Archive for the ‘Iran’ Category

To save Iraq from economic collapse and fight ISIS, contain Irans proxies – Brookings Institution

The day after President Biden was inaugurated, Baghdad was hit by two suicide bombers who, in macabre fashion, killed at least 32 people and wounded at least 100. The attack was a stark reminder that the Iraq theater is still a critical one for combatting ISIS and preventing it from mounting a resurgence. With this in mind, U.S.-Iraq ties are worth salvaging after their deterioration over the past four years. ISIS is strongly positioned to carry out more routine mass-casualty attacks. While the January bombing was its first major terrorist attack in Baghdad in over three years, ISIS carries out near-daily attacks in the rest of the country and could develop a momentum similar to that which preceded its declaration of a caliphate in 2014.

There are two underlying challenges that makes ISIS capable of carnage and launching a resurgence: Iraqs desperate need for an economic revival and the threat from Shiite militia groups. Addressing both requires that Washington adopt a set of guiding principles for its engagement with Iraq an approach premised on the fact that Iraqs economic crisis and the threat from Iran-aligned Shiite militia groups are two sides of the same coin.

Iraqs economic crisis will produce untold poverty levels if it is not addressed. The COVID-19 pandemic, together with the decline in oil prices, has added to the urgency of stabilizing the precarious security environment and reviving the economy. According to the World Bank, 12 million Iraqis could soon become vulnerable to poverty. Iraq has a budget shortfall of around $4.5 billion monthly and debt in excess of $80 billion. At least 700,000 Iraqis enter the job market every year but struggle to find jobs.

In this environment of destitution and lawlessness, the influence of Iran-aligned militias will increase; their reach and strength within Iraqi society is underscored by a complex web of inter-personal and inter-organizational links that make their elimination difficult, if not impossible. Central to their predominance is their capacity to exploit socio-economic conditions to swell their ranks with the impoverished and reinforce their patronage networks. When combined with their ongoing and systemic violence against political rivals and the civilian population, this allows them to impose a stranglehold over Iraqs institutions.

On the surface, the Baghdad government has effectively outsourced security to some of these groups in the territories that were previously occupied by ISIS, but in reality the government is too weak to confront them and impose its authority in strategically important territories. The militias are disdained by the local population as a result of their human rights abuses and ongoing sectarian crimes. This allows ISIS to exploit the resulting grievances and cracks in the security environment, and potentially mount a resurgence.

These militia groups also lack the professionalism and discipline to contain ISIS their primary focus is not to secure ISIS defeat, but to secure broader political and territorial objectives, in direct coordination with Iran. Mondays rocket attack on Erbil by Iran-aligned groups shows that they will continue undermining the coalitions efforts to secure the enduring defeat of ISIS. In addition to consolidating their control over illicit economies, the militia groups are augmenting their bastions in Iraqs north. From places like Sinjar, the militias and Iran can pursue cross-border objectives in Syria.

Under President Trump, U.S.-Iraq relations were volatile. While the Biden team in charge of the Iraq portfolio should not emulate the Trump administrations stance regarding Iran and its proxies, it should not assume either that long-term security-sector reform efforts will actually rein in these actors. Biden should focus on empowering Iraqi actors who can hold Iran-aligned groups to account, and who can constrain their ability to shape Iraqs political, economic, and security environment. In the process, Washington can enable economic reforms that will reduce those groups stranglehold over the state.

While there was some hope that security sector reform would result in the integration of Iran-aligned militias into the armed forces, as well as their demobilization and disarmament, this has proven to be a costly miscalculation for which the average Iraqi is paying the price. Through their control of the Popular Mobilization Force (the 100,000-strong umbrella militia organization led and dominated by Irans proxies, which was integrated into the state in 2016), the interior ministry, and an array of other militias, Iran-aligned groups exert undue influence over the Iraqi state. They coerce or kill champions of reform and good governance such as Hisham al-Hashimi and Riham Yaqoob.

These groups have also assassinated government officials and are responsible for killing at least 700 protesters and wounding thousands. Yes, Iraq has an array of armed groups as a consequence of its recent history and its pre-war legacies but it is this particular group of militias that negotiates with its rivals through systemic violence, including assassinations, rocket attacks, and improvised explosive device attacks on coalition personnel. And it is this group of militias that, at Irans bidding, attacks prospective and much-needed investors from the Gulf to prevent Iraq from developing its relations with the Arab world and saving its economy in the process.

The Biden administration has an opportunity to establish new guiding principles for its relations with Iraq. It should focus on possible near- and medium-term wins.

Washington should view two issues as interconnected: its economic support for Iraq and the threat that the Baghdad government faces from Iran-backed militia groups. The resources and energy it spends on Iraqs institutions must no longer indirectly empower the actors that use violence to shape the direction of the political environment. That also means U.S. military support which is designed to strengthen the Baghdad government so that it can undertake the economic regeneration of the country free from the threat of violence must not become an enabler of militia violence. For example, U.S. Abrams tanks and other equipment supplied to Baghdad in the past are now in the hands of Irans deadliest and most powerful partners. Iraqs protesters, civil society, and wider population pay the price.

Washingtons counterterrorism strategy, in coordination with Baghdad, should seek to address Iran-backed militia atrocities in addition to the threat of ISIS. The former ultimately enables the latter. As part of this, Washington should pressure Baghdad to stop expanding the purse that allows militia groups to grow. Iraqs federal budget proposal for 2021 has been criticized. As my Brookings colleague Marsin Alshamarys analysis shows, it proposes to increase the budget allocation for the Ministry of Defense by 9.9%, the Ministry of Interior by 9.7%, the Counter Terrorism Force by 10.1%, and the Popular Mobilization Forces by a staggering 45.7% from the previous budget of 2019.

Irans allies and enablers in Baghdad have sowed confusion and distorted their own complicity in human rights atrocities by adding more militia groups to their growing network of partners. They blame these so-called rogue groups for human rights violations, rocket attacks, attacks on protesters, and assassinations. The Biden administration should not fall for this sophisticated effort to create a degree of plausible deniability that allows them to escape culpability.

Washington should also help the Iraqi security forces insulate reformists from the threat of intimidation and assassination, to include politicians and activists. As a start, the U.S. should work with Iraqi civil society to improve its capacity to expose the nexus between Irans proxies and their front groups, a key part of the accountability process. This could empower (and pressure) Kadhimi to take more action on Irans proxy network in Iraq, and pressure the judiciary to act.

The reason its so important to promote broad reform in Iraq is because, as I wrote last year, economic revival will diminish the resources and manpower that Iran-aligned groups depend on. Iraq must work to erode the patronage networks that allow them to exploit the impoverished, and improve accountability and transparency to constrain their ability to carry out atrocities with impunity. The U.S. should support the pillars of economic regeneration including the prime ministers office, the finance ministry, and the Trade Bank of Iraq, among others to enhance Iraqi efforts vis--vis strategic partnerships with the Gulf, financial assistance from the International Monetary Fund and World Bank, and the establishment of a modern banking infrastructure in the country.

Iran-aligned militias are a major political force as much as they are a military one. Prime Minister Kadhimi should avoid making rivals out of political actors that also want to contain these groups. U.S. engagement with Iraq should consequently focus on mediation between actors that have strong ties to Washington. Efforts to ensure these groups are unified on critical policy issues like revenue-sharing agreements, budget allocations, and the disputed territories should be central to U.S. engagement with Iraq. Moreover, Washington should not be averse to the idea of making support to the Kadhimi government conditional on its ability to reconcile at least some of its differences with U.S. aligned groups. Otherwise, short-term support for Iraq risks becoming either sunk costs, or long-term gains for Iran-aligned groups.

Iraqs struggle with its Iran-aligned militia groups is very multifaceted, and no one policy solution out of Baghdad or Washington will be enough on its own. But given the way these groups exploit Iraqs dire economic situation, in particular, economic reform from within and support from without should be considered a key part of the overall response to these nefarious armed actors.

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To save Iraq from economic collapse and fight ISIS, contain Irans proxies - Brookings Institution

Iran’s Next Step Raises Specter of War for Top Atomic Lawyer – Bloomberg

  1. Iran's Next Step Raises Specter of War for Top Atomic Lawyer  Bloomberg
  2. Iran to Tightly Restrict Inspectors' Access if U.S. Sanctions Not Lifted  The Wall Street Journal
  3. Iran to curb cooperation with nuclear watchdog inspectors  Al Jazeera English
  4. Iran's Khamenei demands 'action' from Biden to revive nuclear deal  Reuters
  5. Iran's uranium metal production is 'most serious nuclear step' to date, but deal can still be saved  CNBC
  6. View Full Coverage on Google News

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Iran's Next Step Raises Specter of War for Top Atomic Lawyer - Bloomberg

Husband of Irans ski coach bars her from leaving country – Home of the Olympic Channel

TEHRAN, Iran (AP) The Iranian womens Alpine skiing team flew on Wednesday to Italy for the world championships in Cortina dAmpezzo without their coach, whose husband has barred her from leaving the country, Iranian media reported.

The reports by the semi-official ISNA news agency and the pro-reform Shargh daily did not provide any details as to why Samira Zargaris husband had not allowed her to leave. Irans ski federation also did not offer any information.

Under Iranian law, husbands can stop their wives from traveling outside of the country.

Zargar is not the first married athlete whose husband prevented her from leaving Iran. In 2015, soccer player Niloufar Ardalan missed the Asian Cup tournament in futsal an indoor version of soccer after her husband confiscated her passport in a domestic dispute.

Womens sports largely disappeared from Iran after the countrys 1979 Islamic Revolution. Over time, however, womens sports gained in popularity, especially soccer. Social customs still come into the game though, as the countrys soccer team plays its games with players hair covered by traditional headscarves, or hijabs.

Two Islamic countries make the headscarf mandatory for women in public Iran and Saudi Arabia. FIFA overturned a yearlong ban against players wearing hijabs in 2012.

Four Iranian skiers are entered for the womens giant slalom race on Thursday at the world championships in Cortina dAmpezzo: Atefeh Ahmadi, Sadaf Savehshemshaki, Forough Abbasi and Marjan Kalhor.

They are part of a 99-skier field for a race in which the favorites are Marta Bassino and Federica Brignone of host Italy, Petra Vlhova of Slovakia and Mikaela Shiffrin of the United States.

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Husband of Irans ski coach bars her from leaving country - Home of the Olympic Channel

Iran: Suicidal inmate subjected to 60 lashes and at risk of amputation – Amnesty International

The Iranian authorities flogging of Hadi Rostami, an inmate at Urumieh prison in West Azerbaijan province, 60 times on 14 February 2021 is a gruesome reminder of the cruelty of Irans seriously flawed justice system, said Amnesty International, calling on the authorities to immediately quash his conviction and amputation sentence and provide him with the urgent medical care he needs.

A criminal court in West Azerbaijan province convicted Hadi Rostami of robbery in November 2019 following a grossly unfair trial marred by torture-tainted confessions and sentenced him to having four of his fingers amputated. In late 2020, while in prison, he was sentenced to 60 lashes and eight months imprisonment for disrupting prison order. This was in relation to his peaceful protest- including in the form of hunger strikes - against his inhumane prison conditions and repeated threats over the past two months that his amputation sentence would be implemented imminently. He is currently suffering serious health complications resulting from two recent suicide attempts.

The cruel lashing of an ailing, suicidal prisoner is another reminder of the inhumanity of Irans criminal justice system, which legalizes torture and other ill-treatment. The Iranian authorities are committing torture by leaving Hadi Rostami in constant fear of amputation and deliberately denying him urgently needed medical care for complications resulting from his recent suicide attempts, said Diana Eltahawy, Amnesty Internationals Deputy Director for the Middle East and North Africa.

We call on the Iranian authorities to quash Hadi Rostamis conviction and amputation sentence immediately and grant him a fair retrial without resorting to corporal punishments. They must also immediately provide him with the specialized physical and mental health care that he requires outside prison.

The cruel lashing of an ailing, suicidal prisoner is another reminder of the inhumanity of Irans criminal justice system, which legalizes torture and other ill-treatment.

In recent months, prison, intelligence and prosecution officials in Urumieh prison have summoned Hadi Rostami on numerous occasions, blaming him for the media attention on the cases of men in the prison who are at risk of amputation, and threatening that his amputation sentence would be carried out imminently.

All of this has taken a severe toll on his mental health leading him to attempt suicide twice most recently by swallowing pieces of broken glass on 18 January 2021.

According to information obtained by Amnesty International from an informed source, he remains in severe pain and continues to suffer internal bleeding and vomit blood because there are still pieces of broken glass in hisdigestive system. The prison and prosecution authorities are refusing to authorize his transfer to a medical facility outside of prison to receive the specialized medical treatment he needs. Despite contemplating self-mutilation and having suicidal thoughts, he is also not receiving any mental health care.

Medical services offered in Irans prison clinics are limited to basic forms of care such as measuring blood pressure, administering injections, providing intravenous fluids and prescribing medication. Prisoners who require further treatment have to be transferred to medical facilities outside of prison to receive it.

We call on the Iranian authorities to immediately stop such shocking acts of cruelty and mutilation and treat all prisoners with human dignity. The international community must urgently pressure the authorities to respect human rights, and to refrain from carrying out the amputation sentences of Hadi Rostami and others in Urumieh prison. The world must condemn, in the strongest terms, the ongoing use of corporal punishments by the Iranian authorities, said Diana Eltahawy.

Background

In September 2020, Amnesty International warned that Irans Supreme Court had upheld amputation sentences against four men, including Hadi Rostami, who had been convicted of robbery following unfair trials. In December 2020, the organization published information indicating that prosecution and prison authorities were preparing to bring a guillotine to Urumieh prison to carry out the amputation sentences of up to six men, but it appears that this has not occurred thus far. The six men at risk are Hadi Rostami, Mehdi Sharfian, Mehdi Shahivand, Kasra Karami, Shahab Teimouri Ayeneh, and Mehrdad Teimouri Ayeneh.

Cruel and inhumane punishments such as flogging and amputation constitute torture, which is a crime under international law and prohibited under Article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), to which Iran is a state party.

According to information gathered by Abdorrahman BoroumandCenter, from 2000 to 2020, the Iranian authorities amputated the fingers and/or toes of at least 129 individuals. This means that, on average, the authorities have amputated the fingers and/or toes of at least one person every two months.

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Iran: Suicidal inmate subjected to 60 lashes and at risk of amputation - Amnesty International

Iran-Taliban growing ties: What’s different this time? – Atlantic Council

Tue, Feb 16, 2021

IranSourcebyFatemeh Aman

Iran's Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif meets with Taliban political chief Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, in Tehran, Iran January 31, 2021. Wana via pool/WANA (West Asia News Agency)/Handout via REUTERS ATTENTION EDITORS - THIS IMAGE HAS BEEN SUPPLIED BY A THIRD PARTY

It could not have been a more striking picture: a Taliban delegation visiting Tehran in late January and being received by senior Iranian officials. They reportedly discussed relations between both countries, the situation of the Afghan migrants in Iran, and the current political and security situation of Afghanistan and the region.

The presence of a Taliban delegation in Iran was shocking to many. However, Saeed Khatibzadeh, spokesman for the Iranian foreign ministry, stated that the Afghan government was notified in advance of the trip. Afghanistans foreign ministry confirmed that Tehran had in fact sought the Afghan governments views in advance. The official Afghan statement went on to say, Iran wants to make sure that a post-conflict Afghanistan will not be a safe haven for terrorist groups [but] will remain a center of regional and international cooperation.

This was not the first time that Taliban leaders had visited Iran. Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, director of the Talibans diplomatic office in Qatar, met with Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif in Tehran in November 2019. It was a trip aimed at helping Afghan peace and security.

According to Zarif, who met with the Taliban delegation on January 31, political decisions cannot be made in a vacuum and an inclusive government must be formed in a participatory process and needs to consider all fundamental structures, institutions, and laws, such as the constitution.

Inviting the Taliban to Tehran: A hard sell for Iranian leaders

Since 1996, when the Taliban seized control of Afghanistan, Iranian hardliners have often been called Irans Taliban. In fact, during the 2009 post-election protests known as the Green Movement, Iranian demonstrators chanted, Down with the Taliban, in Kabul or Tehran. Fast forward twelve years later and Iranian authorities had to justify the actual presence of the Taliban delegation in Tehran.

The trip did not sit well in Afghanistan either. The Afghan public does not react well to the perception that their countrys neighbors support the Taliban, which has been responsible for the deaths of countless journalists, students, and other civilians.

Now the Iranian government must sell the importance of Irans involvement in the Afghan peace process and create a more acceptable image of the Taliban in order to portray them as a serious negotiating partner.

Its attempts so far have not been very successful. On January 27, a tweet by Ali Shamkhani, the secretary of Irans Supreme National Security Council, raised an eyebrow among Afghan officials. Shamkhani tweeted that: In todays meeting with the Taliban political delegation: I found the leaders of this group determined to fight the United States. The Iranian Labor News Agency also quoted Shamkhani as saying: Iran will not recognize any group aiming at coming to power through war, emphasizing the necessity of participation of all ethnicities in determining the fate of Afghanistan through an absolutely peaceful process.

The damage was done, however. Iranian and Afghan social media users pointed out the Talibans previous statement [which contradicted Shamkhanis] that the group is in daily touch with American military. Meanwhile, Yasin Zia, Chief of the General Staff of the Afghanistan National Army, criticized Shamkhani on January 28, saying that Unfortunately, your understanding of the ongoing war in Afghanistan is incorrect. The Taliban is not fighting the Americans but the Afghan people. We act decisively against any group of enemies of the Afghan people.

Iran has also tried to offer its services as a potential middleman. On February 2, Special Representative of Irans foreign ministry, Mohammad Ebrahim Taherian, met with Afghan officialsincluding head of the High Council of National Reconciliation Abdullah Abdullah and Afghan Foreign Minister Mohammad Haneef Atmarin Kabul, in what appeared to be an attempt to mediate between the Taliban and the Afghan government. Abdullah praised Irans position toward Afghanistans peace process and its role in securing peace.

Irans changing view of the Taliban

The Iranian government has not always been on cordial terms with the Taliban. In 1998, Iran almost went to war with Taliban-led Afghanistan, when the Taliban murdered nine Iraniansone journalist and eight diplomatsat the Iranian consulate in Mazar-e Sharif. After the US invaded Afghanistan in 2001, Iran cooperated fully with the US and was highly active in the post-Taliban formation of the Afghan government. It mediated between Afghan warlords who seemed irreconcilable to each other and brought them to the reconstruction conference in Bonn. Iran, the country that for many years hosted various Afghan warlords, expelled Gulbuddin Hekmatyar due to his hostility toward the US.

In January 2002, things changed, however. President George W. Bush branded Iran, along with Iraq and North Korea, as the axis of evil in his State of the Union address. That may have been the genesis of Irans contact with the Taliban. Fearing a possible attack from the US via Afghanistan, Iran provided the Taliban with improvised explosive devices (IEDs) to assist its insurgent campaign against the US occupation. Iran came to view the Taliban as a way to weaken the Americans but did not support the group at the expense of Afghan stability.

Then came the emergence of the Islamic State Khorasan Province (IS-K) in 2015, a group many times more brutal and violent than the Taliban. As Iran lost confidence in the Afghan governments ability to defeat IS-K, it turned to the Taliban. High level contacts between Iran and the Taliban ensued. For example, former Taliban leader Mullah Akhtar Mohammad Mansour was killed on May 21, 2016 by a US drone attack while Mansour was returning to Pakistan after a long stay in Iran. Later, these contacts became public, with Tehran stating that the Afghan government was always notified of meetings between Taliban and Iranian officials. Interestingly, on December 26, 2018, Shamkhani justified the meetings by describing the threat of the IS-K presence in Afghanistan as serious.

Current Taliban-Iran ties

At this point, neither the US nor the government of Afghanistan can deal with the Taliban alone, as neither has enough leverage. At the same time, it is in the interest of the entire region that Afghanistan not become a haven for terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda. A regional solution may be a lasting one that prevents Afghanistan from descending into chaos. Iran would be an essential player in such a project and it would be a political and security win for Tehran if it successfully mediates between the Taliban and the Afghan government. However, it is imperative that the Afghan government remain actively involved and does not feel excluded from Iranian efforts.

The truth is that the Afghan government, despite all its shortcomings, has been elected by the Afghan people. It has made achievements in areas such as womens rights and the rights of minorities that should not be sacrificed, and that, as Abdullah promised, should be reflected in the peace process.

Meanwhile, if the Taliban truly desires to be part of the Afghan governing structure, it must be willing to accept that times have changed since they came to power in 1996. Taliban leaders need to understand that to govern Afghanistan they need to win the Afghan peoples hearts and minds and understand that violent tactics will only increase their unpopularity.

The Taliban have frequently denied responsibility for the increase of violent attacks in Afghanistan over the past several months. However, the Afghan public does not believe their denials. The Taliban is not a unified group with a centralized leadership. There are several different factions within the organization, perhaps with varying understandings of power-sharing. There may be spoilers, both within the Taliban and foreign insurgentssuch as IS-Kwho oppose the peace talks. The Taliban, as a negotiating partner, needs to create visible and verifiable distance from these spoilers.

As the Afghanistan Study Groups February report stated, Iran does not want to see the return of a Taliban regime in Kabul. Iran cannot possibly expect to turn the Taliban into its proxy in the case that Afghanistan descends into civil war and there is a genuine ideological rift between Iran and the Taliban. Moreover, it is in Tehrans interests to have a stable Afghanistan as a neighbor.

Regional cooperation might be the only solution to reach a lasting peace for Afghanistan and, in that regard, Iran may be able to help.

Fatemeh Aman is a non-resident senior fellow at the Middle East Institute. She has written on Iranian, Afghan, and broader Middle Eastern affairs for over 20 years.

Thu, Feb 11, 2021

The de-listing of Iranian economic entities that were designated as terrorist entities could spark a broader debate on the overarching US approach to Iranian support for regional armed factions.

IranSourcebyKenneth Katzman

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Iran-Taliban growing ties: What's different this time? - Atlantic Council