Archive for the ‘Iran’ Category

The Questions Lingering Around the Death of Iran’s President – TIME

When the helicopter carrying Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi went missing on May 19, initial reports said nine passengers were on board, including two bodyguards. But after the wreckage was finally found, the number of bodies was eight. Four days later, the mystery of the second bodyguard was revealed in social media posts: Javad Mehrabl is seen leaning disconsolately in the rear of the memorial service for Raisi. Press accounts said that, at the last minute, his boss, Mehdi Mousavi, had directed him from the Presidents helicopter to one of the two others moving in convoy that day.

After Mousavi died in the crash, his father told Iranian state television that he knew his son would not return from this trip. The night before the trip he visited us, the father says on camera. He said goodbye and got into his car but returned and stayed 20 minutes. Then he left but after a short drive he returned again and spent 10 more minutes with us. He grows choked up. The third time when saying goodbye he kissed his mother, he kissed his mothers feet, he kissed me, and then bent down and kissed my feet.

It was then I knew he would go and never return, I knew we would never meet again.

The bodyguards were members of a special unit of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, the military force created in 1979 to replace an Iranian army distrusted by the countrys new theocratic government. Their unit, Sepah Ansar al-Mahdi, is responsible for the personal security of the regimes senior officials. To that end, its members carry phones specially equipped not only for secure communication, but also for location tracking. The device Mousavi carried on board presumably would have been useful in locating the helicopter, which went down in rugged terrain not far from Irans border with Azerbaijan. Yet it took 16 hours for rescuers to reach it.

The Sepah does not appear to be under suspicion, at least by Irans most senior official: In one photo from the funeral for Raisi and other victims, Sepah bodyguards account for a good two-thirds of the people arrayed behind Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. His throat is warmed, as usual, by the cross-hatched scarf of the IRGC that signals his closeness to the Guard.

More than a week after Raisi was killed, mysterious questions persist not only about the crash, but also about what will come next.

Some of the questions have explanations: The transponder on an aircraft carrying senior officials reportedly was switched off as a matter of routine, out of fear of tracking by hostile governments. When the helicopter went down, on a wooded hilltop in northwest Iran, one passenger survived long enough to retrieve the pilots ringing cell phone, tried to describe the area, and died awaiting rescue. Sparse cell coverage would have hampered efforts to locate it by triangulation.

Still other questions might be answered by forensic technical investigation. Raisis chief of staff, who was flying on another chopper, said that shortly before disappearing, the Presidents pilot ordered the other helicopters to climb in altitude in order to rise above clouds clinging to the hills. The other aircraft did so, but the Presidents helicopter was not heard from again.

And some information, while intriguing, is open to interpretation. Iranians might put the fathers story, for instance, to some premonition accessible to the devout.

But others will hear it as evidence of plotsomething not unprecedented in a regime known both for its opacity and its brutality. Raisis elderly mother added to the speculation when she appeared in a video, visibly upset and calling for the death of anyone who killed you other than God.

Her son was widely assumed to be in the running to succeed Khamenei, who is 85 and frequently reported to be in failing health. Raisi was supported in that effort by the most extreme faction of regime stalwarts, the Paydari Front. As President, Raisi had imposed the crackdown on modesty that in 2022 ensnared Mahsa (Jina) Amini, who died in the custody of the so-called morality police for allegedly improper hijab. He was also the face of the regimes brutal confrontation of the uprising her death inspiredand blamed for the brutal deaths of more than 500 Iranians in the spontaneous movement that took Woman, Life, Freedom as its slogan. That he died returning from the inauguration of a dam called Qiz-Qalasi, or Fort of Girls, struck some as poetic justice.

Human rights groups knew Raisi as a member of the so called Death Committee that in 1988 ordered the summary execution of thousands of dissidents, described by regime officials themselves as "the biggest atrocity of the Islamic Republic... for which we will be condemned by history.

Relatively unknown to the general populace just 10 years ago, Raisi had been fast tracked to national prominence just as the issue of Khameneis succession was gaining urgency. Rumors persist that the Supreme Leader has plans for his son, Mojtaba Khamenei, to succeed him. When, in a speech just hours after Raisis helicopter had gone missing, Khamenei prayed for his safe return but stressed that the people should be confident that there will be no disturbance in the affairs of state. His calm manner did not go unnoticed.

This would not be the first time that someone who did not share Khameneis vision for Irans future leadership had met a suspicious end. In 2017, former President Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani died in a swimming pool. A founder of the Islamic Republic, Rafsanjani had been instrumental in propelling Khamenei to the top job. But in the decades that followed, they fell out so thoroughly that, by the time of his death, Rafsanjani was known as the top opponent of the Supreme Leader within the regime. When Rafsanjanis family reported that his body recorded radioactive readings many times higher than safe levels, they requested an autopsy. The request was denied and, shortly afterwards, the case was closed.

So it was that, in the first hours after the helicopter crash, a battle emerged to define its meaning. An analysis of social media showed that 22% of X accounts involved in the discussions of the crash were fake, operating within a sophisticated disinformation campaign with a potential to reach 6 million views in the first two days, according to the cyber-security company Cyabra.

Cyabra, which is based in Tel Aviv, says it documented a conspiracy theory circulating online that maintained a Mossad agent named Eli Copter had caused the crash. The name had been lifted from a joke posted on Hebrew social media, but Israels spy agency has killed several senior Iranian nuclear scientists and military figures in recent years. Though any role in Raisiss death was denied by Israel officials and discounted by Israeli analysts, the thought occurs.

Only two months earlier, in retaliation for an Israeli strike on an Iranian consulate building in Syria that killed two senior generals, Tehran launched some 300 missiles and drones toward Israelits first direct attack on Israeli territory. After Iraq launched Scud missiles into Israel during the 1991 Gulf War, Israel laid plans to assassinate Iraqi President Saddam Hussein, calling it off after a rehearsal ended in the accidental deaths of five Israeli commandos.

Another of the campaigns promoted by the fake accounts put forward the narrative that portrays Raisi as a national hero, using the same hashtags as his supporters did. Fake accounts were also involved in the narrative that criticized him, though the public outbursts celebrating his death were real enough. Clips that showed families of those killed by the regime shouting and dancing in joy became so bold that police began arresting anyone they deemed to have insulted Raisi online.

The authorities might have hoped that the death of a President while performing his duty would garner some sympathy for the Islamic Republic. But the divide between regime and society seems too deep to be bridged by Raisis death.

Original post:
The Questions Lingering Around the Death of Iran's President - TIME

Stockholm accuses Iran of using criminals in Sweden to target Israel or Jewish interests – Yahoo! Voices

COPENHAGEN, Denmark (AP) Sweden's domestic security agency on Thursday accused Iran of using established criminal networks in Sweden as a proxy to target Israeli or Jewish interests in the Scandinavian country.

The accusations were raised at a news conference by Daniel Stenling, the head of the SAPO agency's counterespionage unit, following a series of events earlier this year.

In late January, the Israeli Embassy in Stockholm was sealed off after what was then described as a dangerous object was found on the grounds of the diplomatic mission in an eastern Stockholm neighborhood. Swedish media said the object was a hand grenade.

The embassy was not evacuated and the object was eventually destroyed. No arrests were made and authorities did not say what was found. On May 17, gunshots were heard near the Israeli Embassy in Stockholm and the area was cordoned off. No one was arrested.

Stenling said, without offering specifics or evidence to back up his assertion, that the agency "can establish that criminal networks in Sweden are used as a proxy by Iran.

It is very much about planning and attempts to carry out attacks against Israeli and Jewish interests, goals and activities in Sweden," he said and added that the agency sees "connections between criminal individuals in the criminal networks and individuals who are connected to the Iranian security services.

Justice Minister Gunnar Strmmer and Hampus Nygrds, deputy head of the Swedish police's National Operations Department, were also at the online news conference with Stenling.

We see this connection between the Iranian intelligence services, the security services and precisely criminals in the criminal networks in Sweden," Stenling said. We see that connection and it also means that we need to work much more internationally to get to the crimes and be able to prevent them.

Stenling and the others made no mention of the recent incidents connected to the Israel Embassy and stopped short of naming any criminal groups or suspects.

Sweden has grappled with gang violence for years and criminal gangs often recruit teenagers in socially disadvantaged immigrant neighborhoods to carry out hits.

By May 15, police have recorded 85 shootings so far this year, including 12 fatal shootings. Last year, 53 people were killed and 109 were wounded in a total of 363 shootings.

Two main gangs the Foxtrot network headed by Rawa Majid, who lives in exile in Turkey, and its rival, Rumba have for years been involved in deadly feuds. Ankara had rejected Swedens request to have Majid, a Swedish citizen, extradited because he also holds Turkish citizenship.

Stenling said there was no reason to change the terror threat level in Sweden.

Last year, it was heightened to high, the fourth of five levels, for the first time since 2016 as the security deteriorated after public burnings of Islam's holy book, the Quran, that triggered protests in the Muslim world.

Read more:
Stockholm accuses Iran of using criminals in Sweden to target Israel or Jewish interests - Yahoo! Voices

Mossad: Iran promoting terror in Europe 60 days before Paris Olympics – The Jerusalem Post

Iran is increasing its support of terror in Europe through proxy criminal groups in the 60-day lead-up to the Paris Olympics, the Mossad revealed on Thursday.

It highlighted in particular the activities of two criminal groups FOXTROT and RUMBA alleging that they were directly responsible for a violent activity and the promotion of terrorism in Sweden and throughout Europe and that they receive funds and direction directly from Iran.

Israels spy agency charged that Iran was behind the grenade attack against Israels Embassy in Belgium this past weekend and the gunshots near the embassy in Sweden on May 17.

A similar third attempt to the attempted attack in Belgium was made to attack Israels Embassy in Sweden this past January using grenades, with the grenade not exploding in that case.

In Sweden's case, the criminal organization FOXTROT was exposed as the culprit acting on Tehrans behalf.

FOXTROT, known for its murders and large-scale drug trafficking, is the largest criminal organization in Sweden and operates in other European countries, Mossad said.

It alleged that FOXTROT head Rua Majid, a Swedish citizen of Kurdish origin nicknamed the Kurdish Fox, had been arrested in Iran for criminal activity and then recruited for terror activity and released to carry out terror for Iran.

FOXTROTs rival gang RUMBA, headed by Ismail Abdo, was behind the May 17 gunshots near Israels embassy in Sweden, the Mossad said.

Iran frequently uses criminal organizations to carry out attacks on its behalf to try to hide its hand in the attacks.

In addition, Mossad said that Iran is trying to take advantage of the wave of global antisemitism relating to the war to recruit a variety of new kinds of proxies to carry out its terror attacks globally.

While the Islamic Republic is constantly trying to achieve acceptance and a level of normalization with the EU and the West, Mossad has worked together with European intelligence agencies to expose its proxies and tentacles of terror throughout the world.

Iran's global terror plans go back long before the current war.

In September 2023, Mossad Director David Barnea said that his agency and other intelligence agencies in Israel and among foreign allies thwarted 27 Iranian terror plots that year against Israelis all over the world on almost every continent.

Barnea showed off videos from Iranian terror agents that the Mossad captured and interrogated in Tanzania and Cyprus. He added that whoever sends terrorists against Israelis and Jews "will be brought to justice. We will raise our level against you."

He listed off the countries of Tanzania; Georgie, Cyprus, Greece, and Germany as just a few examples, naming Yousef Shahbazi Abbasalilo as an Iranian operative in the terror operation in Cyprus and Hamidreza Abraheh as an Iranian operative in the terror operation in Tanzania.

Sweden responded to the attacks, saying, "The Swedish Security Service (SPO) can now conclude that criminal networks in Sweden are a type of proxy that the Iranian regime is using. This is something that Iran previously have done in Europe, so it is nothing new.

But we now see concrete evidence on it in Sweden, connections between criminal networks and individuals within them, that has connections to Iranian Intelligence Services, said the Swedish statement.

Go here to see the original:
Mossad: Iran promoting terror in Europe 60 days before Paris Olympics - The Jerusalem Post

Iran’s intervention in Sudan’s civil war advances its geopolitical goals but not without risks – The Conversation

Irans role in funding and arming proxy groups in the Middle East has been well documented and has gotten extra attention since the Hamas-led attack in Israel in October 2023. Similarly, Tehrans arms shipments to Russia are well known and have prompted complaints and sanctions from the West.

But Tehran has received little coverage of its military intervention in another deadly conflict: Sudans civil war.

Since that conflict started in April 2023, it has killed at least 13,000 people, injured over 33,000 others and displaced millions more. After years of relative peace, people are once again being massacred in the southern region of Darfur.

In the immediate aftermath of fighting breaking out between two rival factions of Sudans military government, Iran limited its involvement to supplying humanitarian aid.

But that policy didnt last long. Between December 2023 and January 2024, Tehran supplied several Mohajer-6 midrange reconnaissance and combat drones to President Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and his Sudanese Armed Forces, or SAF.

In February, the drones helped the SAF take territory from Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as Hemedti, and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces, or RSF, during an offensive in the city of Omdurman.

While the conflict in Sudan has gotten less global attention than those in Ukraine and Gaza, it is strategically significant for Tehran. As an expert on Irans foreign policy, I see how Tehran is increasingly using involvement in African conflict zones to advance the countrys military, commercial and particularly geopolitical goals. It follows a similar trajectory as Irans involvement in Ethiopia during the Tigray war of 2020-22.

Militarily and commercially, drone exports to the SAF have been a continuation of Irans actions since the expiration of a U.N. arms embargo against Tehran in October 2020.

Since then, Iran has delivered surveillance and attack drones not only to its quasi- and nonstate proxies and partners in the Middle East such as Hezbollah, Hamas and the Houthis in Yemen but also increasingly to states outside the region such as Ethiopia, Russia, Tajikistan and Venezuela.

Iran has done this to project power, strengthen alliances and influence conflicts in the Middle East and other regions. At the same time, it can prove a lucrative source of income for the Iranian economy, as well as a showcase for the countrys technology. While it is difficult to determine the precise revenue Iran has received from military drone exports, the estimated value of the global market in 2022 was US$12.55 billion, a figure expected to reach $14.14 billion in 2023 and $35.60 billion in 2030.

In regards to Sudan, arming the SAF helps both Irans wider geopolitical goals and its competition with regional rivals, including Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Israel.

Iran-Sudan relations date back to 1989, when Tehran backed the coup led by Omar al-Bashir, who later became the president of Sudan. During the 1990s and 2000s, Iran offered development assistance and military aid to Sudan. It exported tractors there and stationed naval vessels at Sudanese ports in the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea.

Along these strategic routes and shipping lanes, Tehran exported oil to African countries and smuggled weapons to regional clients, including the Houthi rebels in Yemen and Palestinian militants in Gaza.

As a fellow so-called rogue state subjected to U.S. sanctions and embargoes, Sudan provided diplomatic support to Tehran throughout the period.

It recognized Irans right to pursue a nuclear program and voted against U.N. General Assembly resolutions condemning Tehrans human rights record. From 1979 to 2021, Sudan ranked as Irans third-largest trading partner in Africa and accounted for 3% of its average annual trade with the continent.

But between 2013 and 2016, Iran-Sudan relations suffered a series of severe setbacks. In 2014, Sudan closed Irans cultural center and expelled its diplomatic officials for purportedly proselytizing Shiism in a predominantly Sunni country. Two years later, in 2016, it and other countries in the Horn of Africa cut formal ties with Tehran.

These setbacks resulted from Iran disengaging from Sudan and Africa to concentrate on nuclear diplomacy with the United States and other world powers. They also coincided with growing military, diplomatic and economic assistance from Saudi Arabia and the UAE to Sudan and other states in the Horn of Africa in exchange for joining the Saudi-led coalition against the Iran-backed Houthis in Yemen.

This assistance was especially enticing to Sudan as it confronted isolation and economic adversity as a result of an International Criminal Court arrest warrant for al-Bashir, the secession of oil-rich South Sudan and the imposition of intensified sanctions by the U.S.

Despite Iran and Sudan subsequently participating in multilateral meetings on agricultural cooperation, the bilateral relations between the countries never fully recovered.

The civil war has provided an opportunity for Iran to correct course with Sudan. Supporting the SAF can help Tehran salvage relations with Sudan while also countering or containing Saudi and Emirate influence in the country and the wider continent.

Tehran aspires to assist al-Burhan and the SAF win the war and take back control of the state.

Giving assistance to the SAF also fits a dynamic that predates the war and again relates to Irans battle for influence with Saudi Arabia. In 2019, while Hemedti served alongside al-Burhan in the Transitional Military Council after al-Bashirs ouster by a coup, he visited Saudi Arabia and pledged support for it against Iran and the Houthis.

Nonetheless, supporting the SAF is not without risks for Iran.

For starters, a victory for al-Burhan and the SAF is far from certain. Since October 2023, the RSF has taken some key states, including the capital of Khartoum and the breadbasket of Gezira. In February 2024, the SAF launched an offensive in Omdurman and made gains there. However, the overall balance may still tilt in the RSFs favor.

And unlike the wars in Syria and Ukraine, in Sudan, Tehran has found itself in the awkward position of supporting an adversary of Russia, which sponsors the RSF.

And contrary to the Ethiopia conflict, in which Iran supported the government against rebel groups alongside Turkey and the UAE, Tehran and Abu Dhabi are competing for influence in Sudan by backing the SAF and RSF, respectively. Outside the military realm, the UAE has a sizable economic edge over Iran as Sudans largest export partner and second largest import partner.

Even if al-Burhan were to emerge victorious, its not a given that Irans position in Sudan would significantly improve or its influence grow.

Iran is constrained by being a Shiite power; Sudan is a Sunni-majority country. And even before Sudan severed ties with Iran and descended into another civil war, it had long accepted agricultural, commercial, developmental and military assistance from Irans regional rivals, Saudi Arabia and Israel.

After Khartoum joined the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen, it normalized relations with Tel Aviv through the Abraham Accords in return for diplomatic and economic incentives from the U.S.

Time will tell whether Irans military intervention in Sudan marks a turning point in bilateral relations, or whether its nothing more than a weapons transfer in another civil conflict fueled by foreign intervention.

Read the original here:
Iran's intervention in Sudan's civil war advances its geopolitical goals but not without risks - The Conversation

Iran releases report on helicopter crash that killed Raisi – The Jerusalem Post

Iran has ruled out sabotage or electronic warfare as the cause of the helicopter crash that resulted in the deaths of President Ebrahim Raisi, Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian, and their entourage. The announcement, made Wednesday by the General Staff of Iran's Armed Forces, follows the release of their second detailed report on the incident.

The report's findings are based on an extensive examination of the helicopter's wreckage and the debris dispersion at the mountainous crash site. According to the investigation, there was no evidence of an explosion or any form of sabotage, and the wreckage patterns aligned with a crash scenario rather than an attack.

Additionally, the investigation assessed the helicopter's operational parameters at the time of the crash. It was confirmed that the total weight of passengers and equipment was within the aircrafts maximum load limit.

Communication with the flight crew was maintained up to 69 seconds before the crash, indicating no disruption or interference in the helicopters communication systems.

The report also mentioned that weather conditions during the return flight to Tabriz, the capital of East Azerbaijan province, would need further analysis to determine their potential impact on the accident.

These findings build on the initial report released on May 23, providing a more comprehensive understanding of the circumstances leading to the crash.

Original post:
Iran releases report on helicopter crash that killed Raisi - The Jerusalem Post