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The Supreme Courts recent decision, reversing that of a lower federal court, to reinstate Alabamas evidently gerrymandered voting map did more than just make it harder for affected voters to have a meaningful say in the November midterms. To be sure, according to the lower courts three-judge panel (which included two Trump appointees), the new map adversely impacts Black Alabamans in a way that violates the Voting Rights Act. The electoral stakes could hardly be higher, potentially determining whether control of Congress will shift to Republicans, leading to a cascade of implications, such as the termination of the United States House Select Committee on the January 6 Attack, efforts to impeach President Joe Biden, and possible election trickeryto say nothing of what would come of the normal business of legislating.

But beyond that, the frightening takeaway from Merrill v. Milligan is that a majority of Americas highest court again evinced a disdain for voters and their ability to pick their leaders, intent on cementing a system where this works in reverse, with the entrenched leaders picking their voters in a bid to stay in power indefinitely. By joining the dissent, even Chief Justice John Robertsnot exactly a historical champion of voting rightsseems to think the majority has gone too far, missing the most fundamental message of the U.S. Constitution: no more kings.

Adam Serwer: The lie about the Supreme Court that everyone pretends to believe

The Court neednt have allowed this to happen. Gerrymandering is the practice by which every 10 years, state and local governments carve up and manipulate the geographical boundaries of an electoral district to maximize the power of one political party over the other. Two common techniques are packingthat is, drawing a district in a tortured way that smushes in voters of a certain party, making it all but impossible for others to choose a candidate from a competing party for that district. And crackingtaking a logical geographic boundary that happens to contain a predominant number of voters from a particular party, breaking it up into pieces, and adding those fragments to other districts dominated by the competing party so that those voters voices no longer matter.

With Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, Congress drew a legislative line banning gerrymandering based on race and enabling lawsuits to enforce it. And in Shaw v. Reno, the Supreme Court in 1993 held that gerrymandered boundaries that cannot be explained on grounds other than race violate the Constitutions equal-protection clause, declaring that bizarrely shaped districts strongly indicate racial intent. The Voting Rights Act, combined with the Courts earlier constitutional interpretation, provided it with a solid foundation for protecting voting rights and strengthening American democracy. But thats not what the Courts new conservative majority has chosen to do with its power. Instead, it has made an abject constitutional power grabthe tragic outcome of a judicial assault on voting rights that dates back to when, over a trio of rulings, the Supreme Court unnecessarily struck at the very heart of American democracy, potentially fatally.

The slide away from voting-rights protection began in 2010, in the Courts 54 decision in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, which held that legislative restrictions on independent political spending from corporations violate the First Amendment right to free speech. Meanwhile, donations directly to campaigns and their committeessomething that individuals, but not corporations, can makeare capped. So, for individuals, donating more than $2,900 to a single candidate is illegal, on the rationale that a greater amount could corruptly sway an elected politicians decision making once in public office. However, if an individual or a corporation buys a $1 million Super Bowl ad containing electioneering communications, the majority reasoned, that speech cant be congressionally restricted, so long as the ad isnt coordinated with the candidate. The trick is that only extremely wealthy individuals and corporations can do such a thingleaving them with much more political power than average people. Its a David-versus-Goliath problem caused not by Congress but by the Supreme Court, which all but obliterated the legislatures gains in leveling the playing field on influencing elections through funding.

The Court ruled this way even though corporations are pure legal fictions, and even though Congress determined in legislation dating back more than 100 years that such spending might unduly influence candidates for office, and warrants regulation. It could easily have gone the other way, in accordance with its earlier precedents, as well as a commensurate respect for the U.S. Congress and the commonsense notion that ours is a democracy by the people, not corporations. To be sure, the Framers did not include an affirmative right to vote in the original Constitution, but corporate entities were nascent in 1791 when the First Amendment was ratified. For conservatives who bill themselves as textualists and originalists, it would have been easy to justify a ruling that the First Amendments free-speech protections were intended for individuals who work for corporations, but not for the legal creation of a corporate entity.

Three years later, in Shelby County v. Holder, the Court, in an opinion written by Chief Justice Roberts, again struck down a key portion of an act of Congressthis time, Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act. Section 5 was designed to push back on states outmaneuvering of the Fifteenth Amendments postCivil War prohibition on laws restricting ballot access based on race. To keep Black voters from the polls, states enacted arbitrary hurdles to votingsuch as reciting the Declaration of Independence or counting the bubbles in a bar of soapas a precondition to ballot access. These schemes disproportionately impacted Black voters. Section 5 required states with unsavory histories of imposing such barriers to run proposed laws by the Justice Department before the laws could take effect.

The program was a legislative triumph, and Roberts himself wrote in Shelby County that the Act has proved immensely successful at redressing racial discrimination and integrating the voting process. Section 5 was reauthorized multiple times by substantial supermajorities in Congress. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court held that Section 5 was outdated and sent Congress back to the drawing board. Conceding that voting discrimination still exists; no one doubts that, Roberts wrote for the majority that the conditions that originally justified these measures no longer characterize voting in the covered jurisdictions. The formula for determining which states needed the DOJs approval to enact new voting lawsa process known as preclearancewas based on decades-old data and eradicated practices, Roberts reasoned, because minority-voter access had made great strides since 1965. The Court thus deemed the formula an unconstitutional infringement on states ability to regulate elections under the Tenth Amendment.

This was a sharp departure from prior precedent, as the Court had already rejected a similar constitutional challenge brought by Texas after Congress reauthorized the law in 2006. According to Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, that congressional determination was based on exhaustive evidence-gathering and deliberative process. Surely, the Court didnt have to strike it down this time. Ginsburg famously quipped in dissent: Throwing out preclearance when it has worked and is continuing to work to stop discriminatory changes is like throwing away your umbrella in a rainstorm because you are not getting wet. The majoritys maneuver, she noted, was instead about the separation of powers: who decides this Court, or a Congress charged with the obligation to enforce the post-Civil War Amendments.

The third nail in the voting-rights coffin came in 2019, with Rucho v. Common Cause. Although the Court had banned racial gerrymandering in Shaw v. Reno, in Rucho, Roberts wrote for a 54 conservative majority that constitutional claims of partisan gerrymandering are political questions that cannot be heard in court. The courthouse doors are thus permanently closed to claims that packing and cracking electoral districts for purposes of entrenching party power are unconstitutional. Voters must go back to gerrymandered politicians for help by asking that they give up the reins of power that gerrymandering provides them with and divide up districts more fairly.

Again, the Court neednt have gone down this path. The political-question doctrine is notoriously squishy and untethered from the constitutional text, and the majority did not deny the broader constitutional implications with political gerrymandering. It just refused to hear them. Justice Elena Kagan bemoaned in dissent: For the first time ever, this Court refuses to remedy a constitutional violation because it thinks the task beyond judicial capabilities. By 2019, Kagan was heavily outnumbered by five staunch conservatives who exercised their collective discretion to put a boot on the neck of voting rights, rather than championing them.

Read: The Supreme Courts dead hand

Voting-rights activists have grasped at other straws. The pending John Lewis Voting Rights Advancement Act, which has been languishing for months because of the threat of a Republican filibuster, was Congresss answer to Shelby County. In addition to working via Congress, voters turned to Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act for relief through the courts in the interim. But that strategy, too, was met with the Courts antipathy. In 2021, in Brnovich v. Democratic National Committee, Justice Samuel Alito wrote a 63 majority opinion (with Justice Amy Coney Barrett now on the Court) that effectively inserted a five-part legislative test into the Voting Rights Act as a prerequisite to voters seeking relief from laws inhibiting ballot access, making Section 2 lawsuits much harder.

By the time the Alabama case reached the Court this winter, voting-rights activists faced a panel with six far-right conservative justicesenough that they can lose Roberts to the Courts moderate wing and still have the majority. And thats just what happened.

Following the 2020 census, Alabama redrew its seven seats in the House of Representatives. Although its statewide population is 27 percent Black, only one of the newly drawn districts has a Black majority. All of the remaining six have a majority-white population. The lower court stayed the plan, giving the state legislature two weeks to draw another map that includes two majority-Black districts. Otherwise, the court said, it would hire an outside expert to do it.

In a single paragraph issued on a motion for a stay of the lower courts order, the Supreme Court reversed that decision and issued an injunction effectively putting the contested plan back in place. The Court did this without the benefit of full briefing and argumentanother invocation of its quick-and-dirty shadow docket procedure. (The Court declined to use this power to stay an unlawful ban on abortion in Texas, mind you.) In a concurring opinion, Justice Brett Kavanaugh emphasized that the stay order is not a ruling on the merits, but instead simply stays the District Courts injunction pending a ruling on the merits. His partial rationale was that the lower courts ruling was in the period close to an election.

Kavanaughs pretense that the injunction was only a technicality elevates form over substance. As with Texass S.B. 8 abortion law, the Court effectively left in place a potentially illegal law pending full briefing. Roberts again shot back: I respectfully dissent from the stays granted in these cases because, in my view, the District Court properly applied existing law in an extensive opinion with no apparent errors for our correction. Justice Kagans dissent, which Justices Stephen Breyer and Sonia Sotomayor joined, was sharper: After considering a massive factual record, developed over seven days of testimony, and reviewing more than 1,000 pages of briefing, a three-judge District Court held that Alabamas redistricting plan violated Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.

Roberts and Kagan underscored the ABCs of how the judicial system works. Unhappy litigants must wait patiently for their bid to come up on appeal. In the meantime, the lower-court rulings stand, absent some egregious immediate harm and a clear error of law.

So there we have it. Congress has in fact passed numerous laws to make elections fairer and ballot access easier. But based on its 1803 decision in Marbury v. Madison making it the arbiter of constitutional ambiguity, the Supreme Court has either slapped such legislation down or added material requirements to a statute to make bringing cases harder for voters. For a particularly problematic category of casespolitical gerrymanderingthe Court has barred all constitutional court actions and sided with states for statutory claims, regardless of the merits, on the theory that its better to err on the side of a potential Voting Rights Act violation because elections are around the corner (inevitably every year in some form or another).

This Court is going to continue to make voting more difficult, leaving it up to a Congress that was substantially voted in under those same unfair standards to fix the problem. Good luck with that. In the meantime, the revisionist justices are deep in the business of snatching power from a supposedly co-equal branch of governmentone that, unlike the Court, is accountable to the voters at the ballot box. This is the sleeping dragon, friends. One-party rule will come to federal, state, and local legislatures across the country. But it is already here on the Supreme Court, in the form of four men and one woman in black robes, with jobs for life and nothing to slow them down other than individual conscience.

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How the Court Became a Voting-Rights Foe - The Atlantic

State attorney Libby Bakalar cites a statute governing the appeal process for election certifications and recounts during a press teleconference at the Division of Elections office in downtown Juneau on Nov. 26, 2018. A federal judge ruled that Gov. Mike Dunleavy violated her First Amendment rights when he fired her on the day he was sworn into office. (Jeremy Hsieh/KTOO)

Recently, a federal district court judge ruled that Gov. Mike Dunleavy violated the First Amendment rights of a Juneau attorney he fired on the day he was sworn into office in December of 2018.

Rashah McChesney sat down with former assistant attorney general Libby Bakalar to talk about what the ruling means.

The following transcript has been edited for length and clarity.

Rashah McChesney: This is kind of a complex timeline, so lets walk through it. You have this blog, One Hot Mess, for several years. At one point, you start writing about former President Trump, and another attorney and the state complains. The state investigates you and your blog and finds no wrongdoing.

Then Gov. Dunleavy gets elected, and he and his former chief of staff, Tuckerman Babcock, send out these demands for resignations to 800-something employees in the state including you. Something thats recently deemed unconstitutional. You resign. Gov. Dunleavy gets sworn in at noon on Dec. 3, and you find out 20 minutes later that youve been fired.

Thats more than three years fighting for this. What was that process like?

Libby Bakalar: You know, it was really slow and grueling, to be honest. I mean, it wasnt like every single day, something different was happening in the case or anything. Its just, its a long time to be in limbo with something like this. You know, I think I wrote about this in my blog it just a takes a very long time to prove this kind of point. When I filed this case, I was like, Ill be surprised if this is resolved within Dunleavys first term of office. So I fully expected it to take pretty much as long as it took. Its just part of being a litigant.

Rashah McChesney: One of the reasons that Tuckerman Babcock said that he did it was because he didnt like your resignation letter. Im wondering if you could tell me a little bit about that letter and sort of describe what you were thinking when you wrote it.

Libby Bakalar: Well, so the attorney general at the time, Jahna Lindemuth, gave everybody a template to write the resignation letters on. So every attorney who submitted the resignation letter used the same template. I may have added something like, Im doing this under duress, or Im doing it because, you know, Mr. Babcock said I was going to be terminated if I didnt do it. I kind of wanted to make it clear that my resignation wasnt voluntary. But that language about the resignation being involuntary was in the template. And as Judge [John] Sedwick said, another attorney who used the exact same language that resignation letter wasnt accepted. So that was just something that I think that we found completely not credible. And I think when you read the letter, you can see its completely professional and completely anodyne. So, you know, that was clearly pretextual and Sedwick saw right through that.

Rashah McChesney: When you submitted that resignation letter did you expect that they were going to accept it and that you were going to lose your job?

I think in the back of my mind, I was worried about losing my job, but I knew that what I was doing was legal. Thats the thing, right? I knew my work was good. I knew my relationships with my clients and colleagues were good. My work was beyond reproach, right? And I knew I had the constitutional right to speak on these matters. And so my mistake was assuming that these folks were going to comply with the law, right? And I think I must have thought that because, you know, when they called me and told me about this, that I was fired, I was like, I picked up the phone, and I said, Are you calling and telling me Youre firing me? And like, yeah, sorry, basically. So it kind of, you know, wasnt like this huge shock, I guess. But I think deep down, I was like, they couldnt really do this, because this is against the law, right? And they did it anyway. And were, you know, were a firm of lawyers. So I thought, Theres no way that these lawyers are going to carry out this illegal order, from Tuckerman Babcock, and I was wrong about that. I was wrong about that. So I think I was surprised on some level.

Rashah McChesney: This is a little bit of a rabbit hole, but there was another lawsuit against the governors administration, for demanding those resignations. These psychiatrists from Alaska Psychiatric Institute sued over the same thing, over being asked to resign.

Libby Bakalar: Right. The ACLU filed a case on their behalf of at the same time that they filed my case. And in that case, the psychiatrist plaintiffs did not submit resignation letters at all, and because of that, the judge had a different analysis. Theres these two lines of free speech cases like this. And one of them has to do with patronage schemes, and one of them has to do with policymaking and disruption at work. And the former line of cases is what the psychiatrist case was about, because they did not submit those resignation letters. And so the judge was able to find in that case, that the entire scheme itself, the resignation letter scheme itself, the very act of submitting of was essentially an unconstitutional patronage.

Rashah McChesney: So, they were just on some kind of parallel track this whole time?

Libby Bakalar: The judge declined to consolidate those two cases early on, the ACLU asked to have them consolidated and for a number of reasons, he denied that motion. And I think when you see the two orders, in those two cases, you can kind of see why. There are a lot of different issues. Obviously the psychiatrists, they didnt have this blog. There wasnt this whole question of whether they were policymakers there wasnt, there was just kind of some different issues going on, different fact patterns.

So yeah, they were similar in some ways. But in a way, it was the best possible outcome, in my opinion that these two cases were decided separately and on different grounds. Because what the judge did, essentially within one case, he invalidated the resignation demand scheme on its face. And in my case, he invalidated it as applied to me. Its sort of a double whammy. I think in the end, it was good because we got those two separate rulings that essentially validated the illegalality of this entire scheme, both as it was conceived and as it was applied.

Rashah McChesney: Now that its been ruled that they fired you unconstitutionally how do they pay for it?

Libby Bakalar: So thats yeah, thats the question. Its either gonna be through a settlement or a jury trial. And so this is kind of like the analogy would be the sentencing hearing, kind of. After someones convicted, right, theres a whole other sentencing phase. Its kind of like that. So the judge basically, you know, quote, unquote, convicted them on this wrongdoing. And now theres the quote, unquote, penalty phase, thats more or less the analogy in the civil setting. So its over in the sense that the merits of the case have been decided, I mean, they could always appeal for all I know, they might appeal. And that could change the picture somewhat. But we have this ruling that says they broke the law, right? So now its like, well, how do you remedy that? And thats an open question.

Rashah McChesney: There could still be a fair amount of wrangling.

Libby Bakalar: Theres a fair amount of loose ends. Its not just, like, completely over. Its a win there. Its a pretty much an unqualified win, in my opinion, just because for me, just psychologically, I just, this whole time, all I ever wanted was for a judge to say, Yes, this was unconstitutional. Yes, this was illegal. And that finally happened. And so for me, its over in my mind on that front. In terms of my feelings of vindication on the merits of what they did, how theyre going to pay for it, whats going to happen in the future, how this will affect state employees. What I really care about is that this never happened to another state employee ever again. I never want to see a mass resignation scheme. I never want to see a partially exempt, non-unionized state employee some geologist, biologist, architect, you know be forced to resign their job every four years. Thats just insane.

Rashah McChesney: Is this case as simple as a free speech test? And should every state employee go out now and write whatever they want about the president on a personal blog and feel reasonably certain that they wont be fired?

Libby Bakalar: I dont know. I definitely would hesitate to answer that question in the affirmative. I dont think thats true. I think there is a fact-based analysis of like, what positions are really policymaking positions for which political affiliation is actually a job requirement? I dont think the court order really answers that question in any kind of uniform way. It certainly doesnt say every non-unionized state employee can say whatever they want, whenever they want. Like, thats not what it says. But I think what it does do is it sends a message that, you know, at least in some cases, you know, non unionized state employees do have free speech rights. Its not a good faith constitutional use of personnel resources, to demand resignations, and to make personnel decisions, based strictly on peoples off-duty speech, right?

But there again, theres complicated case law, and these complicated tests and balancing tests and applying all these factors and things. So its not as cut and dried as now, you know, every non-unionized state employee, every partially exempt state employee can say and do whatever they want. No, thats not what this order says. But I think it does send a message that there are still, there are limits, you know, to what the government can do to you. And we do have, we still have democracy, at least nominally. And we still have free speech rights in this country. And even if you work for the state, and thats, thats been established now. And I think it was established before it should have been known before. But now its been reiterated in no uncertain terms.

So I think future administrations are going to think twice before they try anything like this ever again. So functionally, I think its going to be there will be much more deliberation about that transition. About who is told to leave their job, and who was forced to resign their job. And under what conditions, right? I think I will have set some precedent, these two cases will have set some precedent in that respect.

Rashah McChesney: Right, because this is something that happens during every governors administration, generally, is that they asked for the resignation, but usually of political appointees, right?

Libby Bakalar: Usually commissioner-level and director-level people, deputy director levels people who are quite comfortably within that policymaking framework, right. Not typically ever, you know, a Fish and Game biologist, or, you know, city water, a state water inspector or something. I mean, jobs that have absolutely no policymaking, you cant even make a good faith argument that these are policymaking jobs. But, you know, that was all based on norms before, and this administration shattered those norms.

Just because it had never been done before. And the reason it had never been done before was because you would never even consider asking non policymaking employees to resign. And yet, they did do that as some sort of, quote, bold new thing or something to quote Tuckerman Babcock. But what it was, it was a flex, you know. It was a flex. It was an intimidation tactic. It worked. You know, for the past four years, three-and-a-half years people have been absolutely terrified in this administration.

I hear from state employees every day, how scared they are working for these people. And with good reason. They have shown absolutely no compunction about violating the law and penalizing people for quote-unquote disloyalty.

So there was like, a few different kind of iterations of this, right? And all of it just sent this general message of intimidation. And the idea that youre, you know, the administration is lurking on your social media, and theyre just waiting to pounce on you for disloyalty. I mean, thats a terrible and completely undemocratic way to exist as a government employee. And it just made me so angry. And I think thats what fueled this entire thing for me, is that I just wanted to do something impactful for the entire state employee workforce.

Rashah McChesney: In that other case that we were talking about earlier were a couple of doctors sued over this resignation letter requirement. The judge ruled that Tuckerman Babcock and and Governor Dunleavy dont have qualified immunity in that situation. Does that apply to your case as well?

Libby Bakalar: No, it doesnt, and I didnt expect it to either. Qualified immunity is a very hard thing to lose. You have to really do something bonkers to lose it. And I was actually surprised in the psychiatrists case to see Dunleavy and Babcock stripped of qualified immunity, because its functions, in practice, like absolute immunity, it really does.

Ive never seen it happen where a government defendant in a civil case like this loses qualified immunity. Its just unusual, its very unusual. Because if government workers were able to be held personally liable in their jobs, no one would ever work for the government, right? So there has to be some form of protection there.

But I think what the judge was saying is that they went so far with this, this was so out of the realm of reason to do this, that they were personally liable for it. I think, in a way, I think qualified immunity is good for government workers. In another sense, it also disincentivizes good faith conduct on the part of people in power in government, because unless its their personal assets on the line in these types of situations somebody is acting in bad faith theres no incentive to obey the law.

Take my case, for example. Ive been gone from the Department of Law for three-and-a-half years. They got what they wanted, they got me gone, Im gone. Im not there, right? Theyve gone on. And now like the damages phase is, you know, the damages go to the state of Alaska, not to them. So they lost nothing. So when you lose qualified immunity, at least that sends the message of you cant just do whatever you want. At some point, theres going to be a point at which you are going to have to worry about your personal assets in these things. And you cant just disobey the law, and expect to completely get away with it every time and have the State of Alaska foot the bill in the end.

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After winning, Juneau attorney reflects on her years-long First Amendment case - Alaska Public Media News

Ohio Attorney General Dave Yost had a challenge on his hands in trying to explain First Amendment rights to a school superintendent last week. It is difficult to explain a right so many people believe they understand and yet grossly misinterpret in an era of trolling, triggering and too much time on our hands.

Lebanon City Schools Superintendent Isaac Seever made a mistake when he asked parents and religious leaders not to protest on campus, after he had already supported the First Amendment rights of a group calling itself the After School Satan Club to meet regularly at a Lebanon elementary school.

Yost had to explain to Seever that BOTH groups rights should be supported, after Seever wrote a letter in which he pleaded with parents and the community not to protest on school property because we serve a young student population and some of them may have no idea why adults are gathering in support or opposition on Thursday afternoon.

Yost rightly described the Satan Club as an attention-seeking group, but nonetheless correctly assessed they have a right to meet in the public building. Seever seemed to understand that part. What he missed was others right to protest the move.

The area around the school is a public forum. Public streets, sidewalks, and parks have time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions,' Yost wrote. Content-based restrictions on political speech in a public forum just dont fly.

Such a strong statement from the highest-ranking school official, intended to protect the schools controversial decision, sent to all Lebanon families, in coordination with the Lebanon Police, is just the sort of government policy that chills the exercise of First Amendment rights, even if it fall[s] short of a direct prohibition,' Yost wrote.

Too many people today understand First Amendment rights only when they believe those rights protect THEM. When it comes to the rights of those with whom they disagree, that understanding disappears.

Yost was right to step in, reminding Seever First Amendment rights cannot be invoked only when convenient. Heres hoping Seever and a great many other people learn the lesson.

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Explaining the First Amendment | News, Sports, Jobs - Marietta Times

A councilwoman in OFallon, Missouri, has been impeached and removed after raising questions about the municipalitys now former police chief.

Katie Gatewood, a former law enforcement officer, had learned that the man hired as chief in 2020 had been the subject of controversy at his previous post in Conroe, Texas. According to a report by officers in the Texas Rangers, in 2017, Philip Dupuis responded to a domestic violence call that involved a fellow officer who was one of his friends. According to another officer who responded to the scene, Dupuis seemed more concerned with what would happen to his friend than about the victim.

Gatewoods interest in determining what really happened in Conroe has now led to her ouster. Her attorney, Dave Roland of the Freedom Center of Missouri, said Gatewood made several public records requests and phone calls to learn more information about Dupuis actions. Her colleagues accused her of violating city ordinances by making those inquiries and, last week, voted to impeach and remove her from office.

Those actions have Roland concerned. Gatewood, he said, merely exercised her right to free speech.

It raises incredibly severe First Amendment consequences for the voters, as well as for the elected officials who are being threatened with removal from office, he told St. Louis on the Air.

Roland filed a lawsuit against the city on Gatewoods behalf three days before she was ousted by the council. In it, he argues that the councils actions were retaliatory and that the disciplinary panel against her was biased and that these actions violated her constitutional rights.

Listen: OFallon councilwomans removal raises First Amendment concerns

They said, essentially, that it was illegal for her to ask those questions under city law, Roland said.

U.S. District Judge Audrey Fleissig declined to intervene before the impeachment vote. But Roland is hopeful that she will now consider the matter ripe for judicial review. On Wednesdays show, Roland said he plans to approach the federal judge with an updated complaint within a month.

As for Gatewood, her term on the council ends in a little over a year.

We would love to see Katie restored to the council, said Roland, but even if she ultimately is not, we intend to get a ruling as to whether the removal was unconstitutional.

Dupuis resigned from the chiefs job in OFallon last June.

St. Louis on the Air brings you the stories of St. Louis and the people who live, work and create in our region. The show is hosted by Sarah Fenske and produced by Alex Heuer, Emily Woodbury, Evie Hemphill and Kayla Drake. Jane Mather-Glass is our production assistant. The audio engineer is Aaron Doerr.

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Ousted O'Fallon councilwoman will continue to fight - St. Louis Public Radio

On Wednesday, the ACLU of Alaska settled case against Governor Michael Dunleavy and former Chief of Staff Tuckerman Babcock

ANCHORAGE The ACLU of Alaska and State of Alaska finalized a settlement in Blanford and Bellville v. Dunleavy on Wednesday. The settlement resolves a lawsuit after a federal district court ruled in October that the Dunleavy Administration violated the First Amendment rights of two former Alaska Psychiatric Institute (API) doctors who refused to write pledges of loyalty to the administration.

Dr. Anthony Blanford will receive a lump sum of $220,000 and Dr. John Bellville will receive $275,000 for damages, lost wages, and attorneys fees.

Wednesdays settlement marks the end of a years-long battle to defend the First Amendment rights of non-unionized state employees, who were subject to unprecedented demands by the Dunleavy Administration immediately after it took over state leadership in 2018. Exempt and partially exempt employees, including the doctors represented in this case, were told to provide a written pledge of loyalty to Governor Dunleavys political agenda and were told if they didnt, theyd be terminated.

In this country were not supposed to have to sacrifice our freedom of thought in order to keep our jobs. I hope the Governor of Alaska stops doing this to the people he is supposed to be governing, said Dr. Bellville. We elected him with the expectation that he would protect our freedom of speech rights, not force us to give them up under the threat of losing our livelihood.

Neither doctor provided a pledge, as it would have been an ethical violation to put politics before the health of their patients. As such, they were wrongfully terminated.

I hope this clarifies and strengthens the rights of those who work in government and who are not political appointees. No incursion on our basic constitutional rights should go unchallenged, said Dr. Anthony Bellville

The settlement includes a pledge from the Governor and the State of Alaska to refrain from using peoples political affiliation as a litmus test for employment decisions.

We hope that this settlement allows state employees to breathe a little easier knowing the behaviors the governor and his chief of staff engaged in are off-limits for all non-policymaking employees, said Legal Director Stephen Koteff. The court clearly concluded that they violated our clients rights, and this settlement extends the same legal protections to the rest of the State workforce as well.

The State of Alaska must promptly seek legislative appropriation to satisfy the settlement.

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State of Alaska pays out for Dunleavy Administration violating First Amendment rights of API doctors - Alaska Native News