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What emerged was an entire branch of liberalism and a whole universe of activist organizations and even laws dedicated to criticizing and then suing and restraining government. Sabin writes:

Litigation by leading public interest environmental law firms in the early 1970s almost exclusively targeted the government for legal action. The Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund boasted of 77 legal accomplishments between 1971 and 1973. Approximately 70 sought to block government actions or to intervene in public proceedings to influence government regulatory and permitting practices. The Environmental Defense Fund similarly began its 1972 case summary with a list of acronyms for the 10 federal agencies named in its legal interventions. In more than 60 of its 65 listed legal actions, the Environmental Defense Fund either intervened in public proceedings, such as government permitting processes for private projects, or directly assailed a government-led initiative. Fewer than five of E.D.F.s legal actions directly targeted companies or private parties. Similarly, only three out of 29 of N.R.D.C.s legal action initiatives from its first seven months directly named a corporate defendant.

I want to say this as clearly as I can: Carson and Nader and those who followed them were, in important respects, right. The bills they helped pass from the Clean Air Act to the National Environmental Policy Act were passed for good reason and have succeeded brilliantly in many of their goals. That its easy to breathe the air in Los Angeles today is their legacy, and they should be honored for it.

But as so often happens, one generations solutions have become the next generations problems. Processes meant to promote citizen involvement have themselves been captured by corporate interests and rich NIMBYs. Laws meant to ensure that government considers the consequences of its actions have made it too difficult for government to act consequentially. It was as if liberals took a bicycle apart to fix it but never quite figured out how to get it running properly again, Sabin writes.

These bills were built for an era when the issue was that the government was building too much, with too little environmental analysis. The core problem of this era is that the government is building too little, in defiance of all serious environmental analysis. This is the maddening inversion climate change imposes upon us: To conserve anything close to the climate weve had, we need to build as weve never built before, electrifying everything and constructing the green energy infrastructure to generate that electricity cleanly. As the climate writer Julian Brave NoiseCat once put it to me, If you want to stand athwart the history of emissions and yell stop, you need to do really transformational things.

Thats where the environmental victories of yesteryear have become the obstacles of this year. Too many of the tactics and strategies and statutes are designed to stop transformational or even incremental projects from happening. Modest expansions to affordable housing or bus service are forced to answer for their environmental impact. But the status quo doesnt have to win any lawsuits or fill out any forms to persist.

The problem is a bunch of the regulatory law doesnt penalize or regulate pollution, Alex Trembath, the deputy director of the Breakthrough Institute, an environmental think tank that favors technological solutions, told me. It penalizes and regulates technology, infrastructure and growth often quite explicitly. Thats how putatively environmental regulations are used to block laws that would lower pollution or make society more resource efficient.

Its not just the laws that act in this way. A similar logic pervades the permitting processes and political structures. Change is discouraged; stasis is encouraged. Leah Stokes, a political scientist at the University of California, Santa Barbara, who studies the politics of climate change, told me a story both revealing and familiar. Im trying to electrify my home in Santa Barbara, she said. The time it takes to get permits to change my house is about a year. Im still burning gas in my house for that year. Now were going back and forth about what kind of heat pump I can use. None of the system is oriented around climate being the most important thing. If you look at how planes were built in World War II, it wasnt like this.

Ive heard anecdotes like that from a lot of people who work on climate policy. Theyre easy to write off as picayune complaints. But their smallness is the point. If its so difficult for a climate expert to electrify her own house in a jurisdiction that believes itself terrified of climate change, how hard is it going to be to decarbonize the country?

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Opinion | Government Is Flailing, in Part Because Liberals Hobbled It - The New York Times

None of this should be surprising: Its always been the case that a liberal society depends for unity and vigor on not entirely liberal forces religious piety, nationalist pride, a sense of providential mission, a certain degree of ethnic solidarity and, of course, the fear of some external adversary. Liberalism at its best works to guide and channel these forces; liberalism at its worst veers between ignoring them and being overwhelmed by them.

Among the optimistic liberals of the current moment, you can see how that veering happens. A Russian defeat will make possible a new birth of freedom, Francis Fukuyama wrote last week, and get us out of our funk about the declining state of global democracy. The spirit of 1989 will live on. Following up in an interview with The Washington Posts Greg Sargent, Fukuyama framed the current moment as an opportunity for Americans and other Westerners to choose liberalism anew, out of a recognition that the nationalist alternative is pretty awful.

But one of the key lessons of recent years is that the spirit of 1989 was itself as much a spirit of revived Eastern European nationalism as of liberalism alone. Which is one reason countries like Poland and Hungary have sorely disappointed liberals in their subsequent development up until now, of course, when Polish nationalism is suddenly a crucial bulwark for the liberal democratic West.

So liberals watching the floundering of populism need a balanced understanding of their own position, their dependence on nationalism and particularism and even chauvinism, their obligation to sift those forces so that the good (admiration for the patriotism of Ukrainians and the heroic masculinity of Volodymyr Zelensky) outweighs the bad (boycotts of a Russian piano prodigy, a rush toward nuclear war).

And they also need to avoid the delusion that Putins wicked and incompetent invasion means that all complaints about the Wests internal problems can safely be dismissed as empty, false, self-hating.

Last week, for instance, the Russia scholar Stephen Kotkin told The New Yorkers David Remnick that Putins invasion disproves all the nonsense about how the West is decadent, the West is over, the West is in decline, how its a multipolar world and the rise of China. With the West rallying to a resilient Ukraine, all of that turned out to be bunk.

What was bunk was the idea that Putins Russia represents some kind of efficient postliberal or traditionalist alternative to the problems of the West, and one whose military could simply steamroller Eastern Europe. But all those Western problems remain: American power is in relative decline, Chinas power has dramatically increased, and none of what I, as a self-appointed expert on the subject, would classify as the key problems of American decadence demographic decline, economic disappointment and stagnation, a social fabric increasingly shadowed by drugs and depression and suicide have somehow gone away just because Moscows military is failing outside Kyiv.

See the rest here:
Opinion | Will the Ukraine War End the Age of Populism? - The New York Times

March 16, 2022

March 16, 2022

The invasion of Ukraine is only in its third week and far from resolution. But it's already launched thousands of essays, podcasts, and tweets. While the inhabitants of Mariupol, Kyiv, and other cities face bombardment, writers and scholars in the peaceful capitals of North America and Europe lob words at each other. As we try to figure out what it all means, it's important to remember the difference between intellectual if not always civil disagreement and the reality of war and enmity.

In the spirit of honesty, I should acknowledge that some of those salvos were mine. The day after Russian President Vladimir Putin announced the commencement of operations, I published a column proclaiming the end of the so-called liberal international order (or its common synonyms). That argument provoked a critical response from my colleague David Faris. Noting the coordination and severity of American, European, and NATO responses, Faris contended that the basic premise of the post-Cold War politics that interstate aggression is wrong and must be punished remains in place.

It's fair to conclude that reports of liberalism's death have turned out to be premature. The Stanford historian Stephen Kotkin and other scholars have argued that the last few weeks have exposed the gap between Russian aspirations and capabilities.Even if Russia defeats Ukrainian forces in the field, thatlesson may infuence other states that hope to dominate hostile territory. Although the available reports are hard to assess, it appears that the Chinese Communist Party is worried about the implications of Russia's unanticipated political and military struggles for its own efforts to capture Taiwan.

But there's also a sense in which eulogists for the liberal world order and optimists about its prospects can both be partly right. One of the notable features of international opposition to Russian is how limited it is. China's not the only player to opt out of sanctions. India, Brazil, and (until recently) even Israel, have objected to aspects of the campaign to isolate Russia.

Rather than an assertion of global liberalism, we may be seeing the return of a concept that's become unfashionable over the last few decades. In an underappreciated recent book, historian Michael Kimmage shows how "the West" became a central concept in American foreign policy for much of the 20th century before falling into disrepute. The whole point of the "new world order" announced by President George H.W. Bush in 1990 was that liberal practices and ideals would no longer be associated with one culture or region. Instead, they would become truly global norms and universal rights, administered partly, if not entirely, by transnational institutions.

That's the expectation, perhaps utopian, the Russian invasion and varied responses around the world seems to refute. Some states mostly, if not exclusively those linked to the Western alliance of the 20th century reject Russian aggression and the vision of great power competition that inspires it. But others, including population and economic giants, are either morally indifferent or give precedence to other interests.

Yet the popularity and sometimesirrational intensity of opposition to Russia in the "Anglosphere" and Europe suggests a residual solidarity that belies the revival of illiberal nationalism within those regions. As William Galston observed in The Wall Street Journal, Western admirers of Putin including Italy's Matteo Salvini, France's Eric Zemmour, and our Donald Trump have all had to distance themselves from the Russian dictator in the face of overwhelming criticism even from their own supporters. Ordinary Americans and Europeans with populist sympathies, who were far from philosophical liberals before the invasion, haven't turned into Kantians overnight, and it's naive to imagine they ever will. But many hold assumptions about the purposes of violence and requirements of political legitimacy that are implicit in liberal societies and questionable or even alien outside them.

In more abstract terms, then, we may be witnessing an emerging synthesis between two rival theories that captivated political intellectuals in the beginning of the period of hegemonic liberalism that now seems to be in its twilight. One was the "end of history" thesis developed by Francis Fukuyama. Contrary to popular misinterpretations, Fukuyama did not claim that the resolution of the Cold War meant nothing unpleasant, difficult, or surprising would ever happen again. What he did argue was that there were no longer systematic alternatives to liberal democracy capable of achieving broad popular support.

Fukuyama was challenged by his former teacher Samuel Huntington. According to Huntington, the future would not be characterized by consensus around liberal institutions and human rights, but rivalry between distinct cultural groups. That rivalry was likely to turn violent at "bloody borders" at the overlapping periphery of those civilizations that is, places like Eastern Europe.

But what if they're both right? In other words, what if the West really has reached the end of history but other parts of the world are following a different script? That would involve closer ties, even homogenization, among liberal states bad news for advocates of sharply differentiated national identities. At the same time, the influence of that quasi-integrated bloc over the rest of the world might diminish as rivals develop their own cultural, economic, and military resources, contrary to liberal hopes. That could lead to new and different conflicts in the future, increasing strife while belying neat distinctions between democracies and autocracies. To different degrees, India and China both support Russia. But they don't exactly get along with each other.

Writing in The New York Times, journalist Thomas Meaney recently consideredthe limitations and risks of this scenario. He noted that the boundaries of the West are, at best, fuzzy (I made a partial attempt at definition here); that the concept tends to subordinate Europe to the United States; and that appeals to civilizational differences can exacerbate conflict and justify atrocities. In themselves, all these criticisms are fair enough. But the fact that countries including Indonesia, Nigeria, Brazil, India, and of course China have been so skeptical of American and Europeans efforts to constrain Russia underscores the continuing relevance of the idea of the West rather than demonstrating the availability of some alternative form of truly cosmopolitan affinity. History may not be over, but the West is likely to stick around for a while.

See the article here:
The West vs. the world? - The Week

Recent political history has shown that United States conservative leaders tend to vote against the expansion of federal welfare, or social safety net, programs. But are conservative-leaning citizens less likely than their liberal-leaning peers to enroll in said programs and accept aid for themselves?

Thats the question that Virginia Techs Shreyans Goenka answered with his recentlypublished research, Are Conservatives Less Likely Than Liberals to Accept Welfare? The Psychology of Welfare Politics.

This research shows that conservatives are less likely than liberals to enroll in federal welfare programs only when the welfare program does not have a work requirement policy, said Goenka.

Shreyans Goenkais an assistant professor of marketing in the Pamplin College of Business. His research investigates consumer morality. He examines how moral beliefs shape consumption preferences and economic patterns. In doing so, his research produces implications for understanding how morality can help inform policy decisions, marketing positioning strategies, and prosocial campaigns.

The researchers analyzed how participation rates in the federal Supplemental Nutritional Assistance Program (SNAP), formerly known as food stamps, was influenced by a change in the work requirement policy. When SNAP had a work requirement from 2005-08, the Republican-leaning states and Democratic-leaning states recorded similar levels of welfare participation. However, when the work requirement was waived from 2009-13, the Republican-leaning states recorded lower levels of welfare participation than the Democratic-leaning states.

Follow-up controlled experiments show that conservatives believe it is morally wrong to accept welfare if they are not contributing back to society in some manner.

Conservatives tend to believe that accepting welfare without reciprocal work can make them a burden on society, explained Goenka. Therefore, conservatives are less likely than liberals to enroll in welfare programs without work requirements.

Importantly, the research also shows how policymakers can utilize marketing messaging strategies to boost conservatives' welfare participation.

When welfare brochures highlight how welfare programs can serve the interest of society as whole, conservatives welfare enrollment increases, added Goenka. Policymakers can utilize this research to redesign welfare marketing materials and boost participation in welfare programs.

Journal of the Association for Consumer Research

Are Conservatives Less Likely Than Liberals to Accept Welfare? The Psychology of Welfare Politics

Disclaimer: AAAS and EurekAlert! are not responsible for the accuracy of news releases posted to EurekAlert! by contributing institutions or for the use of any information through the EurekAlert system.

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Pamplin professor explores psychology of welfare politics - EurekAlert

Should Canada be purist or practical when it comes to climate change?

Over the next few weeks, there will be some key indications about which path the federal Liberals will choose, and the smart money is on the practical despite pressure from some environmentalists.

Of course, the energy security problems raised by the Russian invasion of Ukraine and attempts to embargo Russian energy heavily favour the practical approach.

The world is looking to Canadian oil and gas producers to increase their production right now in the hopes of offsetting some of the strain of high prices and cutting off Russian supplies, even if it means emissions wont go down as much as hoped.

But theres more to the practical approach than geopolitics.

In a paper to be published this week after two years of looking for a consensus among industry, government, environmentalists and Indigenous communities, the Public Policy Forum argues that a purist approach would just hurt too much.

Two overarching visions of the energy transition are competing for the hearts and minds of Canadians, say lead authors Ed Greenspon, who heads the PPF, and Wayne Wouters, the former clerk of the Privy Council and now a strategic policy adviser at McCarthy Tetrault LLP.

The purist approach an accelerated phaseout of oil and gas, replacing it quickly with renewables and clean electricity risks disrupting the way we live, our jobs and our international relations, they say.

On the other hand, a practical approach an aggressive decarbonization that promotes renewables and clean energy while cutting emissions from oil and gas would be more conducive to a smooth transition for workers and investors, and open the door to a boom in private-sector activity supported by public-sector measures.

But in order to make it work, says Wouters, we have to be all in large emitters, policy-makers, taxpayers, consumers, investors and Indigenous communities. And we have to be organized, setting out strategies that will carry us through the next decades despite election cycles and the Conservative leadership race that is throwing climate policy into question, he added in an interview.

The paper goes on to outline the many steps that need to be taken in order to wrestle our emissions to the ground, from mass electrification to mass marketing in order to sell consumers and the world on the benefits. A transparent price on carbon is only the beginning.

The ideas are frequent refrains in the speeches we hear from government and business leaders. To make them real, though, the decisions in the next few weeks are central.

By law, the government needs to produce the first instalment of its plan to meet Canadas 2030 emissions targets by the end of March. And in the first half of April, Finance Minister Chrystia Freeland will table the federal budget, which will include substantive new measures to fight climate change.

The telling move will come in what those documents say about carbon capture and storage (CCS). By capturing the carbon dioxide that comes from producing things like oil, gas, cement or steel, and then storing it underground, the technology could allow the continued use of fossil fuels with a much lower emissions profile.

Last years budget promised to create an investment tax credit to encourage companies to build CCS facilities, and this years budget is widely expected to set out the parameters of that measure.

The thing is, purists dont like CCS. A group of 400 academics wrote recently to Freeland saying tax credits are akin to subsidies for oil and gas, breaking our international commitments and prolonging our dependence on fossil fuels.

The federal government looks like it will go ahead with the measure anyway. It has consulted widely and is clearly in the midst of crafting policy. On Monday, Environment Minister Steven Guilbeault and Natural Resources Minister Jonathan Wilkinson co-wrote an opinion column for the National Observer, touting the benefits of carbon capture and storage.

But whether the government decides to go big or go small will be a clear indication of whether it is bending towards the practical or the purist route to climate change.

Alberta wants the tax credit to cover up to 75 per cent of eligible investments, but the current system of tax credits for research and development applies to just 35 per cent. The new credit will probably fall somewhere in between, in true Canadian style not quite going all in, but signalling support for ongoing long-term oil and gas production all the same.

That would make sense in todays environment.

Oil prices are sky high, and so are profits. With Canadas carbon price set to climb steeply and capital markets around the world rewarding companies that transition to low carbon, there are already incentives in place to push companies towards cutting emissions. A tax credit will help too, but it doesnt need to carry the entire burden.

Regardless, its only a start on the many things business and government will have to do together if they want a practical approach to climate change to succeed. Electrification alone will cost many, many billions in private and public money, and the plan to find that money is scattered and nebulous.

A signal on carbon capture and storage is one thing, and a full-blown vision to steer the economy, the public, and politics towards a net-zero world is another.

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When it comes to emissions, Liberals will choose the practical not the purist route - Toronto Star