Archive for the ‘Iran’ Category

Iran’s Revolutionary Guard and the Rising Cult of Mahdism: Missiles and Militias for the Apocalypse – Middle East Institute

Ideology & Indoctrination: Manufacturing a More Radical Generation

Another unconventional feature of the IRGC that is consistent with its Islamist militia DNA is the emphasis it places on ideological indoctrination. Since its inception, the Guard has had a formal program of ideological-political training that seeks to radicalize its members, recruits, and their families. Over time the scope of this training has significantly increased and today it accounts for more than half of the required training for both incoming recruits and existing members.

Indoctrination in the IRGC became a key focal point for Khamenei following the 1997 Iranian presidential election after reports emerged that 73% of IRGC members had voted for the so-called reformist Khatami, despite the supreme leader endorsing hardline Islamist Ali Akbar Nategh-Nouri. Khamenei interpreted this as a sign that the Guards second generation (1990-2000) was less loyal to his authority and less ideologically committed. In response, in 2002, indoctrination for all Guardsmen and their families was rapidly increased to 20% of overall training in the IRGC. This figure would increase to 30% by 2007-08 and would account for around 50% after the 2009 anti-regime protests. It is worth noting that ideological assessments are at the core of the IRGCs promotion system, with preference being given to ideological commitment (tahhod) rather than technical expertise (takhasos).

This investment in increasing indoctrination has paid dividends for Khamenei and his hardline followers as the third (2000-10) and forth generations (2010-20) of IRGC members are among the most ideologically radical in the Guard. This extreme zeal has been demonstrated both outside and inside of Iran. The majority of Iranian volunteers who fought in the Syrian civil war to uphold the Assad regime, for example, were third- and fourth-generation IRGC members. The fact that the number of volunteers surged after Khamenei transformed Iranian intervention into a Shia jihad to Defend the Holy Shia Shrines is a strong indication of the ideological commitment of this younger IRGC cohort. Similarly, the unprecedented use of violence against protestors in Iran by the IRGC and Basij in the November 2019 anti-regime protests, which resulted in the killings of as many as 1,500 civilians over several days, compared to the Green Movement protests in 2009, when only 100 were killed over a month, also indicates that the IRGC is becoming more extreme.

IRGC Ideological Worldview

So what are the core tenets of the IRGCs ideology and indoctrination program? The Shia Islamist concept of velayat-e faqih (clerical rule) and clerical superiority underpins the IRGCs worldview. Tied to this is the key ideological pillar of exporting the Islamic Revolution to neighboring Muslim nations (ummah) through what is described as jihad in the path of God. The IRGC rejects the concept of the nation-state as a Western construct and instead divides territories between the dar al-Islam (land of Muslims) and dar al-Kufr (land of infidels). The ummah must be under the authority of the Imam or in his absence, his deputy: the supreme leader, thus legitimizing efforts to export the Islamic Revolution. A quick examination of the IRGCs ideological-political textbooks also reveals the way in which it views the U.S.: as an evil regime hellbent on world domination. This worldview sees the U.S. as the representation of all that is evil (jebeh-e batel) and puts the Islamic Republic of Iran on the side of everything good (jebeh-e hagh). Linked to this notion is the IRGCs other key ideological pillar of eradicating the State of Israel and Zionism. Like other Islamist ideologies, the IRGCs Shia Islamist worldview regards Israel as an illegitimate, oppressive, and usurping entity created in the heartland of the Muslim world to enable the West to achieve its supposed colonial goals. The liberation of Palestine through the destruction of Israel remains one of the IRGCs main objectives, and antisemitism pervades every aspect of its ideology. The IRGC itself has been explicit about its identity and what its members represent. A March 2022 publication entitled what is identity of the Revolutionary Guard outlined three characteristics in order of preference: 1) Guardians of Islam; 2) Soldiers of the Velayat (supreme leader); and 3) Sacrifices for the Revolutionary People. On the latter, the IRGC is clear that it serves the revolutionary people namely, pro-regime supporters and not ordinary Iranians.

It is important to note that the IRGCs Islamist ideology has also practically shaped its military tradition, doctrines, and strategy. More specifically, the Alavi and Ashurai pillars of the clerical regimes Islamist ideology have served as the foundation of the IRGCs overarching military strategy since its inception. Alavi refers to Ali, the first divinely ordained Shia imam, whose forces lost the Battle of Siffin in 657 CE against Muawiyah, the first caliph of the Umayyad empire. The Shia critique suggests that Ali was defeated because his army did not display loyalty to his orders. This is manifested in the IRGCs military doctrine as a demand for total obedience to the supreme leader and his orders (velayat-e madari). The Ashurai pillar is derived from the date on which Imam Hussein, the third Shia imam, led his small band of fighters against the massive army of the Umayyad Caliph Yazid at the Battle of Karbala in 680 CE. Although Hussein knew defeat was preordained, he sacrificed himself and his men to defend true Islam by taking on the Umayyads. The IRGC adopted this logic that oppressors must be challenged, whatever the result into Irans militia doctrine through a belief in acting on areligious commandment regardless of potential outcomes (taklifgarai). These ideological doctrines have been incorporated into the IRGCs overarching military strategy, in part to make up for its lack of advanced military technology and its reliance on human capital.

While all of these pillars of the IRGCs belief system have been assessed to varying degrees, one fundamental value of its ideology that makes up a significant aspect of its indoctrination has yet to be explored: the concept of Mahdism. Mahdism in the IRGC remains a complete blind spot for Western policymakers and experts, and yet its implications could have major consequences.

As a Shia Islamist force the IRGCs worldview hinges on Mahdism: the return of the 12th divinely ordained Shia imam, Muhammad al-Mahdi (or the Hidden Imam), whom Shia Muslims believe was withdrawn into a miraculous state of occultation (hiddenness) by God in 874 CE. The concept of Mahdism is rooted in the belief that Imam Mahdi will one day return to rid the world of evil and injustice. His coming will bring about "one final apocalyptic battle between two armies, in which Shias believe that Mahdi and his forces will prevail over evil.

The concept of Mahdism and the occultation of the 12th Imam emerged during the rule the Abbasid Caliphate (Al-Mutamid al 'llh) from the Shia ulema (clergy) primarily based in modern-day Iraq, Bahrain, and Lebanon. Muhammad al-Mahdi would assume the mantle of imam over the Shia ummah after his father, the 11th imam, Hasan al-Askar, was killed by the Sunni Abbasid Caliphate in 873 CE. Imam Mahdi was withdrawn into a state of occultation to protect him from suffering the same fate as his father. During this period (874-941) known as the Minor Occultation (gheybat-e soghra) Mahdi would appoint four special deputies (navab-e khas), who would act as his representatives and through which he would communicate and rule. In 941 CE, however, the fourth deputy would announce that after his death there would be no more specific deputies a message he claimed to have received from Imam Mahdi. The death of the fourth deputy in 941 CE would trigger the Major Occultation (gheybat-e kobra), whereby Mahdi would no longer have a specific deputy but all Shia clerics would become his representatives (nayeb-e aam).

Quietist Shia Political Doctrine: From the Safavids to the Pahlavis

Shia Islam was formally recognized as Irans official state religion during the Safavid Dynasty in 1501. Determined to attain religious legitimacy for their rule, the Safavids invited Shia clerics from Iraq, Bahrain, and Lebanon to consolidate Shiism in Iran and bless their leadership. However, even after the Safavids made Shia Islam the official state religion, the Shia political doctrine followed by the majority of the clergy ruled that any form of government during the Major Occultation was illegitimate. According to this notion, the only form of legitimate government was an Imamate (Shia Islamic state) and this could only exist under the leadership of the divinely ordained infallible imams. The consensus among the clergy was that the 12th Imam (or Lord of the Age) would appear upon his own accord, when injustice and evil captures the world. He would be accompanied by 313 special fighters, who would defeat evil in an apocalyptic battle, and act as the Shia ummahs savior against the non-believers. During the occultation, however, the clergys role would be to uphold Shia Islams interests only in the spiritual and religious realm, refraining from any political activism. This quietist political Shia doctrine, which began during the Safavid period, would last up until the fall of Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavis rule in 1979.

Irans Islamic Revolution: Preparing for Mahdis Return

The 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran led by Ayatollah Khomeini would fundamentally change the Shia political doctrine and Mahdism.

In the years leading up to Irans revolution, then exiled cleric Khomeini developed a theory of Islamic government that would transfer all political power to the Shia clergy. Khomeini outlined his plans for the creation of an Islamic state by reconceptualizing the doctrine of velayat-e faqih to legitimize clerical guardianship of the state. The ayatollah claimed that God had made Islam for it to be implemented as shown by the creation of divine law (sharia). Given that no one knew Islam better than the clergy (Islamic jurists), Khomeini argued, it was natural that they should rule as guardians of the state until the return of the 12th Imam. In the absence of the 12th Imam, velayat-e faqih would transfer all political and religious authority to a supreme clerical leader (mujtahid), who would have custody over the Shia ummah as the imams deputy (nayeb-e Imam) and Gods representative on Earth.

Khomeinis theory also reconceptualized Mahdism, reversing centuries of clerical quietism during the Major Occultation. Rather than silently waiting for the 12th Imams return, Khomeini argued, the 12th Imam was waiting for Shia Muslims to prepare the ground for his arrival. Shia Muslims, in turn, had to be politically active and form an Islamic government to prepare for Mahdis global revolution. After the 1979 Islamic Revolution, velayat-e faqih would be enshrined into Irans constitution and would underpin the Iranian state, with Irans supreme leader ruling as the 12th Imams deputy. Under this interpretation, the Islamic Revolution in Iran marked the first stage before the return of the 12th Imam.

Khamenei and the Mahdism Doctrine

Preparations for the return of Mahdi became more serious after Ayatollah Khamenei assumed the mantle of supreme leader in 1989. This appetite was initially shaped by the influence of Ayatollah Mohammed-Taqi Mesbah-Yazdi, a hardline Islamist cleric who was one of the main proponents and theorists of Khomeinis reinterpretation of Mahdism. This influence began to manifest itself in the late 1990s where Khamenei developed a doctrine around Mahdism. To prepare for the 12th Imams return, the ayatollah claimed it was necessary to create an ideal Islamic society based on Mahdism (jaameh-e mahdavi). Khamenei further developed this thesis a few years later. To lay the ground for the 12th Imams return, the supreme leader outlined five necessary revolutionary stages: an Islamic Revolution, an Islamic regime, an Islamic government, an Islamic society, and an Islamic civilization. According to Khamenei and his allies, Iran had only achieved the first two stages and was stuck on completing an Islamic government.

Ahmadinejad: The Government of Mahdi

The election of the hardliner Ahmadinejad as president in 2005 turbocharged Mahdism across the Islamic Republic. Ahmadinejad a member of the Basij was obsessed with the doctrine of Mahdism and finding ways to speed up the return of the 12th Imam. This is perhaps unsurprising given the fact that his spiritual leader was none other than Mesbah-Yazdi. As the new president declared, We have a mission to turn Iran into the country of the Hidden Imam.

Ahmadinejad would give special importance to the Jamkaran Mosque, which hosts the Well of Jamkaran, where some Shia Muslims believe the 12th Imam will return. Ahmadinejads administration would allocate$17 million in state funds to Jamkaran Mosque as well as expand its facilities, transforming it from a small mosque to a multimillion-dollar shrine. His administration would also spend around $8 million on refreshments for pilgrims visiting the Jamkaran Mosque for the celebration of Mahdis birthday. Ahmadinejad would go as far as constructing the Jamkaran Highway to connect Jamkaran Mosque directly to Imam Khomeini Airport in Tehran. In a meeting with the supreme leader, the president reportedly insisted on its construction so that in case Imam Mahdi reappears he could travel directly from Jamkaran to Tehrans airport without getting stuck in traffic.

While Ahmadinejads assertions were perhaps comical for audiences beyond Irans Islamist support base, the number of pilgrims to Jamkaran would reach in the millions during his presidency. The Ahmadinejad period would also result in the significant growth of grassroots heyats (Islamist institutions) and ideological preachers (maddahs or eulogists) across Iranian society. Maddahs are usually not clerics and have no religious education; rather, they are individuals who perform Shia mourning processions such as self-flagellation ceremonies and are known for their ability to evoke religious emotion. After the Islamic Revolution, maddahs became a central component of the ideological radicalization of IRGC and Basij members, and were instrumental in preparing Iranian soldiers often volunteers to launch martyrdom-seeking, human-wave attacks during the Iran-Iraq War (1980-88). Whereas the traditional Shia clerical establishment devotes more attention to Imam Ali and Imam Hussain, the maddah culture and class are fixated on Mahdism and praise for the Hidden Imam. The apocalyptic and revolutionary environment is fundamental to heyati and maddah culture. After the 2009 unrest period, the IRGC began to organize, mobilize, and promote maddahs by establishing the Basij Maddahs Organization, with the goal of monopolizing the heyat network across Iran.

The combination of increasing poverty and desperation would provide fertile ground for the emergence of a new form of state-backed radicalism among Irans hardline Islamist constituency, not least the youth. This new form of radicalism can be described as a Cult of Mahdism. This would go as far as proclaiming that Ahmadinejad was Shuayb bin Salih and Khamenei was Seyed Khorasani two individuals, who, according to historic Shia Islamic narrations, appear before Imam Mahdis return.

The Emergence of the Cult of Mahdi

The aftermath of Irans 2009 anti-regime protests, triggered by the rigging of that years presidential elections, would result in the Islamic Republic doubling down on its hardline Islamist ideology. To mitigate against future waves of protests, it was believed that the regime needed to nurture a more ideologically zealous generation of youth. This would provide fertile ground for radical proponents of Mahdism to fill. The rise of Ali Akbar Raefipour, the anti-Semitic conspiracy theorist and staunch advocate of Mahdism, would be a direct consequence of this. Raefipours extreme interpretation of Mahdism would gain huge traction among Irans Islamist youth (javanan-e hezbollahi) the core constituency from which the IRGC recruits. The rise of Raefipour was the direct result of support from the Ahmadinejad government and the IRGC. Today, his organization, the Masaf Institute, which states it has a goal of acquainting Muslims with Mahdist topics and teachings, is the direct recipient of IRGC financial support.

Perhaps more importantly, the post-2009 landscape also injected a new dose of radicalism about Mahdism into Khameneis close circle. This inner elite of hardline clerics began to view, understand, and communicate all contemporary world events in the context of Mahdism and its apocalyptic end of the times worldview (akhar al-zaman). Hojatoleslam Alireza Panahian, a hardline cleric in the Office of the Supreme Leader, close confident of Khameneis son Mojtaba, and an ideological trainer for the IRGC, would be instrumental in this regard. Like a younger version of Mesbah-Yazdi, Panahian would become one of the regimes key propagandists about Mahdism, placing particular emphasis on the warning signs of the nearing of the end of the occultation. For example, in 2020, he claimed the outbreak of the Coronavirus pandemic was the preamble to the reappearance of Mahdi, drawing parallels between COVID-19 and the all encompassing plague that Islamic scripture describes as a sign of the nearing of the end times. Such predictions were by no means restricted to Panahian though. In fact, in March 2022, Ayatollah Golpayegani, the head of the Office of the Supreme Leader, asserted support for Putins invasion of Ukraine and described it as a prelude to the reappearance of the Lord of the Age (Imam Mahdi).

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Iran's Revolutionary Guard and the Rising Cult of Mahdism: Missiles and Militias for the Apocalypse - Middle East Institute

How Soon Could Iran Have an ICBM? – 19FortyFive

Irans progress towards an ICBM. How close are they? Iran possesses the largest and most diversified ballistic missile arsenal in the Middle East. While this threshold certainly poses a significant threat to its neighbors, Irans capability to produce an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) is not entirely on the imminent horizon. However, the tremendous improvements to Irans weapons lethality and precision in the last decade should warn that the regimes ambitions are not limited. The current state of Irans ICBM progress is better dissected in three parts- the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corp. (IRGC) space program, collaboration with North Korea, and proxy warfare in the region.

Amidst the joint U.S.-Iran nuclear talks in Vienna this February, Iran unveiled its Khaybar Sheikan missile. With a reported range of 1,450 kilometers, this weapon could reach both U.S. bases in the region and Israel. A month earlier, Iran tested an engine for a solid-fuel rocket needed to launch satellites. The pure solid-fuel rocket design typically corresponds to ballistic missile systems. While these developments have been showcased publicly, the extent of Irans weapons programs is likely underground or hidden.

The unveiling of the new Khaybar Sheikan missile fell close to the anniversary of Irans National Space Technology Day, which commemorates the 2009 launch of its domestic-grown liquid-fuel Safir rocket. Based on North Koreas Nodong liquid-fuel rocket, the Safir was ultimately intended to carry nuclear weapons. While technical issues and challenges with the Safir have minimized its significance, Irans space program has become more alarming in recent years.

In April 2020, Iran launched its first successful military satellite, Noor-1 (light), carried by its own Qased three-stage space launch vehicle (SLV). This launch marked a turning point in Irans weapons development program for two reasons. First, Noor-1 was launched in coordination with the IRGC military space program. All space launches up this point had been carried out by the Iranian Space Agency, so the militarys coordination with the launch indicates broader resources are being poured into this sector. Second, the launch displayed a solid-fuel capability that could make Irans ballistic missile designs more lethal and sophisticated in the future.

Advancements in Irans space program could correlate to its potential ICBM capabilities in the long run. The regimes long-range missile designs will use the technology developed in its solid-fuel space programs to build launch vehicles and the guidance system for targeting and navigation. While inserting a satellite into orbit suggests a decently sophisticated guidance system, the successful reentry and warheads targeting is another matter.

While Irans exact progress in ICBM development cannot be characterized due to its lack of transparency, the states extensive proxy activities showcase its reliance on missile and rocket technology. Iran serves as a prominent hub for weapons proliferation, supplying militias and proxy groups all over the region with a constant flow of missiles and rockets. While Yemens Houthi rebels have been equipped with increasingly advanced ballistic and cruise missiles in recent years, Iraqs Shiite militias have received explosive-laden drones and rockets.

Iran relies heavily on its missile and rocket development programs to maintain its position as the largest proliferator in the region. The regimes prioritization of its weapons arsenal, covert activities, and advancing space program indicate while Irans ICBM capabilities may not be an imminent threat, it is certainly the regimes ambition. Currently, Iran doesnt possess any nuclear warheads, let alone those capable of use on an ICBM, but they are closing in on a viable warhead. If Iran takes a year after its nuclear breakout time to create a bomb, the regime would undoubtedly pour much of its resources into ICBM development to create a capable delivery system for their weapon.

Maya Carlin is an analyst with the Center for Security Policy and a former Anna Sobol Levy Fellow at IDC Herzliya in Israel. She has by-lines in a wide range of publications including The National Interest, Jerusalem Post and Times of Israel.

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How Soon Could Iran Have an ICBM? - 19FortyFive

At Annual Quds Day, Iran and Its Terror Proxies Call for Jihad Against Israel – Algemeiner

JNS.org Like every year at the annual Quds Day (Jerusalem Day) on the last Friday of the month-long Ramadan holiday, Iran and its proxiesHezbollah, Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, the Houthi movement in Yemen and Iran-backed militias in Iraqcalled for continued jihad against the temporary entity Israel.

According to the Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI) report, the events held this year on April 29 included conferences, rallies and processions in Tehran, Hezbollahs stronghold in Beirut and Gaza.

Furthermore, a Hamas delegation headed by a member of the movements political bureau, Khalil Al-Hayya, and Hamas official Osama Hamdan visited Iran and attended the main rally in Tehran.

The delegation, according to MEMRI, also met with Iranian officials, including the commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), Gen. Hossein Salami.

Salami stated: The latest developments in the Palestinian arena clearly reflect the fear of the Israeli entity and the might of the resistance. Thanks to the jihad fighters of the resistance, the [Islamic] nation is [now] a steadfast nation whose might causes the equations and the power balances in the region to shift. The Palestinian people realized that its goals will be achieved only through jihad.

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At Annual Quds Day, Iran and Its Terror Proxies Call for Jihad Against Israel - Algemeiner

Imagery Update: Iran Continues to Harden its New Natanz Tunnel Complex [1] – Institute for Science and International Security

by David Albright and Sarah Burkhard

May 5, 2022

This report is an imagery update of earlier reports on the construction progress at the new Natanz tunnel complex, located under a mountain south of the main uranium enrichment site. Commercial satellite imagery from March and May 2022 show new, long extensions at two tunnel entrances, likely to be covered by earth to further protect and secure the entrances. In parallel, construction inside the tunnel appears to be progressing steadily. Major excavation efforts appear completed, while tunnel lining work appears to be ongoing, as well as clearance activities for a possible fourth tunnel portal. It now appears possible that the site could be ready for initial operation in 2022. Based on official Iranian accounts, the new tunnel complex will house a new centrifuge assembly facility to replace the Iranian Centrifuge Assembly Center (ICAC) destroyed in an attack in July 2020. However, a recent Institute analysis found that the new tunnel complex will likely be more deeply buried than Fordow and have significantly more floor space, raising questions about other sensitive nuclear activities at the site, most worrisome, enrichment activities.

Construction Progress

Figure 1 provides an overview of the Natanz tunnel complex as of March 8, 2022, with three visible tunnel portals (two eastern portals and one western portal) and a possible fourth one being constructed. Newly visible since the Institutes January 2022 update are new extensions at two tunnel entrances, one at the western tunnel portal and one at the eastern auxiliary entrance.

Figures 2 and 3 show the tunnel entrances and their extensions in March, situated in a channel of excavated rock, allowing future coverage with earth and providing significant additional protection to the tunnel portals. By May 2022, the eastern tunnel entrance extension is covered, while the extension at the western main portal appears to be in progress (see Figures 4 and 5).

Water appearing to flow from the eastern main portal, previously visible in November 2021, is visible again in May 2022. It is unknown if the water is uncontrolled outflow from the eastern main portal, representing an unexpected construction challenge.

Surrounding spoil piles remained largely unchanged since November 2021, indicating that boring and excavation of the underground complex are largely complete. The addition of a probable concrete batch plant, continued presence of heavy construction equipment and usage of dirt roads, as well as previously visible probable shotcrete equipment indicate that the concrete lining of the complex walls is well underway and that final lining and reinforcement operations of the tunnel complex are ongoing. The possible fourth tunnel portal would likely be constructed relatively quickly and segue into the existing tunnel. A spoil pile associated with road grading and clearance of the area appears to grow quickly.

There has been no visible evidence of centrifuge manufacturing or centrifuge-related equipment being moved into the tunnel complex. It may be possible that such transfers could occur later this year or early next year.

Figure 1. A March 2022 overview image of the tunnel complex under construction south of the main Natanz enrichment plant.

Figure 2. One of the two eastern tunnel portals shows a likely permanent tunnel entrance extension, adding further protection to the entrance.

Figure 3. The western tunnel entrance also features a new entrance extension, likely to be covered by earth in the future, as of March 2022.

Figure 4. The eastern tunnel entrance extension is covered in May 2022.

Figure 5. The western tunnel entrance extension appears to have progressed slightly.

1. David Albright, Sarah Burkhard, and John Hannah, Irans Natanz Tunnel Complex: Deeper, Larger than Expected, Institute for Science and International Security, January 13, 2022, https://isis-online.org/isis-reports/detail/irans-natanz-tunnel-complex-deeper-larger-than-expected/8

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Imagery Update: Iran Continues to Harden its New Natanz Tunnel Complex [1] - Institute for Science and International Security

Iran to hold 2nd exclusive exhibition in Bishkek in late June – Mehr News Agency – English Version

Emphasizing the importance of the role and position of exclusiveexhibitions in introducing and recognizing the achievements, capabilities and quality of products of Iranian companies, Mehdi Safari said thatthe second exclusive exhibition of Iran and Kyrgyzstan is scheduled to be held on June 28-31, in Bishkek and is a great opportunity for capable Iranian companies to try to diversify their markets in the current special economic conditions.

Safari describedthe strengthening of trade and economic relations with Central Asian countries, including Kyrgyzstan, as one of the priorities of the Foreign Ministry's economic diplomacy.

The volume of trade between the Islamic Republic of Iran and Kyrgyzstan in the last Iranian year (started March 20, 2021), according to published statistics, reached about $ 80 million.Iran's exports to Kyrgyzstan reached $ 79 million this year, making it the fourth largest country in the Eurasian Economic Union.

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Iran to hold 2nd exclusive exhibition in Bishkek in late June - Mehr News Agency - English Version