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The threat of Isis-linked terror attacks in the UK continues to rise despite heavy military losses for the group in Iraq and Syria, the UKs most senior police officer has warned.

Cressida Dick, the Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police, said six plots have been thwarted in the last four months alone and she expects the figure to rise.

Since March this year, the tempo has changed, she told delegates at the annual Lord Mayor's defence and security lecture, listing the ghastly attacks that left 36 people dead and 200 injured in Westminster, Manchester, London Bridge and Finsbury Park.

Progress on the ground in Syria and Iraq does not necessarily translate into a reduction in threat here.

Her caution came after triumphant statements from Government ministers following Iraqi forces victory over Isis in Mosul.

Sir Michael Fallon, the Defence Secretary, welcomed the jihadis defeat in a city that was ground zero for their so-called caliphate, while Theresa May commended the bravery and sacrifice of Iraqi forces but conceded Isis ideology defeated through military intervention alone.

Mosul after the war: 'Utter and total devastation'

Ms Dick said 13 lethal terror plots were foiled from June 2013 to March this year, amid increasing numbers of arrests seeing 340 suspects detained in the past two years.

We must not deny the scale of this challenge, she added, saying MI5 is monitoring3,000 individuals across the UK who are assessed as posing the biggest threat.

There are 20,000 other former subjects whose risk remains subject to review and the number is expected to rise, as the national terror alert level remains at "severe".

Khalid Masood, who launched the Westminster attack, and London Bridge ringleader Khuram Butt are among the terrorists who were known to authorities but not judged to be an imminent risk.

Ms Dick did not discuss ongoing investigations but said part of the growing challenge was the use of low tech and relatively unsophisticated methods being promoted by Isis, such as car and lorry rammings and stabbings.

These less sophisticated attacks can mature faster making detection harder, the Commissioner warned.

A man walks past messages and tributes left near to where a van was driven into a group of Muslim worshippers in North London (Reuters)

Following the terror attacks in Finsbury Park and murder of Labour MP Jo Cox, she also highlighted the threat emanating from the far-right, saying 14 domestic extremists with lethal capability and intent were in custody.

She said most recent atrocities in the UK were mounted by homegrownextremists acting in small groups or apparently alone, adding: The bulk of this domestic threat seems to be from those who are inspired by overseas networks, though there have undoubtedly been some who have been more directly enabled by them and we should not assume that attempts by senior leaderships of overseas groups to direct UK attacks have gone away.

Europol and other international security agencies have sounded repeated warnings over the danger stemming from foreign Isis fighters seeking to return to their home countries as the group loses territory in Syria and Iraq.

According to Home Office figures, at least 850 suspected jihadis have travelled to Syria, with 15 per cent known to have been killed and just under half returning to the UK.

Many of the most dangerous individuals remain overseas, said Amber Rudd in a recent Home Office report.

London Bridge attacker Khuram Butt is among the terrorists previously known to authorities but not judged to be an imminent risk(Channel 4)

UK-linked individuals who travel to fight in Syria and Iraq pose a clear threat to our countrys security, and we continue to work at a national and international level to mitigate the risk they pose.

Authorities have hailed success at preventing Isis supporters from travelling to join the group abroad, but tightening restrictions across Europe and the Middle East have driven a change in tactics by the group as it shifts back into insurgency mode.

Its propaganda, once focused on attracting men and women to build the so-called Islamic State, is now calling on followers to remain in their home countries and launch terror attacks whenever and however they can.

Ms Dick said both Isis and al-Qaeda were exploiting technology to project their threat around the world, sparking efforts to contest the narrative of jihad, prevent radicalisation and take down online propaganda.

The modern threat, more than ever, includes the encouraging of others to commit atrocious acts, she added.

That virus can infect communities and is spreading faster and more easily due to the internet.

We have large numbers of apparently volatile individuals in the UK, some of whom become determined to die, who may have been inspired largely through the web and decided on methodology learned from there too.

Despite efforts to take down Isis and al-Qaeda material, jihadi magazines and terror manuals including bomb-making instructions and advice on lorry attacks remains available online.

There is also a far wider pool of extremist material includinghate preaching and fundamental texts being propagated by Islamist groups likethe network surrounding Anjem Choudary, whose members have been linked to a number of UK terror attacks.

The Home Secretary has taken aim at technology firms over the spread of propaganda, as well as arguing end-to-end encryption technology including popular mobile apps were making terrorist communications more difficult to detect and counter.

But she has fended off criticism of the Governments own programmes including Prevent, claiming 1,000 people at risk of being drawn into terrorism have been supported since 2012.

The Commissioner praised the work undertaken as part of the UKs Contest counter-terror strategy but said it is manifestly not enough, adding: Clearly in the light of this latest shift in threat, in view of the terrible attacks, there is a need to review the strategy again and as a country we will need to step change in many areas.

This is what those who work in countering terrorism have always done - the threat changes, it morphs, we must adapt with it.

The rest is here:
Isis losses in Syria and Iraq not reducing terror threat in UK, police chief warns - The Independent

After declaring victory in the nine-month battle to oust the Islamic State group from Mosul the Iraqi security forces have a little bit of breathing room to concentrate on the rest of the country and get on with the campaign of eliminating ISIS in Iraq, the top Marine officer in Iraq said. Marine Corps Times talked toBrig. Gen. Robert G-Man Sofge recentlyabout what happens after Mosul and how U.S. forces helped Iraqi forces achieve their most important victory to date.Sofgeis currently thedirector of the Combined Joint Operations Center in Baghdad.

Excerpts of the interview, edited for clarity and space.

ISIS is in Tal Afar; ISIS remains in the western desert and certainly remains in the Hawija pocket north of Baghdad and south of Mosul. Where the Iraqis go on a campaign, I think, is to be determined at this point.

I cant talk to it off the cuff. They are a fine fighting force and they were very brave and took a significant number of casualties as did the federal police and so did the Iraqi army. All pieces of the Iraqi security forces were engaged in different parts of this battle. I cant speak specifically to the numbers.

I think all of the forces are understandably going to have to reset briefly after the tough fight in Mosul. I think what well see in the weeks ahead is that kind of behavior as they restock their ammo, take stock of where they are physically with manpower, repair their vehicles and replenish their fuel stocks for the next stop on the campaign.

Q: How are efforts to clear Mosul of mines and booby traps proceeding?

This kind of back-clearance will be slow and thorough. Its already started with the forces that are there, but the government of Iraq my understanding is going to bring more forces to bear to help with that clearance to make the city safe for the people of Mosul.

The idea that weve loosened the ROE in order to more aggressively fight the enemy is not an accurate statement. There have been a couple of unfortunate incidents, but zero civilian casualties is our goal each and every day. We havent loosened that up in any way, shape or form.

It was challenging to employ that amount of firepower in that small of a space. We dialed it back and kept dialing it back until eventually we werent using any aircraft to strike, only direct fire weapons. And then eventually direct fire weapons were, frankly, too powerful to fight in those closed quarters. It became those last, terrible yards for the Iraqi security forces to really go in by hand. Brutal fighting.

View post:
After Mosul: What's next for the fight in Iraq - Marine Corps Times

The headline of the New York Times piece was breathless: Iran Dominates in Iraq After U.S. Handed the Country Over. The content was only slightly less so: But after the United States abrupt withdrawal of troops in 2011, American constancy is still in question herea broad failure of American foreign policy, with responsibility shared across three administrations.

The statement is curious. What about U.S. history of involvement there tells you its going to end well? asks Hussein Banai of Indiana University Bloomington. Arangos reporting, which advocates for American constancy in Iraq, contributes to this mythmaking on all sides that all Iraq might need is a U.S. stablizing force, says Banai. And its just ridiculous. (Irans foreign minister, the veteran diplomat Javad Zarif, also complained about this piece in comments to the National Interest on Monday).

The evidence suggests the 2011 withdrawal was anything but abrupt. Barack Obama, an original opponent of the war and supporter of withdrawal, won the 2008 election on an anti-war wave. Leading figures in U.S. life had been calling for withdrawal since the war took a turn for the worse shortly after the fall of Baghdad in 2003. But most importantly, the exodus of U.S. forces in 2011 had been negotiated in 2008 by President Bush; not abrupt. And it had been working it ways through the Iraqi parliament for some time before that, Banai notes.

The importance of the American withdrawal, in terms of that event spurring a major upshoot in Iranian influence, is likely overstated. Irans influence in Iraq is... ascendant, Arango writes. But hasnt it been for some time?

Trita Parsi, president of the National Iranian American Council, tells me: Iranian influence in Iraq started much sooner, than 2011. The United States had essentially lost Iraq the minute it invaded Iraq but had no plan for the day after . . . The idea that Iraq somehow fell in Irans after 2011 is simply wrong. Just listen to the very same critics who before 2011 were arguing that Iran has too much influence in Iraq. Banai adds: The major message of that piece is what? That since U.S. withdrawal, Iran has effectively taken over Iraqs national sovereignty. Iran was a player in Iraq from the beginning last decadethere is just nothing to empirically support that Iran has largely taken over because of U.S. withdrawal. The pair worry about the implications of such thinking.

Indeed, at one point in the piece, Arango uncritically quotes a former aide to the the Iraqi politician Ahmad Chalabi, who died in 2015--without mentioning that Chalabi had significant ties to neoconservatives and provided tranches of fabricated evidence to sell the 2003 war. Then there is Arangos portrayal of an Iraq dominated by Iran in the political and economic realm. Most concede the stentorian military influence Iran has in the country. But Parsi, Banai and others take issue with the characterization of all ties, particularly economic, as inherently insidious. The idea that a country like Iran would not have influence in its neighboring country, Iraq, is preposterous, Parsi says, adding that part of the problem of the article is it depicts American intentions in the best possible light, versus Iranians are selling detergent and food to Iraqis because of their desire to subjugate Iraqis. The New York Times does point out that Iraqs Shia rank-and-file also hold close their other identities as Iraqis and Arabs, putting limits on the Islamic Republics ability to strictly appeal to heaven.

One takeaway from Arangos piece could be a hard lesson: the United States should never go looking for trouble in the Middle East ever again. But one could read it the other way: Iran is ascendant because the United States got out too early (or at all), and is now well on its way to establishing a Shia crescent from Afghanistan to Morocco, in direct challenge to our allies; Tehran must be confronted and toppled. The consequences of following such dialectical thinking have, of course, been laid bare by recent history. But the New York Times, for one, does not appear to have wholly absorbed them.

See the original post:
Does the New York Times Want America In Iraq for One Hundred Years? - The National Interest Online

**Since March, MSF teams have treated over 450 severely malnourished children in its hospital in Qayyarah, 60 kilometres south of Mosul. Manuel Lannaud, head of mission in Iraq, explains the different causes and aspects of malnutrition.

Who in the region is affected by malnutrition?**

We began treating severely malnourished children in our hospital in Qayyarah in March. Most are under the age of one and 60 per cent arent even six months old. Some of the mothers arrive from Mosul itself but most live in camps.

Over the past couple of weeks weve seen an increase in the number of malnourished children needing treatment. With bed occupancy often equal to or over 200 per cent, we are about to open a 30-bed unit where we can provide care to children suffering from severe malnutrition. Starting in July, mothers and their babies who, up until now have been accommodated in a 12-bed tent, will be cared for in the new extension.

Whats causing malnutrition in the region around Mosul?

It isnt a problem of access to food. The malnutrition we see here is primarily due to the scarcity of infant formula. Obviously, adults and children in the besieged part of Mosul suffer from lack of food and, indeed, we see a lot of extremely underweight people arriving in the camps. But once theyre out of the city, the adults soon gain weight, but not the babies.

Many Iraqi mothers dont breastfeed and the ones who do usually stop after two to three months. Conditions in the camps combined with stress and exhaustion make breastfeeding even harder.

Theres a political barrier too. International organisations like UNICEF and the World Health Organization (WHO) promote breastfeeding not only in Iraq and provide infant formula, but only on prescription.

We believe distributing infant formula in a conflict situation like Iraq is the only way to avoid children having to be hospitalised for malnutrition. MSF provides infant formula to children when theyre discharged from the hospital and during their follow-up care. We also encourage mothers and tell them how important breastfeeding is, but if they need formula, we give it to them. We also have to ensure that water in the camps is up to standard and we inform mothers this is something they need to be aware of because it can pose a problem.

What can be done to treat malnutrition?

Children whove been hospitalised require close medical supervision. The number of readmissions to Qayyarah hospital is still relatively high. Mothers often want to leave the nutritional feeding centre to get back to looking after their other children, but treating malnutrition takes time, sometimes as much as two or three weeks. Some mothers go against medical advice and then its hard for them to come back to the hospital for lots of reasons, one of them transportation.

At the beginning of July, a preventive feeding programme that includes follow-up care and malnutrition screening for children will be opened in one of the camps. More humanitarian aid agencies must get involved in this type of screening thats so critical to the process of preventing and managing malnutrition.

More here:
Iraq: Babies most affected by malnutrition around Mosul - ReliefWeb

This article originally appeared on AlterNet

TheNew York Times Tim Arango took what could have been an interesting topic for war journalism Irans increased role in Iraq and morphed it into a cynical revisionist history of American and Saudi involvement in the Middle East. In doing so, Arango paints the U.S. as a noble, freedom-loving nation on a mission to improve the lives of average Iraqis, and Iran as a sinister imperial force working to expand its sphere of influence across the region.

Arango sets the table by citing examples of Iranian influence in Iraq, framing the disparate motives at work. He suggests that the U.S. invaded Iraq for pro-democratic purposes, while Irans response to this unilateral invasion (which its government, of course,vehemently opposed) is portrayed as sinister and plotting:

When the United States invaded Iraq 14 years ago to topple Saddam Hussein, it saw Iraq as a potential cornerstone of a democratic and Western-facing Middle East, and vast amounts of blood and treasure about 4,500 American lives lost, more than $1 trillion spent were poured into the cause.

From Day 1, Iran saw something else: a chance to make a client state of Iraq, a former enemy against which it fought a war in the 1980s so brutal, with chemical weapons and trench warfare, that historians look to World War I for analogies. If it succeeded, Iraq would never again pose a threat, and it could serve as a jumping-off point to spread Iranian influence around the region.

Theres so much unmitigated ideology at work in these two passages, we need to take a minute to break it down. Lets begin with the controversial assertion that the [U.S.] saw Iraq as a potential cornerstone of a democratic and Western-facing Middle East.

This was the public relations talking point the U.S. gave for invading Iraq, but was it true? Does Arango provide any evidence or link to an analysis that shows it to be true? For some reason, Arango thinks the same administration that repeatedly lied about Iraqi weapons of mass destruction and Saddams links to al Qaeda was on the up-and-up about the pro-democracy motives behind its devastating invasion.

If one wants to know what role democracy played in Bush administration officials decision, perhaps Arango could have asked Condoleezza Rice, Bushs national security advisor, secretary of state and key architect of the war. In an interview withABC in 2011, Rice was crystal clear that we didnt go to Iraq to bring democracy to the Iraqis. And I try in the book to really explain that that wasnt the purpose.

So, did the U.S. see Iraq as a potential cornerstone of a democratic and Western-facing Middle East? Or did it really not care either way?

As Inoted in FAIR last month, nominally down-the-middle reporters are allowed to mind-read U.S. policy makers motives so long as they conclude that those motives were noble and in good faith. Never are reporters allowed to ascribe sinister motives to U.S. officialsthis is only permissible when covering Americas enemies which Arango does in the next paragraph, insisting that from Day 1, Iran saw something else: a chance to make a client state of Iraq.

Note that the U.S. did not seek to make Iraq a client state, but rather a democracy. Big bad Iran however (which not only had nothing to do with the invasion but openly opposed it), was plotting all along to exploit the U.S. invasion to establish a puppet regime. Its a masterful work of 180-degree reality inversion.

The second thing wrong with the opening frame is that Arango mentions the 4,500 American lives lost and the $1 trillion spent but makes no mention of the 500,000 to 1 million Iraqis killed. He mentions the use of chemical weapons but doesnt say who used them it was Iraq, not Iran. He also omits the country that supplied them to Saddam: the United States.

Throughout the piece, Arango couches subjective opinions on Irans sinister motives as something analysts say or believe. Yet the only analyst he actually interviews, Ali Vaez, works at theU.S-government-fundedInternational Crisis Group and provides a vague quote about the Iran-Iraq war shaping Irans leadership.

Everything Iran does is painted as proactive, sinister aggression and everything the U.S. and Sunni monarchies do is done in reaction to this aggression. Take this dubious passage: [Iran]s dominance over Iraq has heightened sectarian tensions around the region, with Sunni states, and American allies, like Saudi Arabia mobilizing to oppose Iranian expansionism.

So here we have Sunni states, and American allies, like Saudi Arabia mobilizing to oppose Iranian expansionism. There is no Sunni expansionism or American expansionism or Saudi expansionismexpansionism (whatever that means) is the purview of Iranian aggressors. Saudi Arabia floodingSalafist fightersinto post-invasion Iraq is never mentioned.SaudiandQataribacking of Salafist militias in Syria since at the very least 2011 is never mentioned. The U.S. invasion is not framed as expansionism. Iran always draws first blood, while Gulf monarchies, painted as the besieged victims of the Shia empire, are always reacting, mobilizing to oppose Iran expansionism.

TheTimesflubbed analysis has to be seen within the wider context of American designs in the region. Arangos article serves primarily to advance the Shia crescent concept pushed by Gulf monarchies, neocons, Israel, and liberal foreign policy hawks. This narrative conjures a specter of Iranian influence from Tehran to Beirut, with total regional domination on the horizon. Stopping this sinister plot is the primary pretext for increased military involvement of the U.S. in eastern Syria, where American special forces have set up a de facto base and attacked Syrian and Iranian military assets. Its also Israels justification for its stepped-up military activity in Syria, where it has beenbackinganti-Hezbollah, anti-government rebels in Southern Syria. TheTimesarticle, whether by accident or intent, props up the entire moral and political framework for increased U.S. militarism in Syria and Iraq as territorial ISIS faces its final months.

The problem with Arangos analysis is not that Irans increased role in Iraq isnt a story; it certainly is. Its the revisionist notion that Iran had hatched a devious plot from day one of the U.S. invasion rather than react to shifting forces on the ground from an instinct to survive especially after watching its two neighbors get invaded by the U.S. and its arch regional enemy, Saudi Arabia, fund and arm Salafist mercenaries throughout the Middle East. Throw in the absurd, debunked notion the U.S. was motivated by a desire to spread democracy and what you have is a deeply cynical piece of pro-Pentagon myth-making, instead of an informative look at Irans increased regional influence.

More:
NYT rewrites history of Iraq War, painting US as democracy-lover, Iran as sinister imperialist - Salon