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The Court of Appeals of Indiana upheld a mans possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon conviction Friday, affirming a trial court decision that a police stop and search of the man was lawful and did not violate his Fourth Amendment rights.

In 2021, Tony Lawrence Richey was stopped by Shelby County Sheriffs Deputy Justin Parker as he was responding to a call that there was a suspicious person walking on Flat Rock River bridge.

Parker found Richey under the bridge, camping.

Richey told Parker he had not been walking on the bridge, but he packed up his camp and called a relative to pick him up.

Parker then went home and during his drive, he saw Richey walking on the road, where the two waved at each other.

After going home to change clothes, Parker left for an appointment in Greenwood.

He saw Richey again and stopped to ask him where he was going. Richey said he was trying to get to Indianapolis. Parker thought it was strange given that Richey was not walking in the direction of Indianapolis.

After almost four hours since his interaction with Richey, Parker saw him again walking around in the rain without any rain gear.

Parker knew there werent any gas stations or restaurants nearby, so he called Deputy Kenneth Thompson to check on Richey. Parker saw Richey enter the woods.

Parker called off-duty Shelbyville Police Officer John Searle about Richey.

Searle later saw Richey when he was driving to a gas station in his patrol vehicle. He noticed that Richey was walking with the flow of traffic, so he activated his red and blue lights and stopped him.

Richey said he would like a courtesy ride, so they called Thompson to give him the ride.

Thompson asked Richey if he had any guns on him because he always makes sure people are unarmed when giving them a courtesy ride.

The deputy discovered a handgun and ammunition. He arrested Richey on suspicion of carrying a handgun without a license.

Richey was charged with Level 4 felony unlawful possession of a firearm by a SVF.

The jury trial began in March 2022. Richey objected to the handgun and ammunition as evidence, but it was overruled.

The state also introduced court records from the Owen Circuit Court showing Richey was convicted in 1995 for eight felony counts: three counts of Class B felony burglary, three counts of Class C felony burglary, one count of Class C felony arson and one count of Class D felony automobile theft for crimes committed in 1994.

They matched Richeys date of birth and tattoos with Owen Circuit Court records to confirm it was him. The state also used a recorded call Richey made from the Shelby County Jail, where he said, I own up to what I did wrong, and mentioned a case that I had in Owen County.

The jury found Richey guilty and the trial court sentenced him to seven years, ordering the first six to be served in the Indiana Department of Correction and his final year on probation.

Richey appealed and presented the court with three issues. The first issue Richey brought to the appellate court was whether officers unconstitutionally seized him, violating the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. constitution and Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution prior to discovering a firearm.

The appellate court disagreed with Richey, finding the search did not violate the U.S. Constitution or the state constitution.

Richey asserts Officer Searle lacked reasonable suspicion to initiate a Terry stop of him. However, police officers may initiate a stop when they observe even a minor traffic violation, State v. Quirk, 842 N.E.2d 334, 340 (Ind. 2006), and Officer Searle observed Richey walking on the wrong side of the road, which is a Class C infraction, Judge Melissa May wrote. Because Officer Searles Terry stop of Richey turned into a consensual encounter before the discovery of the firearm and Deputy Thompsons search of Richey after Richey disclosed he had a handgun was reasonable, the officers did not violate Richeys rights under Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution.

The second issue he brought to the court was whether the state presented sufficient evidence that he had committed an SVF-qualifying offense.

Richey argued that tattoos can be added, removed or modified over time, and that his reference to an Owen County case could mean a case other than the 1994 burglaries.

However, these arguments are simply invitations for us to reweigh the evidence, which our standard of review precludes, May wrote. A reasonable finder of fact could weigh the matching name, date of birth, and physical characteristics described in the Owen County Court records, the tattoos, and Richeys statement during the jail call to mean Richey was the offender convicted of Class B felony burglary in the Owen County case.

Lastly, Richey asked whether the trial court committed fundamental error when it admitted evidence of more than one of his prior convictions.

Rejecting that argument, May wrote, (T)he fact that the jury learned Tony Lawrence Richey was convicted of multiple other felonies in 1995 does not constitute fundamental error.

The case is Tony Lawrence Richey v. State of Indiana, 22A-CR-1107.

Link:
COA affirms SVF firearm conviction, finds stop and search by police ... - Indiana Lawyer

Item 1.01. Entry into a Material Definitive Agreement.

The information contained in Item 2.03 of this Current Report on Form 8-K isincorporated by reference in this Item 1.01.

Item 2.03. Creation of a Direct Financial Obligation or an Obligation under an

On May 9, 2023, Barings BDC, Inc. ("BBDC") entered into an amendment (the"Fourth Amendment") to the Senior Secured Revolving Credit Agreement, dated asof February 3, 2019 (as amended by the first amendment thereto, dated as ofDecember 3, 2019, as further amended by the second amendment thereto, dated asof December 29, 2021, as further amended by the third amendment thereto, datedas of February 25, 2022, and as further amended by the Fourth Amendment, the"ING Credit Facility"), among BBDC, as borrower, Energy Hardware Holdings, Inc.,Barings BDC Finance I, LLC and Barings BDC Senior Funding I, LLC, as subsidiaryguarantors, the lenders party thereto and ING Capital LLC ("ING"), asadministrative agent.

Under the Fourth Amendment, among other changes, the maturity date of the INGCredit Facility was extended to February 21, 2026.

The above summary is not complete and is qualified in its entirety to the fulltext of the Fourth Amendment and related documents, which is attached hereto asExhibit 10.1 and is incorporated herein by reference.

Item 9.01. Financial Statements and Exhibits.

* Schedules to this Exhibit have been omitted in accordance with Item 601 ofRegulation S-K. The registrant agrees to furnish supplementally a copy of allomitted schedules to the SEC upon its request.

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Edgar Online, source Glimpses

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BARINGS BDC, INC. : Entry into a Material Definitive Agreement, Creation of a Direct Financial Obligation or an Obligation under an Off-Balance Sheet...

By now, you have already heard what happened last week on the New York Subway. A gentleman named Jordan Neely, who seemed to be experiencing a mental health crisis, reportedly had a threatening interaction with other subway passengers. One of those passengers, a Marine Veteran named Daniel Penny subdued Mr. Neely and in the course of doing so, allegedly caused his death.

My experience with urban public transportation is from a different city, and a few decades earlier, but I have seen my share of shady characters on the subway. I always felt safe on the subway during rush hour, when it was very white-collar and there seemed to be safety in numbers, but after-hours travel in the shadowy underground is not for the timid.

I also recall that the specter of homeless people suffering from mental illness is a part of everyday life in the city. Sometimes they ask for money; sometimes they yell at intersections. Often, we know them by name and associate them with specific neighborhoods. They were usually animated and could be disruptiveand they didnt always smell greatbut in my experience, they never hurt anyone.

Like most stories, there are bound to be two sides. I think the case will come down to what witnesses say that Mr. Neely did or didnt do immediately before he was restrained. Was Neelys provocation an assault, or was it speech? If it was only speech, was it speech that would make the elusive reasonable person perceive a threat of violence? I wasnt there and I take no position. We will see.

What I find more interesting about the case is the sequence of events after the incident. First, Mr. Penny was questioned and released without charge. Then, protesters quickly organized and demanded his arrest. Shortly thereafter, Mr. Penny was invited downtown for a free sitting with a photographer and to post a $100,000 bond.

The question raised in my mind today is one that has been debated by legal scholars since long before the launch of our relatively young judicial system. How, when, and to what extent should public opinion influence justice?

The easy answer is that law enforcement should be in contact with the citizens. Were learning, I think a bit late, that their demographics should even reflect the citizens. In most cases, the enforcement side of the equation is answerable to their respective governing authorities (i.e. state, federal, or local), except in the case of County Sheriffs, who are typically elected. The prosecutors follow a similar model. Federal, state, and municipal prosecutors, answer to elected officials but are directly elected at the county level.

Courts, on the other hand, should be independent and free of external influence. They should be able to rely upon and maintain the laws passed by representatives of a free people. That part makes sense to me. An alternate point of view is that courts wield a great deal of power and need to be held accountable. Public scrutiny keeps those powers in check and public approval is a source of much-needed legitimacy.

Personally, I think we enjoy sufficient representation from elected officials and that our justice system is robust enough to sort out any bad actors.

Resorting to mob action doesnt cross my mind, but I have the privilege of knowing that my elected officials will return my phone call. People who feel less enfranchised will undoubtedly have another point of view.

Here in Nebraska, we vote to retain our judges after whats called an assisted appointment. Im comfortable with that system, but in Texas, Illinois, and a handful of other states, judges have full-blown, partisan elections with campaign contributions and all of the baggage that follows. Is that an appropriate amount of public influence? Whats the right formula? How do we best balance public accountability with independence and freedom from systemic compromise? Its a tricky equation, and I sometimes wonder if were getting it right.

I also find it ironic that public influence would be linked to legitimacy. I suppose a court could go too far with an unpopular decision and lose public support, but at least for now, I am confident that the courts are better informed, more cautious, and ultimately more trustworthy than the general public.

Historians tell us that our founding fathers wrote our Constitution with two threats in mind: tyrants and the mob. Our Fourth Amendment is intended to protect us against law enforcement, but the founders dedicated a whole unelected branch of government to counter our mob-controlled, publicly elected officials.

When I see prosecutors appear to bend to public sentiment, I think of our darker days when hooded rioters plucked people out of jail for pre-judicial lynchings. Im not suggesting thats what happened in New York.

We simply cant know, but its one of those areas that we need to watch carefully. Our system of justice is far from perfect, but I think its fair to most people, most of the time, and we need to preserve that trust with our watchful eyes.

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Column: : Justice, tyrants and the mob (5/19/23) - McCook Daily Gazette

On April 3, 2018, Jeffrey Parker called 911 from his Huntsville, Alabama residence and threatened to blow his head off. Huntsville Police Department (HPD) officers Pegues and Beckles were dispatched to the call. Upon arrival, Pegues drew her pistol and made a partial entry through the front door, thereby exposing half her body to the inside. She observed Parker sitting on a couch with what appeared to be a gun at his own head. She told Beckles, still outside, what she saw. Beckles informed police dispatch that Pegues had seen Parker with a gun to his head. [1]

Officer Darby heard Beckles radio call about a guy with a gun threatening suicide and responded. Darby arrived and saw that Pegues had her gun drawn but pointed down. He commanded her to point her gun at Parker because he thought that Parker could kill her. Pegues moved completely into the residence and briefly raised her gun but almost immediately lowered it. Both Beckles and Darby followed her inside and demanded that Parker drop the weapon.

Pegues also pleaded with Parker to drop the weapon, but he kept it pointed at his head and refused to drop it. Darby, believing that all three officers were in danger of being shot, fired at Parker and killed him.

Darby was charged with murder. After a jury trial, he was found guilty and sentenced to 25 years in prison.

Officer Pegues testified at Darbys trial that prior to Darbys arrival, she attempted to de-escalate the situation, but that once Darby entered the residence, she could feel the tension just rising. She testified that Parker didnt threaten her or do anything to make her believe he wanted to do anything other than commit suicide.

Officer Beckles testified that at no time during this event did he feel the need to take deadly force action. He stated that Parker didnt make any overt action to indicate that he was about to point his weapon at the officers. He estimated that Parker was ordered to drop the weapon about seven times but failed to comply.

An HPD detective investigated the shooting incident and testified that he found no evidence that Parker ever made a hostile determination towards anybody other than himself.

Officer Darby testified that upon entering the residence he realized that all three officers had no cover between them and Parker. He ordered Parker to drop the gun twice, but Parker refused. Darby shot and killed him. Darby also presented testimony from three other law enforcement officers (expert witnesses) who each testified that Parker's refusal to put his weapon down constituted an imminent threat to the responding officers' lives. [2]

After both sides presented their evidence, Darby requested the trial judge to charge the jury as follows: "The reasonableness of an officer's actions in using deadly force must be objectively reasonable judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, the fact that officers are forced to make split-second decisions, and in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them at the time.

In support of his requested jury instruction, Darby cited the United States Supreme Court opinion in Graham v. Connor. [3]The trial judge rejected Darbys requested instruction. Instead, the judge provided the jury with a general self-defense instruction that is available to all citizens who assert self-defense as a justification for their actions. This permitted the jury to examine Darbys conduct from the perspective of an ordinary citizen rather than a trained law enforcement officer.

Darby appealed and argued that the trial judge delivered an erroneous self-defense instruction that permitted the jury to ignore, as irrelevant, the expert testimony from several witnesses that reasonable law enforcement officers would believe they were facing an imminent threat to their personal safety.

The decision of the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals [4]

The Alabama Court of Appeals reversed Darbys conviction and ordered that he receive a new trial. The court ruled that it was not bound to accept Darbys offered instruction that was based upon the Supreme Courts opinion in Graham v. Connor. The court explained that Graham does not govern a state courts application of state criminal statutes because it involved a civil action brought under 42 U.S.C. 1983. (The federal civil rights statute). [5]Nonetheless, the court observed that the Alabama legislature passed a self-defense statute designed for Alabama peace officers that states: "A peace officer is justified in using deadly physical force upon another person when and to the extent he reasonably believes it necessary in order [t]o defend himself or a third person from what he reasonably believes to be the use or imminent use of deadly physical force." [6]

The court ruled that the trial judge erred by giving the jury a self-defense instruction designed for ordinary citizens instead of an instruction intended by the Alabama legislature to be used for peace officers in self-defense situations. The court explained, [T]he Alabama Legislature has made clear that there is a unique standard to be used in judging a police officer's use of deadly force in self-defense or defense of another while acting in his capacity as a police officer. Thus, the proper perspective from which to evaluate a police officer's use of deadly force in such situations is indeed that of a reasonable police officer in the same situation.

The court observed that the ordinary citizen self-defense instruction given to the jury permitted the jury to ignore extensive testimony from multiple witnesses regarding the training a police officer receives with respect to confrontations with an armed person. The court noted that this testimony supported a finding that a reasonable police officer in Darby's situation could have concluded that Parker's conduct represented the imminent use of deadly force. In other words, that testimony supported a finding that Darby acted in self-defense or defense of another when he shot Parker.

Heres a summary of the lessons law enforcement officers can take from this case:

1.It would later be determined that Parker was holding a flare gun that had been intentionally painted black,but there is no evidence indicating that any of the officers were aware of that fact.

2.Quote is taken from the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals opinion.

3.490 U.S. 386 (1989}. In Graham, the Supreme Court created an objective reasonableness standard for police use of deadly force grounded in the Fourth Amendment. The Supreme Court ruled that the reasonableness of a particular use of force must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight. Further, the Court ruled that when police use of force situations are evaluated, the fact that officers are forced to make split-second judgments must be considered.

4.Darby v Alabama, (CR-20-0919) (3/24/23).

5.The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals determined when reviewing state criminal statutes, it is not bound to follow a constitutionally grounded Fourth Amendment-based opinion of the United States Supreme Court regarding the standard for police use of deadly force. The Alabama court cited a quote from a California case, People v. Perry, 36 Cal. App. 5th 444, 465, 248 Cal. Rptr. 3d 522, 536 n.10 (2019) as authority for declining to follow Graham v. Connor regarding its application to a states criminal statutes. The California court ruled, Perry contends throughout his briefing that we are bound to apply the standards articulated in Graham in this case. Graham was a civil rights action brought pursuant to section 1983 of title 42 of the United States Code and it involved an alleged violation of the Fourth Amendment. Long-standing and deeply held principles of federalism counsel that we have no obligation to import those standards into our state law defining criminal offenses."

See also, People v. Couch, 461 N.W.2d 683, 684 (1990) in which the Michigan Supreme Court rejected the prosecutions argument that the U.S. Supreme Courts opinion in Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985), requires it to change the Michigan fleeing felon rule to comply with the Supreme Courts ruling in Garner, (i.e. Deadly force cannot be used against unarmed and non-dangerous fleeing felons). The Michigan Supreme Court explained that Clearly, the power to define conduct as a state criminal offense lies with the individual states, not with the federal government or even the United States Supreme Court.

The Alabama court did not offer any United States Supreme Court opinion or federal appellate opinion as authority for its decision on this issue. It is unknown whether the federal courts would agree with the Alabama, California and Michigan courts that have considered this issue.

6. 13A-3-27(b)(2), Ala. Code 1975.

7.490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989). See also, recent university law review articles that take the position that state courts are not bound to follow the Supreme Court opinions in Graham and Garner when confronting use of deadly force issues involving state criminal charges directed at police officers. For example, see, Flanders, Chad and Welling, Joseph (2015) Police Use of Deadly Force, State Statutes 30 Years after Garner, Saint Louis University Public Law Review, Vol. 35: No.1, Article 7. And Shah, Raoul, (2018) Licensed to Kill? An Analysis of the Standard for Assessing Law Enforcements Criminal Liability for Use of Deadly Force, Mitchell Hamline Law Journal of Public Policy and Practice, Vol. 39/ Issue 1.

8.The new bill, commonly referred to as AB-392 is found at Calif. Pen. Code 835a (c)(1), (A)-(B).

9.SeeKathleen Y. Murray, Exploring A Necessary Standard For the Use of Excessive Deadly Force by Law Enforcement: A Flawed Solution With Positive Potential,University of Toledo Law Review, Vol. 52, p. 397 (Spring 2021).

10.Calif. Pen. Code 835a (c)(1), (A). Deadly force must be necessary To defend against an imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury.

11.Calif. Pen. Code 835a (e)(2). Based on the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable officer would believe that a person has the present ability to immediately cause death or serious bodily injury.

12.See, Calif. Pen. Code 835a (e)(3).

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Alabama appeals court reverses murder conviction of Ala. officer ... - Police News

The Oakland Town Commission voted at its May 9 meeting to terminate interim town manager Jack Butler without cause and to appoint Town Clerk Elise Hui as the interim manager until a permanent one can be hired. A search is being conducted.

The town of Oakland has voted to terminate Jack Butler without cause effective immediately, Mayor Kathy Stark said. Severances will be paid based on his contract terms.

Butler has been serving as interim manager since the previous town manager, Steve Koontz, retired April 1.

Its not for cause, and we wish him well, Stark stressed of Butlers termination.

The Town Commission engaged an executive recruitment firm to manage the process of recruiting a permanent town manager. The town has looked at all the applications, and the search has been narrowed to five.

We have some very good candidates, Stark said. We are hopeful that well be able to make an offer next Friday (May 19).

Hui will handle both job duties until a new manager is hired.

The five candidates will be in Oakland Thursday, May 18, to take a tour of the town with Stark and Public Works director Mike Parker. That evening, a reception will be held from 5:30 to 7 at the Oakland Meeting Hall, 221 N. Arrington St., and Stark said the public is invited to meet the candidates. Those interested in attending should RSVP to [emailprotected]

IN OTHER NEWS:

The Oakland Town Commission approved its consent agenda, which included an agreement to allow the Oakland Police Department to conduct traffic enforcement in the gated communities of Johns Cove and Johns Landing. The homeowners associations made the request. State statute doesnt allow traffic enforcement on private property without a written agreement. The police department will solely be responsible for enforcement, including the scheduling of patrols and the use of radar. All decisions regarding the level of traffic enforcement on the private roads and staffing will be within the sole discretion of the police department.

The commission approved a fourth amendment to the development agreement with Oakland Park regarding a buffer fence between Macchi Avenue and the seventh phase of the neighborhood.

The town proclaimed May 15, 2023, Peace Officers Memorial Day and May 15 through 21, 2023, National Police Week. The proclamation was presented to Chief Darron Esan.

I cant tell you how happy I am with our community policing police department, Mayor Kathy Stark said.

You guys are phenomenal, Commissioner Mike Satterfield said.

A proclamation was read declaring May 21 through 27, 2023, National Public Works Week and presented to Public Works director Mike Parker.

We love the job that you do, Stark said. You have been for a very long time a welcome addition to this town.

Continued here:
Oakland narrows town manager search to five | West Orange Times ... - West Orange Times & SouthWest Orange Observer