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The shutdown of schools last February due to Covid-19 affected over 10 million children aged 6 to 17 across Iraq. Globally, the pandemic has created the largest educational disruption in history according to the UN. But in Iraq, school closures have become the latest impediment to the right to education for millions of children who have, in the recent past, already lost years of schooling.

As classes are set to resume partly for some children and exclusively for others through distance learning programs, many pupils and their families will have to cope with the practical burden and psychological toll of home-schooling in what is often a precarious environment. All while struggling to connect to the online platforms that are designed to enable their remote education.

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The Great Disconnect: How remote learning in Iraq is leaving the most vulnerable further behind [EN/AR] - Iraq - ReliefWeb

Along with large areas of northern and central Iraq, in 2014 the Islamic State (IS) group took control of areas in Al-Muqdadiya, Jalawlaa and Saadiya districts in Diyala governorate. Although the IS group controlled these areas of Diyala for a relatively short period (June to November 2014), there were significant consequences for the people and infrastructure.

As the conflict between the Iraqi Security Forces and the IS group erupted, people living in the conflict zone had no choice but to flee to safety with whatever they could carry by hand or fit in their cars.

As a result of the conflict, families lost loved ones, their homes, while others lost their primary source of income farms, orchards and cattle. According to the International Organization for Migration, by December 2014, more than 170,000 families were displaced from their homes in Diyala. Some resettled in safer areas of the same region, while others fled further.

From late 2014 until August 2020, Mdecins Sans Frontires (MSF) provided much-needed healthcare services across Diyala governorate. The services included supporting the health infrastructure in districts like Kalar, Jalawlaa and Saadiya with the rehabilitation of destroyed health structures, running of mobile clinics to respond to the acute needs of displaced people and those returning, as well as donations of essential supplies to existing health facilities.

MSF also provided necessary healthcare services to displaced people living in camps and among host communities in the governorate. However, MSF continues providing healthcare services in our regular projects in Ninewa, Kirkuk and Baghdad. Additionally, we support health structures in other locations on Iraq when there is a need.

In August 2020, after consultation with the Diyala directorate of health, MSF handed over the clinics at Alwand 1 camp and Sinsil primary healthcare centre our last projects in Diyala to the directorate of health and other local and international organisations, who will continue providing healthcare services to the remaining displaced people in the camp and returnees in other areas.

MSF will now focus our resources on other sites in Iraq, where urgent medical care is needed.

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MSF hands over last projects in Diyala, Iraq, after six years [EN/AR] - Iraq - ReliefWeb

The Iraqi parliament on Saturday said a settlement agreement between the Iraqi government and Iraq's Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) on the status of the Sinjar district of the northern Ninewa Governorate will accelerate the return of displaced people.

On Friday, the Iraqi Prime Ministry announced it reached a "historic deal" with the KRG, an agreement that will bolster the Iraqi federal authority in Sinjar under the constitution in terms of governance and security.

"The agreement will directly contribute to accelerate the return of the displaced families to their homes and ensure their stability in their areas," said Deputy Speaker of the Iraqi parliament Bashir al-Haddad.

Al-Haddad stressed the importance of joint management between Baghdad and Erbil in dealing with the security of Sinjar along with the coordination of public services and the reconstruction of infrastructure.

According to the agreement obtained by Anadolu Agency (AA), the PKK presence will be removed from Sinjar and surrounding regions and will no longer play a role in the area.

Hashd al-Shaabi (Popular Mobilization) forces in Sinjar will also be taken out of the district, the agreement said.

The Iraqi prime minister's spokesperson Ahmed Mulla Talal said on Friday in a Twitter statement that the agreement will end the authority of intruding groups in Sinjar, referring to the PKK terrorist group.

The U.S. government also expressed its approval of the Sinjar deal. State Department spokesperson Morgan Ortagus said in a written statement on Saturday that the U.S. is pleased about the joint steps taken by the Iraqi government and the KRG for resolving the political and security issues in Sinjar.

She also expressed Washingtons hope that the deal will accelerate the conditions for the revitalization of Sinjar and will enable the safe and voluntary return of those who were displaced by the Daesh terrorist group.

The PKK terrorist group managed to establish a foothold in Sinjar in mid-2014 under the pretext of protecting the local Yazidi community from the Daesh terror group. Since then, the PKK has reportedly established a new base in Sinjar for its logistical and command-and-control activities. Around 450,000 Yazidis escaped Sinjar after the Daesh group took control of the region in mid-2014.

The Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) regularly conducts cross-border operations in northern Iraq, a region where PKK terrorists have hideouts and bases from which to carry out attacks on Turkey. Iraq's KRG previously called the PKK's presence in Sinjar unacceptable and urged the militants to leave the area.

Turkey has long stressed that it will not tolerate terror threats posed against its national security and has called on Iraqi officials to take the necessary steps to eliminate the terrorist group. Ankara previously noted that if the expected steps are not taken, it would not shy away from targeting terror threats, particularly in Sinjar.

In its more than 40-year terror campaign against Turkey, the PKK, listed as a terrorist organization by Turkey, the United States and the European Union, has been responsible for the deaths of nearly 40,000 people, including women and children.

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Sinjar deal will help return of displaced civilians, Iraq's parliament says | Daily Sabah - Daily Sabah

Iraq's feted archaeological sites,in the heart of ancient Mesopotamia, are sadlyall too familiar with looters, having been irresistible targets for theftover the centuries.

But this year, with resources to protect these sites diverted by authorities having to deal with a struggling economy, social unrest and the coronavirus pandemic, looting has picked up once more.

Buried under Iraq's soil are layers of remnants of civilisations that haveremained mostly undiscovered.

According to a 2005-10 field survey conducted by the Antiquities Inspector's office, there are more than 1,200 known archaeological sites in the country's southeast Dhi Qar governorate alone. These include the nearly 6,000-year-old city of Ur, the Biblical birthplace of Abraham,only fivepercent of which has beenexcavated since its discovery in 1855.

'The Rose of Baghdad': Lamia al-Gailani-Werr, defender of Iraq's heritage

Apart from this legendary site, which is completely fenced off, other archaeological sites are not adequately protected as Iraq still lacks the necessary infrastructure and manpower to safeguard its rich history.

These sites have been raided "virtually ever since they existed," archaeologist Ali al-Rubaie told Middle East Eye.

"But in the last decades, which started with the sanctions against Saddam Hussein's Baath regime [1990-2003], there has been a sharp rise in looting activities. Despite the existence of severe punishments, the activity never stopped."

At the time, the weakening of state institutions and the worsening of living conditions due to unprecedented economic sanctions imposed by the United Nations Security Council encouraged people to engage in looting. Local residents saw antiquities as an easy way to make a living while the country's economy was in tatters.

While most archaeological missions were completed before the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, some of the locally recruited excavators ended up jobless and came back to plunder sites.

Rubaie said such instances took place in Dhi Qar's Tell Jokha, also known as Umm al-Aqarib, where the Sumerian kingdom of Umma was located.

"After the Baath regime's fall and the subsequent security vacuum, some of the workers [from a withdrawn archaeological mission] came back and illegally excavated the hill," he said.

Tell Jokha is emblematic of the devastating effect of the US invasion, which led to widespread looting activity.

After the US dismantled Iraq's law enforcement units, this ancient Sumerian city was intensively robbed for months, to the point where holes pockmarked the surfaces of the site and innumerable artefacts were pillaged before any archaeological unit could resume its activities.

"After 2003, I saw entire groups of looters come to raid the archaeological remains," said Abu Ahmed, a 60-year-old resident of the nearby village of al-Marrashda.

'There has been a resurgence in vandalism since last year, especially after the governorate witnessed violent protests that were followed by the outbreak of the coronavirus pandemic'

-Taher Quinn, director of the Dhi Qar's Antiquities Inspectorate

In the wake of such a disaster, powerful religious authorities stepped in to try to curb the looting by issuing a fatwa.

A decree by Iraq's top Shia leader, Ayatollah Ali al Sistani, prompted many raiders to return their findings, but many gangs remained active.

Still, this archaeological complex, which contains more than seven separate sites, has very few guards to prevent looters from trespassing.

In the absence of adequate protection, local residents took it upon themselves to defend their local heritage as best they could.

Abu Ahmed and his neighbours resorted to threatening looters coming from other parts of Iraq.

"Raids usually happen late at night. In terms of the sites that are close to our houses, no one dared to reach them because they are within shooting range," he said.

But Tell Jokha's nearby residents are not the only ones carrying weapons. Looters also come prepared against those who might try to interfere in their activities.

"In the past few years, we have seen cars loaded with people entering [Tell Jokha]. We know that they are armed and dangerous thieves, so we are unable to repel them," Abu Ahmed said.

Dhi Qar's archaeological sites are spread over large areas and are difficult to protect, especially with the current level of police manpower, Taher Quinn, director of the Dhi Qar's Antiquities Inspectorate, told MEE.

"In order to solve the issue, the Department of Antiquities held a special meeting with the provincial police commanders last September, during which we agreed that the antiquities police should increase surveillance of archaeological sites."

Ever since the fall of Saddam's regime, there have been efforts to redevelop a special antiquities protection unit. The force has conducted training in protection and apprehension, and the efforts to muster an effective unit continue.

"During my time in office [December 2018 - June 2020], we supervised the training of a special force in order to protect archaeological sites, with over 250 qualified and well-equipped personnel," said Dhi Qar native Abdul-Amir al-Hamdani, an archaeologist and former minister of culture and tourism.

Last month, the province's special antiquities police stopped two antiquity smuggling networks and chased down two armed groups in Tell Jokha. In the operation, the antiquities police managed to recover 438 artefacts.

Nonetheless, Tell Jokha remains one of Iraq's most vandalised archaeological sites due to its large and isolated area.

According to Quinn, "there has been a resurgence in vandalism since last year, especially after the governorate witnessed violent protests that were followed by the outbreak of the coronaviruspandemic".

Large-scale, popular anti-government protests broke out a year ago across Iraq's central and southern cities. The movement was violently repressed, with security forces killing at least 560 protesters.

Director of public relations and information at Dhi Qar Police Command, Brigadier General Fuad Karim, said that many police forces working in rural areas of Nasiriyah withdrew to their barracks out of fear of retaliation from powerful tribes seeking to avenge the killing of protesters.

This created a new power vacuum in the province, further preventing sufficient protection of historical sites.

But while many police forces eventually returned to duty in most of southern Iraq, the outbreak of the coronavirus pandemic earlier this year and the consequent repercussions on an already fragile economy played an additional role in the increase of looting.

"Unquestionably, the pandemic and the economic situation, which was worsened by the pandemic, caused a surge in looting activity in Iraq," said Salah Hatem, archaeologist and assistant professor at al-Qadisiyah University in Diwaniyah, in the governorate adjoining Dhi Qar to the northwest.

"Impoverished Iraqis resort to looting in search for gold or statues and destroy structures, architecture and clay tablets that have lesser values in the eyes of traffickers."

At the root of the threat facing Iraq's heritage is that protecting antiquities was never seen as a top priority by Iraqi decision-makers nor by US forces after they invaded the country.

Hamdani noted that, since its inception, a part of the special force trained to guard heritage sites was diverted from its mission to protect other establishments.

"Right after the downfall of the Baath regime, while insecurity was growing steadily, many sites were neglected, as priority was given to what were considered as more vital institutions, such as schools, hospitals, or banks, while archaeological sites remained unprotected," Hamdani said. "This remains a major problem till this day."

The former culture minister stressed the need to invest more in archaeological protection units, to increase the number of patrols around antiquity sites and to cut off smuggler routes.

Antiquities are usually smuggled to Jordan or Turkey before being sold on black markets around the region. They often end up in private collections.

Iraqi authorities regularly retrieve artefacts stolen mostly during the US occupation after international investigations locate them around the globe.

Meanwhile,Karimstressed that police forces are aware of the gravity of the situation and that local authorities are planning to increase patrols in Dhi Qar.

Nevertheless, experts remain dubious that authorities will manage to make an effective change.

"In general, the state acts irresponsibly towards the protection of archaeological sites simply because it suffers from a lack of funding, and staff professionalism", archaeologist Hatem claimed.

Local forces allocated to preserve Iraq's heritage will therefore need to improve their effectiveness and also tackle separate issues such as trespassing by farmers and cattle herders. Farmers have been reported installing water pipes in archaeological sites while digging in and around them to increase their farming surfaces.

"Farmers often bulldoze archaeological sites and then cultivate the land," Hatem said.

Cattle also regularly pass through archaeological remains in search of grazing areas, often damaging the fragile and ancient structures at the surface.

While the Iraqi invasion in 2003 caused irreparable damage to the Iraqi people and their heritage, the ongoing instability is increasing the toll and allowing the perpetuation of illegal looting.

As the country remains stricken by conflict and poverty, the Covid-19 pandemic continues to serve as another factor diverting the countrys efforts to restore and protect its unique cultural heritage.

By the end of September, the country was reporting close to 4,000 new cases every day and around 500 deaths per week. On 23 September, 5,055 new cases were reported across the country, the highest daily rate since the start of the pandemic.

Meanwhile, low oil prices are limiting the prospects for economic recovery as the pandemic continues. In July, the economy was forecast to contract by as much as nine percent this year.

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Coronavirus: Iraq's heritage sites suffer renewed wave of looting amid pandemic - Middle East Eye

The Americans begged us to only stop firing Ashtar rockets at their bases. Jaafar al-Husseini, the military spokesman for the Iraqi Shia militia Kataib Hizballah, was talking about attacking U.S. forces in Iraq before they left the country in 2011. While uttering these remarks in a February 2018 TV interview, he looked directly to the camera, as if to seem more assertive. Since then he has threatened U.S. forces on numerous occasions. The number of attacks on U.S. troops in Iraq has since increased, though with much less lethal weapons than the Ashtar rockets. The attacks, however, have been assessed by the United States to be dangerous enough that Secretary of State Mike Pompeo threatened to shutter the American Embassy in Baghdad if the Iraqi government fails to stop them.

Kataib Hizballah has arguably become the most dangerous Iranian proxy in Iraq. It has engaged in myriad activities to protect and expand Irans influence in Iraq and the wider region. It has helped suppress an anti-Iran nationalist Iraqi protest movement. It has used Iraqi territory to conduct attacks on a neighboring country and has openly intimidated and threatened the Iraqi prime minister, the commander in chief. The groups influence has expanded enormously in recent years, and the militia has become the most reliable proxy for Iran to further its ambitions in Iraq. In Lebanon, Hizballah plays this role. In Yemen, it is the Houthi Ansar Allah that helps Iran expand its influence. In Iraq, Kataib Hizballah is emerging as the main group that implements Irans plans.

In an Aug. 26 interview, Iraqi Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi emphasized once again the need to bring arms under the authority of the state. Talking about the near-daily rocket attacks on the international zone in Baghdad, he told Emirati outlet the National, We continue to arrest those behind these attacks, and their aim is clear, that is to embarrass the government.

Kataib Hizballah is suspected to be behind most of these rocket attacks. There are several Iran-backed militias that have a habit of disobeying the orders of the prime minister, but Kataib Hizballah has been the most brazen, eroding the Iraqi states authority. On the same day that Kadhimis interview was published, Abu Ali al-Askari, head of Kataib Hizballahs security division, posted a message on his Telegram channel threatening the United States, Israel, and Saudi Arabia: Kataib Hizballah and its allies will fight all of you, everywhere. Despite nominally falling under the office of the commander in chief as part of the Popular Mobilization Forces, the group fiercely criticizes the prime minister and his policies.

The Popular Mobilization Forces (al-Hashd al-Shabi in Arabic) is an umbrella paramilitary organization that consists of dozens of militias, many of which are affiliated with Iran. The Popular Mobilization Commission Law of 2016 defines the Popular Mobilization Forces as an independent military formation and part of the Iraqi armed forces, subordinate to the commander in chief of the armed forces. In reality, the Popular Mobilization Forces commission has been dominated by pro-Iran figures who have disobeyed orders from the commander in chief on numerous occasions, particularly when they deem the orders to be against Irans interests in Iraq. Both the commission and also several pro-Iran units inside the Popular Mobilization Forces, such as Kataib Hizballah, have a tendency to follow the Islamic Republics policies, rather than those of the Iraqi government. Just a few days after Kadhimis July 1922 visit to the United States, Kataib Hizballahs political office issued a statement fiercely criticizing his trip and threatening him for trying to expand political and economic ties with the United States and Saudi Arabia: anyone who colludes with the occupiers and conspirators will be held accountable.

The Secretive Legion

In 2007, at the height of the Islamic Republics campaign against U.S. forces in Iraq, Qassem Soleimani, the late commander of the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Quds Force, came to the conclusion that a more agile militia was needed in order to inflict maximum damage on U.S. troops. Soleimani judged two of the main Iran-affiliated militias the Badr Organization and Jaysh al-Mahdi, along with their splinter groups to be unwieldy. The Quds Force decided that it needed a new elite group that was better trained and equipped, and under its control, to escalate against the U.S. military. Soleimani, with the help of a few Iraqi and Lebanese militia leaders (including Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, the top commander of the Popular Mobilization Forces who was assassinated alongside Soleimani by a U.S. strike in January), brought together five smaller militias to form Kataib Hizballah. Abu al-Fadl al-Abbas Brigade, Kataib Karbala, Kataib Zaid ibn Ali, Kataib Ali al-Akbar, and Kataib al-Sajjad joined under one banner and received sophisticated Iranian weapons and extensive training from Lebanese Hizballah.

Since its inception, Kataib Hizballah has maintained close ties with Lebanese Hizballah. Decades ago, Muhandis established his relationship with the Lebanese Hizballah and worked with its operatives to carry out, in his words, jihadi activities. This relationship came to Muhandis help years later. Imad Mughniyeh, Lebanese Hizballahs chief of staff, was an instrumental figure in establishing Kataib Hizballah in its early stages. Mughniyeh was on a list of foreigners whom Israel wanted to kill or apprehend. After he was assassinated in a car bomb attack in February 2008 in Damascus, Kataib Hizballah claimed that it had attacked five U.S. bases in Iraq with rockets as revenge.

Since then, Kataib Hizballah has grown from a small, elite group of a few hundred fighters to one of the most capable Iraqi militias. Estimates suggest that the militant group currently has a total of 10,000 fighters, mainly in Iraq but also in Syria. Kataib Hizballahs activities are not limited to military and security operations. The militant group also runs media outlets, staffs cultural centers, has established research centers to promote political Shia Islam, and more. Kataib Hizballah is now a very influential member of the Popular Mobilization Forces. Exploiting Muhandis position as the deputy chief and chief of staff of the Popular Mobilization Forces, the group received special treatment from the organization. After the death of Muhandis, the group insisted that his position be filled by another Kataib Hizballah commander. Despite opposition from various groups inside the Popular Mobilization Forces, in February Kataib Hizballah imposed one of its top commanders, Abu Fadak al-Mohammadawi, as the acting chief of staff for the Popular Mobilization Forces.

Kataib Hizballah also controls important directorates inside the Popular Mobilization Forces. The group runs the security directorate, which is developing rapidly into a powerful internal affairs force with intelligence and special forces capabilities. The directorate supports the power consolidation of Kataib Hizballah. The group also controls the missiles directorate. This is particularly important, as Iran has sent ballistic missiles to Kataib Hizballah and is working on transferring missile technology to the group, a privilege not granted to other pro-Iran militias. This shows the Quds Force places Kataib Hizballah among the most trusted militias. To further its plans with no scrutiny from the government, Kataib Hizballah has also transformed a strategic district south of Baghdad called Jurf al-Sakhar into a no-go zone. Until 2014, the area was populated by Sunni Arab citizens. After the area was liberated from ISIL, Kataib Hizballah prevented the residents from going back. Popular Mobilization Forces sources told me that the group has been granted a lease by the government to vast swathes of agricultural lands, effectively turning the area into a private zone. Iraqi sources have confirmed this piece of information to other researchers. No other Iraqi force is allowed to enter the zone. Jurf al-Sakhar is now a sanctuary for Kataib Hizballahs activities, including developing missiles. No other Iran-backed militia has gone this far in violating the states sovereignty.

Kataib Hizballah has adopted a unique hierarchy to ensure maximum secrecy around its activities. Ex-members of Kataib Hizballah told me that the militant group divides its fighters into two major categories. Members of the first category are called Ajsam, or the bodies. These are fighters who have been tried and tested, and have gained the trust of their leaders. Members of the second category, which consists of the majority of fighters, are called Arqam, or the numbers. The numbers have little information about Kataib Hizballahs activities and chain of command, to the point that sometimes they dont even know the real names of their direct commanders, calling them instead by their aliases.

The Bodies and the Numbers

Kataib Hizballah has also created a special system of mentorship for its members. The bodies have their own mentors, called Moalim, or teacher. The mentors are not simply military commanders. Through their jihadi activities, they are assumed to have acquired a unique wisdom that they in turn bestow upon their mentees. When Kataib Hizballah fighters quote a sentence from their mentors, they usually finish it with my Moalim is a man who never lies. Hussein Abu Khomeini, a Kataib Hizballah fighter, tweeted June 17: didnt I tell you that my Moalim possesses the talisman of the mankind and the jinn. Jinn are shape-shifting spirits made of fire and air with origins in pre-Islamic Arabia. (Abu Khomeinis Twitter account was later suspended.)

The other pseudonymous position in the hierarchy of Kataib Hizballah is al-Khaal, or maternal uncle. Some Popular Mobilization Forces sources told me that this pseudonym is designated to a few high-ranking commanders. Others have said that the only person who enjoys this name is Abu Fadak. Searching social media pages affiliated with Kataib Hizballah proves that Abu Fadak is indeed called al-Khaal. Muhandis himself is al-Shayeb, or the senior.

This mentorship system, and its associated aliases, has significant cultural connotations for Iraqi youth. Combined with military hierarchy, it generates a strong sense of belonging and deep loyalty among the members. It also constructs a mystic environment that elevates the leaders to semi-superhuman status, rendering commanders such as Muhandis mythical. Kataib Hizballah has been able to exploit this system in a way that signifies power and control, too. When in late December 2019 Kataib Hizballah members protested in front of the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad, one photo in particular among those circulating on social media caught the eyes of Iraqis: a photo of graffiti on the embassy wall reading al-Khaal passed through here. This use of language signifies that for a top Kataib Hizballah commander to exert significant influence, he needs only to pass by a place. The protest in front of the embassy, in which protesters threw stones and tried to break in and set fire to parts of the wall, was an unprecedented incident. Kataib Hizballah presented this event as a humiliation to the United States. The graffiti emphasized al-Khaals passing through, rather than taking part in or leading the protest, signifying his enormous power: For a high-ranking Kataib Hizballah commander to humiliate the Americans, he needs merely to pass through a place where they are present. This combination of hierarchy, secrecy, mysticism, and power is a perfect blend for recruiting young soldiers and building an obedient force ready to undertake any mission.

Attracting young people to its cause is Kataib Hizballahs priority. Not only have they established the Imam Hussein Scouts Association to undertake various sociopolitical activities and to recruit future loyal and trustworthy bodies, but they enlist young people to spy on U.S. forces. Sabreen News, a news channel on the Telegram platform affiliated with Kataib Hizballah, asked Iraqis to join Kataib Hizballahs shadow cell. The message, which was posted on Aug. 21 and since then has been removed, said: Be a resistance [fighter] from where you are and join the shadow cell to send images, videos, or information of every move of the American enemy. Pro-Iran groups are part of the Iran-led axis of resistance, which resists Americas policies in the Middle East, as well as Israel and their allies in the region. Until its deletion in early September, Sabreen News message was seen 14,400 times. It was clearly aimed mainly at young Iraqi men. This is a call to join the ranks of the group from their towns, and it is a recruitment channel for future fighters.

The Ideological Battle: In Search of a Faqih

Kataib Hizballah works hard to shape the public opinion in its favor. To achieve this goal, it has established a variety of news outlets. It has satellite TV channels, radios, newspapers, news agencies, and social media channels and accounts. Additionally, Kataib Hizballahs media center produces sleek propaganda videos to project an image of power and invincibility. The militant group has also established several cultural centers, mainly in Baghdad, but also in Shia-majority cities in the south, for women, university students, academics, and families of Kataib Hizballahs fighters who lost their lives in battle.

Propagating the idea of Wilayat al-Faqih, or guardianship of the Islamic jurist, is one of the main areas that institutions linked to Kataib Hizballah are focusing on. This ideology is the foundation for Irans Shia theocracy. Wilayat al-Faqih gives political leadership to the faqih, or jurist in Islamic law, paving the way for a Shia theocracy. Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini popularized this ideology and put it into practice after the Iranian revolution of 1979, becoming the first Wali al-Faqih in post-revolutionary Iran. According to Wilayat al-Faqih, only a Shia jurist with specific characteristics is eligible to lead the political system. According to Irans Constitution, a council of senior clerics called the Council of Experts chooses a qualified Shia jurist as the supreme leader, who enjoys absolute and exclusive authority over the states affairs.

The problem for Kataib Hizballah and the like is that key Iraqi Shia clerics in Najaf, where one of the most influential Shia seminaries is located, do not believe in this doctrine. Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, the highest Shia authority in Iraq, has clearly expressed his opposition to a political system ruled by the clergy. For Sistani, the major role of the clergy is to provide religious guidance for their followers personal lives. Beyond that, it is the task of the state to regulate its citizens lives. Sistani and other major Najaf clerics believe that they can only comment occasionally on political matters and that it is for their followers to act on their recommendations or not. This doctrine is rooted in conservative Shia theology that has been developing for hundreds of years in Najaf.

Kataib Hizballah and similar Iran-backed groups have recognized this as a major problem for advancing Irans plans in Iraq and beyond. Therefore, their institutions are working on disseminating the Wilayat al-Faqih ideology. One of Kataib Hizballahs affiliated institutes working toward spreading this ideology is the al-Hadaf Research Center. Among its various activities, the research center holds workshops for cadres who work with or for various organizations affiliated with Kataib Hizballah. As members of the axis of resistance believe in the global nature of their movement, the workshops promise to help the attendees reach their important place in the global movement. An important segment of the workshop is dedicated to Wilayat al-Faqih.

One of the major differences between the Wilayat al-Faqih ideology and the Najaf school is that the former has global ambitions. While after the outbreak of the Syrian civil war in 2011 the pro-Iran Iraqi militias, including Kataib Hizballah, rushed to defend the Assad regime under the command of the Quds Force, Sistani opposed sending fighters to Syria to fight alongside the Assad regime. In order to sustain its future in Iraq and to expand its influence in the region, Kataib Hizballah and similar groups need to propagate Wilayat al-Faqih to secure religious legitimacy for their ambitions. Sources affiliated with the Popular Mobilization Forces told me that Kataib Hizballah has established religious schools where Wilayat al-Faqih-oriented religious lessons are taught together with other regular lessons. The Shia Najaf seminary is a conservative institution, and not compatible with Islamist ideals. Wilayat al-Faqih, on the other hand, is a revolutionary ideology that has established a transnational Islamist movement with followers in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon, among other countries. It is key for Kataib Hizballah and the like to try to replace the Najaf ideology with Wilayat al-Faqih in Iraq.

Anticipating the Twelfth Imams Return

Not only is Kataib Hizballahs ideology global, but it is also apocalyptic: both in the sense that it assumes a role for itself in paving the way for the apocalyptic reign of the mahdi, and in the sense that it sees the world through the lens of this coming apocalypse. The main branch of Shia Islam is called the Twelver. The reason behind this appellation is that followers of this branch of Shiism, which is prevalent in Iraq and Iran, believe that only 12 of the Islamic prophet Mohammeds descendants are his true successors. They call them the infallible imams. The Twelvers believe that the first imam was assassinated by a rebel group. The next 10 of these imams were killed by the rulers of the time, and when plots were made to kill the 12th imam, known as the mahdi, by Gods will he went to occultation (i.e., hidden existence). The Twelvers believe that the mahdi will emerge during the apocalypse to create a just world. Many Iran-backed militias, including Kataib Hizballah, have integrated this ideology into their doctrine. In the About Kataib Hizballah section of its website the group introduces itself as an Islamic jihadi resistance group which tries to establish the rule of Islam which will be concluded by the establishment of the divine just government under the leadership of mahdi. It continues to say that establishing mahdis government needs hard work to pave the way for it and that Kataib Hizballah believes that Wilayat al-Faqih is the best way to prepare for the just world to come.

According to some Shia texts, holy lands in the Levant, including Palestine, and Arabia will witness the rise of evil characters, which will result in the emergence of the 12th imam. Pro-Iran groups that see the current rulers of Israel and Saudi Arabia as evil interpret these apocalyptic beliefs as proof that the Islamic Republic, which considers itself the prelude to the mahdis global government, will eventually defeat Israel and Saudi Arabia. For Kataib Hizballah, Iran plays the main role in the mahdis arrival. Jassim al-Jazairi, an influential Kataib Hizballah cleric, uses various religious sources to prove that the Iranians are leading the way to the mahdis government. That is why for Kataib Hizballah, Iraqis have to be followers of Iran. That also explains why the Academic Elites Institute a Kataib Hizballah-affiliated institution recruiting students and academics for the groups cause is so diligent in teaching Farsi to its members.

The apocalyptic ideology allows Kataib Hizballah to justify violating the Iraqi states authority as a legitimate act. If the purpose of the group is to help prepare for the establishment of the apocalyptic, just world, who is the Iraqi government to demand Kataib Hizballahs disarmament? When in June the government, various political factions, political activists, and security analysts talked about the importance of bringing arms under the states control, Kataib Hizballahs general secretary (suspected to be Abu Fadak) said, The resistances arms will not be handed over to anyone but Mahdi. Kataib Hizballahs apocalyptic beliefs also label Saudi Arabia, Israel, and by extension the United States as the eternal enemies of the Shia.

Control the Narrative, Control the World

Kataib Hizballah has big ambitions. Its leaders have created an increasingly secretive organization that is founded on a compelling ideology, enjoys a strict hierarchy, and is equipped with quality arms and training for a paramilitary group. It is gradually taking control of the narrative of the resistance in Iraq. Kataib Hizballah is trying to place itself above other Iran-backed groups. It feels at liberty to criticize them for not being genuine or brave enough in their resistance mission. In April, when the majority of Iraqi parliamentary blocs, including those representing major resistance militias, agreed to nominate Kadhimi for premiership, Kataib Hizballah accused them of betraying the history of Iraq. For pro-Iran Shia groups, the main characteristics of Iraqi history are fighting and resisting oppressors, which includes the Iraqi revolt of 1920 against the British Empire. The United States is for them the epitome of oppression. Selecting a prime minister like Kadhimi, perceived by them to be pro-America, is thus a betrayal of the history of Iraq. Kataib Hizballah is progressively setting the bar higher for genuine resistance groups, and any militia not meeting Kataib Hizballahs standards can be attacked and labeled as a traitor. This can make any future compromise by these groups more costly for them. Also, by taking a more radical approach and adhering to higher standards, Kataib Hizballah is introducing itself as the role model for resistance groups.

In addition to its presence in Syria, Kataib Hizballah has shown willingness to undertake a greater role in Irans regional adventures. The group is suspected to be behind the May 14, 2019, attack on Saudi Aramco oil infrastructures, and its leaders openly advocate terrorist attacks inside the kingdom. Abu Ali al-Askari wrote in a May 27 Telegram message: You wont be safe from House of Salouls treachery and hypocrisy unless Jihadi operations are transferred to Saudi Arabia. What the Mujahedeen did in the Gulf by attacking Aramco several times is a testament to their ability to transfer the battle inside [the Kingdom]. House of Saloul is a derogatory term used to describe the House of Saud by enemies of the Saudi rulers, including the self-proclaimed Islamic State. Most pro-Iran groups in Iraq avoid adopting such a strategy. Take the Badr Organization, for example. It is hard for a group with a heavy presence in the political process to risk its interests by advocating attacks on foreign countries. Instead a group such as Kataib Hizballah has the capacity to act as an outlawed radical militia, a status that can be exploited by Iran when under pressure.

Kataib Hizballah has shown its utter disregard for the Iraqi governments authority and a tendency to go to extremes to intimidate Iraqi politicians. When in late June the Iraqi counter-terrorism service arrested 14 Kataib Hizballah members on suspicion of planning to fire rockets into the international zone, the group mobilized around 150 fighters and drove to the prime ministers residence, forcing him to release the detainees. No other Iran-backed militias have the power to influence the prime ministers decisions to this extent. This is not to say that in the future the Iraqi prime minister will not take any actions Kataib Hizballah opposes, but rather to emphasize that the militant force is increasingly confident in impacting the political class, whether through putting pressure on other militias who are part of the political process or directly through threatening high-ranking officials. By acting in this manner, Kataib Hizballah offers Iran incredible leverage over the political class, a gift no other pro-Iran group in Iraq can offer.

How to Reduce the Groups Influence

It seems that the reason the Iraqi prime minister has not yet taken decisive actions against Kataib Hizballah is fear of further destabilizing the country. But at this pace and with the trajectory that Kataib Hizballah is following, the country will be headed toward chaos anyway. Many Iraqi Shia politicians believe that if the government fails to bring paramilitary groups under the control of the Iraqi state, the country will witness yet another civil war, this time among Shias themselves. In order to avoid this grim scenario, the government needs to start to reduce Kataib Hizballahs influence in the Popular Mobilization Forces. Pro-Sistani units within the organization have clearly expressed their discontent with Irans dominance inside the Popular Mobilization Forces, and that dominance is facilitated mainly by Kataib Hizballah. They have announced their defection from the Popular Mobilization Forces and their readiness to facilitate more defections. This is what pro-Iran militias dread the most. Qais al-Khazali, head of Asaib Ahl al-Haq, another radical pro-Iran militia, stated in an interview in June that the defection, if completed, will end the Popular Mobilization Forces. The prime minister needs to leverage the threat of increasing defections to diversify the Popular Mobilization Forces chain of command by appointing more patriotic commanders.

Kadhimi should also limit Kataib Hizballahs economic activities. The militant group is increasing and diversifying its sources of revenue by penetrating various economic sectors, such as construction, agriculture, and oil, and by engaging in illegal cross-border trade with Syria, extortion, and exploiting the notorious central bank currency auction. Kadhimi has taken some steps to limit corruption at the border points to deny groups such as Kataib Hizballah their illegal revenues. But the move has not achieved much yet.

Denying Kataib Hizballah its sanctuary zones is also key to reducing the groups grip over the country. Kataib Hizballah is keen to deny access to areas in Baghdad, Jurf al-Sakhar, and the Iraqi-Syrian border to the Iraqi government. This should end, otherwise Kataib Hizballah will be able to use these areas to continue building a parallel force that can greatly challenge the Iraqi security forces and drag Iraq even further into destructive regional conflicts.

It is highly likely that Kataib Hizballah will resist these moves and resort to violence in order to protect its interests. But if they are done carefully, discussing the matter with all the major players, the harm can be mitigated. Kadhimi needs to consult not only Sunni and Kurdish partners in the political process and the global coalition against the Islamic State, but more importantly Shia factions, including the pro-Sistani forces. It is likely that a range of Shia political and paramilitary forces will back the government in its efforts to exert its authority, especially if carried out step by step, trying peaceful means first.

Kataib Hizballah and other Iran-backed militias are suffering from a lack of unifying leadership after the deaths of Soleimani and Muhandis, but by building upon what has already been established, Kataib Hizballah is emerging as the most potent militia that can influence the security sphere in favor of Iran more than any other Shia militant group. Its true that Kataib Hizballah is not engaged directly in politics, but it has shown its willingness and capability to eclipse Iraqs fragile political process. Enjoying the help of top Quds Force and Lebanese Hizballah advisers, the group is also working diligently on building a high-quality paramilitary force with a powerful missile capability.

In 2012, talking about Kataib Hizballah, Ahmad al-Khafaji, a high-ranking official in the Ministry of Interior, said: What is the nature of this group? I cannot see any sign of them on the ground, [I see] only statements If they really have the power to implement their agenda, let them take to the streets and well face them. Surely, after Kataib Hizballah marched to Kadhimis residence, the group has answered the question.

Kataib Hizballah is ready to expand its regional reach more than any other Iran-aligned force. Just a few years ago, the maximum capacity of Kataib Hizballah was to engage in guerrilla warfare with U.S. forces in Iraqs Shia-majority areas. At that time the Badr Organization was a much more advanced group in terms of the number of fighters and experience. Now Kataib Hizballah controls a strategic axis on the Iraqi-Syrian border and plays an integral role in Irans efforts to build the so-called Iranian land corridor to the Mediterranean which could give Iran freedom of movement to send military supplies and mobilize forces in Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon, and to reach Israeli borders more easily. Also, the group has already engaged in attacks on Saudi Arabia and helped train Bahraini operatives to conduct attacks inside Bahrain on the order of the Quds Force. No other Iraqi militia has gained enough credits to be given these missions. Kataib Hizballah is Irans preferred militia and it is evolving as the main force belonging to the resistance in Iraq.

Unlike Lebanon or Yemen, where one major militia facilitates Irans expansionist policies, several smaller militias function as the Islamic Republics proxies in Iraq. But one militant group more than others has the potential to dominate the scene, and that is Kataib Hizballah.

Hamdi Malik, Ph.D., is a Middle East analyst for Iran International TV and a contributor writer for Al-Monitor. He is a co-author of Honored, Not Contained: The Future of Iraqs Popular Mobilization Forces, published by the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. He tweets at: @HamdiAMalik.

Image: @WithinSyriaBlog/Twitter

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