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U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III meets with Masrour Barzani, prime minister of the Kurdistan Region, an autonomous region of Iraq, in March 2023.

Kurdish autonomous regions in Iraq and Syria are increasingly coming under threat by regional powers, namely Iran and Turkey. They are also increasingly becoming vulnerable to internal challenges posed by the central governments in Baghdad and Damascus. The United States, at different stages, played a central role in the establishment of two autonomous Kurdish regions in Iraq and Syria. But the changing dynamics in both countries and the broader region may compel Washington to get even more involved in preserving these Kurdish entities.[1]

This article will explore how the once-promising Kurdish autonomous regions in Iraq and Syria have been in fragile situations, facing multifaceted internal and external challenges, and how the United States could help its Kurdish allies in the two countries protect their political projects.

September and October of 2023 were among the most challenging months for Syrian Kurds and their semi-autonomous region since the northeastern part of Syria came under the control of Kurdish forces months after the beginning of the country's civil war in 2011.

In September, an unprecedented revolt led by Arab militias formerly affiliated with the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) nearly overran the U.S.-backed group's presence in the eastern province of Deir Ezzor, a former stronghold of the Islamic State (ISIS) terror group. The rebellion prompted a major operation by the SDF, which ended with the group regaining its control over several villages that had been briefly taken by the rebels. The clashes between the two sides in the Middle Euphrates Valley killed 29 Arab militiamen, 25 SDF fighters and 9 civilians.

While there are many domestic factors as to why this revolt happened in the first place, it is the external influences that Kurdish leaders thought were behind that serious rebellion against their rule. Kurdish officials, particularly those with the SDF, had been very careful in balancing their precarious presence in that part of Syriasteering clear from the Syrian regime of President Bashar al-Assad and its Iranian backers. This is because their relationship with the United States has largely been a military one that is confined to the war on ISIS. The Kurds feel they do not have the political support that they have been striving to receive from Washington to ensure their place within Syria.

However, the Kurds were quick this time to blame both Tehran and Damascus for not only instigating the multi-day revolt in Deir Ezzor, but also actively sending men and weapons from the regime-held western side of the Euphrates River into the SDF-held eastern side in order to destabilize the Kurdish-led group's territory. The explicit and assured Kurdish position toward the Syrian regime and its Iranian allies was perhaps a signal to Washington and others in the West that Kurdish self-rule was facing a real risk. It was then that the U.S.-led Coalition against ISIS issued a statement, reaffirming its solid support for the SDF. The Kurdish group and local Arab allies were able to quell the revolt in Deir Ezzor, but the situation remains unsettled. It is important to note that the population of Deir Ezzor is almost exclusively Sunni Arab. Ethnic Kurds have no presence there. Some influential Arab tribes can't simply accept a Kurdish-led rule over their region, imposing progressive policies that oftentimes contradict with the ultra-conservative values of the local Arab population.

The Syrian regime and its Iranian allies understand these dynamics very well. So they prey on fueling anti-Kurdish sentiment with the hope of sparking further ethnic tensions between Arabs and Kurds and ultimately creating a scenario where a Kurdish presence will no longer be tolerated in Dier Ezzor. The September revolt was undoubtedly part of that plot.[2]

In October, Turkey launched its most intense bombardment campaign since its last invasion of Syrian Kurdish regions in 2019. Turkish artillery, airstrikes and drone attacks targeted dozens of Kurdish cities, towns and villages along the Syria-Turkey border. According to one local monitor group, Turkey carried out attacks against 131 targets in northeast Syria, most of which were civilian infrastructure. Among those were oil and natural gas fields, power plants, schools, hospitals and industrial factoriesin addition to military targets belonging to the SDF.[3] Turkish officials, including President Recep Tayyip Erdoan and Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, openly said that their objective in that campaign was to destroy sources of income for Syrian Kurdish forces.[4] Turkey has made clear that it will not allow a Kurdish entity to exist on its southern border. Hence the targeting of civilian infrastructure and vital points of interest in northeast Syria are aimed at keeping the Kurds from standing on their feet and thinking about further political and economic developments for their nascent autonomy.[5]

Ankara considers the SDF as part of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (Partiya Karkern Kurdistan, or PKK), which is designated a terrorist group by Turkey, the U.S., and the E.U. Washington, however, makes a very clear distinction between the two Kurdish groups. The SDF has been a major U.S. partner in the fight against ISIS.[6] The Turks say a Kurdish-held, PKK-friendly region in Syria poses a direct threat to its national security. In fact, the recent intensification of Turkish strikes on Syrian Kurds was in response to a bombing attack on October 1, 2023, in front of Turkey's General Directorate of Security in Ankara, which left two police officers wounded. Turkey immediately said the two attackers had been trained in Syria. Kurdish Syrian officials denied the accusation, and there is no concrete evidence to support the Turkish claim.

While the United States did not overtly support the establishment of a Kurdish-led autonomous region in northeast Syria in the early years of the conflict, it was its military support for Kurdish forces against ISIS that helped expand Kurdish gains and further their self-rule.

Kurdish autonomy in Syria came about in the wake of the civil war, at a time when the central government in Damascus was at its weakest. Prior to that, Kurds in Syria did not have any form of self-government or any other political, cultural and linguistic rights for that matter.[7] And while Assad's army and his Iranian and Russian backers were busy combatting Sunni rebels elsewhere in the country, the Syrian regime had no choice but to accept a situation where the Kurds ran the show in the northeast. But from Assad's perspective, Kurdish-led self-rule was never intended to be a permanent reality, let alone to expand. His hope was for the Kurds to be a placeholder in the northeast until his regime would be fully capable of governing the entire country.

Now that the civil war has largely subsided, the regime wants to regain its control of the Kurdish-held region in northeast Syria.

Now that the civil war has largely subsided, the regime wants to regain its control of the Kurdish-held region in northeast Syria. Assad and other regime officials have repeatedly expressed their desire to reestablish Damascus' control over every inch of Syria's territory. The SDF-controlled region makes up roughly one third of Syria's territory. This includes the Kurdish heartland along the border with Turkey as well as Arab tribal regions in the east along the border with Iraq. Both regions happen to be the country's richest in terms of resources. And after more than a decade of brutal civil war, the Syrian regime wants to have access to every resource that could help its shattered economy.

The Syrian regime, Iran, and Turkeyand of course Russia by way of supporting the Assad regime and antagonizing the U.S.have a vested interest in destroying this Kurdish entity in northeast Syria.[8] Their different strategic interests converge under a common objective of reducing America's influence and footprint in Syria. For them, the existence of a Kurdish autonomous administration in northeast Syria is closely tied with the presence of American forces, which number about 900 troops who are there as part of the U.S.-led coalition against ISIS. Therefore, ending Kurdish autonomy will reduce America's influence in Syria. But in order to eliminate this Kurdish self-rule experiment they will first have to make sure America no longer supports Syrian Kurds. It is certainly a catch-22 situation for these actors that they are trying everything in their political and military power to end.

For Damascus, the objective is simple and clear: Kurds must be tamed. They cannot become more powerful than they already are. The longer Kurdish forces receive military support from the U.S. the harder it is for the Syrian regime to keep the Kurds in check. After all, the SDF has grown into a 65,000-strong semi-conventional military force equipped and trained by the best military advisers in the world. After nearly a decade of fighting ISIS terrorists and other armed groups in Syria, the SDF has become a sophisticated military actor in the Syrian context, with well-developed, disciplined and specialized units that have proven their effectiveness on the battlefield. Despite its depleted military, the Syrian regime has two other military advantages that give it a superiority over the SDF: its air force and the support of Iranian-backed militias.

Nonetheless, the Syrians know better not to wage any large-scale military assaults on the Kurds while American forces are deployed in the Kurdish-held region. They would use their proxies to destabilize the SDF rule and undermine its autonomy, without the risk of any direct confrontation with American troops. Their current goal appears to be chipping away at the SDF-held region through applying constant political and economic pressures on the Kurdish group and its civilian administration. The Kurdish region remains economically dependent on the Syrian regime. Its control over local resources and trade ties with Iraqi Kurdistan don't seem to be sufficient for a viable economy for northeast Syria that is entirely independent from Damascus.

The current expansive autonomy that Syrian Kurds and other communities in northeast Syria enjoy cannot be accepted in any shape or form by Damascus, given the centralist mindset of the Baath regime. In the best-case scenario, the Assad regime could be fine with granting the Kurds some limited powers in the local administrative councils. The regime has repeatedly referred to its current local administration law, which was first ratified in 2011 and then in 2022, as the only form of governance that must be accepted in the country. This has been a major point of dispute between Damascus and Kurdish representatives during several rounds of talks. Kurdish officials now say such talks have been suspended indefinitely because the Syrian regime is not willing to make any concessions. They Kurds want to make their de facto autonomy a formal one, but it doesn't seem that the regime is ready to accept it.[9]

For Tehran, an American-backed Kurdish-led entity in Syria is not such a short-term nuisance. It is a major obstacle for its long-term expansionist ambitions in the broader region. The so-called "Shiite Crescent" that aims at creating an overland corridor between Tehran to Beirut, going through Iraq and Syria, will not be accomplished without removing American forces from the region, namely the border areas between Iraq and Syria, both of which have an American military presence, more significantly on the Syrian side. The American military presence in Syria is also in contrast to Tehran's vision of establishing governing structures in the country and elsewhere in the region that are sectarian-based, militia-oriented, and most importantly loyal to the Wilayat al-Faqih. The existence of a pro-American Kurdish enclave in Syria is delaying such plans. While Tehran is aware that carrying out occasional attacks, through its many proxies, on U.S. bases in Syria may not force the Americans to leave, it continuously seeks to empower Arab militias in eastern Syria with the goal of exhausting the SDF, America's partners, who are engaged in many fronts, whether against remnants of ISIS or Turkey-backed militias elsewhere in northern Syria. Recognizing its limited options on the ground to alter current dynamics in eastern Syria, Iran hopes that Turkish threats could eventually sabotage the Kurdish experiment and force the Kurds to cede the region to the Syrian regime, which will automatically achieve Tehran's goals.

As for Turkey, it is no longer a secret that Ankara's Syria policy has largely been driven by its anti-Kurdish approach, at least in a past few years. Its opposition to political autonomy for the nearly three million Kurds in Syria derives from perceived concerns that such a gain could empower the much larger Kurdish population inside Turkey itself.

Since 2016 Turkey has launched multiple large-scale invasions into northern Syria either to dislodge Kurdish forces from certain border regions or inhibit the Kurds from taking territory previously controlled by ISIS. The last Turkish invasion into Kurdish territory in northern Syria was in 2019 shortly after U.S. troops partially withdrew from several Kurdish border towns. Ankara constantly threatens to wage additional ground assaults against the SDF and other Kurdish groups within its ranks. But the only thing that seemingly has made them stop short on such threats is the presence of U.S. troops in northeast Syria. Turkey certainly cannot carry out any new invasions into the region where Americans have physical presence. And it doesn't look like U.S. forces will withdraw from Syria anytime soon. Washington recognizes that its forces there have been instrumental in assisting and advising local Kurdish forces to ensure the ultimate defeat of ISIS remnants. It also fears that a new Turkish invasion could allow the resurgence of ISISboth because Ankara's focus in Syria is to defeat the Kurds not ISIS, and because Turkey's very invasion would undoubtedly cause chaos and distraction from the fight against ISIS terrorists.[10]

In what seems to have become an alternative compromise, Turkey's drone and airstrike campaign continues to hit crucial targets in the Kurdish region of Syria.

In what seems to have become an alternative compromise, Turkey's drone and airstrike campaign continues to hit crucial targets in the Kurdish region of Syria. While the United States is firm on opposing any Turkish military adventure that would imperil gains made against ISIS, it shows understanding about Ankara's stated security concerns in Syriawhich may explain Washington's tacit acceptance of these aerial Turkish attacks in northeast Syria if they don't put the anti-ISIS missions at risk. For Ankara, this could be satisfying as long as it keeps the Kurdish region unstable and prevents the Kurds from expanding territorially, politically and economically.

Turkey has come to understand that American troops cannot stay in Syria indefinitely. It also realizes that once U.S. forces leave northeast Syria, eradicating the Kurdish autonomy there would be a matter of time. That inevitable American departure is what Tehran and Damascus are also eagerly on the outlook for.

Unlike their brethren in Syria, Iraqi Kurds have a much longer history with political autonomy. Their experience with self-rule dates to 2003. In fact, they started experimenting with autonomy in 1991 after a U.S.-led coalition imposed a no-fly zone over northern Iraq and established "safe havens" in the Kurdistan region. They even had nominal autonomy of sorts after a 1970 agreement between the Kurds and the Baathist regime of then-president Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr.

Unlike their brethren in Syria, Iraqi Kurds have a much longer history with political autonomy. Their experience with self-rule dates to 2003.

But none of that decades-long experience with autonomy seems to matter now as the central government in Baghdad continues its efforts to tighten its grip over many affairs of Iraqi Kurds that were until recently almost taken for granted. This includes matters such as the control of border crossings and airports, budget, oil revenue and the status of provincial councils of the Kurdistan Region.

While Baghdad's attempts at curbing Kurdish autonomy in the north seem to have stepped up in recent months, the situation has been on a downward slope for Iraqi Kurds since October 2017, after a major referendum for Kurdish independence. The ill-fated voting for Kurdish statehood, which was favored by of the vast majority of local Kurds, gave a pretext for the Iraqi government to take retaliatory measures against the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG).

Even though the right to a federated region for Kurds has been enshrined in Iraq's constitution, which was adopted in 2005, Iraqi Kurds no longer feel that such an article in the country's most important document could guarantee their autonomy. That is because the Iraqi government increasingly has been dominated by pro-Iranian Shiite groups that have both sectarian and nationalistic tendencies.

Since the failed referendum in 2017, Iranian-backed Shiite militias, most of which also have the support of Baghdad, have been taking over more areas in what is known as "disputed territories." These are areas claimed by both the KRG and the central Iraqi government. The Kurds were able to take full control of most of them during the war on ISIS in 2014 and onward. But the 2017 referendum not only gave a unique political power to the Iraqi government and its militias to retake those areas controlled by Kurds since 2014, but also allowed them to dislodge Kurdish forces from some other areas in the vicinity that had been under Kurdish control since 2003.

In line of that policy, Iran-backed Shiite militias and their local supporters in the multi-ethnic city of Kirkuk, also part of the disputed territories, rejected an order by the Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia' al-Sudani in September to return a building in the city to the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), the ruling party in KRG, which had been emptied since October 2017. It evolved into violent clashes with Kurdish residents of the city that resulted in the death of four Kurdish civilians. The deadly events prompted Iraq's federal supreme court to suspend the implementation of al-Sudani's order, which was largely seen as a success for the pro-Iranian Shiite militias.[11]

The shrinking of areas controlled by Kurds in northern Iraq has been coupled with KRG's overall diminishing role in Iraqi politics. Since 2003, Kurds were a major player in the makeup of the extremely delicate Iraqi national politics, which has mostly been characterized by ethno-sectarianism. Kurdish leaders indeed played a significant role in keeping Iraq as a unified country, particularly during a bloody period between 2006 and 2007 which witnessed the most sectarian-inspired violence between Sunni and Shiite groups. It was the Kurds who played a mediating role between two sides, which ultimately averted the breakup of Iraq something that Kurds ironically have always been accused of championing.

The Kurds also played kingmakers in the formation of successive Iraqi governments since 2005. The unified position between the KDP, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and other Kurdish parties gave the Kurds leverage in negotiations over pressing matters in national Iraqi politics and allowed the KRG to sustain its autonomy.

That no longer seems to be the case.[12] The "Kurdish House" is now divided more than ever before. The so-called Strategic Agreement signed in 2006 between the KDP and PUK that unified the different administrations in Iraqi Kurdistan under the leadership of KRG has been rendered worthless in recent years due to growingly divergent views by the two parties and the emergence of other political forces that have shaken up the foundational legitimacy of the KRG as a solid governing body.[13]

A purported letter recently sent by KRG Prime Minister Masrour Barzani to President Biden may be summing up the dire situation of Iraqi Kurds. In the letter, reportedly sent in early September, Barzani urged to Biden to intervene in revolving longstanding issues between the KRG and Baghdad, expressing concerns that the if the crisis is left unresolved the Kurdistan Region could collapse altogether.[14]

But the deep divisions within the main political parties in Iraqi Kurdistan must not be looked at independently from attempts by regional powers, namely Turkey and Iran, that are aimed at, if not destroying, at least limiting Kurdish autonomy in Iraq. Both countries were vehemently opposed to the referendum on Kurdish independence in 2017. And since then, they appear to have been working, at times closely, toward breaking up any prospect for Kurdish statehood or even strong autonomy within Iraq. Through a pro-Iranian central government in Baghdad, the KRG in recent months has been deprived of many significant financial resources, including blocking its oil exports to Turkey.[15] And the talks between Baghdad and KRG over the latter's share of the national budget are not likely to see any breakthroughs. It seems that the Iraqi government is only interested in reaching temporary solutions that are designed to keep the Kurds at the mercy of Baghdad. Coupled with an endemic corruption in KRG's government institutions, this unstable financial situation has caused a growing indignation within the Kurdish population toward the KRG's performance, with some local voices even calling for a stronger say by the federal government in local affairs in Iraqi Kurdistan; something Kurdish officials fear will totally undermine their hard-fought autonomy.[16]

The sharp differences between the KDP and PUK, the two political powerhouses in Iraqi Kurdistan, are also attributed to attempts by Iran and Turkey to divide the "Kurdish House," with Ankara supporting the KDP, while Tehran is backing the PUK. These growing divisions have led to a lack of a unified Kurdish front, not only in the Iraqi parliament and the makeup of the Iraqi government, but also in KRG-Baghdad talks over issues of strategic significance to Iraqi Kurdistan.[17]

There are also external cards that Iran and Turkey have been using to further pressure Iraqi Kurds. For Tehran, it is the presence of Iranian Kurdish opposition groups in Iraqi Kurdistan. For many years, several armed Kurdish groups exiled from Iran have been based in the Kurdistan region. These include the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran, the Komala Party of Iranian Kurdistan, and the Kurdistan Freedom Party (PAK). Their presence there has given excuses to the Iranian regime to carry out numerous attacks on Iraqi Kurdish territory.

While these groups have not posed a real threat to Iran, Tehran has been insisting on disarming and relocating them from the border region between KRG and Iran. In late August 2023, Iran and Iraq reached an agreement that would force the KRG to empty the bases of Iranian Kurdish groups. A deadline was given to the KRG to implement the agreement the following month.[18] Iraqi Kurdish authorities had no choice but to yield to such demands. Some of the bases evacuated by Iranian Kurdish groups were taken by Iraqi border guards or joint Iraqi-Kurdish units, a move seen as yet another blow to the KRG and its authority.

Turkey, on the other hand, has been using the presence of PKK fighters in a remote, inaccessible part of Iraqi Kurdistan as a pretext to not only carry out cross-border attacks and airstrikes, but also expand its military presence in the KRG by establishing dozens of permanent military outposts.[19] Occasional incursions, and a growing airstrike campaign in recent months, by the Turkish military have left large numbers of Iraqi Kurdish civilians dead and forced thousands of villagers in the border region to flee their homes.[20] Regardless of how the KRG more particularly the KDP views the presence of PKK within its borders, such Turkish attacks undermine the legitimacy of the KRG as an entity and damage the trust of local Kurds in their government. Even though the KDP is seen as closely partnering with Turkey, Ankara remains focused on portraying the KRG as an unreliable actor.

While the current situation for Kurdish autonomies in Iraq and Syria rightfully seems gloomy, there is still a glimmer of hope for these two pro-American entities to not only overcome these difficult circumstances but also thrive to become strong long-term U.S. allies in a region increasingly becoming anti-American. The Kurds in both countries still possess significant political and military cards that could be used to maintain their autonomous regions. Just as how the respective existence of these two Kurdish regions was, albeit variably, thanks to American intervention, their long-term survival may also be possible with a strong, continued American commitment.

Given the current dire situation for Kurds in both countries, the United States can prioritize its objectives to help the Kurds save their political gains. For one, staying the course is crucially important for Syrian and Iraqi Kurds. This means a continued American military and diplomatic engagement with both dossiers. Doing so can be an assurance for short- and medium-term stability.

Another important aspect is for the U.S. to help both entities strengthen their democratic institutions and allow for pluralistic governing systems to flourish. The pro-American sentiment among Kurds in Iraq and Syria remains high. Therefore, Washington can capitalize on that to invest more in democratization, economic development, community capacity-building and other aspects of growth that could be of benefit for the Kurds in both countries on the long-run.

Even though these are two autonomous regions in two different countries, America's enemies and adversaries view them as part of one project, one that they are determined to destroy. It is not only the right thing for America to protect these Kurdish entities, but also in its best interests to do so.

Sirwan Kajjo is a Washington-based journalist and researcher who focuses on Kurdish politics in the Middle East.

[1] Fabrice Balanche, "From Kirkuk to Deir ez-Zor: Threatened Kurdish Autonomies," The French Research Center on Iraq (CFRI), Paris, Sept. 8, 2023.

[2] Author Interview with an SDF official who requested anonymity, Sept. 29, 2023.

[3] "'Turkiya Tudamir al-Bunya At-tahtiya'.. istihtaf 131 mauqeaan khilal 48 Sa'a fi Shamal Suriya" North Press, October 7, 2023.

[4] "Erdogan Vows To Intensify Strikes On Kurd Fighters In Iraq, Syria," Agence France Presse, Oct. 11, 2023.

[5] "Turkey will not refrain from targeting Kurdish forces in Syria: FM," Rudaw, Erbil, October 18, 2023.

[6] Pinar Tank, "Preserving Kurdish Autonomy," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Jan. 29, 2019.

[7] Sirwan Kajjo, "Syrian Kurds: Rising from the Ashes of Persecution," in The Syrian War: Between Justice and Political Reality, ed. Hilly Moodrick-Even Khen, Nir T. Boms, and Sareta Ashraph, Cambridge University Press, 2020, p. 26886.

[8] Steven Erlanger, "Seeking 'Axis of Good' Against U.S., Russia Taps Allies of Convenience," New York Times, Brussels, July 20, 2022.

[9] "Analysis: How Serious Are Talks Between Assad and Syrian Kurds?" Middle East Center for Reporting and Analysis, Feb. 12, 2020.

[10] Ellen Loanes, "Why the US doesn't want Turkey to invade Syria," VOX, July 17, 2022.

[11] "Iraq's highest court halts government order to return Kirkuk army building to KDP," The National, Abu Dhabi, Sept. 4, 2023.

[12] Yerevan Saeed, "In Iraq, the Kurds Are Their Own Worst Enemy," The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, June 17, 2023.

[13] Beston Husen Arif, "KDP-PUK Strategic Agreement and Its Consequences for the Governing System in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq," Journal of Asian and African Studies, Dec. 29, 2022.

[14] Amberin Zaman, "In letter to Biden, Barzani warns of Iraqi Kurdistan's collapse, urges mediation," Al-Monitor, Washington, Sept. 12, 2023.

[15] Rikar Hussien, "Cash-Starved Iraqi Kurds See Iran's Hand in Budget Crisis," Voice of America, Washington, Sept. 14, 2023.

[16] Bilal Wahab, "How to Stop Iraqi Kurdistan's 'Bleeding,'" The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Washington, Sept. 28, 2023.

[17] Author interview with a KRG official who requested anonymity. October 19, 2023.

[18] "Tehran and Baghdad reach a deal to disarm and relocate Iranian dissident groups based in north Iraq," The Associated Press, Aug. 28, 2023.

[19] Yousif Ismael, "Turkey's Growing Military Presence in the Kurdish Region of Iraq," The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, May 18, 2022.

[20] Amina Ismail, Lina Masri, "As Turkey intensifies war on Kurdish militants in Iraq, civilians are suffering," Reuters, Sinjar, Iraq, Oct. 10, 2023.

Related Topics: Iran, Iraq, Kurds, Syria, Turkey and Turks, US policy | Sirwan Kajjo | Winter 2024 MEQ receive the latest by email: subscribe to the free mef mailing list This text may be reposted or forwarded so long as it is presented as an integral whole with complete and accurate information provided about its author, date, place of publication, and original URL.

Excerpt from:
Will Washington Intervene to Protect the Kurds of Syria and Iraq? - Middle East Forum

The impact of climate change grows with each passing year, and so does Iraqs population projected to reach 80 million by the year 2050 while the countrys resources are decreasing. Temperatures in Iraq are rising roughly seven times faster than the global average, which diminishes water levels through evaporation. By the end of the century, water levels in the Tigris and Euphrates rivers will likely decline by a minimum of 30 percent and up to 70 percent, necessitating long-range planning of resource management, particularly in agricultural areas. The loss of agricultural livelihoods in water-scarce regions has already accelerated migration across Iraqs southern and central provinces and provoked local-level disputes over water sharing. As of September 2023, the International Organization for Migration estimated that 130,788 individuals remained displaced due to factors related to drought conditions and acute water scarcity.

Amid this water crisis, a plethora of additional factors are threatening Iraqs stability and progress, including the widening distrust between citizens and the state over services and corruption; divisive partisanship; armed groups acting with impunity; regional interference and the social and environmental impacts of decades of war. If unaddressed, water scarcity combined with these broader sources of fragility have the potential to undermine Iraqs ambitious efforts for development for example, Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudanis Development Road project and the Kurdistan Regions economic transformation plans. At a time when Iraqi citizens are calling for broad-based socioeconomic development, it is urgent that holistic, coordinated and effective measures ensure that the water crisis does not upend these aspirations.

USIP, in collaboration with the Institute of Regional and International Studies at the American University of Iraq Sulaimani, has conducted research in 2023 on the drivers and consequences of Iraqs water-scarcity crisis. Our findings underscore the importance of taking a systems-wide approach to water management in an era of climate change. Unlike other challenges, where Iraq works through a degree of compartmentalization of issues and makes progress at the local level, preventing the worst outcomes in Iraqs water crisis will require a more holistic strategy that would span the full upstream-to-downstream spectrum. Urgent and sustained engagement is needed at all levels regional, domestic and local.

In an ideal regional political context, the riparian countries of the Tigris-Euphrates river basin (Iraq, Turkey, Syria and Iran) would coordinate together based on long-term and legally binding agreements. But divergent water management policies have thwarted this possibility. Iraq has witnessed a dramatic decline in water availability largely due to damming practices by upstream neighbors. Turkey has vastly expanded its network of southern dams as part of an increasingly ambitious state-managed water infrastructure program, while Iran has grown ever more determined to divert shared rivers toward fulfilling its immediate water needs.

At present, meaningfully addressing the problem of transboundary water sharing remains a distant prospect. A senior Iraqi official involved in negotiations, who spoke on condition of anonymity due to the sensitivity of bilateral talks, reflected upon the feeling of frustration from the governments perspective. We, in Iraq, are unhappy about the share of the water we receive from Turkey and Iran. The water issue should not be looked at just as an Iraq problem, the official said. To secure our rightful share, we rely on negotiations first and foremost . We do not want to resort to international courts or military solutions for securing our rights. Access to water is our legitimate right. We need something and they need something, and so negotiation is the way to solve the water-sharing problem bilaterally.

Frustrations are high, but Iraqs leverage is perceived to be low. Iraqi officials informed us that Tehran tends to make one-sided decisions without consultation with Iraqi partners, though some observers have noted that the empowerment of the Coalition Framework, considered to be Iran-backed, has coincided with slightly more reliable releases of water from the Karoon River. Talks over water with Turkey are more institutionalized and regular, and yet the existence of such talks has not translated into a much-needed formal agreement on damming practices and water allocations. At most, the Baghdad-Ankara dialogue has meant that Turkey has been more inclined to respond to Iraqs requests for more water during times of extreme duress.

There are those within the Iraqi government and the international community who believe Iraq could use energy, trade and other areas as bargaining chips more effectively. To that end, the United Nations Development Programme has rolled out a capacity-building program in water negotiations benefitting officials from relevant government agencies such as the Ministry of Water Resources, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Environment. The trainings focus on enhancing usage of data and trade-offs, equipping Iraqi negotiators to leverage the fact that Iraq and Turkey have $4 billion in cross-border commerce each year. Interviews with research participants underscored the programs benefits and limitations, with one participant noting that it would surely enhance the technical skills of negotiators but lacked participation from the most senior officials.

Disputes over water do not stop once rivers pass through Iraqs borders. The Kurdistan Region, situated in the north of Iraq, is home to some of the countrys largest dams and reservoirs, and 85% of the water in these dams travels southward beyond the jurisdiction of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) into federal Iraq. Previous reports have suggested that the KRG might leverage this upstream position to wield influence over Baghdad by withholding water allocations, perhaps leading to conflict between the two sides. Our interviews with officials on both sides suggest that this framing of the Erbil-Baghdad divide misses the mark. The issue is less about the flow of water and more about the flow of finances. Officials in the KRGs Ministry of Agriculture and Water Resources repeatedly stressed that they always abide by Baghdads requirements for water. Similarly, officials and advisors in al-Sudanis government noted that the KRG never puts water shares on the table as a threat in any negotiations on broader issues.

However, the KRG has grown increasingly aggrieved over the perceived lack of financial support from Baghdad for the maintenance of the very dams and water purification facilities that release water into the federal areas. The wastewater from Erbil eventually flows to the Tigris and contaminates the river, and so if we treat the waste water in Erbil, we will prevent the contamination of the Tigris and stop the spread of diseases in the rest of Iraq, noted Ali Rasheed Khoshnaw, the former head of Erbils Provincial Council, sharing his sentiment that Baghdad should be more cooperative on loans and other financial mechanisms benefitting Erbils water infrastructure.

With finances contested, key water treatment and purification plants in the Kurdistan Region have been long planned but not implemented on the ground, which directly impacts water quality from north to south. The dispute over finances is in the context of broader political disagreements between Erbil and Baghdad over budgetary allocations, which show no sign of abating.

The Erbil-Baghdad divide is not the only domestic fault line of concern. Particularly during the scorching and water-scarce summers, provincial authorities in southern Iraq have engaged in heated disputes over water allocations and limits, with downstream provinces accusing upstream provinces of consuming more than the share mandated by the Ministry of Water Resources. Such disagreements have been recorded between Basra and Maysan; Basra and Thi Qar; Babil, Diwaniyah and Muthana; Wasit and Diwaniyah; and Najaf and Diwaniyah. Disputes are also commonplace at the local level, as farmers living toward the end of an irrigation canal commonly claim that farmers upstream are siphoning off more water than allowed through illegal pipe extensions. The pervasiveness of such disputes speaks to the difficulty of achieving equitable water distribution at a time when the Ministry of Water Resources is imposing strict and wide-ranging water limits in agricultural areas as a drought response measure. Though the ministry insists that overall compliance with the restrictions has recently improved, the fact is that entire agricultural areas are buckling under the severity of the water limits, and more must be done to develop sustainable and long-term solutions for these communities. Achieving this will require a systems-wide approach across the relevant ministries dealing with farmers, particularly the Ministry of Agriculture and the Ministry of Water Resources.

Indeed, to address all the above challenges from the regional to the local level, the importance of enhancing the effectiveness of the core ministries with jurisdiction over water management cannot be underestimated. The main difficulty facing these particular ministries is that they are relatively marginal both politically and financially within the broader government system, and can only act effectively with the support of other ministries. For example, the Ministry of Water Resources is developing a new water management and infrastructure strategy; however, without support from the Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Planning in addition to the parliament, the much-needed irrigation canals and water purification facilities included in these plans will never be realized on the ground. Similarly, the Ministry of Environment is tasked with taking the lead on climate change strategy, but sources within the ministry indicate that it struggles to access the most basic data and compliance from more powerful public entities, including the pivotal Ministry of Oil. It is normal for governments to have some level of interagency friction, but in the case of Iraq, the level of disconnect between ministries has become unsustainable in an era of climate change and water scarcity.

In the years to come, conditions will only grow worse. Climate models suggest that snowfall in the southeastern mountainous region of Turkey and southwestern Iran will depreciate significantly between now and 2050, thereby reducing melt into Iraqs streams and rivers. By 2035, the gap between supply and demand will have reached nearly 11 billion cubic metersof water annually.

The international community has begun developing aid and development packages accordingly. Between 2021 and 2023, U.N. agencies and other major international organizations began rolling out an array of initiatives, programs and collaborations with the Iraqi government on climate change, environmental degradation and water scarcity. And yet, serious questions remain about both the priorities and long-term durability of international efforts and interventions. With ongoing wars in Ukraine and Gaza, both humanitarian practitioners and Iraqi environmental activists alike fear that international funding will continue to decrease with each passing year. The international turn toward long-term development, including climate change programming, is based on a sense that Iraq is now relatively stable and ready to tackle challenges that do not pertain directly to a lack of security or humanitarian emergency. But the caveat is that funding levels remain a major question mark, with most Western officials in Baghdad expressing doubts about sustaining significant levels of international financing now that Iraq is the beneficiary of high oil prices and a surging economy.

One limitation of the international efforts is a tendency toward excessive focus on the local level, as these efforts are less hamstrung by bureaucracy and results are more likely. While sustainable farming and community resilience programming may benefit specific communities where water is scarce, such approaches do little to address the broader context of Iraqs water crisis. Iraq has complex state-run water infrastructure with dozens of dams, layered irrigation systems and reservoirs. Water levels in the dams of the Kurdistan Region directly impact water levels in Basra. To make a meaningful difference in correcting problems in water quantity and quality, Iraqs crumbling water infrastructure across the countrys varied regions requires urgent attention. For the international communitys efforts to count, they will have to avoid the pitfall of excessive localism and commit to sustained and holistic engagement at all levels of the federal and KRG water governance system.

The Iraqi government must lead and take the first step to develop and subsequently implement a comprehensive water strategy aligned with the realities of climate change. The Ministry of Water Resources has commissioned a study to assess the countrys water management policies and infrastructure. Simultaneously, the Ministry of the Environment is undergoing national strategic planning around climate change adaptation in coordination with U.N. agencies as well as the KRGs Board of Environmental Protection and Improvement.

In a country with widespread distrust in government and fatigue toward policy reports, many are anticipating that these strategic documents will effectively be shelved upon completion, never seeing the light of day in terms of actual implementation. Al-Sudani, the federal government and the KRG leadership have the opportunity to cooperate to develop a track record of championing services and development in accordance with their respective government platforms, while charting an actionable course for Iraq to minimize destabilizing impacts of climate change and water scarcity.

Mac Skelton is executive director of the Institute of Regional and International Studies (IRIS), American University of Iraq-Sulaimani (AUIS).

Zmkan Ali Saleem is a senior research fellow at IRIS, AUIS.

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Climate Adaption Key to Iraq's Stability and Economic Development - United States Institute of Peace

Joseph Samuels

Joseph Samuels

When I saw the photos and videos posted by Hamas murdering entire Israeli families, raping women and killing young people at a music festival on Oct. 7 I was horrified and shocked. These images ignited the flames of a dormant trauma I suffered 82 years ago in Baghdad, Iraq, when I was just 10 years old.

On June 1 and 2, 1941, two months after a pro-Nazi coup that plagued Baghdad, mobs aided by the police and soldiers broke into Jewish homes, raping women and girls and murdering Jews mercilessly in a rampage that came to be known as the Farhud an Arabic term for pogrom. Jews could not fight back, and there was nowhere to run and no country to seek refuge. This horrendous massacre occurred during the festival of Shavuot, a holiday celebrating the giving of the Ten Commandments.

My older brother, Eliyahu, unknowingly rode his bicycle to visit our cousins in the Old Jewish Quarter on the first day of the Farhud. The doors of my two uncles homes were broken in and the interiors were looted. Cycling back home through the main thoroughfare, Al Rashid Street, he witnessed a group of men stop a minibus, drag out the Jewish passengers, then rob and slaughter them. It still sends chills down my spine thinking of what he saw.

Thank God, my family was spared. The mob, who could be heard just blocks away, didnt manage to reach us before the British forces entered Baghdad on the afternoon of June 2. After the events, none of the perpetrators was accused or convicted.

I also heard stories of courageous Muslim men who stood in front of Jewish homes with knives, daggers and guns, risking their lives and preventing the mob from breaking into homes. Some took Jews into their own homes to protect them and took the injured to doctors. Some Muslim leaders condemned these brutal acts as heresy to Islam.

I was conflicted and confused. My father, a textile importer, always praised his Muslim customers as honorable, and my older brothers had very close Muslim friends. When I asked my father about this dissonance, he told me, Son, you must judge people by their individual actions, and not as a group. That was a lesson I carried throughout my life.

When I saw the pro-Hamas demonstrations that erupted after the Oct. 7 massacre, it brought memories of the events after the United Nations approved the partition of Palestine into two states, one Arab and one Jewish, on Nov. 29, 1947. The Jews of Iraq and other Arab countries prayed that the Palestinian leaders would agree to start a new country, the 23rd Arab country, and live alongside the newly created Israel. The Arab League, however, unanimously rejected the partition and declared a war to eliminate the Jewish state.

Frequent demonstrations took place in the streets of Baghdad, with screams of death to Zionists and calls to free Palestine. We feared another Farhud. We got lucky there were only a few skirmishes but the Jews of Aleppo, Syria, were raided by mobs, encouraged by the Syrian government, that looted and set ablaze homes, synagogues, schools and an orphanage in December 1947. An estimated 75 Jews were killed, and hundreds were injured.

We Iraqi Jews faced a dilemma. If the Arab armies won and eliminated the new Jewish state, there would be a second Holocaust. But if they lost, would the Iraqi leaders turn against us, their Jewish citizens that had inhabited the area for over 25 centuries?

On May 15, 1948, five Arab armies, including Iraq, attacked Israel. Against enormous odds, Israel survived. The shame of failure caused Arab countries to, indeed, turn against their Jewish citizens. In Iraq, Zionism was declared a capital offense. Jews were fired from government jobs, and accusations, arrests, tortures and imprisonments culminated in the public execution of a prominent Jewish merchant, Shafiq Addas, on Sept. 23, 1948. This brought fear to every Jewish heart.

I was accepted at three universities in America, but Iraq refused to grant me an exit visa. In December 1949, I got to Iran with the help of two Muslim smugglers. And two months after that, I arrived in Israel. I became a homeless, penniless refugee. I stood in line with a tin plate to get a free meal and slept in a tent anchored in the sand. However, I felt liberated for the first time in my life. The sense of freedom overshadowed the feeling of victimhood.

The continuous harassment, persecution, torture and execution in Iraq and other Arab countries forced 850,000 Jews to flee from their homelands. Jews lived in Iraq for more than 1,000 years before Islam conquered the region and for 1,300 years after. Presently, only about 6,000 Jews remain in Arab lands. They left their homes, businesses, synagogues, properties, everything. Like myself, they became refugees. But we all moved on. We had to learn a second language and were grateful to become equal citizens of the countries that accepted us.

This is not to say that the situation of the Mizrahi Jews who were made refugees after the creation of Israel and that of the Palestinians in Gaza are completely analogous. But it suggests that experiences of oppression and exile do not have to lead inevitably to the horrific events that played out on Oct. 7.

Hamas first order of business like ISIS, Assads Syria and other totalitarian regimes is to eliminate the opposition. Hamas mercilessly crushed the Fatah movement who were giving them a fight for the 2006 election. Today, they continue to discriminate against minorities, women and homosexuals.

As a Jew who survived the Farhud and who grew up with, and has, many faithful Muslim friends and who knows the hardship of being a refugee I cried for the massacre of Jews by Hamas. I also cried for the innocent Palestinians who were killed by Hamas for refusing to follow orders and join their movement. I pray that the Palestinian people will find the courage to stand up to Hamas and make it a priority to establish a democratic and prosperous Palestinian state.

Joseph Samuels is a board member of JIMENA, an organization dedicated to the preservation of Mizrahi and Sephardi culture and history of Jews from the Middle East and North Africa. He lives in Santa Monica, California.

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I Survived a Pogrom in Iraq 82 Years Ago. I Know Where Hamas ... - Jewish Exponent

BAGHDAD, Nov. 30 (Xinhua) -- Iraq will voluntarily cut oil production by 220,000 barrels per day (bpd) between January and March 2024, the country's oil ministry said in a statement on Thursday.

The measure was taken in coordination with OPEC+ and its allies to stabilize the global oil market, it added.

The ministry statement came hours after OPEC+ oil producers on Thursday agreed to voluntary output cuts of about 2 million bpd for early next year to bolster the market.

On April 2, the ministry said Iraq would voluntarily cut oil production by 211,000 bpd from May until the end of this year.

Oil prices rose after the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine conflict in February last year, benefiting oil-exporting countries, including Iraq. However, oil prices declined in the past few months due to fears of lower demand in global markets.

Iraq's economy relies heavily on crude oil exports, which account for more than 90 percent of its revenues.

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Iraq announces additional oil output cut for Q1 2024 - Xinhua

The UKs export credit agency has secured 226 million in financing for the Iraqi government to develop over 350km of drainage infrastructure as well as 15 stormwater and wastewater lifting stations near Hillah city.

Upon completion, the project is expected to help over 25,000 households access clean water in the wider Al-Hillah district, where wastewater is not currently treated.

Supported by UKEFs financing agreements, UK exporters will provide almost half of the projects content, including specialist equipment and installation.

The UK government has secured financing for the construction of a drainage network over 350km long which will bring clean water to tens of thousands of residents in the Al-Hillah district of Iraq, to the south of Baghdad.

The financing comprises a guarantee for 113 million in financing arranged by Standard Chartered Bank, as sole Structuring Bank, Mandated Lead Arranger and Agent, and a 113 million direct loan from His Majestys Treasury.

UK Export Finance the governments export credit agency has ensured that the government of Iraq can access 226 million in financing to fund the project, which will be transformational for a district currently unable to treat wastewater.

Upon completion, the network is expected to process up to 20 million cubic metres of water each year, bringing clean water to over 25,000 households and improved sanitation to hundreds of thousands.

The transaction is expected to support over 100 million in UK export contracts, which make up almost half of the total project value. Turning to the country which gave the world its first modern sewage system, the project will procure equipment and related installation services from the UK.

With their deep expertise across a range of sectors, UK exporters are leading partners for overseas governments seeking to deliver transformational projects. Works in Al-Hillah will help to bring clean water to tens of thousands of people in Iraq, showing how UK Export Finance can unlock financing and UK innovation for sustainable development around the world.

We are proud to provide UKEF-backed financing for our important client, the Iraqi government, to improve sewage and drainage infrastructure for local communities in the Al-Hillah district, underpinning our here for good commitment to make a positive difference in the places we call home. Our UKEF financing capability and global network helped us deliver a unique and complex financing, collaborating with multiple companies from various countries.

The drainage network and water treatment systems will also reduce the local risk of diseases from poor sanitation and flooding from stormwater and the nearby Euphrates River. The project will in addition upgrade existing treatment systems so that they can create biogas and phosphorous by-products to support local agriculture.

Funds will go to the Government of the Republic of Iraq, allowing the Governorate of Babil to contract GCITJ Babel Limited, a UK joint venture, to deliver the works.

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UK businesses to build over 350km of new critical drainage system ... - GOV.UK