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Gender identity has been an issue of intense debate over the past couple of years. Courts are still grappling with the U.S. Supreme Courts decision inBostock v Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020), which held that the 1964 Civil Rights Act protects gay, lesbian and transgender employees from discrimination based on sex. Although it has been two years sinceBostock,public and private universities are continuing to reform their discrimination policies to comply with this new law.InMeriwether v. Hartop, 992 F.3D 492 (6th Cir. 2021), the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals determined whether a university professor who refuses to use transgender pronouns is afforded First Amendment protections.

Nicholas Meriwether was a philosophy professor at Shawnee State University. At the start of the 2016 school year, the university emailed faculty informing them they had to refer to students by preferred pronouns; professors who refused would be disciplined.

One day Meriwether referred to a student, Jane Doe, as sir instead of using a feminine pronoun. According to Meriwether, no one would assume Doe was a female based on Does outward appearance. Doe demanded that Meriwether use feminine pronouns when he addressed her. Meriwether believed his religious beliefs prevented him from communicating messages about gender identity that he believes are false.

He reported the incident to senior university officials, and the Acting Dean of the College of Arts and Sciences met with him. The Dean advised Meriwether to stop using all sex-based references in his class. In response, Meriwether stated hewould refer to most of the students using pronouns and refer to Doe by her name. The Dean accepted the compromise.

Doe remained unsatisfied and complained to university officials. The Dean informed Meriwether that if he did not address Doe as a woman, he would be violating the universitys policy. Meriwether accidently referred to Doe as sir on another occasion. Doe reported the incident to the universitys Title IX Coordinator, and Meriwether met with the Dean again. He offered a second compromise. He asked whether he could use preferred pronouns but place a disclaimer in his syllabus noting that he was doing so under compulsion and setting forth his personal and religious beliefs about gender identity. His compromise was rejected.

Doe complained again, and a Title IX investigation ensued. The investigation concluded that Meriwethers disparate treatment[of Doe] [had] created a hostile environment. The Dean later brought a formal charge against Meriwether under the collective bargaining agreement. The Dean also recommended placing a formal warning in his file. The Provost approved the Deans request even though Meriwether maintained that he began referring to Doe without pronouns and used Does last name as an accommodation. The Provosts decision remained unchanged.

Merriweather grieved the discipline but was unsuccessful. Left with no other option, he filed suit alleging several claims, including a free speech claim. The district court dismissed his lawsuit, so Meriwether appealed.

The Sixth Circuit first addressed Meriwethers free speech claim and held the First Amendment protects the academic speech of university professors. In reaching its decision, the court looked to the U.S. Supreme Courts ruling inGarcetti v.Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006). There, the Court held that speech by a public official is only protected if it is engaged in as a private citizen not if it is expressed as part of the officials public duties. But theGarcetticourt did not address speech related to scholarship or teaching. The court decided that prior Supreme Court decisions notGarcetti held that professors at public universities retain First Amendment protections when engaged in scholarship and teaching.

In response, the university argued that the court should not apply Supreme Court decisions that precededGarcetti. The court found this argument unpersuasive because its job is to apply existing Supreme Court precedent unless it is expressly overruled.

The university also argued that any academic freedom exception toGarcettidoes not apply to Meriwethers use of titles and pronouns in the classroom. The court rejected this argument. The court opined that gender identity is a matter of public concern and often arises in classroom discussions. Silencing Merriweathers viewpoint on the matter halted potential robust and insightful in-class discussions. The court concluded:

Thus, the academic-freedom exception toGarcetticovers all classroom speech related to matters of public concern, whether that speech is germane to the contents of the lecture or not. The need for the free exchange of ideas in the college classroom is unlike that in other public workplace settings.

Next, the court had to determine whether Meriwether plausibly alleged his in-class speech was protected by the First Amendment. This analysis posits two questions: (1) was Meriwether speaking on a matter of public concern and (2) was his interest in doing so greater than the universitys interest in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through him?

The court held that Meriwether spoke on amatter of public concern because his speech involved gender identity, which has been the recent contention of many passionate political and social debates.

Determining whether this interest outweighed the universitys interest in promoting the efficiency of public services was a taller task. Nonetheless, the court concluded it was.Academic freedom is paramount to the First Amendment, the court said, and that was especially the case here given that Meriwether spoke on a matter of public concern.

The university argued that it has a compelling interest in stopping discrimination against transgender students. But the court rejected this argument because the government does not always have a compelling interest in regulating employees speech on matters of public concern. If it did, the analysis is left meaningless. The court went on:

A schools interest in limiting a teachers speech is not great when those public statements are neither shown nor can be presumed to have in any way either impeded the teachers proper performance of his daily duties in the classroom or to have interfered with the regular operation of the schools generally.

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Meriwether v. Hartop and Meriwether v. Hartop and LGBTQ Rights - The National Law Review

A freedom of speech advocacy organization has called for a public apology this week after it says Kern County government threatened legal action against a Bakersfield man who had accused local officials of withholding public information.

Eddy Laine, who has lived in Bakersfield for 35 years, had sought information about the Kern County Park Rangers program by requesting documents through the California Public Records Act, but mistakenly claimed he never got a response.

The County Counsels Office sent Laine a letter June 21 stating it had provided most of the documents Laine requested, but that he should be aware of the California False Claims Act, which imposes liability for damages totaling thousands of dollars for spreading falsehoods.

Ive never had a letter like that ... threatening legal action. Never, Laine said Wednesday, adding he has used the records act to request documents over the years. I found (it) highly unusual.

The county cited the False Claims Act after learning Laine had sent a letter to the California Attorney Generals office accusing Kern County of failing to respond to his CPRA letter. He sent copies to entities such as the American Civil Liberties Union of Southern California, the Dolores Huerta Foundation and this newspaper.

The First Amendment Coalitionsent a letter Tuesday to the County Counsels Office asking that it apologize to Laine and ensure threats about seeking financial liability never recur. The county's statements, FAC Legal Director David Loy wrote in the letter, violated Laine's freedom of speech and the right to petition the government for redress of grievances, which are enshrined in the First Amendment.

First Amendment rights are intrinsic to democracy they are the oxygen of civil society, Loy said in a phone interview Wednesday.

County Counsel Margo Raison wrote in an email that the county has not threatened Laine or initiated any investigation into him. It also does not intend to commence legal action, she added.

I believe the First Amendment Coalitions reading of the letter is overbroad, Raison wrote.

The request

Laine sent a CPRA request May 2 for information such as the number of filled park ranger positions, number of park rangers assigned to Kern River Parkway area and contact information for park rangers. He also sought records on how the county plans to use $5 million it received from the American Rescue Plan Act of 2021 a federal stimulus bill passed to help counties recover from the COVID-19 pandemic and how the community could provide input to designate those funds.

Laine then sent a letter to the California Attorney Generals office stating the county did not respond to these requests.

FACs scrutiny arose from a letter the county penned to Laine in response to his complaint to the state Attorney General office. The county wrote it provided complete responses to some of Laines requests, while partially responding to others. In addition to making reference to the California False Claims Act, the county counsel noted anyone held liable for making false statements faces triple damages and civil penalties between $5,500 and $11,000 for each violation.

The coalition took no position on whether the county had properly responded to the CPRA request or whether the county had properly engaged with Laine. The County Counsels emailed responses to Laines CPRA request were inadvertently diverted to his spam folder, which gave Laine the impression he received no response, FAC noted in its letter.

The problem, FAC said, lies with the county citing the False Claims Act. Loy said this kind of invocation, sent on county letterhead, serves to intimidate citizens and prevent them from speaking when being threatened with financial costs. Laines First Amendment right was to speak out on a topic of public concern, and to petition the Attorney General, he said.

Loy added the threat of the False Claims Act against Laine was baseless because it does not apply to speech protected by the First Amendment, which Laines statements were. Even if Laine made a mistake, Loy noted, it does not mean he should be sued.

That should just never have happened, Loy stated.

Raison added that her office, and other county departments, has worked to ensure Laine gets information he requests. When pressed on whether her office will apologize publicly, Raison did not respond.

In fact, we have previously offered to assist him in crafting his public records requests so the County is able to respond more expeditiously, Raison wrote. We have again renewed our offer to work with him to obtain the records he seeks.

Laine said he was taken aback when he read the countys letter. The public should know how money is being spent, he added.

He said he hopes FACs letter results in one change.

Transparency in the future, Laine said. Regarding this and other potential issues that arise in the future.

You can reach Ishani Desai at 661-395-7417. You can also follow her at @_ishanidesai on Twitter.

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First Amendment Coalition accuses County Counsel of threatening Bakersfield man, violating First Amendment rights - The Bakersfield Californian

The states efforts in the absence of federal action could test governments ability to regulate speech, while forcing some of the nations wealthiest tech companies to fight an array of legal battles against laws that could upend their business models. These fights will also present courts with a fundamental debate about how the First Amendment plays out in the online age, including the companies own rights to decide what content they host on their platforms.

Many legal scholars see glaring flaws in some states approaches. The government cannot tell a private company what speech it can or cannot carry, provided that speech is constitutionally protected, said Jeff Kosseff, a cybersecurity law professor at the U.S. Naval Academy who has written two books about online speech.

Industry groups have warned that some of the laws especially the ones in Texas and Florida could wreak havoc on how they handle content worldwide.

You cannot have a state-by-state internet, Kosseff said. When you step back and look at the possibility of having 50 different state laws on content moderation some of which might differ or might conflict that becomes a complete disaster.

The bills fall into four major categories: More than two dozen, pushed by Republicans, seek to prevent companies from censoring content or blocking users. Others, pushed by Democrats, aim to require companies to provide mechanisms for reporting hate speech or misinformation. Lawmakers of both parties support proposals to protect children from addiction to social media. A fourth, also with bipartisan support, would impose transparency requirements.

Here is POLITICOS look at the state of play:

Conservatives efforts to ban social media from restricting users content ramped up last year, after the major social media platforms booted then-President Donald Trump following his supporters Jan. 6 attack on the Capitol.

Since then, legislatures in more than two dozen states the vast majority Republican-led have introduced bills aimed at preventing social media companies from censoring users viewpoints or kicking off political candidates.

Two of those have become law: Florida Gov. Ron DeSantis signed a bill (SB 7072) into law in March 2021, later updated this past April, prohibiting tech platforms from ousting political candidates. Texas followed suit last September with a law (HB 20) banning social media companies from restricting online viewpoints.

Now those laws are going through the courts, where tech companies have succeeded so far with arguments that the measures infringe on their First Amendment right to decide what to content to host. The 11th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals ruled in May that Floridas law was largely unconstitutional, and the Supreme Court blocked the Texas law while an appellate court considers an industry challenge against the statute.

Proponents of the laws say they protect individuals free speech rights to share their views on the platforms. But Scott Wilkens, a senior staff attorney at the Knight First Amendment Institute at Columbia University, said the Texas and Florida laws are pretty clear violations of the platforms First Amendment rights to speak themselves by actually deciding what they will and wont publish.

Social media companies have argued that if the Texas law goes back into effect, it may make it harder to remove hate speech, such as a racist manifesto allegedly posted online by the perpetrator of a mid-May mass shooting in Buffalo, N.Y. The major platforms eventually removed that posting after the shooting.

Additionally, the Texas and Florida laws had they been in effect could have left Facebook open to lawsuits for their decision in June to remove an ad from Missouri Republican Senate candidate Eric Greitens calling for the hunting of so-called Republicans In Name Only. Facebook took down the ad because the company said it violated policies prohibiting the incitement of violence. Twitter labeled the ad as violating its policy against abusive behavior, but left it visible to users due to the publics interest.

Other Republican-led legislatures have introduced similar bills in Ohio, Georgia, Tennessee and Michigan that would prohibit social media companies from censoring religious or political speech, or would ban platforms from removing political candidates.

Democrats have long pushed social media companies to do more to take down misinformation and disinformation, as well posts attacking people along lines of race, gender or sexual orientation. Legislatures in primarily Democratic-run states including New York and California have introduced bills requiring social media companies to establish mechanisms for users to report hate speech to the platforms.

New York is the only state where such a proposal has successfully been enacted. Democratic Gov. Kathy Hochul signed S. 4511 in early June as part of a package of 10 bills aimed at curbing gun violence after the Buffalo shooting. The new law requires social media networks to make it possible for individuals to report hate speech on the platforms in a publicly accessible way and says the companies must directly respond to anyone who reports such speech. Companies could face fines of up to $1,000 a day if they dont comply.

The law takes effect in December.

New York Gov. Kathy Hochul attends a press conference on August 26, 2021, in New York City.|Michael M. Santiago/Getty Images

Democratic New York state Sen. Anna Kaplan introduced the bill last year in hopes of curbing the radicalizing effects of social media. We are not in any way telling social media what policy to put in, she said in an interview. Its not about violating the First Amendment. Its about just empowering the users to be able to report hateful content.

But NetChoice and the Computer and Communications Industry Association, lobbying groups representing tech companies such as Facebook, Twitter and Google, are analyzing whether the new Texas law could lead to First Amendment infringements. Both groups filed lawsuits against the Florida and Texas laws.

Were concerned about the laws constitutionality, and are raising those concerns with state lawmakers, said Chris Marchese, NetChoices counsel, said in an interview after the New York law was signed.

He said the New York law could violate the First Amendment because its definition of hateful conduct is too broad, and covers speech thats protected by the Constitution. He added that even though New York is different from Texas and Florida, the temptation for the government to step in is incredibly high no matter where you live.

In California, Democratic Assemblyman James Gallagher of Yuba City introduced a bill (AB 1114) that would require social media companies to explain how they handle content that involves obscenity, threats and incitements of violence that are not constitutionally protected. The bill failed to advance this session.

New York also has several pending bills that would require social media companies to provide ways to report election- and vaccine-related misinformation.

Legislation addressing childrens safety on social media platforms has some bipartisan support. Several bills have been introduced following last years revelations from Facebook whistleblower Frances Haugen that Instagrams algorithms were pushing unhealthy body images on young girls.

Legislators from both parties in California and Minnesota have introduced bills to address the addictive nature of social media.

The California Assembly passed a bipartisan bill (AB 2408) in late May aiming to protect kids from addictive social media features by making the platforms liable to lawsuits and fines if their products knowingly harm children under the age of 18. A child user or their parent or guardian would be able to sue a platform if the child becomes addicted to a platform. Penalties in a successful class action brought under the bill would be at least $1,000 per individual, potentially adding up to very large sums given the number of children using social media in California.

The bill advanced through a California Senate committee in June and is expected to go to the floor in August.

Tech advocates are raising free-speech objections about the measure.

This has really serious First Amendment problems, said David Greene, the civil liberties director of the digital rights nonprofit Electronic Frontier Foundation.

Dylan Hoffman, a California lobbyist for tech trade group TechNet, said the bill goes directly after platforms algorithms which are used to moderate user content and therefore infringes on their First Amendment speech rights.

Its clearly about the content and seeking to regulate any feature that you claim as addictive well, whats more addictive than showing good content? he said. Thats the inherent problem with this bill because you cant divorce those two ideas.

The bills sponsor, Republican state Rep. Jordan Cunningham, disputed that argument. It doesnt touch or regulate content at all, he said in an interview. Nothing in the bill tells any social media company what they can or cannot allow users to post on their platform.

Kosseff said ultimately he doesnt believe that going after algorithms gets rid of the free speech issue. He added, If youre restricting the ability for speech to be distributed, then youre restricting speech.

However, Wilkens, of the Knight First Amendment Institute, said that while the bill may implicate the First Amendment, it doesnt mean that it violates the First Amendment. He said that while its still up for interpretation, the legislation if it became law may be held constitutional because the states interest here in protecting young girls seems to be a very strong interest.

A bill (HF 3724) in Minnesotas Democratically controlled House also would bar social media companies from using algorithms directed at children, but it failed to advance this session. It would ban social media platforms with more than 1 million users from using algorithms directed at individuals under the age of 18. Companies could face fines of up to $1,000 per violation.

Legislators in Mississippi, Tennessee, New York and California have introduced bills this year requiring platforms to provide transparency reports on their content moderation decisions. Both the Florida and Texas social media laws have provisions requiring such reports. The 11th Circuit upheld disclosure and transparency disclosure requirements in Floridas social media law in its May decision striking down other parts of the law.

We have made the argument that there is room for government regulation in disclosure requirements, Wilkens said. He said he thinks those bills may very well be constitutional under the First Amendment.

This bipartisan approach on the state level is one federal legislators are contemplating emulating. Sens. Chris Coons (D-Del.) and Rob Portman (R-Ohio) have drafted a bill to mandate that companies disclose some of their data and explain how algorithms amplify certain content.

It wont solve the problem, but it will help us identify what the problem might actually be, and increase the chances that Congress might responsibly legislate, Coons said in an interview.

Link:
Push to rein in social media sweeps the states - POLITICO

from the fix-the-damn-bill dept

Over the last few weeks, weve written quite a bit about the American Innovation and Choice Online Act (AICOA), which has become the central push by a bunch of folks in Congress to create a special antitrust bill for big tech. There are some good ideas in the bill, but, as weve been highlighting, a major problem is that the language in the bill is such that it could be abused by politically motivated politicians and law enforcement to go after perfectly reasonable content moderation decisions.

Indeed, Republicans have made it clear that they very much believe this bill will enable them to go after tech companies over content moderation decisions they dislike. Most recently, theyve said that if the bill is clarified to say that it should not impact content moderation, that they will walk away from supporting the bill. That should, at the very least, give pause to everyone who keeps insisting that the bill cant be abused to go after content moderation decisions.

We recently wrote about four Senators, led by Brian Schatz (with Ron Wyden, Tammy Baldwin, and Ben Ray Lujan), suggesting a very, very slight amendment to the bill, which would just make it explicit that the law shouldnt be read to impact regular content moderation decisions.

In response to that Schatz letter, Rep. David Cicilline (who is spearheading the House version of the bill, while Senator Amy Klobuchar is handling the Senate side), sent back a letter insisting that Section 230 and the 1st Amendment already would prevent AICOA from being abused this way. Heres a snippet of his letter.

Moreover, even if a covered platforms discriminatory application of its terms of servicematerially harmed competition, the Act preserves platforms content-moderation-relateddefenses under current law. Section 5 of S. 2992 states expressly that [n]othing in this Act maybe construed to limit ... the application of any law.

One such law is Section 230(c) of the Communications Decency Act. Under thatprovision, social-media platforms may not be treated as the publisher or speaker of anyinformation provided by another information content provider. They also may not be heldcivilly liable on account of any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to oravailability of material that the provider or user considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy,excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable, whether or not such material isconstitutionally protected. Accordingly, as with other liability statutes enacted since thepassage of Section 230, Section 230 provides an affirmative defense to liability under [the Act]for ... the narrow set of defendants and conduct to which Section 230 applies. Another stillapplicable law is the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which the Act does notandindeed, cannotabrogate.

He then goes on in more detail as to why he believes the bill really cannot be abused. And while he does note that that he remains committed to doing what is necessary to strengthen and improve the bill and that he is happy to keep working with these Senators on it, the very clear message from his letter is that hes pretty sure the bill is just fine as is, and that Section 230 and the 1st Amendment already protect against abuse.

Finally, your proposed language for the Actalthough well intentionedis alreadyreflected in the base text of the bill. As detailed above, among other things, section 5 of S. 2992preserves the continued applicability of current laws, including 47 U.S.C. 230(c), that protectsocial-media platforms from liability for good-faith content moderation. Although I agree thatlegislation is necessary to address concerns with misinformation and content-moderationpractices by dominant social-media platforms, I have consistently said that this legislation is notthe avenue for doing so. As such, this legislation is narrowly tailored to address specificanticompetitive practices by dominant technology firms online. And as the Department of Justicehas noted, it is a complement to and clarification of the antitrust laws as they apply to digitalmarkets. As such, it does not supersede other laws.

Except Cicilline is wrong. Very wrong. We at the Copia Institute this week signed onto a letter from TechFreedom and Free Press (two organizations that rarely agree with each other on policy issues) along with some expert academics explaining why.

The letter explains why Cicillines faith in Section 230 and the 1st Amendment is misplaced. It walks through, step by step, ways in which motivated state AGs (or even the DOJ) might get around those concerns, by claiming that moderation decisions were not actually content-based decisions, but business conduct, focused on anti-competitive behavior.

We dont have to look far to see how that played out: the Malwarebytes case was an example of that in action. That was a case where a company was able to avoid Section 230 by claiming that a moderation decision (calling an app malware), was actually done for anti-competitive reasons. But with AICOA, we could get that on steroids. As the letter notes:

There is a substantial risk that courts will extend the Malwarebytes reasoning to exclude AICOA claims from Section 230 protectionincluding politically motivated claims aimed at content moderation. Specifically, courts may try to harmonize the two statutesi.e., strive to give effect to bothby accepting some showing of anticompetitive results as sufficient to circumvent Section 230(c)(2)(A) in non-discrimination claims.

Anticompetitive animus is not required by the plain text of AICOA 3(a)(3). Allowing only AICOA claims that allege (and, ultimately, prove) anticompetitive motivation to bypass Section 230s protection would infer an intent requirement where Congress chose not to include one. While courts do sometimes infer intent requirements, they may reasonably conclude that doing so here would effectively read Section 3(a)(3) out of the statute. How could a platform with no direct stake in the market where competitive harm is alleged ever have an anticompetitive intent? Thus, how could any plaintiff ever bring a Section 3(a)(3) claim regarding harm to competition between downstream business users that would survive Section 230(c)(2)(A)? For Rep. Cicillines presumptions about Section 230 to be correct, courts would have to effectively render Section 3(a)(3) a nullity by holding that only claims of self-preferencingbut not discrimination between other business usersare actionable. This is an implausible reading that clearly contradicts what the present draft of AICOA says.

The Malwarebytes court relied heavily on Section 230s history and purpose as evincing Congressional intent to protect competition. Here, there is explicit statutory language and legislative history from which a court could conclude that AICOAs purpose is to prohibit anticompetitive results, regardless of motiveand thus to carve those claims out from Section 230. This result would apparently be statutorily required if another bill co-sponsored by Sen. Klobuchar becomes law: The SAFE TECH Act (S. 299) would amend Section 230 to exempt any action brought under Federal or State antitrust law.

Theres a lot more in the letter, but the point is clear. The idea that 230 will magically stop the abuse of this bill seems contradicted by the way the law is currently drafted, and actual cases on the books.

Filed Under: 1st amendment, aicoa, amy klobuchar, ben ray lujan, brian schatz, content moderation, david cicilline, ron wyden, section 230, tammy baldwin

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Do Not Expect Section 230 And The 1st Amendment To Save Antitrust Bills From Abuse - Techdirt

Another Fourth of July is upon us. Once again we are preparing to celebrate our Independence Day with parades, ball games, cookouts and community gatherings. Loudspeakers will resound with My Country Tis of Thee and America the Beautiful. Our hearts will swell at the familiar words, From every mountainside, let freedom ring and Brotherhood from sea to shining sea. Come night, loud explosions will fill the air. Will they accompany the bursting sprays of multicolored stars and spiraling rockets as the skies light up with spectacular displays? Or, while we ooh and aah at the glorious show, will other fireworks be taking place in our country, sowing death and destruction?

Americas 100 senators are on summer recess, thrilled with the compromise they have reached with their House colleagues. The just passed bipartisan Safer Communities Act will supposedly save countless lives with strengthened background checks of gun buyers, increased penalties for gun traffickers, protection of domestic violence victims and improved mental health services. All good ideas, but will they be effective as long as semiautomatic guns remain legally available?

The National Rifle Association lost no time registering its opposition to the act by trotting out its tired canard of the Second Amendment. That amendment is surprisingly short and reads: A well-regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed. Thats all it says, and one cant help but wonder what kind of arms our Founding Fathers were referring to in 1791. Revolutionary guns of that era included mostly muskets and flintlock pistols. A typical musket had a one-round magazine capacity and could fire about three effective rounds per minute in the hands of the most skilled wielder. The Uvalde gunman used an AR-15-style semi-automatic rifle with a magazine that carries 30 rounds.

Among all the capable legal minds in our government, has anyone seriously argued the legal applicability of the Second Amendment when it comes to todays weapons? The semi-automatic and other assault guns did not exist in 1791. The authors of the amendment obviously referred to muskets and pistols. They could have, but did not specify any arms that may be invented in the future.

It is useful to compare the Second Amendment history and meaning with that of the First Amendment the right of free speech. Its meaning has been the subject of continuing interpretation and dispute over the years. Landmark Supreme Court cases have dealt with the right of citizens to protest U.S. involvement in foreign wars, flag burning and the publication of classified government documents. In Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire (1942) the U.S. Supreme Court established the fighting words doctrine that spells out certain limits to the freedom of speech as protected by the First Amendment.

Our current Supreme Court has just ruled against the legitimacy of Roe v. Wade. A landmark constitutional right to abortion, established almost 50 years ago, is declared no longer valid. Those in favor of this far-reaching decision claim to be led by a pro-life philosophy. Is it not more than high time to also consider the right to life of Americas children who are already born and who are afraid to go to school?

Today, in America, can we really joyfully celebrate our independence and call ourselves free, until we have rid ourselves of these military-style weapons that have nothing to do with prudent self-defense or fair hunting practices but are used on an almost daily basis to murder innocent people?

Elisabeth Breslav is a regular essay writer for the Oronoque, Stratford, Villager magazine. Her memoir Blackouts, Bombs and Sugar Beets is currently being agented in the U.S, Canada and Europe.

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Opinion: On July 4th, a limited meaning of freedom - CTPost