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Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the former Iranian president, once declared to the world: In Iran, we dont have homosexuals. In Iran, we dont have this phenomenon. I dont know who has told you we have it. Ahmadinejads remarks at Columbia University were met with much laughter and criticism at the time. Ironically, however, his claim is not far from the truth. This narrative is reflective and representative of the states policies and practice that, in fact, do not support a homosexual subject. Conversely, despite how this subject is named, same-sex relationships have historically existed and continue to subsist/persist even in todays toxic environmentthough silenced and under-recognized. This is precisely because every cultural apparatus, from families to society to the government and judiciary, deny their sexual identity and human rights.

Human-rights campaigners report that over 4,000 members of sexual minorities have been executed since the ayatollahs seized power in 1979. However, it is estimated the number and frequency of executions is much higher due to the fact that queer Iranians are often condemned under the charges of rape, fraud, or treason in order to justify their criminality. These camouflaged charges appear to allow the Iranian government to conceal the punishment of queer citizens, thereby continuing to curtail sexual minorities rights to life and security as well as obscuring from reports the circumstances surrounding their executions.

The religious fundamentalism that characterizes the attitude of the Iranian judiciary toward homosexuality is longstanding. To contextualize the strict upholding of such judiciary practices one must first consider the ideology of the Islamic Republic as it is embodied in its religious and political leaders. Within months of the 1979 Iranian revolution, the birth date of the Islamic Republic, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeinithen the highest-ranking political and religious authority in the Islamic Republic of Iran, and its supreme leadercalled for homosexuals to be exterminated. They were to be understood as the parasites and corruptors of the nation who spread the stains of wickedness.

Makwan Moloudzadehs bitter trial and execution is testament to the harshness of this central tenet of regime ideologyone that Amnesty International deemed a mockery of justice. Makwan had been found guilty of multiple counts of anal rape, allegedly committed when he was only 13 years old. The alleged victims in his case withdrew their testimony, claiming to have lied under duress. Makwan also informed the court that his confession had been coerced, and pleaded not guilty. Most important, Makwan was only a minor and under Article 49 of the Iranian Penal Code, minorsthose who have not yet reached maturity [puberty] as defined by Islamic Laware exempt from criminal responsibility.

Nevertheless, according to Article 120 of the Penal Code, in cases of anal sex between men, the judge can make his judgment according to his knowledge, which is obtained through conventional methods. Accordingly, the judge relied on his discretionary powers under Article 120 to rule that Makwan could be tried as an adult. Both the seventh district criminal court of Kermanshah, and later the supreme court, found him guilty and ordered his execution.

Makwan was executed in Kermanshahs central prison Dec. 5, 2007, in the absence of medical evidence testifying to his state of maturity at the time of the crime, and in spite of widespread international uproar. Makwan was invisible throughout the proceedings to those who turned on him, to the prosecutor, the executor, and, most significantly, to the society and the status quo that stood idly by and witnessed it all.

***

Despite the official pronouncements that deny or discount the existence of homosexuals in the Islamic Republic, the existence of legal sanctions, militia actions and relationships indicate that whatever the official pronouncements, thousands of Iranians clearly self-identify as what we would term queers (whatever labels they themselves dare use), while many others engage in consensual same-sex acts. There are, of course, no official statistics regarding the size of Irans queer population. They are visible in a number of Irans larger urban areas such as Tehran, Esfahan, and Shiraz. In the capital city, Tehran, for example, there are public and semipublic spaces known for being meeting places where Iranian queers may discreetly meet or gather. Some of these spaces, such as cafs and restaurants, are associated with the middle class or well-to-do, while others, including several well-known parks, are frequented by queers who have often been rejected by their families and are living on the fringes of society or are even homelessparticularly gay youth and men, as well as transgender individuals, who must resort to prostitution in order to afford basic needs.

Queer Iranians live in an atmosphere of uncertainty, peril, and pressure. There are various factors that contribute to their inhumane living conditions. First and foremost, the religious and patriarchal elements that are characteristic of the present Iranian Republic proscribes homosexuality as something to be feared and controlled. The penal code of the Islamic Republic of Iran is based on strict Sharia laws that reserve some of the harshest penalties for those convicted of same-sex sexual conduct. Furthermore, sexual minorities in Iran may face arrest as well as physical and sexual assault during detention, summary prosecution, and corporal punishment due to their consensual same-sex acts. Finally, familial and societal pressures to be other than themselves deprive Iranian queers of their dignity, leaving them stranded and invisible amidst their stark vulnerability.

Iranian queers fight for survival, liberty, and dignity begins first and foremost as a struggle for acknowledgement and existence. Iranian queers are often surrounded by friends and family who encourage and enforce heteronormativity; subjected to a socio-symbolic contract that largely supports homophobic Sharia laws, and are victims of judicial proceedings that falsely prosecute and convict them because of their sexual orientation. The true lives of queer Iranians are readily hidden, sheltered, or censored from public appearances. It is almost as if they do not exist.

As Farshad, an Iranian gay man, put it: Since the moment you realize you are gay or that you belong to an LGBT subgroup, you know that you will be discriminated against. One form of discrimination is that your identity as a human being is denied. They deny your right to be a human being, because you know that if you speak of your rights, terrible things might happen to you. Your family, your society, your government, your friends, and your workplaceall of them might do terrible things to you. Discrimination could be everywhere. Certainly, what I witnessed and experienced has always existed [in the society]. The heaviest discrimination is to live under constant suppression. You cannot express who you are, what you want, or what you believe in, and you cannot talk about your sexual orientation.

Even under the reformist government of President Mohammad Khatami, the Islamic judiciary remained one of the bulwarks of religious conservatism in Iran, a judicial and legal status that was strengthened under the hardline rule of Ahmadinejad. In fact, the argument against any recognition of civil rights for sexual minorities is reiterated as an unassailable cultural, religious, and ideological cornerstone of the state itself. In January 2012, in a meeting with the head of the human rights commission of the German parliament, Dr. Mohammad Javad Larijani, the international adviser to the Iranian judiciary, referred to homosexuality as a perversion and a form of sexual disease [that is] not acceptable to Iranians. Consequently, any discussion of the rights of homosexuals in Iran with Western officials has been superficial and fleeting. Admittedly, nation states have always responded to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in varying degrees. Yet, Larijanis staunch position to curtailing sexual-minority rights for cultural reasons is deplorable and clearly contrary to the declaration.

In Iran, the penal code proscribes same-sex sexual expression and imposes harsh sentences. A man found guilty of kissing another man with lascivious intent is punishable by up to 60 lashes of the whip (Article 124). Likewise, tafkhiz or nonpenetrative sex and other sexual behavior between two men are punishable by 100 lashes for each partner. Four convictions of tafkhiz may lead to the death penalty (as does sexual penetration). The penal code further stipulates that if two men, unrelated to one another, lie, without necessity, naked under the same cover, they will each be punished by up to 99 lashes of the whip (Article 123).

It is important to note that there are many negative repercussions of the morality laws in Iran. Moreover, the rigorous enforcement of the laws results in disproportionate harm to GLBT people in Iran in comparison with other laws applying to Iranians generally. Sexual minorities are singled out for such treatment and for the deprivation of their human rights.

This is a brief summary of the discriminatory penal code as it is regularly and rigorously enforced. As recently as May of 2012, an Iranian court sentenced four menSaadat Arefi, Vahid Akbari, Javid Akbari and Houshmand Akbarito death by hanging for sodomy. London-based Iranian human-rights lawyer Mehri Jafari pointed out:

There are two important issues in this case: the location of the alleged occurrence [all from the town of Choram in Kohgiluyeh and Boyer-Ahmad Province] and the interpretation of the Sharia law that a hodud (strict Sharia punishment) is eminent. Kohgiluyeh and Boyer-Ahmad is one of the most undeveloped provinces in Iran, and it is obvious that a lack of access to lawyers and fair trial can be considered a serious issue in this case. After this announcement, it is very likely that the execution will be carried out soon, and the remote location makes it difficult to exert any influence on the process.

On the observation about access to lawyers, it is worth recalling that judges are enabled to bear in mind their own view of facts, regardless of any defense. They may also consider confessions extracted through coercion that would be excluded in court proceedings in most jurisdictions. Presence of informed legal counsel, a right in such jurisdictions, is therefore not always supportive of human rights as a result.

The law is equally punishing for Iranian lesbians. According to Articles 129 and 131, the punishment for mosaheqehsexual relations between two femalesis 100 lashes for each of the first three offenses, and the death penalty for the fourth. According to a report by Amnesty International, the Iranian Supreme Court issued a quick verdict of execution for Atefeh Rajabi Sahaaleh, the 16-year-old female who had confessed to her crime for the fourth conviction of mosaheqeh. Based on eyewitness accounts, as Atefeh was taken to the crane for execution, she repeatedly asked Allah for forgiveness. When asked later why [the] case was rushed, [the judge] was reported to have said that, in his opinion, there was too much immorality in Neka, Atefehs hometown. The case of Atefeh illustrates the complete discretion conferred to judges in Iranian courts to disregard rules of evidence and render decisions based on personal attitudes toward homosexuality.

People charged with sexual crimes often endure summary trials that do not adhere to principles of fairness. In so-called morals cases, such as those aforementioned, the stringent standards of evidence are likely to be flouted by the judiciary in the name of protecting cultural and religious standards. For example, according to Article 117 of the penal code, the witness of four just men who have observed the act proves the crime of sodomy. Given that judges may draw from their own views of circumstances, this provision opens the way to slander and rumor from others.

LGBT Iranians have also reported accounts of physical and psychological abuse during detentionincluding the threat and use of torturein order to extract confessions as evidence of homosexual conduct to be adduced in Iranian criminal trials. In 2002, Irans Guardian Council of the Constitutiona committee of 12 senior clerics who oversee all judicial, governmental, and parliamentary legislationvetoed a bill passed by the Iranian parliament that would put limits on practicing torture and presenting confessions obtained from it in judicial proceedings. Yet the proposed bill also stated that political dissidents and homosexuals were exempt from the proposed limits on torture. With that bill, the Iranian government clearly acknowledged that protection against torture should be provided, but that sexual minorities are undeserving of such fundamental legal protection.

A Human Rights Watch report documents instances in which police and the militia have allegedly physically and sexually assaulted individuals before obtaining an arrest warrant. Several of those interviewed spoke of how they had been sexually assaulted or raped during detention. (It might be added that gay Iranians are also abused by police and morality authorities in public, not just while in detention.) According to a July 2012 email from Ahmad, a queer Iranian who lives in Canada, to IRQR,

I was arrested in a gay birthday party in Iran by basij [the militia]. I was taken to police station and I got raped there while I was in the detention center. The guy told me that I could enjoy my life from now on as a faggot. I find out that I became HIV-positive three months later when I wanted to donate blood.

Farshid, another gay Iranian interviewed by Iran Human Rights Documentation Center, also vividly recalls his rape by two members of the militia. He was initially arrested under the pretext that he was wearing what to the militia was inappropriate clothing. He was eventually taken to an unknown residential apartment where he was severely beaten and raped by two senior officers:

There was a full bathroom on that floor. The bathroom was large and its floor was covered by ceramic tiles. First the younger one raped me. Then the older one did the same. All that time I was very afraid that they would kill me after raping me out of the fear that they could get caught. Nobody had their number or any other information leading to them.

***

Endemic homophobia in Iran also stems from the teachings of Islam as provided in Sunnah and Sharia. When serving as the head of the supreme council of the judiciary, Ayatollah Musavi-Ardebili noted the most severe punishments as befitting the Islamic prohibition against homosexuality. While delivering a sermon at Tehran University in 1990, he remarked:

For homosexuals, men or women, Islam has proscribed the most severe punishments. Do you know how homosexuals are treated in Islam? After homosexuality has been proved on the basis of Sharia, the authorities should seize him [or her] they should keep him standing, and should then split him in two with a sword, cut off his head at the neck or split the head. He will fall down. They get what they deserve.

It is evident, therefore, that the authoritative and flawed practice of justice in the cases of Makwan and Atefeh above is the connected to the prevailing attitudes defining the core of the Islamic Republics religiosity, and to its opposition to what it continuously strives to mount as its irreconcilable exterior: homosexuality.

Discrimination against sexual minorities is arguably one of the main tenets of the legal and ideological discourses of the Islamic Republics regime. These discourses squeeze out minority expression and make the GLBT community virtually invisible, if for no other reason than the absolute prohibition from the communitys very identity. As one essayist has observed, the personal is political:

The logic behind the Iranian governments denial of the existence of homosexuals is simple: if something does not exist it is not eligible for basic human rights. The Iranian government denies LGBT Iranians a voice and does its utmost to prevent them from interacting with each other or speaking out in public.

Implicit in this observation is that certain basic rights, such as freedoms of association, assembly, and speech, are conditional upon conforming to the religious and legal beliefs and codes of the republic, or at the very least upon abstaining from expressing sexual identity and gender.

However, there is a wider current to the homophobic tide in Iran that reflects more than the ideological and legalistic rhetoric of the Islamic Republic regime. This current of public opinion that acts to restrict, conceal, and prohibit Iranian queers flows through the main body of Iranian society and enables homophobic state policies, actions and ideologies. At times, homophobia takes the form of plain-clothed religious volunteers, but most often it surges in places the LGBT Iranians call home, or spaces where they seek understanding and counsel, such as doctors offices or school classrooms.

***

Read more from Tablets special Iran Week.

Arsham Parsi is an Iranian LGBT human rights activist living in exile in Canada. He is the founder and head of the Iranian Railroad for Queer Refugees.

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Arsham Parsi - Tablet Magazine

Since the Syrian civil war began in 2011, Iran has been one of Mr. Assads chief allies, deploying thousands of Hezbollah and other Shiite fighters and providing other forms of aid to help him beat back Syrian rebels. Irans interests in Syria are thus markedly different from its interests in Iraq. In Iraq it has fought ISIS. In Syria, its focus has been on helping the Assad regime.

It is in Syria where the interests of Iran and the United States are most sharply at odds, and in Iraq where they most nearly converge. American and Iraqi security forces have just about driven ISIS from Mosul, a major Iraqi city. In Syria, America is also seeking to crush ISIS, but is doing so in concert with Syrian opposition forces, not Mr. Assad, whom it has long opposed.

As in Iraq, the fight against ISIS is going well; ISIS is close to being routed from its headquarters in the city of Raqqa. But the prospect of victory has opened the door to new tensions between American-led forces and Iranian-Syrian forces. That has manifested itself in a series of encounters this month in which the United States shot down a Syrian warplane, came close to shooting down another and downed two Iranian-made drones that were nearing American-backed troops on the ground. Iran, meanwhile, used ballistic missiles against ISIS targets.

ISIS now controls only about half the territory it once held in Syria, and, as the space shrinks, the various combatants are concentrating on a smaller area, along Syrias eastern border with Iraq and Jordan and in the Euphrates River Valley, home to oil reserves and water.

Administration officials suspect that Iran is more interested in controlling territory in these areas than defeating ISIS, and that the presence of Iranian and Syrian government forces could impede the American-led effort to finish ISIS off in Raqqa. It could also obstruct American plans to establish outposts in the Syrian and Western Iraqi desert so that fleeing ISIS fighters can be killed or captured, thus preventing them from hunkering down and later re-emerging as a threat, these officials say.

Adding to the combustible environment is Russia, the other major Assad defender, which threatened to retaliate to what Washington called its recent self defense moves by treating American planes as targets. Despite this, administration officials, reflecting a president who shares Saudi Arabias hard-line anti-Iran views, seem to consider Iran a bigger problem than Moscow and one that could threaten Israel, Jordan and other allies.

Could Mr. Trump stumble into a wider war in Syria? There are reasons to worry. He has yet to offer a comprehensive plan for dealing with Syria, including the diplomacy needed to develop a political solution to end the civil war, which could create a more stable country less vulnerable to extremist groups.

The fear is that Mr. Trumps demonizing of Iran, and his unwillingness to engage its government, could result in a broadening of the American military mission from defeating ISIS to preventing Iranian influence from expanding. This would be dangerous. Iran is a vexing state to be smartly managed, not assumed to be an implacable enemy.

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The Iran Puzzle - New York Times

In the past five weeks, U.S. forces in Syria have struck directly at the Assad regime and its allies in Syria no less than four times. On May 18, U.S. warplanes struck regime and allied militia forces that breached a 34-mile exclusion zone around a U.S. outpost in southeastern Syria. Then on June 8 and June 20, the United States shot down Iranian-made drones as they approached the outpost.

But the most dramatic event so far was the June 18 downing of a Syrian air force Su-22 by a U.S. Navy F/A-18 Super Hornet. This took place after regime forces attacked a town held by the U.S.-aligned Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) near Tabqa, in northern Syria. The Su-22 dropped bombs near the SDF fighters, ignored U.S. warnings, and was then shot down.

The downing of the Su-22 threatened to bring Washington and Moscow into conflict in the war-torn country. In the aftermath of the incident, Russia announced the end of deconfliction arrangements with U.S. forces and that it had decided to treat future U.S. flights west of the Euphrates River as hostile.

Syria is quickly devolving into a free-for-all. There is a high possibility of further friction among regional powers, as the Russians, Americans, and their various clients scramble to realize mutually incompatible objectives specifically in the areas of eastern Syria held by the now collapsing caliphate of the Islamic State.

So how did events in Syria reach this pass, in which direct confrontation between United States and Russia is no longer unthinkable? And what might happen next?

Syria has been divided into a number of de facto enclaves since mid-2012. But a series of events over the past 15 months has served to end the stalemate in the country, ushering in this new and dangerous phase.

Russias entry into the conflict in September 2015 ended any possibility of rebel victory and the overthrow by arms of the regime. Syrian President Bashar al-Assad with invaluable help from Russia, as well as Iran and its various militia proxies went on to clear the rebels out of the key cities of Homs and Aleppo. A diplomatic agreement establishing four de-escalation zones then consolidated regime control of western Syria.

This development has enabled the regime to divert forces to the effort to reassert control over the east of the country. As it does so, the regime is encroaching on a conflict from which it had previously been largely absent: the war between the U.S.-supported, Kurdish-dominated SDF along with other, Arab rebel clients further south and the now retreating jihadis of the Islamic State.

The confluence of interests between Damascus and Tehran on this battlefield is clear. Iran, whose proxies form the key ground forces available to the regime, wants to secure a land corridor through eastern Syria and into Iraq. The Assad regime wants to re-establish a presence on Syrias eastern border.

Regime forces are thus now advancing eastward on two axes: one from the town of Palmyra and the second from south of Aleppo. It was friction along the second axis, as regime forces closed up against areas controlled by the SDF, that caused the events leading to the downing of the Syrian Su-22.

A geographically inevitable contest of wills is developing between the regime and its associated forces as they drive east into Islamic State territory and U.S.-associated SDF and Arab rebel fighters, who also seek to control the former Islamic State areas. Moscows forces are an integral part of this regime push east, with Russian air power and Russian-supported ground forces especially present in the Palmyra offensive.

For a while, it seemed as though the United States and its allies had the upper hand. In mid-2016, the United States established a base in the Tanf area at which U.S. and allied special forces personnel have been training the Maghawir al-Thawra (Revolution Commandos) rebel group. This raised the possibility that these Western-supported Arab forces might link up with SDF fighters in the north. Together, they would then clear the Islamic State out of the Euphrates River valley, complete the conquest of Raqqa, and establish that they control the territory in question before regime forces could make an advance.

In order to decisively preempt this possibility, Irans Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), Hezbollah, and Assad regime and Iraqi Shiite militia forces on June 9 made a lunge for the Syria-Iraq border along a line north of Tanf, effectively dividing U.S.-supported elements from one another. Maghawir al-Thawra was trapped south of the new line established by the regime side, as the SDF still engaged the Islamic State far to the north. The rebels, if they wish to progress further, now need to break through regime lines to do so. That would be inconceivable without U.S. help.

Iranian and pro-Iranian regional media were quite frank about the intentions behind this sudden move. A report in the IRGC-linked Fars News Agency described the thinking behind it as follows: America wants to link the northeastern part [of Syria, which is controlled by the Kurds] with the southeastern part, which is why it has stepped up its activity in the al-Tanf area. The Syrian army and its allies, the article went on to say, defied American red lines in a military advance designed to thwart this strategy.

This is where the war currently stands. The latest reports suggest that the United States is in the process of beefing up its presence in the Tanf area. A new base is being built at Zakaf, 50 miles northeast of the town, according to pro-U.S. rebels. The United States has moved its High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) into southern Syria for the first time. Capable of firing rockets and missiles to ranges of nearly 200 miles, the system constitutes a significant increase in U.S. firepower on Syrian soil.

So where is it all heading? The downing of the Su-22 may serve, for a while at least, to demarcate the zones of U.S. and Russian air activity over the skies of Syria. But the real contest is the one on the ground. And here, the prize is the eastern governorate of Deir Ezzor, the site of a large part of Syrias oil resources. Does Russian President Vladimir Putins warning about American air activity west of the Euphrates mean that this area will need to be ceded in its entirety to the regime? Will the United States agree to this?

The Russians have no crucial interest of their own causing them to back the ambitions of the Iranians in the east. But for as long as the going is relatively easy, it appears that Putin also feels no special compunction to rein in his allies. Perhaps both Moscow and Tehran simply assume that American interest in the area is limited and hence that Washington will not take risks in order to counter red lines set down by other players.

The crucial missing factor here is a clearly stated U.S. policy. Trump can either acquiesce to the new realities that Russia seeks to impose in the air, and that Iran seeks to impose on the ground, or he can move to defy and reverse these, opening up the risk of potential direct confrontation. There isnt really a third choice.

Fars News Agency concluded its recent report in the following terms: The imbroglio in eastern Syria has only begun, and stormy days are ahead of us. In the face of much uncertainty, this point at least seems crystal clear.

DELIL SOULEIMAN/AFP/Getty Images

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Trump Is Tripping Over Iran and Russia's Red Lines in Syria - Foreign Policy (blog)

In 1979, just as the Shah of Iran was overthrown and the the reign of the ayatollahs began, a former Central Intelligence Agency operative named Kermit Roosevelt, the grandson of President Theodore Roosevelt, published his first-hand account of the covert operation he had led more than a quarter century earlier. Operation Ajax, as it was called, ousted the elected government in Tehran and put the previously deposed young monarch, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, back on the Peacock Throne.

Roosevelts book, Counter-Coup: The Struggle for the Control of Iran, made for compelling reading then and it still does. But, as often is the case with memoirs, its not very reliable history. And as President Donald Trump, many in Congress, a new head of Iran operations at the CIA, and the increasingly aggressive Saudis look for ways to overthrow the government in Tehran, its useful to look closely at what really did happen in the early 1950s.

Interestingly enough, thats precisely what the American government has just done with a project started years ago that came to fruition earlier this month.

Its described in the following report by Arash Azizi was published originally on IranWire.com, a partner of The Daily Beast:

The United States Department of State has published a much-awaited, newly-updated version of its official history of U.S.-Iran relations during the crucial period of 1951-1954, during and after the government of Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh, who was overthrown in a CIA-backed coup on August 19, 1953.

The U.S. role in the coup is well-established, and 17 years ago then-Secretary of State Madeleine Albright issued an official apology.

Additionally, the CIA released some of its declassified documents relating to the coup in 2013, at the same time admitting its official role in the course of events.

The new material, which was made public on June 16, is part of a Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) series published by the State Departments Office of the Historian. The publications are legally mandated to portray an accurate picture of U.S. diplomatic history.

The tumultuous U.S.-Iran relations in the early 1950s previously were covered in a volume published in 1989. But that volume, which focused on the U.K.s oil dispute with Iran after the latter moved to nationalize the assets of a British oil company, resulted in so much outrage due to its failure to include documents pertaining to the U.S. and British role in the 1953 coup that it led Congress to take it upon itself to pass new legislation.

As the introduction to the new volume states: In 1991, this reaction prompted the introduction and passage of Congressional legislation, updating the Foreign Relations statute and affirming the requirement that the Foreign Relations series shall be a thorough, accurate, and reliable documentary record of major United States foreign policy decisions and significant United States diplomatic activity.

The recently-published material focuses on covert operations carried out by both the Truman and Eisenhower administrations in Iran.

Todays release brings some closure to a long-standing dispute over the completeness of the FRUS volume related to Iran [between] 1951 and 1954, Siavush Randjbar-Daemi, Professor of Iranian History at the University of Manchester, told IranWire.

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He said the documents published on June 16 vindicate and confirm the existing research that points out the CIAs overall management and control over the August 16-19 1953 operation.

Coup leader General Fazollah Zahedi ransacked Mossadeghs residence and entered his office, all under the CIAs watch and guidance, according to Randjbar-Daemi.

One of the scholars whose work Randjbar-Daemi cited as confirmation of CIA direct involvement is Malcolm Byrne, a deputy director at the non-governmental National Security Archive and an authority on U.S.-Iran relations.

On the central question raised in recent yearswhether the CIA and the British intelligence played a leading role in organizing the coup or whether it was their Iranian partners who were responsibleByrne told IranWire:

There are some intriguing records of after-the-fact meetings that show both an American appreciation for the actions of various Iranian actors and a reaffirmation of the importance of the U.S. role. In other words, the point some of us have been making for a long time seems mostly to be borne outthat it was both.

Byrne says the newly released documents are very significant and that most of these records have been locked in government vaults for more than 60 years.

Byrne said the new material will likely help clarify some of the persistent ambiguities about the coup and related events. These materials may not have a tremendous amount about the mechanics of the coup [although there are some enlightening items]. But they will likely help to clarify some of the persistent ambiguities. They often take us considerably deeper into the details and allow for a more nuanced interpretation of events. This might even dissolve some myths.

Of special interest is a report on a debriefing session by Kermit Roosevelt in Washington, D.C., on August 28, 1953. The colorful U.S. author and secret agent had a key role in leading the U.S. efforts during the coup and went on to publish a definitive first-hand account of it.

The report contains some details which complete previous accounts of the extent of the handling of Zahedi by the CIA, up to the afternoon of August 19, Randjbar-Daemi said.

As has often been the case with this particular account of history, not all documents have been declassified for public view, even after the passing of almost 64 years. The declassification review for the material released on June 16 took 10 years (from 2004 to 2014.) At the end it was decided that 10 documents would be withheld in full, a paragraph or more to be excised from 38 documents and more minor excisions to be made in 82 other documents.

But was there a need to delay publishing these documents for so many years? Byrne doesnt think so.

Looking at these materials, as fascinating as many of them are, it is very hard to conceive of why they needed to be withheld from the public for so long, he said.

He went further, saying that the expectation that they would create temporary awkwardness for U.S. diplomats and policymakers should not come before the larger and long-term national interests of transparency, an informed public (not to mention an informed bureaucracy) and accountability, Byrne said.

The U.S. operation was codenamed TPAJAXwith TP standing for Tudeh Party, referring to the Iranian Moscow-aligned communists that had grown to be a major force in the 1940s and early 1950s. The newly-released documents seems to confirm the U.S. preoccupation with the Tudeh threat.

The primary driver of the American initiative against Mossadegh appears to have been the fear of a communist takeover of Iran, Randjbar-Daemi says.

Even after the coup was over, Frank Wisner, the fabled CIA agent, asked Kermit Roosevelt about measures being taken to further smash the apparatus and the machinery of the Tudeh Party.

Roosevelt reassured his supervisor, saying: Both the shah and Zahedi promised me that very rigorous measures would be taken.

As scholars pore over the documents, the Iranian public is also entering the fray.

One thorny issue is the role of Ayatollah Abolqasem Kashani, a leading political cleric who is revered in the official historiography of the Islamic Republic. Kashani has long been hated by nationalists for changing his allegiance from Mossadegh to the shah and the coup-plotters. Hours after the new documents were released, #Kashani and #Kashani-Coup were already trending on Twitter, with many calling on the Iranian government to change the name of a major Tehran street named after Kashani and some demanding changes in the school curriculum.

According to Randjbar-Daemi, the new documents actually shed little light on the large unknowns of the coup, particularly the role therein of Ayatollah Kashani, who is dedicated as a wily politician who remains at the center of the political scene before and after the coup, but who despised Mossadegh and Zahedi in equal measure.

He said the newly-released material does little to help clear up his exact role. The information on his agency and decision-making [during] August 16 to 19 remains scant and inconclusive, he said.

As always with historical narratives, the struggles and the fierce disagreements will continue, long after all the documents and material have finally all been released.

POST-SCRIPT: Kermit Roosevelt concluded his memoir by reporting a conversation he had in late 1953 with then-Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles. If we, the CIA, are ever going to try something like this again, said Roosevelt, we must be absolutely sure that people and army want what we want. If not, you had better give the job to the Marines! But Dulles wouldnt listen. The Agency embarked on multiple coups, many with bad or disastrous long-term results. It has also sent in Marines and massive American military forces to impose U.S. policies on countries as diverse as the Dominican Republic and Panama, Lebanon and Iraq. And indeed, Roosevelts triumphant reinstallation of the shah created a regime that barely lasted 25 yearsthe blink of an eye in the history of Iran and the Middle East.

Christopher Dickey

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Oblivious to History, Trump's Turning Up the Heat on Iran. He Should Look at the 1953 CIA Coup. - Daily Beast

From Zurich to Rome, there is striking new evidence that foreign investors are growing spooked by the risks of doing business with Iran. And they should be.

I was in Zurich last year after the signing of the nuclear deal sparked a gold rush by European governments and investors to cash in on the bonanza in Tehran.

At the time, organizers of the 2016 Europe-Iran Forum were brimming with much excitement about the post-sanctions opportunity laid out before them. Would-be-investors I talked to on the sidelines of the event were feeling bullish lured by the promise of a large and lucrative market and eighty million potential new customers.

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How much has changed in one year. At this years Europe-Iran Forum, slated for October, the admonition from organizers is prudence.

The unsettling reality in Iran is bringing some investors back down to earth because Iran isn't simply an emerging market with untapped potential. It's also the world's leading state sponsor of terrorism.

Even Iranian media are increasingly acknowledging the cloud of caution and uncertainty that looms over the global investment conferences that have served as the main vehicle for the regimes global road show.

The largest annual convention in Iran's petroleum industry, known as the Iran Oil Show, opened in Tehran last month without big names such as BP and Total present. The director of public relations at the National Iranian Oil Company noted that many top-flight oil companies, including BP and Total, did not want to participate in the 22 nd Iran oil exhibition this year and will only send their representatives to assess investment opportunities.

Empty and disused Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL Group) containers are seen at Malta Freeport in the Port of Marsaxlokk outside Valletta February 10, 2012. Darrin Zammit Lupi/reuters

One Iranian news report noted that the event was the antithesis of last year's exhibit, when oil giants visited post-sanctions Iran with high hopes for investment and collaborationA walk through the halls of the 22nd oil exhibition gives the uneasy impression that barely in one year, the international companies have grown noticeably reserved and reticent.

Examples of this dynamic abound:

A breakfast session at an upcoming conference on June 20 th in London, Investing in Iran: challenges and opportunities, promises to tackle challenges that remain sanctions, compliance, [and] on the ground practicalities noting that some sixteen months following the roll back of international sanctions, Irans investment potential is still to be fully realised.

The 2nd Iranian Consumer Summit in Paris, slated for September, will walk through Investment Guarantees: How to protect your investments if things go wrong?

At the Iran International Oil, Gas & Petrochemical Summit in Rome this July, topics will include 1) Avoiding common pitfalls and red tape, 2) ensuring compliance with US and international banking restrictions and 3) Conducting a risk assessment.

At issue is the invisible hand of sanctioned organizations like the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and its vast economic footprint.

According to the U.S. Treasury Department, the IRGC is Irans most powerful economic actor. It represents around one-sixth of the countrys gross domestic product and controls hundreds of front companies that mask its involvement in huge swaths of the economy.

Just consider the case of Taiwans Yang Ming, one of the largest cargo shipping lines in the world. In March, it confirmed to United Against Nuclear Iran, an advocacy group where I serve as an advisory board member, that it would stop its work at Irans largest container port by the end of April.

The layers of ownership are endlessly complex: One IRGC-controlled entity, the Tidewater Middle East Co., is blacklisted by the Treasury Department and operates in six of Irans ports and terminals: Assaluyeh Port, Bandar Anzali, Bandar Imam Khomeini Grain Terminal, Aprin Port, Amir Abad Port Complex, and Khorramshar Port.

That means foreign shipping companies could unwittingly become entangled by IRGC-controlled entities that have successfully masked their involvement in the industry paying loading, docking and other port fees to an internationally-sanctioned terrorist group.

Now, other companies operating at Iranian ports are in the crosshairs, including Evergreen Marine (Taiwan), Pacific International Lines (Singapore), Regional Container Lines (Thailand), Maersk (Denmark), Ignazio Messina (Italy), and Hyundai (Korea).

If Yang Mings announcement triggers a broader exodus, it could potentially deprive the worlds leading state sponsor of terrorism of a critical economic lifeline since they provide access to global markets, especially oil.

As a result, foreign investors risk enriching an internationally sanctioned terrorist group. Its risky business.

Giulio Terzi served as Italys Foreign Minister 2011-2013, and serves as an advisory board member of United Against Nuclear Iran.

Link:
Foreign Shipping Companies are Key to Iran's Prosperity - Newsweek