of seven NGO rescue boats now in the Mediterranean are currently unable to leaveport four of which are blocked in Italy for administrative reasons.

"What we're witnessing is a situation of three different strategies," said Giorgia Linardi, the legal advisor for Sea-Watch. "We have a renewed interest of prosecutors in investigating NGOs for facilitating illegal immigration, media attacks against NGOsand the latestblocking NGO ships in port through administrative measures."

The administrative blocksbegan after Italy's far-right Interior Minister Matteo Salvini was replaced byLuciana Lamorgese in mid-2019, Linardi said.

Salvini gained renown for blocking migrant rescue boats from re-entering Italian ports, stranding shipscrowded with traumatized migrants at sea for weeks. He vociferously proclaimed his hard line to shore up support among Italians, many of whom feel abandoned by Europe, left alone to deal with thousands ofmigrants escaping Libya who arrive on their country's shores.

The current government does not block rescue ships from docking. Butunder Salvini, fewer NGO vessels were blocked from leaving port than under today's government.

"This government realized the strategy of bombastic attacks against NGOs backfired and that the criminal investigations went nowhere," said Linardi. "They realized bogging the boats down in bureaucracy was cheaper and a lot more effective."

As the rescue boats idle in Italian ports,refugees stranded at sea are dying as they attemptto reach safe harbour.So far this year, almost 9,000 people have crossed to Italy, with almost 1,000 dying during their attempts,according to the UNHCR, the UN refugee agency.

Last week 130 people escaping Libya in a rubber boat drowned after their radio calls for help went unheeded for two days by bordering countries. Italy's coast guard planes circled the sinking boat. Malta said the rescue was up to Libya. Libya said conditions were too dangerous to embark on a rescue mission.

Three cargo vessels attempted to reach the people in distress, with the only NGO rescue boat at sea, the Ocean Viking, 10 hours away. By the time it got to the sinking boat, all that remained on the surface of the sea was the deflated dinghy and a dozen bodies.

Pope Francis condemned the inaction by the governments as a "moment of shame."

WATCH | Megan Williams explains the ships' predicament:

Linardi says Italy and Europe have constructed a fictional narrative that NGO rescue boats are not needed because Libyan coast guard ships, supplied by Italy with EU funds, are there to rescue migrant boats in distress.

"But this is not what happens. Libya is not able today to cover an immense search and rescue area that was instituted simply for the European Union to push forward its externalization policy," she said.

Even when Libyans do intercept boats in international waters, Linardi says, they can't be called rescues, but rather "illegal pushbacks" the returning of people to a place where their lives are at risk.

As Italy keeps rescue boats mired in bureaucracy, the frustration aboard Sea-Watch 3 is palpable.

"For the last two years, we have barely been out on a mission, doing what we want to do, so it's been very, very hard," said deckhand Lina Veller. She has spent the weeks in port painting, de-rusting, oiling and carrying out other maintenance work while the ship has been docked.

"You really strongly have to disconnectyour mind from what's happening."

In the five or so weeks that Sea-Watch 3 has been stuck in Augusta, almost 300 people trying to flee Libya have drowned in the Mediterranean"and those are just the deaths we know of," Veller said.

She has seen a lot of tragedy during her four years with Sea-Watch. But she says the deaths last week of the 130 migrants in the rubber boat drove homea bitter lesson.

"There was the belief that if you show what's happening and that if you show that people are drowning, political decisions will be different," said Veller. "They will stop people from drowning and there will be legal ways for them to flee and migrate. That was the expectation.

"What's changed is that it's more OK for people to drown."

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These rescuers want to save refugees fleeing Libya by sea. But they're trapped on shore by red tape - CBC.ca

Libya and UK discuss mental health and localization of healthcare | – Libya Herald

By Sami Zaptia.

Libya and Britain seek cooperation in the health sector (Photo: Health Ministry).

London, 3 May 2021:

Libyas Health Minister Ali Zanati received in his office the Charg dAffairs of the United Kingdom Embassy Kate English yesterday where the discussion revolved around the pandemic situation in the two countries, as well as the health situation in general, and the possibility of cooperation in the health field.

The Health Ministry reported that English affirmed that her country is ready to stand with Libya in the field of health, and that they support the development of the health sector and are ready to cooperate to benefit the sector.

She praised the role of the Minister of Health in these circumstances and hope to provide support to the sector through the Ministry of Health.

The Minister of Health thanked her for Britains desire to support the health sector, and that Libya opened its doors for cooperation in various fields and various disciplines, whether training, participation or cooperation.

Minister Zanati also noted in the meeting the need to promote mental health and its importance, especially after the period of instability that Libya went through.

The Minister considered that mental health is a cornerstone in building qualified capabilities needing attention and cooperation.

Charg dAffairs English expressed Britains interest in cooperating with Libya and that Libya has a distinguished historical relationship with Britain, and that they will learn about the ministers vision in the programme of localizing treatment at home, and the possibility of localizing expertise within Libyan medical institutions, by sending British experts specialized in this field.

Localization of treatment at home and organization of treatment abroad aim of Health Ministry | (libyaherald.com)

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Libya and UK discuss mental health and localization of healthcare | - Libya Herald

Italy found its way back into Libya – Atlantic Council

Fri, Apr 16, 2021

MENASourcebyKarim Mezran, Alissa Pavia

Italian Prime Minister Mario Draghi and Libyan Prime Minister Abdulhamid Dbeibeh are seen duirng a joint news conference, in Tripoli, Libya April 6, 2021. REUTERS/Hazem Ahmed

On April 6, Italian Prime Minister Mario Draghi met with his Libyan counterpart Abdulhamid Dbeibah in Tripoli. It was the Italian prime ministers first state visit since taking office on February 13. More significantly, the visit has come at a time when Libya is entering a new phase of political transition.A recent ceasefire agreement signed on October 23, 2020 by the two main factionsthe Tripoli-based United Nations-backed Government of National Accord and General Khalifa Haftars Benghazi-based Libyan National Armyhas prompted the election of a unified government headed by Libyan Prime Minister Dbeibah.

The Italian prime ministers visit, albeit brief, focused on several important issues. He stressed that this is a unique moment for the two countries to rebuild an ancient friendship, referring to the long-lasting economic and political collaboration that Italy and Libya have shared over the years. PM Draghi showed much enthusiasm to start a new future and to do so quickly, adding that the 2020 ceasefire must be strictly observed.

The two countries share many common interests, which were discussed during the visit. Most notably, Italys oil giant, Eni, holds strategic investments in Libya (in 2019, Italy exported 8 percent of its natural gas from Libya). It is to no surprise, then, that Draghi spoke about intensifying collaboration with Libya in the electrical and energy sectors. Immigration, another key interest, was also touched upon when Draghi mentioned that he greatly appreciated Libyas efforts to save migrants at sea and combat human smugglingstatements he was heavily criticized for given the perilous and dire state of Libyas detention camps.

Regardless, collaboration between the two countries will likely move beyond what was said in public by the two leaders. In fact, many believe that Italy will take the lead in rebuilding Tripolis airport, a project that was commissioned to Italian construction company Aeneas three years ago. It is also rumored that Italy will take over the construction of a long highway along Libyas Mediterranean coast, which would connect Tunisia to Egypt through Libya.

Draghis visit to Libya is a big step for renewing Italys role in Libya and the wider Mediterranean, one that should not be overlooked. Italy may well be paving the way to becoming an important actor in managing crises and challenges in the region. In fact, two weeks before Draghis trip on March 21, 2021, Italys Foreign Minister Luigi Di Maio met with Dbeibah, Libyan Presidential Councils vice presidents Musa al-Koni andAbdullah al-Lafi, and Foreign Minister Najla el-Mangoush. During his visit, Di Maio spoke about the important geostrategic interests that the two countries share and highlighted Italys intent to help stabilize the country. Its worth noting that Di Maio was the first European Union minister to visit the newly elected Libyan Prime Minister. The readiness with which Di Maio took the opportunity to visit the country was already a strong signal that Italy is ready to become a strategic partner in the regionone that was further confirmed by Draghis visit.

Italy has many reasons to be a vital partner for Libya and other countries in the region. For one, Italy and Libya share historic ties that date back to 1911, when Italy first occupied Tripolitania and Cyrenaicatwo regions that later became known as Libya. Over the decades, Italian-Libyan relations have seen low and high points. Of note was the 2008 signing of the Treaty of Benghazi between then-Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi and Dictator Muammar Qaddafi, an agreement which placed Italy as a solid and credible partner for Libya.

Italy is also one of the only countries to maintain a strong presence on the ground even before the ousting of Qaddafi, but especially in the last few years during the civil wars intensification. In fact, Italy never closed its embassy in Tripoli, whereas many other countriesincluding France and the United Statesdid. The fact that Italy maintained an ambassador in Libya over the years provides the country with strong ties to local institutionsties that allow the Italians to place themselves at the forefront of a potential renewed European partnership with Libya.

Finally, Italy now has stronger credibility thanks to Draghis appointment as Italys new prime minister. His track record as a trustworthy politician derives from his long and successful career at top international institutions in Europe, most notably as head of the European Central Bank between 2011 and 2019. This renewed credibility places Italy in a strategic position in Europe to become the new point of reference for the US when dealing with Libya and other countries in the Mediterranean. At a time when Germanys Angela Merkel is stepping down and Frances Emmanuel Macron faces an important electoral campaign, Italy is best suited to take the lead in strengthening transatlantic cooperation in the Mediterranean.

However, the road ahead is complicated. Italy must now act decisively to determine its foreign policy strategy and coordinate with its American and European allies. With the Joe Biden administration turning towards the east, Italy can play the role of intermediary in Libyaa strategy which Washington may be eager to welcome, as evidenced by Secretary of State Antony Blinkens remarks upon meeting his Italian counterpart on April 13. If Italy were to strategically place itself as a broker for its allies, it could finally become a key player and help restore stability and security in Libyaand perhaps the wider Mediterranean.

Karim Mezran is director of the North Africa Initiative and resident senior fellow with the Rafik Hariri Center and Middle East Programs at the Atlantic Council focusing on the processes of change in North Africa.

Alissa Pavia is assistant director for the North Africa Program within the Rafik Hariri Center & Middle East Programs at the Atlantic Council.

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Italy found its way back into Libya - Atlantic Council