Mediaboss Marketing

A U.S.-trained Iraqi military unit committed war crimesinMosul during the battle to liberate the city from the Islamic State militant group (ISIS), Human Rights Watch said Thursday.

The groupsaid two international observers alleged that the unit, the 16th Division of the Iraqi army, summarily killed four people in mid-July. The observersalso alleged they had evidence of other executions, including one case involving a boy. The group did not provide an age.

In the case of the four people, the observers said they saw soldiers walk the men, who were naked, into an alleyway, after which they heard gunshots. Soldiers said the four were members of ISIS, butthe observers said they had heard no clashes in the area. One of the observers returned the next day and capturedimages of three of the bodies, which wereshared with Human Rights Watch.

Daily Emails and Alerts - Get the best of Newsweek delivered to your inbox

The U.S. militarys 82nd Airborne Division has previously provided training to the unit, and led it in the western Iraqi city of Ramadi, which Iraqi troops recapturedin December 2015. It remains unclear if the divisionstill trains the unit, but, with the forceoperating inside Mosul,it is likely that there was some form ofcoordinationduring the battle for the city.

The U.S. government should make sure it is no longer providing assistance to the Iraqi unit responsible for this spate of executions but also suspend any plans for future assistance until these atrocities have been properly investigated, saidSarah Leah Whitson, Middle East director at Human Rights Watch.

Given the widespread abuses by Iraqi forces and the governments abysmal record on accountability, the U.S. should take a hard look at its involvement with Iraqi forces.

A member of the Iraqi federal police walks through the rubble of a destroyed building during the advance through the Old City of Mosul on June 28. Human Rights Watch said an Iraqi unit trained by American forces summarily executed prisoners in western Mosul. Ahmad Al-Rubaye/AFP/Getty

The battle for Mosul lasted nine months and forced hundreds of civilians to flee ISISs brutal rule, an Iraqi ground offensiveand U.S.-led coalition airstrikes.

Aside from ISISs barbaric treatment of civilians and opponents in the city, rights groups have criticized the U.S.-led coalition for its bombing campaign, which left hundreds of civilians dead in the Iraqi city.

They have also taken aim at the Iraqi forces, accusing them of severe human rights abuses, particularly against Sunni civilians and suspected members of ISIS attempting to flee the city.

The Iraqi security forces are dominated by Shiite members and are aided by Shiite militias such as the feared Hashd al-Shaabi, whose members havebeen accused of torturing and executing Sunnis.

ISISs captureof Mosul, a Sunni-majority city, came after disaffected Sunni Iraqi security forces put down their weapons and deserted their positions amid the jihadi groupsadvance.

The threat of further sectarian tensions in and around the city and the liberatedSunni lands of northern Iraq will raise fears among Baghdads partners that security could again be severely threatened,despite the defeat of ISIS in Mosul.

Read more:
US Trained Unit in Iraq That 'Committed War Crimes' in Mosul Battle - Newsweek

Out there, somewhere Aaron Taylor-Johnson as Sgt Isaac in The Wall. Photograph: David James

Screenwriter Dwain Worrell has put together a tough, well-carpentered thriller, directed by Doug Liman, about a US soldier in the dying days of the Iraq war who is stranded in the desert and engaged in a Spielbergian duel with an unseen Iraqi sniper who has him pinned down next to a shattered wall. According to the vengeful sharpshooter, who has hacked into the soldiers radio comms, that wall is what remains of an important building. Is he telling the truth?

Its a smart piece of work, and if it occasionally feels like the worlds best film-school project, that is part of its intelligent minimalism. Perhaps it only really comes into own in its final minutes. Aaron Taylor-Johnson is the US soldier, Sgt Isaac, who shows up at an oil pipeline to find the civilian contractors and their military liaison all lying dead. Somewhere below the horizon is the worryingly proficient killer. But where? Soon the situation escalates out of control and Isaac cant be sure whether the 7th Cavalry are coming to help.

Maybe a more experienced writer would have developed and varied the relationship between Isaac and the unknown voice. At any rate, its an eerie, menacing film.

The rest is here:
The Wall review Aaron Taylor-Johnson under fire in menacing Iraq war duel - The Guardian

After 9 months of fighting, the final stage of the Mosul offensive does not mean an end to the ordeal of the thousands of civilians still trapped in the city. No more than it puts a stop to the exodus of populations from Iraq. The coming military operations by the Iraqi and international forces against other bastions of the Islamic State group risk causing large-scale displacement in the areas where Terre des hommes intervenes, like at the Tal Jarabia camp. Our colleague Stephan Richard, currently in Iraq, reviews the situation.

Families are still fleeing

The recapturing of Iraqs second city by the United States-led coalition is having an effect in the North-West of the country, where Terre des hommes leads emergency aid projects for the internally displaced. Beyond the hope that it gives to inhabitants of the areas controlled by the Islamic State group (ISIS), the liberation of Mosul is paradoxically having a negative impact on the population in the areas where we intervene, observes Stephan Richard, a specialist in humanitarian interventions and emergencies. The movements of the fighters fleeing Mosul and trying to reach one of the last pockets of resistance, in Tal Afar, is driving out populations who were previously spared from the fighting.

70 kilometres from Mosul, the city of Tal Afar is located next to the Tal Jarabia camp for displaced people, where Terre des hommes has been working for over 6 months. The coming military operations, designed to liberate the last pockets of resistance in the centre (Hawija) and the North-West (Tal Afar), will probably cause large-scale population displacement to the areas where Terre des hommes has already been intervening to provide emergency aid for over a year, in Qayarrah, Sherqat, Tikrit, Kirkuk and Tal Jarabia, adds Stephan Richard.

Scaling up the emergency aid at the Tal Jarabia camp

Today, the informal settlement of Tal Jarabia shelters about 1650 displaced. Most of them have spent hours on trucks in temperatures exceeding 45 degrees to seek safety. Even if the camp offers a respite for the families, there is limited access to water, food, health and protection, putting childrens health at risk. This situation pushes many families to continue towards camps in the east, says Francis Hughes, Tdh Country Emergency Programme Coordinator. Families remaining in Tal Jarabia usually have their livestock with them, their only source of income. Yet, there is no food and water for their animals, which are being left to die as a result.

Tdh is working around the clock with other NGOs to provide displaced children and their families with water, sanitation facilities, emergency kits, as well as hygiene and kitchen kits, even in challenging weather conditions. To avoid the heat and the storms, our trucks now leave from Qayyarrah at 1am to be in Tal Jarabia for distributing emergency aid early in the morning, explains Francis. In cooperation with other NGOs, Tdh is also going to set up a mobile unit connected to two existing bore holes in the settlement. This will allow us to provide families with safe drinking water while avoiding daily water trucking.

We have been scaling up our emergency response with providing daily humanitarian aid. We deliver 120 litres of water on daily basis to each family in the settlement and we will ensure that the most acute needs of children and their families are met and that they are protected in the coming months, too.

Read more:
Iraq: The heavy humanitarian toll in the aftermath of Mosul - Reliefweb

A war veteran died in a shootout with police after carjacking a family and threatening to kill co-workers.

Casey Nolen, KSDK 7:25 AM. CDT July 27, 2017

Photo: Jarrod Kershaw

ST. LOUIS - Monday, as his family watched his fate unfold on the news Jerrod Kershaw's aunt says she couldn't believe how his life was ending.

Totally, totally not him, says Debra Collins who says as Kershaws godmother shes known him all of his life.

Wearing a bullet proof vest and armed with several weapons, police say the 30 year old car jacked a family who stopped to help him on the side of Interstate 55 near 270, then led police on a chase that stalled traffic for hours ending in a standoff and shootout with police.

No officers were seriously injured. Kershaw was killed in the exchange.

That's not the boy I know, says Collins. He's not an angel, but not a devil.

And not the man he was before he went to war, she says. Collins says the Army was not a good thing for Kershaw. His father passed away during his boot camp and, he deployed four days before the birth of his first child - spending most of 2010 in Iraq.

That was a life change for him, says Collins. I think that's why he was so troubled was because he just, his emotions just took a pounding.

A nurse in Columbia, Missouri, Collins says Kershaw stopped taking medications for his mental health a little over a week before he allegedly opened fire on officers.

I feel bad for the police officers...feel so sad for them that he made them shoot himI feel very sad for the family that he terrorized.

We the family love him and we'll miss him, Collins said.

2017 KSDK-TV

See the original post here:
Aunt: veteran in I-55 shootout changed in Iraq - KSDK

By Brian Keith Simpkins, Ed.D.

In early July 2017, the Iraqi government regained control of Mosul from the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), thereby ending a bloody and destructive nine-month campaign. ISIS controlled Mosul for almost three years after seizing control of the city in June 2014. With Mosul back under Iraqi control, the main focus of the fight against ISIS turns to Raqqa in Syria, where international-backed forces are zeroing in on ISIS forces.

[Related: Understanding the Ideology of Terrorism]

While progress is being made against ISIS in Iraq, it is beneficial to examine the intelligence failures that contributed to the ISIS territorial gains in Iraq in 2014 to avoid similar mistakes.

Erik Dahls (2013) Theory of Preventive Action can help examine the Iraq intelligence failures. In fact, Dahls theory can be easily applied to other notable intelligence failures such as 9/11, Pearl Harbor, and the national intelligence estimate that led to the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq.

Dahls theory focuses on the type of available intelligence (tactical versus strategic) and policymaker receptivity to the intelligence. More specifically, the theory defines that the collection and production of tactical intelligence has the potential to influence policymaker decisions as it is more specific and highlights the need for immediate and/or specific action. Conversely, strategic intelligence is less precise and focuses more on long-term goals related to foreign policy and international security. As for policymaker receptivity, one can easily deduce that policymakers are more influenced by and prefer tactical intelligence. Using these two concepts (type of intelligence and policymaker receptivity), can help explain the pre-incident intelligence failures leading to the 2014 ISIS territorial gains in Iraq.

Intelligence Collection Methods

The first factor of Dahls theory deals with the type of intelligence that was collected by the U.S. intelligence community (IC). Prior to the U.S. military withdrawal from Iraq in 2011, the U.S. military and the IC collaborated to develop one of the most successful battlefield intelligence systems in history (led by the U.S. militarys Joint Special Operations Command [JSOC]), which relied heavily on human intelligence (HUMINT). Both the U.S. military and CIA utilized extensive networks of operatives and analysts within Iraq focused on HUMINT. The CIA station in Baghdad was the agencys largest overseas station in the world during the Iraq War. Utilizing overt and covert (clandestine) collection methods, HUMINT operations provided tactical intelligence on insurgents and their movements, including those of former Iraqi Republican Guard members, some of whom became important figures in ISIS.

[Related: How Syrians are Using Cyber Community Policing to Fight Terrorism]

However, when the military withdrew in 2011 so did the important intelligence assets, thereby creating an intelligence-collection vacuum in its wake. After the U.S. militarys withdrawal, HUMINT operations ended (even the CIA ceased clandestine operations in Iraq). As a result, the IC had to rely solely on satellite imagery and signals intelligence (SIGINT) for intelligence collection.

[Related: Why Overt Intelligence Is Important But Often Undervalued]

The problem with reliance on SIGINT intelligence was that ISIS used human couriers for message transmission (thus nullifying SIGINT) and was able to bypass satellite imagery by blending into the social environment. In essence, ISIS became better at denying HUMINT collection strategies while the IC became worse at HUMINT collection.

As a result of inadequate intelligence collection, the IC started producing more strategic intelligence and warnings instead of the more useful tactical and specific intelligence and warnings. The IC was now relying on intelligence that was overly broad, lacked specifics for senior officials, and provided little benefit when given to the Iraqi army to respond to ISIS.

As Dahl (2013) states, strategic-level intelligence and warnings are surprisingly easy to acquire and are often readily available before major attacks, but they are unlikely to be acted upon by decision makers, and in any case too general to be useful (p. 22). Ultimately, even though the IC raised warnings about ISIS, the inadequacy of the collected intelligence resulted in an underestimation of the will and capability of ISIS and an overestimation of the will and capability of the Iraqi army.

Policymaker Reception to Strategic Intelligence Reports

The second factor of Dahls theory and its application to the 2014 ISIS territorial gains in Iraq deals with policymaker receptivity. In 2014, the Obama administration was not receptive to the strategic intelligence regarding the ISIS threat in Iraq. This was mainly due to the Obama administrations reluctance to get drawn back into Iraq after pledging and ultimately getting U.S. troops out of Iraq.

Further, at the time, the Obama administration was focused on the Syrian civil war and al-Qaeda in Afghanistan, which caused the administration to be blind to the ISIS threat. In addition, the Obama administration felt that ISIS could be checked and rolled back at Fallujah and Ramadi. Despite warnings by senior IC and military officials, the Obama administration was not receptive to the intelligence (which was strategic and not tactical) and, therefore, failed to adequately confront the ISIS threat.

Overall, there were intelligence failures by the IC as well as policy and leadership failures in the Obama administration in response to the ISIS threat in 2014. Based on Dahls Theory of Preventative Action, an attack is most likely to succeed if there is strategic intelligence/warning (instead of tactical intelligence/warning) and low policymaker receptivity.

As illustrated above, this was exactly the situation and pre-incident intelligence failures led to the 2014 ISIS territorial gains in Iraq. Specifically, the IC was collecting inadequate intelligence to inform policy makers (due to the withdrawal of intelligence assets) and providing only strategic intelligence/warning to unreceptive policymakers who were focused on other matters and underestimated the ISIS threat.

The failure in responding to the ISIS threat in 2014 especially underscores the importance of HUMINT operations as well as the need for tactical intelligence and for policymakers to be receptive of, and take action based on, available strategic intelligence when appropriate. The IC must also look back at previous intelligence successes and try to repurpose what has worked in the past. As militant groups associated with ISIS are attempting to gain control of territory in the Philippines, it is imperative that the United States does not let what transpired in Iraq repeat itself elsewhere.

About the Author: Dr. Brian Simpkins is the Principal Investigator and Co-Director of the Bluegrass State Intelligence Community Center of Academic Excellence (BGS IC CAE) and Associate Director of the Eastern Kentucky University (EKU) Justice and Safety Center. Dr. Simpkins is also a part-time faculty member with EKU where he teaches courses in intelligence, critical infrastructure protection and resiliency, and homeland security technologies. In 2016-2017, Dr. Simpkins served as the Program Director of the Institute for Research, Innovation, and Scholarship (IRIS) for the School of Security and Global Studies (SSGS) at American Military University in which he focused on faculty and student research engagement.

Reference

Dahl, E. (2013). Intelligence and surprise attack: Failure and success from Pearl Harbor to 9/11 and beyond. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press

Sign up now to receive the InPublicSafety eNewsletter.

Go here to see the original:
How Intelligence Failures Contributed to ISIS Territorial Gain in Iraq - In Public Safety (blog)