Mediaboss Marketing

1 Melvyn Leffler, Confronting Saddam Hussein: George W. Bush and the Invasion of Iraq (New York: Oxford University Press, 2023); and Samuel Helfont, Iraq Against the World: Saddam, America, and the Post-Cold War Order (New York: Oxford University Press, 2023). See also Marjorie Gallelli, Its Been Twenty Years Time for Historians to Turn to Iraq, Passport 54, no. 1 (April 2023): 63, https://shafr.org/system/files/passport-04-2023-last-word.pdf.

2 Leffler, Confronting Saddam Hussein; Frederic Bozo, A History of the Iraq Crisis: France, the United States, and Iraq, 1991-2003 (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2016); Alexandre Debs and Nuno Monteiro, Known Unknowns: Power Shifts, Uncertainty, and War, International Organization 68, no. 1 (Winter 2014): 131, https://www.jstor.org/stable/43282094; Ivo Daalder and James Lindsay, America Unbound: The Bush Revolution in Foreign Policy (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 2005); Peter Hahn, Missions Accomplished?: The United States and Iraq Since World War I (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012); Hakan Tunc, What Was It All About After All? The Causes of the Iraq War, Contemporary Security Policy 26, no. 5 (2005): 33555, https://doi.org/10.1080/12523260500190492; Steve Yetiv, The Iraq War of 2003: Why Did the United States Decide to Invade, in The Middle East and the United States: History, Politics, and Ideologies, 6th ed., ed. David Lesch and Mark Haas (New York: Routledge, 2018), 25374; and Ron Suskind, The One Percent Doctrine: Deep Inside Americas Pursuit of Its Enemies since 9/11 (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006).

3 Ahsan Butt, Why Did the United States Invade Iraq in 2003? Security Studies 28, no. 2 (2019): 25085, https://doi.org/10.1080.09636412.2019.1551567; Andrew Bacevich, Americas War for the Greater Middle East: A Military History (New York: Random House, 2016); Jeffrey Record, Wanting War: Why the Bush Administration Invaded Iraq (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 2011); Frank Harvey, Explaining the Iraq War: Counterfactual Theory, Logic, and Evidence (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012); John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt, The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2007); Paul Pillar, Intelligence and U.S. Foreign Policy: Iraq, 9/11, and Misguided Reform (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011); Patrick Porter, Iraq: A Liberal War After All, International Politics 55, no. 2 (March 2018): 33448, https://link.springer.com/article/10.1057/s41311-017-0115-z; Lloyd Gardner, The Long Road to Baghdad: A History of U.S. Foreign Policy from the 1970s to the Present (New York: New Press, 2008); Gary Dorrien, Imperial Designs: Neoconservatism and the New Pax Americana (New York: Routledge, 2004); Stephen Kinzer, Overthrow: Americas Century of Regime Change from Hawaii to Iraq (New York: Times Books, 2006); Stephen Wertheim, Iraq and the Pathologies of Primacy, Foreign Affairs, May/June 2023, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/iraq-and-pathologies-primacy; Michael Desch, Americas Liberal Illiberalism: The Ideological Origins of Overreaction in U.S. Foreign Policy, International Security 32, no. 3 (Winter 2007/2008): 743, https://www.jstor.org/stable/30130517; Daniel Deudney and G. John Ikenberry, Realism, Liberalism, and the Iraq War, Survival 59, no. 4 (2017): 726, https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2017.1349757; Jane Cramer and Edward Duggan, In Pursuit of Primacy: Why the United States Invaded Iraq, in Why Did the United States Invade Iraq? ed. Jane Cramer and Trevor Thrall (New York: Routeledge, 2011), 20145.

4 Major primary source collections that scholars have drawn on to analyze U.S. decision-making on Iraq include the Digital National Security Archive, the Donald Rumsfeld Papers, U.S. Intelligence in the Middle East 1945-2009, and the British Iraq Inquiry, also known as the Chilcott Report.

5 Robert Jervis, Why Intelligence Fails: Lessons from the Iranian Revolution and the Iraq War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2010).

6 On Iraqi foreign policy and politics in this era, see Helfont, Iraq Against the World; Lisa Blaydes, State of Repression: Iraq Under Saddam Hussein (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2018); David Woods et al., Iraqi Perspectives Project: A View of Operation Iraqi Freedom from Saddams Senior Leadership (Norfolk, VA: United States Joint Forces Command, 2006). On U.N. weapons inspections, see Malfrid Braut-Hegghammer, Cheaters Dilemma: Iraq, Weapons of Mass Destruction, and the Path to War, International Security 45, no. 1 (Summer 2020): 5189, https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00382; Gregory Koblentz, Saddam Versus the Inspectors: The Impact of Regime Security on the Verification of Iraqs WMD Disarmament, Journal of Strategic Studies 41, no. 2 (April 2018): 372409, https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2016.1224764. On the role of U.S. allies and the United Nations on the road to war, see David Malone, The International Struggle Over Iraq: Politics in the U.N. Security Council, 1980-2005 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006); and Alexander Thompson, Channels of Power: The U.N. Security Council and U.S. Statecraft in Iraq (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2010).

7 For example, see Benjamin Miller, Explaining Changes in U.S. Grand Strategy: 9/11, the Rise of Offensive Liberalism, and the War in Iraq, Security Studies 19, no. 1 (2010): 2665, https://doi.org/10.1080/09636410903546426.

8 Leffler, Confronting Saddam, 248.

9 Robert Jervis, Explaining the War in Iraq, in Why Did the United States Invade Iraq? ed. Jane Cramer and Trevor Thrall (New York: Routeledge, 2011), 33.

10 Bozo, History of the Iraq Crisis, 9. See also Tunc, Causes of the Iraq War, 336.

11 Leffler, Confronting Saddam, 2840; Jervis, Explaining the War, 30; and Yetiv, Iraq War of 2003, 40001.

12 Leffler, Confronting Saddam, 5160; and Hahn, Missions Accomplished, 14243.

13 Leffler, Confronting Saddam, 91. See also Jervis, Explaining the War, 34; Debs and Monteiro, Known Unknowns, 34, 17; Tunc, Causes of the Iraq War, 339; Yetiv, Iraq War of 2003, 398408; and Philip Gordon and Jeremy Shapiro, Allies at War: America, Europe, and the Crisis Over Iraq (New York: McGraw Hill, 2004), 83

14 Leffler, Confronting Saddam, 15758; and Daalder and Lindsay, America Unbound, 12023.

15 George W. Bush, Decision Points (New York: Crown, 2010), 228. See also: Donald Rumsfeld, Known and Unknown: A Memoir (New York: Sentinel, 2011), 435; Douglas Feith, War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the Dawn of the War on Terrorism (New York: Harper Collins, 2008), 5152; and Richard Cheney, In My Time: A Personal and Political Memoir (New York: Threshold Editions, 2011), 369.

16 Jervis, Why Intelligence Fails, 23; and Leffler, Confronting Saddam, 85, 167.

17 Interview with Condoleezza Rice, CNN, Sept. 8, 2002, https://transcripts.cnn.com/show/le/date/2002-09-08/segment/00.

18 Daalder and Lindsay, America Unbound, 11628; and Yetiv, Iraq War of 2003, 40102.

19 Leffler, Confronting Saddam, 98. See also Jervis, Explaining the War, 30; and Debs and Monteiro, Known Unknowns, 26.

20 Tunc, Causes of the Iraq War, 342.

21 Leffler, Confronting Saddam, 98.

22 Leffler, Confronting Saddam, 252.

23 Leffler, Confronting Saddam, 252. See also Hahn, Missions Accomplished, 143.

24 Jervis, Explaining the War, 31, 34.

25 Melvyn Leffler, The Foreign Policies of the George W. Bush Administration: Memoirs, History, Legacy, Diplomatic History 37, no. 2 (April 2013): 190216, https://www.jstor.org/stable/44254516.

26 Condoleezza Rice, No Higher Honor: A Memoir of My Years in Washington (New York: Crown Publishers, 2011), 121.

27 Bush, Decision Points, 229.

28 Rumsfeld, Known Unknowns, 42224; Rice, No Higher Honor, 14749; and Feith, War and Decision, 6.

29 Bush, Decision Points, 223; Rice, No Higher Honor, 147; Feith, War and Decision, 181.

30 Joseph Stieb, Confronting the Iraq War: Melvyn Leffler, George Bush, and the Problem of Trusting Your Sources, War on the Rocks, Jan. 30, 2023, https://warontherocks.com/2023/01/confronting-the-iraq-war-melvyn-leffler-george-bush-and-the-problem-of-trusting-your-sources/.

31 Scholars in the realist-hegemony school include: Butt, Invade Iraq, 284; Wertheim, Pathologies of Primacy; Gardner, Long Road, 23; Dorrien, Imperial Designs, 18182; Deudney and Ikenberry, Realism, Liberalism, 89; Cramer and Duggan, Pursuit of Primacy, 20103; Noam Chomsky, Hegemony or Survival: Americas Quest for Global Dominance (New York: MacMillan, 2007), 1116; and Steven Hurst, The United States and Iraq Since 1979 (Edinburgh, UK: Edinburgh University Press, 2009), 1920.

32 Butt, Invade Iraq, 251.

33 Butt, Invade Iraq, 271.

34 Butt, Invade Iraq, 25758, 272.

35 Wertheim, Pathologies of Primacy.

36 Deudney and Ikenberry, Realism, Liberalism, 8.

37 Record, Wanting War, 2425. Record explicitly aligns his argument with the realist school of international relations.

38 James Bamford, A Pretext for War: 9/11, Iraq, and the Abuse of Americas Intelligence Agencies (New York: Doubleday, 2004); Wertheim, Pathologies of Power; Kinzer, Overthrow, 292; Gardner, Long Road, 4; and Cramer and Duggan, Pursuit of Primacy, 203.

39 Butt, Invade Iraq, 253; Harvey, Explaining the Iraq War, 140; Chomsky, Hegemony or Survival, 14041; Deudney and Ikenberry, Realism, Liberalism, 18; and Cramer and Duggan, Pursuit of Primacy, 23037.

40 Walt, Good Intentions, 13, 5464; Andrew Bacevich, The Age of Illusions: How America Squandered Its Cold War Victory (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2020) 11011; and Patrick Porter, The False Promise of Liberal Order (Medford, MA: Polity Press, 2020), 112.

41 Walt, Good Intentions, 2532; John Mearsheimer, Imperial by Design, National Interest, no. 11 (January/February 2011): 1619, https://www.jstor.org/stable/42897726; Bacevich, War for the Greater Middle East: A Military History (New York: Random House, 2016), 35863; Desch, Liberal Illiberalism, 79; and Miller, Offensive Liberalism, 3537.

42 Bacevich, Age of Illusions, 114; Record, Wanting War, 4952; and John Mearsheimer, The Great Delusion: Liberal Dreams and International Realities (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2018), 15051.

43 On oil motives, see Michael Klare, Blood For Oil, in Iraq and Elsewhere, in Why Did the United States Invade Iraq? ed. Jane Cramer and Trevor Thrall (New York: Routledge, 2011), 129145; and Hurst, United States and Iraq, 29. On the Israeli alliance as a motive, see Mearsheimer and Walt, Israel Lobby, 25355. Michael MacDonald effectively rebuts the arguments that oil and Israel were core motives for the Iraq War in Overreach: Delusions of Regime Change in Iraq (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2014), 2426.

44 Walt, Good Intentions, 76, 110; Porter, A Liberal War, 346; and MacDonald, Overreach, 36.

45 Porter, A Liberal War, 34042; Walt, Good Intentions, 6576; and Pillar, Intelligence and U.S. Foreign Policy, 2430, 5963.

46 The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, The White House, September 2002, introduction, https://2009-2017.state.gov/documents/organization/63562.pdf. For first-hand testimony of Bushs commitment to democracy in Iraq, see Natan Sharansky, The Case for Democracy: The Power of Freedom to Overcome Tyranny and Terror (New York: Public Affairs, 2004), 23944.

47 Porter, A Liberal War, 33942; Desch, Liberal Illiberalism, 2529; Eric Heinze, The New Utopianism: Liberalism, American Foreign Policy, and the War in Iraq, Journal of International Political Theory 4, no. 1 (April 2008): 11617, https://doi.org/10.3366/E1755088208000116.

48 George W. Bush, George Bushs Speech to the American Enterprise Institute, The Guardian, Feb. 27, 2003, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/feb/27/usa.iraq2.

49 MacDonald, Overreach, 3946.

50 Mearsheimer, Great Delusion, 154.

51 Bacevich, Age of Illusions, 11013; and Bacevich, Greater Middle East, 24043.

52 Porter, False Promise, 11213. For similar claims, see Pillar, Intelligence and U.S. Foreign Policy, 18; MacDonald, Overreach, 37; and Dorrien, Imperial Designs, 181.

53 Barton Gellman, Angler: The Cheney Vice Presidency (New York: Penguin, 2007), 232; Dorrien, Imperial Designs, 13; and Daalder and Lindsay, America Unbound, 1516.

54 Gardner, Long Road; and Bacevich, Greater Middle East.

55 Excerpts from 1992 Draft Defense Planning Guidance, Frontline, 1992, https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/iraq/etc/wolf.html.

56 Scholars who cite the 1992 Defense Planning Guidance include Bacevich, Greater Middle East, 362; Butt, Invade Iraq, 273; and Wertheim, Pathologies of Primacy.

57 Joseph Stieb, The Regime Change Consensus: Iraq in American Politics, 1990-2003 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2021), 16061; and Project for a New American Century Statement of Principles, in The Iraq Papers, ed. John Ehrenberg et al. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 1920.

58 Record, Wanting War, 15. See also Gardner, Long Road, 12630; Butt, Invade Iraq, 251; Dorrien, Imperial Designs, 18182; Bamford, Pretext for War, 423; and MacDonald, Overreach, 35.

59 George Tenet, At the Center of the Storm: My Years at the CIA (New York: Harper Collins, 2007), 30508, 322.

60 Scott McLellan, What Happened: Inside the Bush White House and Washingtons Culture of Deception (New York: Public Affairs, 2008), xiii. See also Richard Clarke: Against All Enemies: Inside Americas War on Terror (New York: Free Press, 2004), 3032.

61 Michael Mazarr, Leap of Faith: Hubris, Negligence, and Americas Greatest Foreign Policy Tragedy (New York: Public Affairs, 2019), 40607; Justin Vaisse, Neoconservatism: The Biography of a Movement (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011), 1417; and Robert Draper, To Start at War: How the Bush Administration Took America Into Iraq (New York: Penguin, 2021).

62 Stieb, Regime Change Consensus, 113.

63 Pillar, Intelligence and U.S. Foreign Policy, 41. See also Butt, Invade Iraq, 25557.

64 Pillar, Intelligence in U.S. Foreign Policy, 1342; Cramer and Thrall, Pursuit of Primacy, 20407; and Bamford, Pretext for War, 26970.

65 Desch, Liberal Illiberalism, 9.

66 Christian Alfonsi, Circle in the Sand: Why We Went Back to Iraq (New York: Doubleday, 2006); Samuel Helfont, The Gulf Wars Aftermath: Dilemmas, Missed Opportunities, and the Post-Cold War Order Undone, Texas National Security Review 4, no. 2 (Spring 2021): 2547, https://tnsr.org/2021/02/the-gulf-wars-afterlife-dilemmas-missed-opportunities-and-the-post-cold-war-order-undone/; and Stieb, The Regime Change Consensus, 411.

67 The Iraq Liberation Act of 1998, Public Law 338, 105th Cong., 2nd sess., Oct. 31, 1998.

68 Helfont, Iraq Against the World, 110.

69 For scholars who call the Iraq War a tragedy, see Mazarr, Leap of Faith, 11; and Leffler, Confronting Saddam Hussein, 252. For scholars who call it a blunder, see Stieb, Regime Change Consensus, 1; and Wertheim, Pathologies of Primacy.

70 Scholars who emphasize continuity include Gardner, Long Road, 2; and John Lewis Gaddis, Surprise, Security, and the American Experience (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004), 8091. Scholars who stress discontinuity include Daalder and Lindsay, America Unbound, 12223; and Andrew Bacevich, The Limits of Power: The End of American Exceptionalism (New York: MacMillan, 2008), 7475.

71 George W. Bush, Remarks at the United Nations General Assembly, White House Archives, Sept. 12, 2002, https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/09/20020912-1.html.

72 Bush, Decision Points, 22930; and Leffler, Confronting Saddam, 110

73 Leffler, Confronting Saddam, 109.

74 Leffler, Confronting Saddam, 94, 120, 16064. See also Gordon and Shapiro, Allies at War, 9698.

75 Leffler, Confronting Saddam, 160.

76 Leffler, Confronting Saddam, 184, 191. See also Draper, Start a War, 181.

77 Harvey, Explaining the Iraq War, 7.

78 Debs and Monteiro, Known Unknowns, 34. See also Draper, Start a War, 181; Todd Purdum, A Time of Our Choosing: Americas War in Iraq (New York: Times Books, 2004), 4663; and Anthony Lake, Two Cheers for Bargaining Theory: Assessing Rationalist Explanations of the Iraq War, International Security 35, no. 3 (Winter 2010/2011): 752, https://www.jstor.org/stable/40981251.

79 Bush, Decision Points, 229.

80 Bush, Decision Points, 24445; Rumsfeld, Known and Unknown, 442; Rice, No Higher Honor, 181; and Feith, War and Decision, 223.

81 Rice, No Higher Honor, 18687.

82 Mazarr, Leap of Faith, 113. See also John Prados, The Iraq War-Part II: Was There Even a Decision? National Security Archive, Oct. 1, 2010, https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB328/index.htm; and Mark Danner, ed., The Secret Way to War: The Downing Street Memo and the Iraq Wars Buried History (New York: New York Review of Books, 2006).

83 Mazarr, Leap of Faith, 222.

84 Mazarr, Leap of Faith, 3, 21821; and Stieb, Regime Change Consensus, 21416.

85 Mazarr, Leap of Faith, 245-246; and Prados, Even a Decision?

86 Mazarr, Leap of Faith, 9.

87 Mazarr, Leap of Faith, 292.

88 Stieb, Regime Change Consensus, 23640.

89 Butt, Invade Iraq, 251.

90 Prados, Even a Decision?; and Richard Haass, War of Necessity, War of Choice: A Memoir of Two Iraq Wars (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2009), 213.

91 Mazarr, Leap of Faith, 238.

92 Prominent works that skip coercive diplomacy include Bacevich, Greater Middle East; and Mearsheimer and Walt, Israel Lobby; Record, Wanting War.

93 William Burns, How We Tried to Slow the Rush to War in Iraq, Politico, March 13, 2019, https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2019/03/13/bill-burns-back-channel-book-excerpt-iraq-225731/.

94 Thanks to Theo Milonopoulos for this insight about future paths for Iraq scholarship.

95 Report of the Iraq Inquiry, House of Commons, July 6, 2016, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-report-of-the-iraq-inquiry.

96 Leffler, Confronting Saddam, 10304.

97 Butt, Invade Iraq, 279.

98 Butt, Invade Iraq, 27980; and Mazarr, Leap of Faith, 153.

99 Patrick Porter, Blunder: Britains War in Iraq (New York: Oxford University Press, 2019), 25, 20.

100 Vaisse, Neoconservatism, 12, 221. Vaisse also calls neoconservatives democratic globalists.

Continue reading here:
Why Did the United States Invade Iraq? The Debate at 20 Years - Texas National Security Review

The Iraqi authorities must take concrete action towards revealing the fate and whereabouts of at least 643 men and boys who were forcibly disappeared in June 2016 by the Popular Mobilization Units (PMU) in the context of military operations to retake Fallujah from the so-called Islamic State, Amnesty International said, marking seven years since the men and boys were abducted.

The PMU are comprised of large, well-established militia groups and are legally considered part of the Iraqi Armed Forces.

It has been seven years since then-Prime Minister Haidar Abadi formed a committee to investigate those disappearances and other abuses committed by the PMU during the Fallujah operations. But so far, the committee has not made any of its findings public and no one has been held accountable, said Aya Majzoub, Amnesty Internationals Deputy Director for the Middle East and North Africa.

The victims of enforced disappearances are not only those who are missing, but also their families and loved ones who continue to live in agony not knowing the fate of their loved ones. Multiple governments have failed to provide these families with the answers that they deserve and with reparations. In order to end the reign of impunity in Iraq, the government must make the findings of the investigative committee public, ensure that any information on the fate or whereabouts of the missing men and boys is disclosed to their families, and that evidence is shared with judicial authorities so that perpetrators can be brought to justice in fair trials without recourse to the death penalty.

In early June 2016, thousands of men, women and children fleeing the area of Saqlawiya in Anbar Province were met by armed individuals carrying machine guns and assault rifles. They were identified by witnesses as members of the PMU, based on emblems on their uniforms and flags.

As detailed in a 2016 Amnesty International investigation, the armed men put some of the captured men and boys onto buses and a large truck. The fate of those who were driven away in these vehicles remains unknown. Despite multiple attempts by the families of the disappeared over the years to press the authorities for investigations, they have not been given answers.

One woman, who was among those captured by the PMU on 3 June 2016, told Amnesty International that at least six other members of her family were abducted. Her husband and one of her brothers remain missing. She said: There is no bigger of a disaster than losing someone dear to you. We lost our loved ones, husbands, uncles, fathers. Everyone left. I dont remember anything other than sadness.

She was released on the same day of her abduction and four of her brothers were released three days later. She said that her brothers were tortured day and night and that they witnessed the PMU burying people alive and heard the sounds of people being tortured.

Another woman whose loved ones were abducted by armed men in PMU vehicles on 2 June 2016 told Amnesty International that 15 members of her family, including her husband, brother and son, remain missing. Despite her efforts, the authorities have not taken action nor provided the family any redress.

We were living a happy life If they could hear me, I would tell them enough of being gone. We are tired. We need you, because life is not worth it without you. Your children need you and they ask about you. If only you could return I am prepared to forget everything and forget all the pain and start life over again and we live happily, if only.

According to the UN Committee on Enforced Disappearances, Iraq has an estimated range of 250,000 to 1 million missing persons since 1968, making it one of the countries with the highest number of missing persons worldwide.

On 5 June 2016, the office of then-Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi set up a committee to investigate disappearances and other violations committed in the context of military operations to retake Fallujah, including by the PMU. He also tasked the local government of Anbar with setting up a separate investigative committee, which on 11 June 2016 published findings that it sent to the Prime Minister, revealing that 643 men and boys from the area of Saqlawiya were missing. Families of the disappeared claim that the actual number is higher.

Since that date, it is unclear what steps the committee set up by the former Prime Minister has taken to effectively investigate the disappearances, and it has failed to publicly report on any findings. Rights groups and families told Amnesty International that the authorities have not communicated any outcome to the families of the disappeared. To this date, the Iraqi authorities have been silent as to the action they have taken to address and investigate these violations and provide justice and redress to victims.

Since 2016, Amnesty International has repeatedly requested information regarding this investigation, including in letters addressed to the Prime Ministers Office and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 19 May 2023. To this day, Amnesty International has not received a substantive response detailing the fate and whereabouts of the disappeared.

On 4 April 2023, the UN Committee on Enforced Disappearances issued a report following its visit to Iraq in November 2022. It urged Iraq to immediately include enforced disappearances as a separate offence. It also called upon Iraq to establish a comprehensive search and investigation strategy for all cases of disappearances, and to strengthen and enlarge the national forensic capacity to ensure that all victims have access to exhumation processes and forensic services.

Enforced disappearance is currently not a crime under Iraqi law and therefore cannot be prosecuted as a distinct offence. As a state party to the International Convention for the Protection of all Persons against Enforced Disappearance, Iraq has an obligation to criminalize enforced disappearances, investigate, bring perpetrators to justice, and ensure reparation for victims.

Al Haq Foundation for Human Rights, an independent civil society organization based in Baghdad, told Amnesty International: The failure to legislate a law to protect persons from enforced disappearance is an indication of the failure to put an end to cases of enforced disappearance. Our organization continues its efforts to support the voices of the victims and their families to together reveal the truth about the fate of thousands.

Amnesty International calls on the authorities to provide redress and reparation, including compensation and rehabilitation, for the families of those disappeared in June 2016 and to pass effective legislation criminalizing enforced disappearances in accordance with international law.

Read the rest here:
Iraq: Authorities must act to reveal fate of 643 men and boys abducted by government-linked militias - Amnesty International

On a bright spring day, Ayyad Mohmmed Ali stood at the edge of his farm, facing a row of about a dozen new construction sites nearby. A river separated his farm and the buildings.

Its really painful to see this, he said. In Iraq, we dont like to build vertically and now, youre seeing all these lands being turned into buildings.

Mohmmed Ali has planted date palm trees and vegetables at his boostan, which is Arabic for grove, for the past three decades.

This green bit of land is his sanctuary, he explained. Its where he comes to escape the noise and pollution of the capital Baghdad, a city of roughly 8 million people.

In the early 1980s, Iraq had an estimated 30 million palm trees. It used to be among the top producers of dates in the world. But war, construction and the impact of climate change have taken a toll. By 2009, there were fewer than 9 million date palms left in the country.

This is like the hair of the Iraqi desert and were watching the Iraqi landscape go bald with the stresses of war,

This is like the hair of the Iraqi desert and were watching the Iraqi landscape go bald with the stresses of war, said Kali Rubaii, who teaches anthropology at Purdue University, and has researched the environmental impacts of war in Iraq.

As part of her research, Rubaii interviewed date farmers who were displaced after the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 and she said the lack of date farming told a story of dispossession.

Palm trees need consistent care: watering, pruning and fertilizing. And when farmers had to leave, the trees suffered.

So many people are forced to sell their land for very cheap and, oftentimes, farmers have found themselves working on land that they used to own, Rubaii explained.

Iraq has also been getting hotter and drier. According to the UN, it is the fifth-most vulnerable country to the impacts of climate change.

Theres a section of the southern part of Baghdad, if you drive through, you can see a lot of trees that look like theyve been decapitated, Rubaii added, because sometimes when trees die, they keel over or, if theyre not surviving, sometimes they get cut from the top.

Making matters worse is Iraqs construction boom especially in bigger cities like Baghdad. It means that more farmers are choosing to cut down palm trees entirely to make way for building projects.

The farms have a problem, explained Labeeb Kashif al-Gitta, there is no water, there is no commercial income from this farm, so I cut the palm trees and I build buildings instead and get more profits.

And the concept was this: homeowners with palm trees on their land could sign a contract with Nakhla to have the company take care of the trees.

Many times, Gitta said, people just cut down the trees because they are too much work to maintain.

Palm trees, for them, is [a] very heavy project. They need to take care of it four times per year, he said.

Nakhlas team waters, prunes, fertilizes and vaccinates palm trees to protect them from things like fungus.

Come harvest time, Nakhla either packages and hands over the dates to the tree owner or takes the product to market, depending on the type of contract.

These types of services are not common in Iraq, but Gitta said the company is growing.

It is expanding its client base and recently signed a contract with the municipality of Baghdad to take care of the citys many palm trees.

Last year, in houses, we had 300 palm trees, in farms, we had 1,000 palm trees, and in the street, we had 6,000, Gitta explained.

The Iraqi government is also funding reforestation projects.

But biologist Ayyad Wajeh al-Shahwany explained that to truly bring back Iraqs palm trees, a lot more needs to be done.

Private projects like Nakhla and others are good, he said, but they need more support from the government and international organizations.

Kali Rubaii, from Purdue, said that many Iraqis see the value in helping to save the countrys iconic palm trees.

People are stubborn and they are not going to stop. They are finding different grassroots tactics to keep their trees alive and also to keep the date economy alive, and maybe even grow it back.

Iraqi date palms are incredibly resistant plants, she added. They can cope with all kinds of environmental stress, like storms, wind and drought.

They just need a little help to thrive.

Related:'It's a mass ecological crisis': Extreme weather in Iraq hits those already struggling the hardest

The rest is here:
This startup is fighting to keep Iraq's palm trees alive - The World

(Beirut) The reconstruction of the Sinjar district in northern Iraq, which was heavily damaged in the fight against the Islamic State (ISIS), is being held up by a political dispute over its administration, Human Rights Watch said today.

In April 2023, Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani ordered the government to open a reconstruction campaign for Sinjar and announced the allocation of 50 billion Iraqi Dinars (IQD) (US$34.2 million) to do so. But a political dispute between the federal government Baghdad and Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) has prevented other previously allocated funds from being used, while damaged infrastructure and poor essential services have hindered the return of over 200,000 people who have been displaced from the district since 2014, including 85 percent of Iraqs minority Yazidi population.

The allocation of funds is a positive development, but only if those funds are actually invested in services and infrastructure to improve access to health care, electricity, water, and housing for Sinjars residents, said Sarah Sanbar, Iraq researcher at Human Rights Watch. Political infighting is preventing the use of available funds while Sinjaris remain in limbo.

According to the International Organization for Migration (IOM), the United Nations migration agency, 80 percent of public infrastructure and 70 percent of homes in Sinjar Town, the largest city in the district, were destroyed during the conflict against ISIS between 2014 and 2017. Residents said that electricity and water are not consistently available, and many education and health facilities remain damaged or destroyed, with gaps in staffing where they do exist.

Human Rights Watch interviewed dozens of Sinjaris living in displacement camps in Duhok governorate; three Sinjaris who had returned to Sinjar; officials of the Kurdistan and Baghdad governments; the former mayor of the Sinjars self-administration; the head of the Sinjar general hospital; representatives of six civil society organizations; and two Western diplomats.

Sinjar is a disputed territory between the KRG and federal Iraq. The mayor of Sinuni, in northern Sinjar, is temporarily serving as acting mayor of Sinjar, based out of Dohuk, where Sinjaris currently must travel for administrative and civil documentation services. The Sinjar Resistance Units (YBS), a Yazidi-led militia with perceived links to the Kurdistan Workers Party, established a self-governing local administration in Sinjar in 2017 and elected a mayor, who is not officially recognized by the KRG or federal Iraq.

Under the 2020 Sinjar Agreement, Iraq committed 28 billion IQD ($18 million) to the Sinjar Reconstruction Fund. The governor of Ninewa, Najim al-Juboury, said that Erbil and Baghdad are unwilling to spend the funds without first agreeing on who will be responsible for the local administration of Sinjar, but discussions have stalled. They have been unable to agree upon a suitable candidate for mayor, and proposed candidates are frequently rejected by local Sinjaris who feel marginalized and excluded from the process.

The Sinjar Agreement also calls for the creation of a joint committee with representatives from the KRG and federal Iraqi government to distribute these funds, but the committee has not yet been formed, al-Juboury said. There are no provisions to ensure local participation in decision-making processes, which Sinjaris said exacerbated their feelings of exclusion.

Everyone interviewed cited the lack of adequate public services as a barrier to return in addition to the unstable security situation and the governments failure to provide compensation for destroyed homes and businesses.

They said that public education is not readily available, in part due to damage or destruction of schools. Even where it is accessible, the quality of education is undermined by overcrowding, with some schools accommodating students from multiple villages, and staffing shortages as thousands of teachers remain displaced. An IOM survey found that 58 percent of residents lack access to a functional secondary school within five kilometers of their residence.

In Sinjar, there are 206 schools, but only 96 of them are currently operational due to a variety of factors, such as a lack of academic staff, the continued displacement of families, and destroyed school buildings, said Hassan Salih Murad, head of the Sinjar Education Department. Due to a shortage of teachers and school facilities, one school has between 600 and 1,000 pupils enrolled in it, although it can only accommodate a maximum of 400 students.

Three schools are being used by armed groups as military bases, Murad said, undermining access to education and putting school infrastructure at risk of attack. Twelve armed groups are competing for control of Sinjar, and government attempts to regain administrative control of the area have resulted in violent clashes and further displacement, most recently in May 2022. The presence of the YBS has exposed the area to Turkish airstrikes, including one that struck a hospital in August 2021. Human Rights Watch documented military use of schools in Sinjar and recruitment of children by armed groups, including at schools, in 2016.

Waad Abdo, who was displaced from Gormuz village in 2014, said that the school in his village was destroyed by fighting, and anyway there are no teachers. Kids from my village and three villages around it all must travel to the same school, and it is very crowded.

The Sinjar Health Department also faces overcrowding, a lack of qualified professionals, and damage to physical infrastructure. Two general hospitals serve the district, one in Sinjar town and one in Sinuni, a town north of Mount Sinjar.

The general hospital in Sinjar was damaged during military operations, said Dr. Dilshad Ali, head of the Sinjar general hospital We are operating in a tiny alternative location now, and we only have 53 hospital beds instead of the 130 we once had. The original location of Sinuni Hospital is still operational. Out of 26 primary health centers, all are operating except for two in Sinuni sub-district, which need to be rebuilt.

Both hospitals have limited capacity to treat complex cases, given shortages in specialists, so people with medical emergencies or complex diseases must travel two to three hours to Dohuk or Mosul for care. People interviewed said that a lack of access to health care is a major barrier to return, particularly with pregnant women and those with chronic illnesses.

I have many chronic illnesses and there is no hospital there to help me, said Eidi Chichi, a displaced person in Khanke informal settlement. Why would I return to Sinjar if I needed to come back to Dohuk every week for health care? There are no men in my household. It is difficult for me to make that journey alone.

People also said that neither electricity nor water are consistently available, with returnees reporting that electricity is available from between 2 and 10 hours per day. According to IOM, 90 percent of Sinjar residents report relying on water trucking sometimes or always, and 76 percent reported issues related to the taste, appearance, or smell of drinking water.

Mohammed Majeed, director of the Sinjar Electricity Department, said that Station 132, Sinjars primary power plant, and Station 133, a backup station, were damaged during military operations and have not yet been rebuilt. We are currently able to serve 18 hours of electricity per day because it is spring and the weather is not too hot, but once summer arrives, we will only be able to do so for 12 hours each day, he said.

Majeed said that some repairs to the electricity network have begun, using the Emergency Food Security Fund. The Emergency Food Security Fund was passed in June 2022 to allow the government to meet urgent needs like food, energy, and paying salaries of public sector employees as months of political deadlock left the country without a budget.

Souad, a returnee from Khanasour village said, only those who can afford it have generators, and they have to pay 20,000 IQD ($15) per ampere of electricity. We pay 15,000 IQD ($11) per day for drinking water, and we had to dig a borehole to have enough water for washing.

International human rights law and the Iraqi Constitution guarantee citizens rights to health, education, housing, and an adequate standard of living. The right to an adequate standard of living includes everyones right to water and electricity, among others as Human Rights Watch has concluded. Iraq has ratified numerous human rights treaties that contain obligations related to these rights.

To enable displaced people to return home and respect all Sinjaris economic rights, the government needs to take an integrated approach to Sinjar, which includes reconstruction, rehabilitation, reparations, administration, and security, Sanbar said. Returnees will continue to struggle in the absence of government services as displaced people remain stuck in limbo.

See the rest here:
Iraq: Political Infighting Blocking Reconstruction of Sinjar - Human Rights Watch

Baghdad (IraqiNews.com) The Iraqi government is working to end the displacement issue and tackle problems affecting hundreds of thousands of displaced Iraqis because of the ISIS occupation of their areas from 2014 to 2017, in governorates such as Nineveh, Kirkuk, Diyala, and Salah Al-Din.

The Iraqi government announced in mid-April the closure of the last refugee camp in Nineveh governorate in northwestern Iraq.

With the announcement of the Iraqi government, all camps housing displaced people in the country are closed except the ones located in the Kurdistan region of Iraq.

There are 26 refugee camps in northern Iraq, according to the Iraqi Ministry of Migration and Displaced.

The Iraqi Ministry of Migration and Displaced continues to provide successive financial grants to displaced families returning to their homes. The financial grant per family is 1.5 million Iraqi dinars (equivalent to $1,500).

The step aims to encourage and help the displaced people return to their homes and start their lives once again in their areas of origin.

The Minister of Migration and Displaced, Ivan Jabru, revealed during a field visit to Salah Al-Din governorate in northern Iraq on Sunday that the ministry will offer new grants in the coming days.

The last of these financial grants was offered by the Iraqi ministry in early May to nearly 7,000 families returning to their areas of origin.

Read the original post:
Iraq offers grants to help displaced people return to their homes - Iraqi News