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Iranian newspapers Sunday marked the end of the first year since President Ebrahim Raisi's election on June 18, 2021 with harsh criticism of his economic team.

Most columnists and commentators welcomed the recent resignation of Raisi's Labor Minister Hojjat Abdolmaleki but said that many more ministers will have to leave the cabinet.

Nonetheless, some commentators including Reformist lawmaker Naser Ghavami said replacing current ministers with new ones cannot solve Iran's economic problems. He added that even the best economists cannot tackle the ongoing economic crisis because the underlying reason for problems is the political system itself.

Ghavami charged that the government has made Iran dependant on Russia and China, adding that the two countries simply follow their own interests.

Former lawmaker Mohammad Reza Khabbaz asked: "Do not these minister feel any shame even before their own conscience for accepting to be in charge of key ministries? On what basis has Raisi appointed them as ministers? And what do those who suggested these individuals think about the situation now?"

Khabbaz said that many more ministers from Raisi's cabinet need to go. Meanwhile, he called those ministers who promised to create one million jobs or build one million houses every year, "liars." He further asked: "Isn't what they have been doing a waste of the country's resources and the nation's dignity?"

Protests in Tehran Bazaar against a steep rise in prices. June 11, 2022

Columnist Mohammad Shadi wrote in a commentary in Jahan Sanat newspaper that his publication has been in the market for nearly two decades and it was evident for its journalists that Raisi's ministers were not fit for their jobs. Shadi opined that at least two more economic ministers should leave the government.

Shadi wrote that Iran needs to prove that its economic policies are consistent with international norms if it wishes to attract foreign investment.

The new reformist daily Arman Emrooz, not to be mistaken with the very similar looking Arman Melli, wrote that "during the past ten months since Raisi took office, he has issued a major directive every 9 days. However, 3 out of every 4 orders have been ignored by those who had to carry them out."

The daily added: "Out of 37 official orders issued by Raisi, 27 of them have not been carried out at all, 6 have been carried out and another 4 have been abandoned halfway through their implementation."

Meanwhile, Tahmoures Hoseini wrote in an article in Toseh Irani newspaper: "Because of the government's performance, the divide between the people and officials has increasingly widened in recent years. The current government blames its predecessors and the members of the previous government blame the way elections are held in Iran.

The daily wrote that the rise in the number of protests is another indication of the government's failure while it keeps blaming the United States. The daily quoted Former lawmaker Gholamreza Jafarzadeh Imanabadi: "I should say clearly that I doubt the honesty of Raisi's economic team. Raisi needs to reshuffle his government and try to meet the promises he made to the people for their votes."

Economist Albert Boghossian wrote in Setareh Sobh that most of the complaints about the government have something to do with Raisi's broken promises. Boghossian also added that neither Raisi nor his economic team can make any difference while the system does not allow for reforms.

Despite all this, the administration-owned daily, Iran, says all is well, and quotes Raisi as saying, "There is no problem in Iran that cannot be solved."

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A Year After Election, Papers Say Iran's Raisi Let Down The Nation -

i24 News Iran continues to significantly develop its cyber capabilities for a variety of purposes. Only recently it was reported that Tehran had sought to attack Boston Childrens Hospital an attempt that the director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation called one of the most despicable he had ever seen. This incident is another indication of Irans boldness in operating cyber tools.

But the majority of Iranian cyberactivity is focused on social engineering for obtaining intelligence information. Tehran has been expanding its use as a tool, mainly through numerous inquiries to various experts on Iran. Iranian intelligence is attempting to obtain their information and assessments, and even trying to lure some to attend international conferences to recruit or kidnap them.

One of the authors of this article was recently contacted via email by someone claiming to be a leading journalist. When the email was met without a response, the same journalist called the author personally multiple times asking to schedule a test interview, with the phone number appearing registered from the country in which that media outlet was located.

Further investigation revealed this to likely be a phishing attempt by Charming Kitten, which is an advanced persistent threat actor linked to the Iranian government. There are lessons to be learned from this episode, namely the sloppiness in tradecraftthrough persistence and unaffiliated, personal email addresses of Iranian cyberwarriors. The fact that the Iranian operatives followed up after an email with phone calls demonstrates the aggressiveness with which the Islamic Republic is deploying these tools.

To uncover the Iranian pattern of action, we will focus in this article on the ways Iran uses social engineering tools and their unique characteristics to help possible targets identify that they are under Iranian attack. In general, most of the actions being carried out by Tehran are very amateurish and easy to identify, provided those who are subjects of interest to the Iranian government are aware of its tactics.

The use of social engineering tools has greatly expanded in recent years, mainly due to the difficulty of obtaining information from social media platforms in light of heightened awareness and actions taken by these networks aimed at protecting the privacy of their users.

Social engineering has thus become a kind of offensive WEBINT (Web Intelligence) tool that allows for receiving a lot of information about the relevant user.

The central principle when it comes to social engineering is trust. That is, the target will feel safe enough to provide details to the applicant (in this case Iranian intelligence). Iran also understands this principle very well, and therefore it seems that its operatives are working around the clock on these strategies.

If in the past Iran used assets that it established for dedicated operations which were for the most part very easy to identify, today the Iranian trend is to steal the identities of real people and to weaponize them.

That is, they are using the real names of people to approach their targets using emails that are very close to the real name of the stolen identity. This is usually a respectable approach made by a high-ranking expert (to persuade the target to work with him) during which there is an offer for a potential target to collaborate, whether it is via an interview, writing a joint article, or appearing at some conference. This modus operandi can be seen in a recent cyberoperation targeting Israels former Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni, where an Iranian hacker posed as an Israeli military official asking her to use her email password to open a document, which would compromise her account.

Most often the goal is to get valuable information from the target and assessments about how he sees the situation in Iran. The same researcher is often showered with praise and seduced by an original idea that often goes against Iran, such as how to destroy Iran from within.

The approach usually is signed under the name of the same person without his phone number (for fear that the target will call the same person and understand that he was tricked). But as one of the authors recently experienced, Iran-linked operatives are now even leaving phone numbers.

Those who are at the receiving end of such Iranian entreaties should take the following steps: doubt any email they receive regarding possible collaboration, especially when emails are sent from a users private address (e.g., via Gmail) and not the institutional domain; doubly verify that the sender is real through other social media platforms or by calling his/her employer; never provide personal details or open links you receive from this source; and be cautious in the information you make accessible about yourself on social media platforms.

Contrary to popular belief, most of Irans successful cyberattacks were not because of its technological capabilities, but because of the very extensive use it makes of social engineering tools. Today there are good technical solutions that can protect companies and people from hacking in the cyber dimension. However, it is very difficult to influence the human factor with these approaches, especially when the email seems credible, the offer to cooperate is so flattering, and it corresponds with the subjects desire to demonstrate the knowledge he has and share it with others.

This makes the human factor the weakest link in the chain. This is not a new pattern of action, but there has been an acceleration in its use. The higher the awareness of the relevant parties, the more difficult it will be for Iran in its intelligence missions.

In a broad sense, there is a need to increase information sharing between the social networks and state intelligence agencies. This cooperation in the Iranian context can help block those profiles. The phenomenon cannot be prevented, but it can certainly be reduced considerably. Awareness of Iranian behavior in the cyber realm is the best way to counter their practices.

Excerpt from:
Social Engineering in the Name of Iran's Islamic Revolution - Algemeiner

TEHRAN - Ali Alizadeh, the Azerbaijani ambassador to Iran, said on Sunday that his country is always after developing cooperation with Iran.

Baku has good economic and political ties with Tehran, Alizadeh said in a meeting with Mahmoud Shalouei, the assistant to the Iranian culture minister, state news agency IRNA reported.

Referring to the upcoming visit of the Azeri culture minister to Iran, the ambassador hoped that cultural relations would widen during the visit.

Shalouei, too, expressed hope that Iran-Azerbaijan cultural cooperationwould strengthen.

The Azeri minister of culture will visit Iran on Monday (June 20).

Relations between Iran and Azerbaijan have been developing over the past few years, with the two countries exchanging visits.

Last month, Iranian President Ayatollah Seyed Ebrahim Raisi sent a message to his Azerbaijani counterpart Ilham Aliyev to congratulate him on the anniversary of the independence of the Republic of Azerbaijan.

In the message, Raisi emphasized Irans foreign policy priority in promoting relations with neighbors, including the brotherly country of Azerbaijan.

President Raisi stated that the common history and religion and the deep ties between the two nations of Iran and Azerbaijan have provided a solid foundation and valuable support for the relations between the two countries in the new era. Since the independence of the Republic of Azerbaijan, Iran has always worked within the framework of mutual interests to deepen relations between the two countries in all fields.

He also expressed satisfaction with the fact that after the lifting of the occupation of the territories of the Republic of Azerbaijan, the fields of cooperation between the two countries have expanded, and expressed hope that these capacities will be exploited by the efforts of both parties.

Also last month, President Raisi met with Azerbaijani Deputy Prime Minister Shahin Mustafayev in Tehran.

In the meeting, Raisi said that the Islamic Republic welcomes the promotion of economic, political, cultural and trade cooperation with Azerbaijan, adding, "Full implementation of the Tehran-Baku agreements in various fields, requires practical steps by Azerbaijan."

The president said, "Apart from being neighbors, Iran and Azerbaijan share the same culture and have kinship relations. No factor should be allowed to undermine the close relations between the two countries."

Raisi also said the United States and the Zionist regime do not care about well-being of the countries in the region and the wider world, adding, "The existence of constructive relations based on mutual interests between neighboring countries, especially Iran and Azerbaijan, is the most effective factor in maintaining and strengthening regional security."

Referring to the meeting between the presidents of Iran and Azerbaijan in Turkmenistan, the Azeri deputy prime minister said, "Your meeting with Mr. Aliyev in Ashgabat is historic and has opened new pages in the history of relations between the two countries."

Excerpt from:
Azerbaijan seeking to upgrade ties with Iran: ambassador - Tehran Times

While many in the West are quick to ascribe Iransinterventions throughout the Middle East to itscomplex history with the United States, the matter is not nearly so simple. A confluence of military, religious, economic, and historical factorsoften completely ignored by many Western governments, who assume Irans policy of intervention and nuclear aims are solely motivated by ideological anti-Western sentimentdrives Iranian interventionism throughout the region, stretching from its ancient history to the present. These interventionist impulses are a desire for regional hegemony; aspirations to promulgate Shia Islam; efforts to reap the benefits of regional trade; and a resurgence of Persian nationalism. For the West to truly comprehend, much less correctly respond to, Irans actions, it must first analyze Iran from a non-Western perspective.

Perhaps the most evident impulse driving Irans interventionist practices is its desire to achieve regional hegemony. Just like ancient Persia, modern-day Iran is centrally located in the Middle East and surrounded by rival and weakened failed states. Two nations, in particular, Israel andSaudi Arabiain conjunction with the Gulf Cooperation Council and Turkeyhave long engaged Iran in a series of proxy wars to promote their regional agendas and expand their power. These conflicts often occur in the surrounding failed states, as the governments are not strong enough to quash them and assert control. Several recent examples include theSyrian Civil War, in which Iran backs the Syrian government and similarly aligned non-state actors such as Hezbollah; theYemeni Civil War, where Iran supports the Houthi rebels opposing the internationally recognized government; andwar-torn Iraq, where Shia militias loyal to Tehran carry out its bidding in exchange for funding and armaments. In each instance, Iran has clashed with Israel and Saudi Arabia to cement its status as a powerful actor in the Middle East.

Irans conflict with its neighbors is not a recent phenomenon. In its early days, the Persian Empire clashed with Rome over their Western border in Syria, frequently employing indigenous guerilla raiders on the frontiers to instigate conflict. From the sixteenth century through the nineteenth century, Iran came into conflict on all sides, from Mughal India to the east, the Ottoman Empire to the west, the Russian Empire to the north, and even the Portuguese and British Empires in the Strait of Hormuz. Throughout its history, Iran has feuded with its neighbors and rivals to achieve regional hegemonic status, to varying degrees of success.

Along with its hegemonic aspirations, another driving force behind Irans meddling in the Middle East is spreading its unique brand of Shia Islam. After the Islamic Schism in 632 AD, following the death of the Prophet Mohammed, Iran became one of the last bastions for Shiite Muslims. Iran is estimated to contain over 80 percent of the worlds Shia population. Iran fought several religiously motivated conflicts with its Sunni Muslim neighbors, the Ottoman Empire and Mughal India, throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, as well as countless skirmishes with Sunni tribesmen before that.

Religion became far more important as a motivating force for Iran after the Iranian Revolution of 1979. During the Revolution, radical Islamic theocrats led by Ayatollah Khomeini deposed the U.S.-backed shah of Iran, Reza Pahlavi. Khomeini promptly utilized the religious fervor ignited by this coup to spread an anti-American sentiment throughout the nation, which contributed to the Iran hostage crisis. Seeing itself as the protector of Shia Muslims, this newfound emphasis on Shiism put Iran directly in conflict with Saudi Arabia, the de facto leader of Sunni Muslims and self-described Defender of the Holy Cities. Conflagrations between the two Islamic powers, both direct and indirect, often occur in the failed states surrounding them, showing just how interconnected Irans interventionist impulses truly are. The desire to spread Shiism has led to Irans growing influence in post-Saddam Iraq and the Syrian Civil War, much to the consternation of Saudi Arabia.

Another factor driving Irans interventionism is its propensity for reaping the rewards of regional trade, something it has been denied for most of its existence. The Persian Empire naturally contained avast abundance of economic resources, additionally benefitting from its position along the Silk Road. For a time, Persia enjoyed tremendous economic prosperity. However, as the Ottoman Empire expanded economically and territorially, Persia began to lose its regional economic dominance. Eventually, as the Portuguese and British Empires began to take hold of the Indian subcontinent, clashes with Europeans became more and more frequent. Predictably, these confrontations led to Persia becoming boxed in between them and the Ottomans. Being trapped between their rivals meant Persias economic situation gradually deteriorated to the point where it competed with the Ottomans and imperialist Europeans to trade resources on the world market.

Contemporary Iran faces a similar economic dilemma, although in a different context. After the 1979 revolution, Irans interventionist activities (both religious and hegemonic) increasingly set itself in conflict against the main trading partners in the region, Saudi Arabia and the GCC. These actions have also earned the ire of the United States, which has applied stringent economic sanctions on Iran in an attempt to end its interventionist practices. These sanctions, combined with its inability to trade extensively with the GCC, have led Iran to have an abundance of in-demand economic resources, yet it cannot export them. Many experts stipulate that Iran wishes to use its interventionist practices, such as supporting Hezbollah, Hamas, and other proxies, asbargaining chips to lessen theimposed sanctions.

The fourth element of Irans interventionism in the Middle East is the sentiment of Persian nationalism that the Iranian government and ordinary Iranians feel. Iran views itself as the inheritor of the once-great Persian Empire and hopes to reclaim what it perceives as its lost glory. Leaders in Tehran believe that Irans historical significance and cultural superiority automatically permit it to have amore significant role in regional affairs. Unlike regional hegemony, this impulse is not directly about territory or political clout. Instead, it is a state of mind to justify and unify Irans different desires under a single idea. This form of nationalism adopted by the Iranian government also draws on the countrys Persian ancestry and prestige to influence the Iranian populace to support its interventions abroad.

Persian nationalism, especially for the current regime, is a way to define Iranian national independence in light of its cultural past. It recalls the many previous examples of the old Persian Empire being exploited and abused by foreign powers. It thus dictates why Iran must come into its own and adopt a more aggressive foreign policy. However, in other instances, it celebrates former moments of Persian greatness, particularly itscultural superiority over its neighbors. Before the revolution, Shah Reza Pahlavi relied heavily upon Persian culture by keeping the term Shah and utilizing his royal bloodline to relate himself to the Shahs of old. The religious regime that replaced him also used Persian nationalism to its advantage by recently reviving thepre-Islamic New Year.

Contrary to the prevailing thought in Washington and other Western nations, it isnt Irans inherent hatred towards the West but rather a wide range of factors that drive its interventionism in the Middle East. The central impulses driving Iranian interventionismregional hegemony, Shiism, trade, and Persian nationalismmust be more broadly studied by Western scholars and policymakers should they truly hope to understand why Iran undertakes the actions it does. A greater understanding of these themes can also assist politicians in knowing how to engage Iran properly, and how they will likely respond to those overtures.

Rising regional tensions and the seemingly inevitable dissolution of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action largely show that the Wests current maximum pressure approach does not work, primarily because its aim is curtailing displeasing Iranian actions without addressing the genesis of their implementation. The West could reach a more mutually beneficial arrangement with Iran if they adopted a more amenable attitude towards its foreign policy concerns or at least appropriately analyzed them. Washingtons repeated classification of Irans interventionist actions as being purely targeted against the United States and its interests, as opposed to merely being reactionary with respect to Irans own economic, political, and historical environment, has thus far only poured more fuel on the fire instead of creating a workable solution.

Jake McAloon is an American historian and political analyst in the Chicagoland area. His primary areas of interest are Middle Eastern & African foreign policy formulation and implementation as well as American interventionism.

Image: Reuters.

Continued here:
How the West Gets Iran's Interventionism Wrong - The National Interest Online

Many experts have asked the question if Russia or China could sink a U.S. Navy aircraft carrier in a war and if that means those warships are now obsolete. But what about other nations that have large amounts of missiles in their military arsenal, like Iran? The Islamic Republicof Iran frequentlydemonstratesits willingness to strike U.S. assets in the Middle East, including a naval aircraft carrier. While the regime has threatened its Western adversary since the Iranian Revolution, the intensity of its rhetoric has increased exponentially in recent years. As U.S.-Iran tensions have soared following the upheaval surrounding the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the IRGC has greatly expanded its weapons arsenal, making these threats more meaningful. Iran has practiced destroying U.S. military assets, including a naval aircraft carrier, in its semi-regular wargame exercises.

Additionally, Irans Navy blatantly assaulted oil tankers in the Gulf of Oman in 2019, indicating the regime has the capability and willingness to escalate conflict. Although U.S. defenses are superior in every way, the potential for Irans successful destruction of a U.S. naval aircraft carrier is not impossible.

What Could Iran Really Do?

In 2015, the IRGC firedrocketsclose to the Nimitz-class carrier USS Harry S. Truman while it was transiting the Strait of Hormuz. Denouncing Irans assault as highly provocative, the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM)reportedthat the IRGCs motive to fire drills less than 1,500 yards away from the carrier was to threaten Americas presence in the region. The CENTCOM spokesperson at the time, Commander Kyle Raines, stated that Firing weapons so close to passing coalition ships and commercial traffic within an internationally recognized maritime traffic lane is unsafe, unprofessional and inconsistent with international maritime law.

While it is doubtful that a barrage of rockets could have sunk the carrier, it could have caused damage and potentially injured soldiers on board. Regardless of the outcome, Irans willingness and capability to fire any weapon that close to a U.S. naval aircraft carrier served as escalatory behavior.

In 2019, four oil vessels wereattackedoff the port of Fujairah on the Gulf of Oman. The tankers were owned by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Two months later, a suspectedcoordinatedattack on a Japanese-owned tanker and a Norwegian-owned vessel off the coast of Oman greatly escalated tensions between the U.S. and Iran. Then-Secretary of State Mike Pompeo blamed the attack on Iranian aggression.

These events proved significant for multiple reasons. The Gulf of Oman links the Arabian Sea with the Strait of Hormuz- the gateway to the Persian Gulf. Almost a fifth of the worlds oil consumption passes through the strait, making it a strategic waterway. Iran was demonstrating with this assault that they are capable and can interrupt theflow of oiland upset the global economy.

The Bottom Line

Although Irans torpedoes and rockets alone do not pose a significant threat to the survivability of a U.S. naval aircraft carrier, the regime could possess weapons that do. As the IRGC has ramped up its efforts to expand and advance its weapons arsenals in recent years, Irans increasedcapabilitiespose a greater threat to its adversaries, including America. The Iranian Navys fleet ofKilo-class submarinesare equipped with torpedoes that could severely impact the structure of a carrier. Additionally, Iran has been able to developlonger-range ballistic missilesthat will ultimately be capable of hitting U.S. assets.

Maya Carlin is a Middle East Defense Editor with 19FortyFive. She is also an analyst with the Center for Security Policy and a former Anna Sobol Levy Fellow at IDC Herzliya in Israel. She has by-lines in many publications, including The National Interest, Jerusalem Post, and Times of Israel.

Excerpt from:
Is the U.S. Navy Aircraft Carrier on the Brink of Being Obsolete (Thanks to Iran)? - 19FortyFive