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Backed into a corner and influence waning, the United States has in recent weeks been promoting a plan to create an autonomous Sunni region in western Iraq, officials from both countries told Middle East Eye.

The US efforts, the officials say, come in response to Shia Iraqi parties attempts to expel American troops from their country.

Iraq represents a strategic land bridge between Iran and its allies in Syria, Lebanon and Palestine.

Establishing a US-controlled Sunni buffer zone in western Iraq would deprive Iran of using land routes into Syria and prevent it from reaching the eastern shores of the Mediterranean.

For Washington, the idea of carving out a Sunni region dates back to a 2007 proposition by Joe Biden, who is now vying to be the Democratic Partys presidential candidate.

'The creation of a Sunni region has always been an option for the US. The Iranians cannot be allowed to reach the Mediterranean Sea or benefit from the land bridge connecting them to Hezbollah'

- Former US official

It was hoped that the scheme could tighten US control over Iraq and provide protection for Sunnis during the 2006-08 sectarian civil conflict, in which tens of thousands of innocent Iraqis from both the Sunni and Shia communities were slaughtered.

But opposition to Iraq being divided along sectarian and ethnic lines, as well as Americans insistence on keeping the country united, has postponed attempts at its implementation.

Now efforts to expel US troops have breathed new life into the project, and the creation of a Sunni region is just one of the options being considered by Washington to counter Iranian pressure, a top Iraqi Shia official, speaking on condition of anonymity, told MEE.

Iraqi unity is no longer a priority now for the US, the Shia official said.

If the Americans reach a dead-end in terms of the presence of their forces in Iraq, they will work to implement this project vigorously.

A former US official familiar with the project confirmed that the Americans have worked on "taking this project out of the drawer and putting it on the table".

The creation of a Sunni region has always been an option for the US. The Iranians cannot be allowed to reach the Mediterranean Sea or benefit from the land bridge connecting them to Hezbollah in Lebanon, the former US official told MEE.

"The project is American, not Sunni. The presence of the American forces has been the guarantor for the Sunnis and the Kurds, so if the US has to leave Iraq, then establishing a Sunni region in western Iraq is its plan to curb Iran and its arms in the Middle East, he added.

We are talking about establishing a country, not an administrative region.

Since the 2003 US invasion, Iraq has been one of the largest arenas of conflict between Washington and Tehran.

But tension between the two enemies climaxed on 3 January, when a US drone strike in Baghdad killed top Iranian general Qassem Soleimani and Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, deputy head of Iraqs Hashd al-Shaabi paramilitary.

The assassination of Soleimani, who was in charge of Iranian field operations in the Middle East, and Muhandis, who established most of his countrys Shia armed factions and acted as a kind of spiritual father to the fighters, sent shockwaves through Iraq.

It forced Iraqi Shia politicians and a number of their allies to respond to pressure from the armed factions by heading to parliament and voting to end the 17-year US military presence in the country.

Tracked, targeted, killed: Qassem Soleimani's final hours

Though it was non-binding, the 5 January vote to expel foreign forces sent a powerful message.

The absence of Sunni and Kurdish MPs in parliament highlighted the fragile relationship between Sunni leaders and their Iran-backed Shia allies. Most abstaining MPs left Baghdad toward either Erbil in northern Iraq or Jordans Amman for fear of retaliation.

The latest developments in Iraq have prompted them to search for other options, foremost among which was an autonomous Sunni region, Sunni lawmakers told MEE.

As soon as some Sunni politicians arrived in Erbil and Amman, they met US officials there to "discuss options for both sides, sources said.

In the early hours of 8 January, Iran targeted two Iraqi military bases hosting US forces, one in western Iraq and the other in the north, with ballistic missiles that left no casualties.

Less than 24 hours later, US Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs David Schenker flew to Erbil, without going through Baghdad, to meet key US ally and former president of the Kurdistan Regional Government, Masoud Barzani, in addition to a number of other Kurdish officials.

Although statements later issued by the US did not mention any meetings that took place with Sunni leaders in Erbil, many sources confirmed that both the assistant secretary of state and Stephen Fagin, the US consul in Erbil, met a number of Sunni politicians to discuss the implications of the parliaments decision, the threats that Sunnis face and options for facing the two issues.

On the same day, Schenker flew to the UAE. There, he later said, he met "by chance" with the speaker of the Iraqi parliament, Muhammad al-Halbousi, who happened to be there.

After meeting with Schenker, Halbousi held a series of meetings in the UAE on 9 and 10 January with several prominent Sunni leaders.

'The talks on this topic are uninterrupted and increase in frequency over time'

-Abdullah al-Khirbeit,Sunni lawmaker

The idea of establishing a Sunni region came as a reaction to Shia forces attempts to make crucial decisions without the approval of Sunnis, a lawmaker who participated in the UAE meetings told MEE on condition of anonymity.

"Claims for our own region do not come on a sectarian basis, but on an administrative basis to develop our provinces, the lawmaker said.

The attendees agreed on the idea and said that they will present it to our audience at an appropriate time.

Halbousi, who is currently the strongest Sunni ally of the Iranian-backed al-Binnaa parliamentary alliance, and who secured his office thanks to this support, has denied that such a plan was even discussed, let alone agreed upon.

However, a number of leaders in Halbousis coalition have said they are subject to pressure from political partners keen to pursue the plan, and are presented with various temptations.

The talks on this topic are uninterrupted and increase in frequency over time, Abdullah al-Khirbeit, a prominent Sunni lawmaker and a close ally of Halbousi, told MEE.

When we say we want decentralisation in Iraq, this can be discussed. But federalism and confederation is not acceptable to us because it means dividing Iraq.

None of the Sunni and Shialeaders and officials spoken to by MEE have any clear idea of the projects details.

They all say that it is still just ideas and no clear information has been provided regarding the regions prospective borders, the number of provinces it would contain and mechanisms to solve the problems that it will face.

It is perfectly clear, however, that the project will be launched from Anbar province, to later include the provinces of Nineveh and Salah al-Din, and part of Diyala.

The proposed Sunni region will be created first in accordance with the articles of the Iraqi constitution, which allows for administrative regions to be established alongside Kurdistan.

Later, the region will be temporarily annexed to Kurdistan in a federal or confederal form, "to avoid the conflict between Sunnis and Kurds over Kirkuk and the disputed areas", according to a prominent Sunni leader.

The last step, MEE understands, will be to have this region recognised internationally.

The Arab Gulf states allied to US, led by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, support and finance this project, Sunni and Shia leaders and officials told MEE.

Funding is in place, international pressure is in place, and the necessary military strength is in place to create this region, a prominent Sunni leader familiar with the talks said.

'Neither Iran nor the Shia forces will be able to stand against the project because the US and Gulf states back it'

- Sunni leader

Neither Iran nor the Shia forces will be able to stand against the project because the US and Gulf states back it, the leader added.

A huge amount of money and investment offered by the Sunni states is at stake, and these will turn the Anbar desert into green oases and rebuild the destroyed areas in Mosul and Salah al-Din. Who will care about oil?

Since 1 October, Baghdad and nine predominantly Shia provinces have been rocked by anti-government demonstrations, which have demanded an end to corruption, the governments downfall and early elections based on a new electoral law that will limit Irans influence.

Iraqi security forces and some Iran-backed armed groups have led a bloody crackdown on demonstrators, activists and journalists in response, killing some 500 people.

The Sunni-dominated governorates have not participated in the demonstrations, however, fearing it could be used by Shia factions to justify violent repression.

'No to America, no to Iran': Thousands protest against foreign influence across Iraq

And while the majority of Sunni politicians have remained silent over the protests, in general Sunnis have shown sympathy for the Shia protesters cause.

Leaders familiar with the ongoing talks on partitioning Iraq said that Sunni politicians are seriously involved in the discussions and are waiting to see the demonstrations outcome before deciding on their path.

"The meetings are taking place in full swing, and all the Sunni leaders are attending. But they deny this publicly, waiting for the conditions that protect them, a prominent Sunni leader familiar with the talks told MEE.

If the protesters are able to force through a national government that takes care of all Iraqi communities, then the Sunnis will reject any planned autonomous area, the leader said.

Failure to achieve this, he warned, would see Sunnis supporting the partition project en masse.

"Sunnis do not want to be part of the Shia crescent, and refuse to submit to Iranian control. So they will offer the Americans permission to build military bases in their lands, in exchange for the necessary support to establish the desired region.

This article is available in French on Middle East Eye French edition.

Read more:
US seeking to carve out Sunni state as its influence in Iraq wanes - Middle East Eye

Donald Trumps impeachment trial is already unfolding as a Mitch McConnell-coordinated farce. This week on Intercepted: The charges against Trump are serious, but theyraise the question of why Congress has never impeached a president for war crimes. None of the three Senate trials of a president was for imperial crimes committed in plain sight, despite a long history of presidents invading countries, killing civilians, and torturing prisoners. Constitutional and international law scholar Marjorie Cohn discusses the trial of Trump, the refusal of lawmakers to prosecute war crimes, and presents the case that Trump should be impeached for assassinating Iranian Maj. Gen. Qassim Suleimani in Baghdad. This month marks 29 straight years that the U.S. has been bombing Iraq. Joe Biden, who proactively aided and abetted the Bush administrations drive for war, has been openly lying about his record, but Bernie Sanders also has some serious questions he needs to answer about his own support for regime change, missile strikes and deadly economic sanctions. Jeremy Scahill and Sam Husseini, of the Institute for Public Accuracy, present a thorough history of both candidates records on Iraq over the past three decades.

Transcript coming soon.

Go here to read the rest:
Sanders, Biden, and the Rewriting of Iraq War History - The Intercept

As the United States is entering its 19th year of war in Afghanistan and Iraq, the presence of our troops in the respective regions can be out of sight and out of mind. All it takes is some attention, such as a breaking news story, for eyes and hearts to turn back to remembering the dangers our men and women in uniform continue to face. The attacks on U.S. military bases this month reminded the nation we still have troops on the ground and their lives were in imminent danger.

In the last couple of weeks, our U.S. Embassy in Iraq was under attack, Iran-backed militias were responsible for the death of an American contractor, and most recently, more than a dozen missiles attacked Iraqi-U.S. bases housing our troops. Out of the roughly 5,000 U.S. troops deployed in Iraq, more than 2,000 are from Alaska. Between the Stryker Brigade out of Fort Wainwright and the Alaska Guard Rescue Squadron from Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson, our Alaska troops have a large presence in the region and are key contributors in supporting Operation Inherent Resolve in an effort to eliminate the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria.

Alaska soldiers were in charge of fence and base exterior security at Al-Asad. The night before the missile attacks, the base commander ordered troops to bunker and lock down the bases. Some units were able to evacuate with their aircraft while others sought shelter in hardened buildings or bunkers. However, many of the Alaska soldiers were to remain on the fence to ensure base security during the attack and sheltered in their vehicles.

After the attacks, commanders sought accountability of their troops and checked for casualties. The Explosive Ordnance Disposal, or EOD, teams conducted sweeps to ensure no units remained unexploded. Afterward, they began the clean-up process to remove rubble, destroyed buildings and equipment.

Ive spoken to several of our Alaska-based military members and expressed my admiration for their strength under fire as well as relief that they sustained no casualties. Their matter-of-fact attitude of we were just doing our job is inspirational. It hasnt taken long for news reports to shift to the next hot-button issue, and most have already stopped talking about the strikes and the status of our U.S. troops. Its important as the reports of whats happening in the Middle East are less frequent, we remember our troops are still there. As Ive learned, sometimes the best thing we can do to help is simply be supportive to them and their families back home. To let them know while they are far in distance, they are near at heart.

I thank these men and women for their service and remind Alaskans and the nation that we must never forget their sacrifices. Our thank you needs to be continuous, not just when the news is on the front page.

I encourage Alaskans to think about ways we can show our support for those who serve our country, their families and loved ones, and to let them know through our actions that they are appreciated from how we remember them while afar to welcoming them when they come back home.

Sen. Lisa Murkowski, first elected to the U.S. Senate in 2004, is Alaskas senior U.S. senator.

Read the original post:
Alaskans are in harm's way in Iraq. We should remember they're there. - Anchorage Daily News

KUWAIT (Reuters) - Qatar Airways, Emirates and several other Gulf airlines still fly in Iraqi and Iranian airspace and to cities in both countries, even as other international carriers have rerouted planes since the United States and Iran traded military strikes.

FILE PHOTO: An Emirates Airbus A380-800 airliner prepares to land at Nice international airport, France, January 18, 2018. REUTERS/Eric Gaillard

Executives and analysts said carriers in the Gulf, a major transit stop between European and Asian destinations, have few alternative routes to choose from in an area where much of the airspace is kept clear of civilian aircraft for military use.

In the latest flare up, a U.S. drone strike killed a top general in Iraq on Jan. 3 and Iran fired missiles at U.S. targets in Iraq on Jan. 8. In the tense aftermath, Irans air defenses accidentally shot down a Ukrainian airliner.

Gulf carriers have grown into major airlines even as regional tensions in recent decades erupted into conflict. Rerouting flights hurts profits, they say, although they also insist that they take every precaution to keep passengers safe.

Iranian airspace is important for all carriers in this region, said Adil al-Ghaith, Emirates senior vice president, commercial operations, Gulf, Middle East and Iran.

Dubai-based Emirates and sister carrier flydubai together serve 10 cities in Iran and Iraq, and have continued to use the airspace of both countries for other flights.

Kuwait Airways and Abu Dhabi-based Etihad Airways have continued using Iranian and Iraqi airspace.

We will continue to fly to Iran because Iran is an important country to us and it is our neighbor and we want to serve the people of Iran, Qatar Airways Chief Executive Akbar al-Baker said on the sidelines of a Kuwait air show.

Qatar has forged closer economic ties with Iran since 2017 when neighboring Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and other Arab states cut relations with Doha in a diplomatic row.

The Qatari state carrier turned to Iranian airspace to keep its network that flies through its Doha hub operating.

At the same time, many other international carriers have rerouted flights to avoid Iraq and Iran since the military strikes this month, including Lufthansa (LHAG.DE), Air France (AIRF.PA), Singapore Airlines (SIAL.SI) and Qantas (QAN.AX).

Some regional carriers have also changed their routes. Bahrains Gulf Air has redirected European flights away from Iraqi airspace and now flies longer, more fuel consuming routes over Saudi Arabia and Egypt.

We want to take the safest option even if it costs us a little bit more for a period of time. We can live with that, Gulf Air Deputy Chief Executive Waleed Abdulhameed al-Alawi told Reuters.

The UAE regulator told its carriers Emirates, Etihad, flydubai and Air Arabia (AIRA.DU) this month to evaluate flight path risks although it said it was up to the airlines to make the final decision on the routes they chose.

Gulf carriers face a big challenge but that doesnt mean that risks can be taken - even if that inflicts damage on the business model, independent aviation consultant John Strickland said.

Ukrainian International Airlines flight 752, bound for Kiev, was shot down in error after taking off from Tehran on Jan. 8, killing all 176 people aboard. Iran said on Saturday it was sending the black boxes to Ukraine.

(This story was refiled to remove extraneous word in paragraph 13)

Reporting by Alexander Cornwell; Editing by Edmund Blair

Read the original here:
Gulf carriers fly over Iraq, Iran after military action deters others - Reuters

TERRY GROSS, HOST:

This is FRESH AIR. I'm Terry Gross. We're going to talk about a trove of secret Iranian intelligence reports and cables that were leaked to the news organization The Intercept. They reveal the unique military and political role played by General Qassem Soleimani, who led Iran's elite Quds Force and oversaw Iran's proxy wars in Iraq and Syria. Soleimani is the general the U.S. killed earlier this month in a drone strike. The leaked documents also reveal how Iran has embedded itself in the politics of its neighbor Iraq by co-opting Iraqi leaders and buying off Iraqi agents who had worked for the Americans, getting them to cross over to the Iranian side and reveal American intelligence secrets. Last year, the U.S. Army released its official history of the Iraq War, which concluded that the only victor appeared to be an emboldened and expansionist Iran. These leaked documents help explain why.

My guest is James Risen, senior national security correspondent for The Intercept. He's part of the team of reporters examining these documents. The Intercept shared the documents with The New York Times, and they published the first story simultaneously last November. Risen used to cover intelligence and national security for the Times and won two Pulitzers. He's also the author of the book "State Of War: The Secret History Of The CIA And The Bush Administration."

James Risen, welcome back to FRESH AIR.

JAMES RISEN: Thanks for having me.

GROSS: Can you explain what the documents are that you acquired?

RISEN: Yeah. The Intercept received from an anonymous source a large file - about 700 pages - which amounts to several hundred reports and cables of the Iranian intelligence service, known as MOIS or Ministry of Intelligence and Security, of the Iranian government. It's the first time that a Western news organization has ever received a leak like this from the Iranian national security apparatus. And it's a phenomenal archive of documents that date primarily from 2013 through 2015, and they are essentially almost all cables between MOIS intelligence officers - in other words, Iranian spies working in Iraq. And they are filing cables back to headquarters in Tehran about their operations in Iraq.

And the - this provides an amazing picture of the degree to which Iran has gained dominance over Iraq, and it shows that Iran's spies kind of had the run of Iraq. And the really interesting aspect of this is that the documents reveal by name many of the top officials in Iraq, top Iraqi government officials who are secretly working for the Iranians and have secret intelligence relationships with Iran. And many of the reports are about private meetings between Iranian MOIS officers, what we - what the CIA would call a case officer, someone who goes out and meets a source. And they're reports back to headquarters about meeting all kinds of Iraqi officials at the highest levels and then down into the lower levels, as well as reports about things going on in Iraq at the time.

GROSS: One of the things of note in these documents is that General Soleimani, who the U.S. recently killed - you say he just, like, leaps off the pages.

RISEN: Yeah.

GROSS: And I was surprised to read you consider him, like, the - you consider him Iran's political fixer in the whole Middle East. I thought he was just more of a military leader, but he was both?

RISEN: Yes. I mean, that's one of the things that jumps off the page in these documents is - Qassem Soleimani was the commander of what's called the Quds Force of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps of Iran. It is the interesting thing from these documents is it's - the IRGC is a parallel organization to the MOIS. The MOIS are the - is the professional spy service. The IRGC is more of a paramilitary ideologically driven intelligence and military organization. The Quds Force, which Soleimani was the head of, was the foreign entity, the foreign unit of the IRGC, the most - kind of the Special Forces of the Special Forces. So he had a military leadership role, but after the invasion - the U.S. invasion of Iraq where we kind of threw out Saddam Hussein and there was chaos that developed, Soleimani and the Quds Force became a very dominant political player in Iraq. He did transform himself over the last 15 years or so from just being a kind of a military figure into also being the political godfather of Iraq, where Iran had enormous power. He was the representative of Iran in Iraq in virtually all ways, and he was the man you went to see in Iraq if you had a problem.

And there's one great document I can read briefly from where he - the Iraqi - top Iraqi officials are so intimidated by him and his power that there was one document where he - where the Iraqi transportation minister describes Soleimani coming to see him because Soleimani wanted clearance from the Iraqi Transportation Ministry to have flights - Iranian flights go through Iraqi airspace to Syria to help in the Iranian involvement in Syria. And he - this one - this Iraqi official is telling an MOIS officer about his meeting with Soleimani, and he's - it's just - it reads like something out of "The Godfather." It says, Soleimani came to me and requested that we let Iranian airplanes use the Iraqi airspace to pass on to Syria, the Iraqi Transportation Ministry official said. Then the official tells the MOIS, I put my hands on my eyes and said, absolutely - as you wish. Then he stood up and came close and kissed my forehead.

And that's Soleimani, the power he had. He could walk into any room in Baghdad and in the government and get what he wanted.

GROSS: But then the transportation minister basically rats out Soleimani...

RISEN: Yeah.

GROSS: Right? - by reporting him..

RISEN: Yeah, and that's the...

GROSS: ...To the rival group in Iran.

RISEN: That's the fascinating thing about these documents - is that it reveals that the MOIS, the professional spy service, hated Soleimani and they hated the IRGC. They saw them as the - you know, the roughneck paramilitary militia types. And there's a lot of reports in this where they are criticizing Soleimani and criticizing the IRGC for the atrocities that they committed in the war against ISIS.

GROSS: Soleimani's critics in Iran saw him as a showboat.

RISEN: Yes, and that becomes clear in these documents. There's one document where an MOIS officer is reporting back to Tehran, and at the top of the document, it says, do not share with the IRGC. And he's attacking Soleimani for going to every battlefield in the ISIS war and having his picture taken and making it clear that Iran is behind these Shiite militias that are attacking ISIS. And he says, he's clearly running for president of Iran.

GROSS: While we're on the subject of Soleimani, this isn't from the documents, but you've reported on what Soleimani did in Iraq to try to stop the protests against the Iraqi government and tried to protect the Iraq - the then-Iraqi prime minister.

RISEN: Right. The really interesting thing is that as the protest built in the fall of last year in Baghdad and other cities in Iraq, it became clear that the protesters in the streets were anti-Iranian. One of the goals of the protests has been to get rid of Iranian influence in Iraq, and Soleimani was backing the Iraqi government against these protesters.

GROSS: How was he backing them?

RISEN: The prime minister Abdul-Mahdi was being pressured to resign in the face of these protests because he was seen as being too close to Iran. And Soleimani came to Baghdad, met with him and met with a lot of other top Iraqi officials in October of 2019 and negotiated among the top Iraqi officials to keep Abdul-Mahdi in power. The interesting thing about that is that in the documents that we do have, there is one document that describes Abdul-Mahdi as having a, quote, "special relationship" with Iran. And so that really provides the context for why Soleimani felt so determined to keep Abdul-Mahdi in power - was he had a special relationship with Iran. And they didn't want somebody else who didn't have that kind of relationship in power.

GROSS: Well, let's take a short break here, and then we'll talk some more. If you're just joining us, my guest is journalist James Risen. He's the senior national security correspondent for The Intercept, formerly reported on national security and intelligence for The New York Times. We're talking about a trove of secret Iranian intelligence cables that were obtained by The Intercept and shared with The New York Times. We'll be right back. This is FRESH AIR.

(SOUNDBITE OF SLOWBERN'S "WHEN WAR WAS KING")

GROSS: This is FRESH AIR, and if you're just joining us, my guest is James Risen, a senior national security correspondent for The Intercept and a former reporter for The New York Times on national security and intelligence. He won two Pulitzers at The New York Times. He's part of a team of reporters who reported on documents and an archive of secret Iranian intelligence cables that were obtained by The Intercept. This is hundreds of reports and cables written mainly between 2013 and 2015 by officers of Iran's Ministry of Intelligence and Security who were serving in the field in Iraq. Their reporting on this was published simultaneously by both The Intercept and The New York Times.

So what did you learn about Soleimani's role in driving ISIS out of Iraq? And that's a goal that Iran and the U.S. shared, although...

RISEN: Right.

GROSS: ...We're on opposite sides of so many other issues.

RISEN: Yeah. I mean, that's the fascinating thing to me - is that, you know, the United States just killed a guy who, in many ways, was as responsible as anyone else for the defeat of ISIS in Iraq. The Shia militias of Iraq were organized largely by the IRGC and by the Quds Force, and they were - they really were run and directed by Qassem Soleimani. The...

GROSS: Wait. So you're saying that Soleimani really was responsible for overseeing the Iraqi forces that were trying to drive ISIS out of Iraq.

RISEN: Yes, to a great degree. The Shiite militias, which, in many of the early - especially the early battles, took a real lead role in fighting ISIS on the ground, along with, you know, some Iraqi military units, were really responsible to Soleimani. Soleimani helped develop and create them, and he ran them and paid for them, and he directed them. And he was, through the Quds force, basically running the ground - you know, a large chunk of the ground war against ISIS at the same time the United States was conducting the air war. Now, there's no evidence in these documents of cooperation between American forces and Iranian forces in the ISIS war, but it's clear that we were fighting the same war in parallel. And we were going along with a campaign by Soleimani that was filled with awful atrocities against Sunni villages in their campaign against ISIS.

GROSS: The U.S. strike that killed Soleimani was in Baghdad. How much time did Soleimani actually spend in Iraq when he was overseeing the ground war in Iraq against ISIS?

RISEN: A lot. I mean, I don't know exactly, but he was - he was a constant presence in Iraq, in Baghdad. He was completely out in the open. He was never - he wasn't trying to hide. You know, he was a top government official of Iran, and he was constantly welcome at the highest levels of the Iraqi government. I talked to a State Department official for a project, and one of them said, you know, one of the things that the U.S. was irked about was that Abdul-Mahdi, the prime minister - when Donald Trump came to Iraq, I think, in - for Christmas 2018, Abdul-Mahdi refused to meet him. And then when Mike Pence and Mike Pompeo went to Iraq, I think in November, Abdul-Mahdi refused to meet them.

But Abdul-Mahdi was constantly traveling between Tehran and Baghdad meeting with Soleimani and other Iranian officials. And so the - it's fair to say the Iranians, and Soleimani in particular, had a better relationship with the prime minister of Iraq than President Trump did.

GROSS: You mentioned that Soleimani was responsible for some atrocities while fighting ISIS in Iraq. An example that you learned about from these leaked documents was in a place called Jurf al-Sakhar, and this was in late 2014. You described it as the first major victory over ISIS in Iraq. What did he do, and what were the consequences?

RISEN: Well, that was a classic example of the use of the Shia militias backed by the Quds Force to basically launch a campaign of ethnic - I think you have to call it ethnic cleansing, almost genocidal cleansing. Jurf al-Sakhar was basically on the - in the way of the road between Baghdad and the holy cities of the Shiite world. And there were a lot of pilgrims from Iran going down those roads, and they were afraid of Sunni extremists attacking Iranian pilgrims. And so it was this brutal campaign to wipe out the entire village. And they - after they killed any male who they thought was part of ISIS, they forced all of the Sunnis out of the city, and it turned into a ghost town. I think it's still a ghost town today. And they changed the name of the town.

And it was just an example of the level of atrocity that has never been - no one has been held to account for it. And I think, to me, this is one of the cases where we as an - the United States allowed this kind of atrocity to happen as part of the larger anti-ISIS campaign.

GROSS: You're saying no one was held to account for it, but the U.S. did kill Soleimani.

RISEN: Well, yeah. That's true, although it wasn't because of that. Anyway, it's - there was a document in the files where the Iranian ambassador to Iraq goes to Jurf al-Sakhar, and an MOIS officer accompanies him. And the document is just one of the most heart-wrenching things I've ever read from - you know, that you will find in these files where they - he talks about how they've even slaughtered the cattle and the - and torn - you know, cut down all the trees and the orchards. And it's just a phenomenal description of what the anti-ISIS campaign was like.

GROSS: And you write that tens of thousands of people were displaced...

RISEN: Right.

GROSS: ...From this town. You say that Iran's Intelligence Ministry was afraid that Iran's gains in Iraq were being squandered because Iraqis resented the Shia militias like the Quds Force...

RISEN: Right.

GROSS: ...That sponsored these kinds of massacres.

RISEN: Right. Yeah. I mean, at first, it led to, you know, a lot of resentment among Sunnis. But now I think what you've seen is - in these protests in Iraq in the fall was a more general uprising by all Iraqis against Iranian influence in the country. And I think that was one of the key drivers of these protests - was that you saw Shia Iraqis for the first time really protest Iranian influence. It's not just Sunnis anymore.

GROSS: And what are they protesting against?

RISEN: Well, you know, the - there's a lot of complaints they have against the government about corruption and the lack of services, but overall, behind that is a sense that they are angry at continued Iranian influence in the country and that Iran runs their - they're angry that Iran runs their government.

GROSS: And what was Soleimani's role in running the Iraqi government?

RISEN: He was the No. 1 guy. He was the top Iranian official in the country.

GROSS: The top Iranian official in Iraq?

RISEN: In Iraq. What I didn't realize until we got into this was that the Iranian ambassador to Iraq was a former Quds Force officer who worked for Soleimani. You know, so the top Iranian diplomat worked for Soleimani or had previously worked for Soleimani. And so the Quds Force not only ran the militia, the Shiite militias. They also ran the Iranian embassy.

GROSS: So since Iran helped drive ISIS out of Iraq, why are Shia in Iraq protesting against Iran or Iranian influence now?

RISEN: They believe that the government, the Iraqi government, is deeply corrupt, that they're not getting public services that they should be getting based on the level of oil that they - wealth that they should have. And they believe that a big part of that is because Iran has a de facto occupation of the country through its control of the government and top government officials. And they believe that there needs to be basic reform in the political system, and a big part of that is to get Iranian influence out.

GROSS: My guest is James Risen, senior national security correspondent for The Intercept who has been reporting on secret Iranian intelligence documents that were leaked to The Intercept. We'll talk more after a break, and David Bianculli will review the new BBC nature documentary, "Seven Worlds, One Planet," which explores the land and creatures of each continent, starting with Australia. I'm Terry Gross, and this is FRESH AIR.

(SOUNDBITE OF AVISHAI COHEN'S "FACE ME")

GROSS: This is FRESH AIR. I'm Terry Gross. Let's get back to my interview with James Risen, senior national security correspondent for The Intercept. We're talking about his reporting on secret Iranian intelligence documents that were leaked to The Intercept. The Intercept shared the documents with The New York Times, where Risen formerly reported on national security and intelligence and won two Pulitzer Prizes. The Intercept and The Times worked together and simultaneously published their first story on the documents in November.

Those documents have become even more relevant in the aftermath of the U.S. drone strike that targeted and killed General Qassem Soleimani, who headed Iran's elite Quds Force and oversaw Iran's proxy wars in Iraq and Syria. The leaked documents reveal how Iran has embedded itself in the politics economy and military of its neighbor Iraq and reveals unintended consequences of the U.S. invasion of Iraq.

So among the many things you learned from these leaked documents is that after the U.S. pulled out our troops in 2011, that a lot of the people who were working with the U.S., often secretly, felt abandoned by the U.S. and switched sides and told the Iranians secrets about American intelligence in Iraq.

RISEN: Right. Yeah, I mean, there's a great story about an Iraqi who worked for a secret CIA program called AMAX (ph), which was a counterterrorism program. And basically, as you said, in 2011, he was left unemployed by the CIA. The CIA was pulling out or reducing its presence in Iraq as U.S. troops were pulled out, and he was left without a job. And so he applied to the MOIS to become their sources - paid sources.

And it's really interesting that - the way the Iranians deal with these Iraqis is fascinating because they tell them, look. If you want to work for us, you're going to have to tell us everything you did for the CIA. And we want a written report from you. Before we agree to bring you on and make you a source - a paid source - we want a written report describing everybody you worked with at the CIA and everything you did for them. And this guy says, oh, sure, here. And he tells them all the things that he did.

And then there's other people. One of the really interesting characters is a guy who had worked for Saddam Hussein's intelligence service. And then when Saddam was overthrown, he went to work for the CIA. And then when the CIA left, he goes to apply to the Iranians. And the Iranians say, even though he's a Sunni, and he hates us, he wants to work for us because he needs the money.

GROSS: So what are some of the things that you learn from these people who used to work with the U.S. and then felt abandoned when we pulled out and they had no more income from the U.S. so they switched sides and went to the Iranians? What did they tell the Iranians?

RISEN: Well, they told them everything about every individual from the CIA that they had worked with, every kind of program they'd done, every kind of technical secret that they knew. They gave them basically chapter and verse on every operation they'd ever run.

GROSS: Did they leak, like, where the safe houses were?

RISEN: Oh, sure. Yeah, they told them exactly everything, and they...

GROSS: Did they name names of people who...

RISEN: Yes. Yeah. And then they - at the end, they say I swear - basically, I swear to God that I've told you everything I know and I will never again work for the Americans. And it's like a formal vow.

What these documents also show is that Iran was using Iraq as a espionage platform against the United States. In at least one case we know of where they had a - they were developing or trying to develop a spy inside the State Department, someone who had been working in Iraq. We don't have the name of that person.

And also, there's a really fascinating case of a top Iraqi military intelligence official going to the Iranians and telling them, I want to - he basically just shows up one day at one of their consulates and says, I want to give you everything I know about what we do and what the Americans have done here. And he then shocks the Iranians by telling them, you know, before I came here, I went and told my boss that I'm coming to spy for you and they go what? And he says, yes, and my boss said, oh, greet the brothers, and tell them that we're - we are at your service.

So it just shows you, like, the Iraqi intelligence service that the United States helped create after the fall of Saddam - you know, we tried to create a new service - is completely it open and accessible to the Iranians.

GROSS: Let me quote what this guy says his boss said to tell the Iranians. "Tell them we are at your service. Whatever you need is at their disposal. We are Shia and have a common enemy. We are now in conflict with ISIS, and we must cooperate to eliminate it. All of the Iraqi Army's intelligence - consider it yours. If you have a new laptop, give it to me so I can upload the program onto it." What program?

RISEN: Yeah. I think that was a targeting program. It's fascinating. And I remember when we went to the U.S. government to get responses, they just kind of shook their heads. But this is something...

GROSS: Wait. Shook their heads indicating, wow, that's crazy, or, no, we didn't do it, or, we don't know about it?

RISEN: Yeah. I mean, I'm not sure. I mean, I think it was like this sense that, well, you know, what are you going to do? It's - I think the American government kind of knows they've been had in Iraq by the Iranians, and there's a deep anger and resentment over that but also a sense of resignation that they now know, you know, the U.S. invaded Iraq and Iran won the war.

GROSS: Yeah. I mean, in one article of yours, you quote a recent two-volume history of the Iraq War published by the U.S. Army that details our campaign's missteps and its staggering cost in lives and money. And this report says - this report from the U.S. Army says that "an emboldened and expansionist Iran appears to be the only victor..."

RISEN: Yeah.

GROSS: "...In the Iraq War."

RISEN: Yeah, that's the official U.S. Army history of the war in Iraq that was - its publication was delayed for a long time because it was kind of considered controversial within the army. And they finally published it when they, you know, realized, well, we've got to just tell the truth.

GROSS: Do you think we're any closer now to a military conflict with Iran or do you think that Iraq is any closer now to a military conflict with Iran?

RISEN: I think - well, one of the things that's interesting to me is that Abdul-Mahdi, the prime minister of Iraq, who said he was going to resign in November, is still prime minister. The Parliament and the Iraqi government still hasn't figured out what they want to do, the leadership situation there is still kind of paralyzed.

GROSS: So the prime minister is still aligned with Iran?

RISEN: Yeah. So where things go in Iraq is going to be fascinating. I think one of the things that a lot of people explain to me, which I think is fascinating, is that one reason why Soleimani had gained so much power in Iraq, and why being essentially the viceroy of - Iran's viceroy in Iraq was such a powerful position for an Iranian leader, was that Iraq is the outlet for the way Iran gets around Western sanctions. They go through - Iraq provides the money laundering, the oil smuggling, the currency manipulation, and all kinds of other economic benefits for the Iranian regime. And it's the primary outlet for Iran to get out from under American sanctions.

And so to Iran, Iraq is a critical part of its survival, you know, its control over Iraq is very important. And I think that's why Soleimani was so adamant on keeping Abdul-Mahdi in power, and it's why he played such a central role and why I think he saw himself as - that his success in Iraq was something that could elevate him to president of Iran because Iraq had become so important to Iran's survival. And that'll be interesting to see if Iraq gets a government that's willing to shut down some of Iran's access to Iraq, what that will mean for Iran and what - how Iran will respond.

GROSS: Let me reintroduce you here. If you're just joining us my guest is journalist James Risen. He is the senior national security correspondent for The Intercept, formerly reported on national security and intelligence for The New York Times, where he won two Pulitzer Prizes. He's part of a team of reporters who reported on documents in an archive of secret Iranian intelligence cables that were obtained by The Intercept. Let's take a short break and then we'll talk some more. This is FRESH AIR.

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GROSS: This is FRESH AIR. And if you're just joining us, my guest is James Risen. He's a senior national security correspondent for The Intercept and formerly reported on national security and intelligence for The New York Times, where he won two Pulitzers. He's part of a team of reporters who's reported on documents in an archive of secret Iranian intelligence cables obtained by The Intercept and then shared with The New York Times. These are hundreds of reports and cables written mainly between 2013 and '15 by officers of Iran's Ministry of Intelligence and Security who were serving in the field in Iraq. And this reporting was published simultaneously in The Intercept and The New York Times.

So the U.S. killed General Soleimani, and the word that one uses to describe what they did to Soleimani is very loaded. If you say assassination, that we assassinated him, assassination is illegal. If you say it was a targeted killing, that's a different story. So the language is very charged.

RISEN: Right.

GROSS: Assassination has been illegal since when? Assassinating a foreign leader.

RISEN: Well, the United States, in the wake of the Church Committee in the mid-1970s, created a ban on assassinations. It's an executive order, 12333 I think it's the name of it. And it's never been taken off the books since the days of the Church Committee, so it's still in place.

GROSS: And this was the committee that was formed after the discoveries of how the U.S. tried to assassinate Castro and had their eyes on other political leaders in Latin America.

RISEN: Right. The Church Committee was basically the first congressional investigation into CIA and FBI abuses in the post-war world. There was virtually no congressional oversight of the CIA before the Church Committee. And they uncovered all of these assassination plots that had taken place years earlier by the CIA against Castro and other leaders. And their investigation led to this executive order being passed banning assassinations, and that is still on the books.

The problem is that since Sept. 11 in particular, the U.S. has engaged in countless targeted killings of terrorists. And they have - the U.S. has used the - with the authorization for the use of military force, the AUMF, the congressional resolution that was passed right after Sept. 11 for - to allow for the war on terror and the war in Afghanistan. That's the legal justification, the legal legislation that allows for targeted killings in - against terrorists. But the AUMF was never envisioned as something that would allow the assassination of foreign government leaders like Soleimani. That's the clear red line between the targeted killings of terrorists in the war on terror and what Trump did in the case of Soleimani.

GROSS: This is what made you suspicious when the Trump administration declared the Quds Force, which was led by Soleimani, and the Revolutionary Guard, which oversaw the Quds Force, when the Trump administration declared them terrorists groups. So by declaring them terrorist groups, do you think that kind of opened the door to killing Soleimani and legally justifying it?

RISEN: I believe that's probably part of the legal - the secret legal justification. I - you know, the, you know, in all these kind of cases what happens usually is that the Justice Department in the White House and the Pentagon or the CIA. The lawyers for all of those organizations get together and they create a legal opinion that approves whatever action the president wants to take.

And we've seen time and time again what we call now Office of Legal Counsel legal opinions. The Justice Department Office of Legal Counsel is the final drafter of these legal opinions after they consult with the lawyers throughout the national security apparatus. And these legal opinions have very rarely been made public, only occasionally. The whole point of those things is to find loopholes in the law, of all the various laws that govern the way war is supposed to be conducted.

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Leaked Intelligence Reports Reveal The Vast Power Iran Wields In Iraq - NPR