Archive for the ‘Fifth Amendment’ Category

Question of fear or vengeance at core of Lawton murder trial – The Lawton Constitution

Was the December 2018 shooting death of a Lawton teen predicated on fear or vengeance?

That is the question a Comanche County jury will decide following the first day of testimony in the trial of David Keith Winbush for the charge of first-degree murder. The crime is punishable by life in prison, life without parole or death.

Represented by public attorney Lawrence Corrales, Winbush, 37, took intermittent notes but primarily kept his eyes focused on the table before him during Tuesday's testimony. He is on trial for the shooting and killing of Marques Brown Jr., 15, who was a Lawton High School freshman when he died.

It began with the theft of Winbushs white 2003 Chevrolet Silverado the night of Dec. 8, 2018. Former Lawton Police Officer Austin Mahsetky testified to taking the stolen truck report from Winbush at his home at 502 SW Jefferson. He was told two males had stolen the truck.

Winbush and his friends had been a bar and arrived home to find the truck missing. After checking his home video surveillance system, he told Mahsetky the truck had been stolen about three to five minutes before hed arrived home.

He said that if hed caught them in the act, he wouldve filled the truck with lead, Mahsetky testified Tuesday.

Mahsetkysoon heard the 911 call made by Jessie Burk reporting the truck was found in the 1200 to 1300 block of Southwest Bishop Road. Mahsetky said he arrived to find Winbush standing in the street near his truck. Winbush's neighbor, Geronimo Martinezs truck was parked blocking it. It was shortly before 12:30 a.m. Dec. 9, 2018.

Winbush told Mahsetky that hed shot the driver twice. He turned over his handgun that was in his hip holster and was taken into custody. He told the officer the teen had pulled out a large knife and tried to stick him like a pig and he shot the (expletive).

Police never reported recovering a knife in the area of the incident nor was one collected when Brown was discovered.

Still upset about the truck, Winbush described its theft as a breaking point for him, according to Mahsetky. Hed recently been at the center of a story that caught a large amount of media attention when his dog was beaten and severely injured. That assault was also captured on Winbushs home security video.

He said he was tired of everything, tired of being messed with, Mahsetky said. He was tired of being a target.

Winbush later told investigators he ran up to the male on the ground who then jumped up while placing one of his hands into his jacket/hoodie pocket and that he freaked out. Mahsetky said Winbush described hearing a distinct gasp sound from Brown after the first gunshot.

He said he would never forget hearing that sound, Mashetky said. He said he'd thought he wouldnt feel so bad for using his gun.

Brown died as a result of two gunshot wounds fired from behind, according to the State Medical Examiners autopsy report.

Another friend of Winbush's, Kendall Jirtle, testified to driving Winbush to the site where Martinez had stopped the pickup. After leaving the bar, Jirtle said all were meeting at Winbushs home so they could drop their vehicles off and go to another bar. When he got there, Winbush told him the truck had been stolen. He and Jessie Burk watched the security video of the trucks theft.

When Mahsetky left from taking the theft report, Jirtle said Winbush spoke with Martinez, who was following the stolen pickup. Thats when Winbush said to go get it. Neither Jirtle nor Burk knew Winbush was armed.

Once at the scene, Winbush was the first out of the vehicle. He said Martinez was standing in the roadway and was looking down at Brown, who was lying face down on the ground.

Everything else happened after that, he said.

Jirtle said Winbush asked the teen if he was the one who stole his pickup. He saw Brown jump up and turn to run away and the first shot was fired. The second shot followed a moment later. He testified Winbush pulled the trigger and said he knew Brown had been hit by the first gunshot.

I heard the kid say oh, he said.

In the 911 recording played in court, Jirtle said it was his voice telling Winbush Dont shoot. Assistant District Attorney Jill Oliver asked him why he made that statement.

I didnt think he needed to shoot, he said. I know the first shot hit him.

Winbush told Jirtle the teen had a knife. Jirtle said he wasnt close enough to see if he did or didnt and, at first, believed his friend.

At that point and time, it was really hard to tell, he said. He had to have a reason to pull the gun.

Brown was able to run away for a short distance. Footprints in the snow led emergency personnel to him in the roadway on Southwest 13th Street near Oklahoma Avenue. The teen was taken to Comanche County Memorial Hospital where he was pronounced dead.

Jirtle testified no one chased after Brown or the three other teens seen running away from the truck.

During cross-examination, Jirtle told Corrales he didnt hear anything about a knife from Winbush until after the two shots were fired. He confirmed he saw Winbush fire the weapon.

He fired the first shot when he (Brown) turned and went to run and one after that, he said. It was just one after another. Everything just happened so fast.

During Martinezs testimony, he confirmed hed been looking for the truck for his neighbor. When he got behind it and began to follow, he said the teens sped up.

When asked if he sped up to keep up with them, Martinez looked to his lawyer at the back of the courtroom, and then invoked his Fifth Amendment right to not incriminate himself. District Judge Emmit Tayloe asked the witness for clarity and determined he didnt want to admit to speeding. After Tayloe requested immunity for his exceeding the posted speed limit, and Oliver accepting it, Martinez confirmed he sped up in pursuit.

The teens driving the pickup made a turn from Southwest 11th Street onto Bishop Road at the northern boundary of the Lawton-Fort Sill Municipal Airport, struck a curb and went off the road to the right. Martinez said he pulled his vehicle in front of it and the doors opened with the teens bailing out. The truck continued and struck his truck.

Brown, who was unable to get away, was ordered to lie on the ground by Martinez and he complied. Winbush arrived moments later. When a knife was mentioned, thats when everything set off, he said.

He said knife, knife then the shots happened, Martinez said.

Martinez heard the first shot and saw the second burst from the handgun. He couldnt state for a fact that it was Winbush who fired the weapon, however.

Oliver then asked Martinez, Did you shoot the kid on the ground?

I plead the Fifth Amendment, Martinez replied.

Tayloe interjected and, again, asked Martinez if he pulled the trigger. This time, the witness answered: No.

I think you answered the question, Tayloe said.

Earlier testimony from one of the teens who had been in the pickup with Brown described the fear felt as they were pursued. The four had been riding around in the pickup, listening to music and smoking marijuana when a vehicle dropped in behind them, according to Warren Dennis.

When Martinezs truck blocked the truck, Dennis said they all tried to flee the stolen truck but Browns jacket was hung up on the door and the next time he looked, he was lying on the ground. As he ran, the sound of the gunshots scared him.

Dennis said he fled to his friends house. While on the run there, he said there was a truck that was circling the block and, he thought, looking for them. He said he wouldnt know Browns fate until seeing an Instagram post the next morning.

I just started crying and stuff, he said. Im scared to think about it. I got PTSD about it.

Testimony will resume at 9 a.m. today.

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Question of fear or vengeance at core of Lawton murder trial - The Lawton Constitution

Arbitration. Enforcement of Award. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. Personal Jurisdiction. District court refuses to enforce $20 million award…

UAB Skyroad Leasing v. OJSC Tajik Air, No. 20-cv-00763 (D.D.C. Jan. 26, 2021) [click for opinion]

Petitioner UAB Skyroad Leasing ("Skyroad") brought an arbitration against Respondent OJSC Tajik Air ("Tajik Air"), before the Vilnius Court of Commercial Arbitration in Vilnius, Lithuania, for violating an agreement to lease two Boeing aircraft. In 2018, a $20 million award was issued in favor of Skyroad. It brought this action to enforce the award.

Tajik Air argued that the petition should be dismissed because the court lacked personal jurisdiction over it. Specifically, Tajik Air argued that it did not have sufficient minimum contacts with the United States for the court to exercise personal jurisdiction consistent with the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Skyroad argued in response that a minimum contacts analysis was not required because Tajik Air qualified as a foreign state under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (the "FSIA"); therefore, Tajik Air had no Fifth Amendment due process rights. Skyroad's argument was based on the fact that Tajik Air was incorporated under the laws of Tajikistan and fully owned by the state.

Because Skyroad conceded that Tajik Air lacked sufficient minimum contacts with the United States to satisfy the Due Process Clause, the court only addressed whether Tajik Air qualified as a foreign state. The court noted that, underSection 1330(b)of the FSIA, personal jurisdiction over a foreign state exists as to every claim for relief over which the district court has subject matter jurisdiction. However, the court explained that this only applies to "an actual foreign government."

When a case involves an "agency or instrumentality" of a foreign sovereign, the court affords the instrumentality a "presumption of separateness" from the foreign sovereign. For purposes of personal jurisdiction, that presumption means that, unless rebutted, the instrumentality is entitled to due process protection under the Fifth Amendment. And such protection means that, unless the instrumentality has sufficient minimum contacts with the United States, the court lacks personal jurisdiction over it.

Skyroad's case thus rested on rebutting this presumption of separateness. Skyroad asserted that Tajikistan maintained such extensive control over Tajik Air that the company lacked a distinct identity. Skyroad argued that this lack of a distinct identity was clearly shown through (i) Tajikistan's owning 100% of Tajik Air's voting shares, (ii) the government's making decisions on disbursements and appointment of the company's Director General, the Supervisory Board including senior government officials, and (iii) the government's funding Tajik Air, and the reducing of Tajik Air's debts through tax offsets.

The court rejected most of these arguments, stating that the facts presented "are relevant but as a matter of law do not by themselves establish the required control" and "such government action to prop up a wholly owned instrumentality's financial position is not at all unusual, however, and does not constitute excessive control by the state."Further, the court identified features of Tajik Air that "are the hallmark of separateness from a sovereign". First, Tajik Air was restructured from a state enterprise to an open joint stock company by government resolution in 2009. Second, Tajik Air is "authorized to open bank accounts, operate on an independent balance sheet, and may acquire and exercise its proprietary rights and personal non-property rights, incur obligations and litigate."

Under these circumstances, the court ruled that Skyroad did not sufficiently rebut the presumption of separateness; therefore, the court deemed Tajik Air a "person" for Fifth Amendment due process purposes. Because Skyroad conceded that Tajik Air lacked sufficient minimum contacts with the United States, the court concluded that it lacked personal jurisdiction over Tajik Air and could not enforce the $20 million award against the company.

Will Shields of the Washington, DC office contributed to this summary.

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Arbitration. Enforcement of Award. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. Personal Jurisdiction. District court refuses to enforce $20 million award...

Separation of judiciary still elusive – newagebd.net

The separation of the judiciary from other organs of the state remains elusive even after 50 years of Bangladeshs independence as successive governments have amended the constitution to control the judiciary.

Legal experts said that Article 96 of the constitution on the removal of Supreme Court judges for misbehaviour or incapacity was amended on eight occasions between January 1975 and September 2014 while Article 116 on the control and discipline of the lower judiciary was amended on three occasions in 1975, 1979 and 2011.

It is painful that we are deprived of getting full independence of the judiciary from the executive, even though the establishment of an independent judiciary was one of the core objectives of our 1972 constitution, Dhaka University law professor Md Mizanur Rahman told New Age.

Although the law ministry is consulting with the Supreme Court to deal with administrative affairs in the subordinate judiciary, questions can be raised on how much the consultation is effective, he added.

He said that it is not a good sign for a democracy and such deviations bring no blessings for a country and a nation. When the judiciary is kept under the executive, democracy the first casualty, he pointed out.

The power to remove SC judges was vested in the president through the parliament in 1972, then in January 1975, through the Fourth Amendment to the constitution, the president became the sole arbiter.

Later in 1977, the president and the chief martial law administrator were authorised to exercise the power through the chief justice-led Supreme Judicial Council and the system of Supreme Judicial Council was ratified by the fifth amendment to the constitution in 1979, and the power was again vested in the chief martial law administrator in 1983.

All the martial law proclamations, including the Supreme Judicial Council of the fifth amendment, were revived through martial law proclamation in 1986 with the power vested in the chief martial law administrator.

All the martial law proclamations were declared unconstitutional by the High Court on August 29, 2005 in a Bangladesh Italian Marble Works Ltd case, but the Appellate Division in February 2010 retained the Supreme Judicial Council until December 31, 2012 with the observation that the parliament would make necessary amendment to the constitution regarding issues related to the Article 96.

On June 30, 2011, the parliament upheld the Supreme Judicial Council by amending the constitution through the 15th amendment.

In 2014, the government through the 16th amendment vested the power again in the parliament but the High Court on May 5, 2016 declared 16th amendment unconstitutional and restored the Supreme Judicial Council and the Appellate Division to upheld the HC verdict on July 3, 2017.

Jurist Shahdeen Malik told New Age that though the government has yet to amend the constitution to restore the Supreme Judicial Council on the ground that its appeal against the Supreme Courts ruling awaits a hearing, the online version of the constitution incorporated the parliaments authority to remove SC judges.

He said that the separation of the lower judiciary from the law ministry on November 1, 2007 remained on paper because the ministry continued influencing the subordinate judiciary.

He said that the process of recruitments of SC judges was not transparent and partisanship became the norm since early 2000 as no law has been framed yet to set up the qualifications of the judges as per Article 95 of the constitution.

Consequently, there are always some doubts in independent functioning of the higher judiciary, he said.

There is dual control of subordinate judges by the law ministry and the Supreme Court, said Shahdeen, who also added that the law ministry should not have any control over the judiciary as per the constitution.

Although the judiciary has been developed on paper, the independence of the judiciary could not be achieved in reality, SC lawyer and right activist Md Asaduzzaman said.

He said that the judiciary became relatively weaker and more affected since former chief justice Surendra Kumar Sinha was removed as it is him who penned the 16th amendment verdict in 2017.

Judges have been appointed on the political choice of the governments in absence of any law or rules and this is why the higher judiciary has become questionable sometimes, he said.

Asaduzzaman said that the partisan judgements on this occasion come from the judges.

He said that the government wanted to control the judges without making any law for setting out qualifications for Supreme Court judges.

The Appellate Division in the 16th amendment case also restored Articles 115 and 116 from the 1972 constitution.

The governments petition seeking a review of the 16th amendment verdict still awaits a hearing.

The authority of control and discipline of judges and magistrates shall vest in the Supreme Court as per Article 116 of the 1972 constitution.

The Supreme Court lost the authority as the government vested the authority in the president amending the constitution through the fourth amendment.

The Supreme Court lost its authority over lower court judges after the Appellate Division upheld the High Courts verdict that had declared the fifth amendment unconstitutional.

On June 30, 2011, the government restored the fifth amendment provision relating to Article 115 and 116 paying no heed to the Appellate Divisions observation in its verdict on the fifth amendment to reinstate original Articles 115 and 116.

Article 115(1) of the 1972 constitution empowered the president to appoint district judges on the recommendations of the Supreme Court and other persons after consultation of the Public Service Commission and the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court also lost the authority to appoint district judges and magistrates as the government through the fourth amendment empowered the president to exercise the power in accordance with rules made by him.

The president still retained the power.

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Separation of judiciary still elusive - newagebd.net

Professor’s New Casebook Is First to Look at Law of the Police – UVA Today

As debates about policing pervade the public conversation, professorRachel Harmonof the University of Virginia School of Law has written the first casebook to look at the laws that govern police conduct in the United States.

The Law of the Police, published by Wolters Kluwer, takes on the question of how the law shapes police-citizen encounters and how the law might be leveraged to make policing serve the public better.

Harmon, a former federal prosecutor who directs the Law SchoolsCenter for Criminal Justice, has taught a course on the laws governing police for 15 years. She came to UVA Law in 2006 after spending eight years as a federal prosecutor in the U.S. Department of Justices Civil Rights Division.

Throughout her time in academia, she has wrestled with what role, if any, policing should have in peoples lives, and how best to prevent misconduct.

I came to the Law School from practice, where I spent years prosecuting civil rights cases, including against police officers, she said. Over time, I got frustrated with criminal prosecution as a response to police misconduct. Prosecuting illegal police violence can be important, but I knew there had to be better ways to prevent problems in policing.

Among her goals for the book, she said, was to look at how different laws and legal rules make policing more or less harmful.

The book is a reaction to the traditional approach to policing the police, which is rights-focused. For example, a common police practice she considers problematic is selectively asking drivers, based on a gut feeling, to open their trunks during a traffic stop with all of the officers conscious and unconscious biases in tow.

Lawyers have typically looked at such problems and argued that they violate Fourth Amendment doctrine or, if they dont, that the doctrine should be changed, she said. I see things differently.

In the evolution of her thoughts, Harmon first looked at how existing rights and remedies might be applied to curb policing that works against the public interest.

I spent my first couple of years as an academic looking at legal remedies to see whether they could be used to prevent problems in policing and tossing them over my shoulder, Harmon said. So civil rights damages actions, is that going to work? No, thats not going to work a lot of the time. Justice Department investigations of police departments, is that going to work? No, that wont work well enough either.

She then suggested enhancements to these existing tools, before going another way.

I wrote a couple of articles trying to improve rights and remedies before I started to write about how to think more broadly about police misconduct as a regulatory problem, Harmon said. The question is not only how to remedy police misconduct, but how to use law to get the public safety we want, both through policing and through other means.

Focusing on that question led Harmon to study the harms of policing and how the law overlooks them or contributes to them.

Moreover, studying the vast array of legal rules that shape policing and police departments led Harmon to realize how little of it lawyers and law students may know, she said.

Hopefully, the book can be a resource, not just for law students, but for academics, lawyers, police chiefs, journalists, activists, judges or just about anyone interested in how the law actually governs policing and how it might do so differently whether thats reforming police departments or turning public safety over to nonpolice actors, she said.

She noted that the book is different than a criminal procedure textbook, which specifically prepares lawyers for the concepts they will need to know as future prosecutors or defenders. Her book is organized by police practices, such as stopping traffic, using force, maintaining order, and policing resistance and protests, rather than legal categories dictated by Fourth and Fifth Amendment law. The book covers departmental policies and local and state law, as well as federal statutes and cases. It also addresses topics law students rarely study and on which there are few resources for lawyers and commentators, such as asset forfeiture, protest policing, video recording the police, and criminal investigations and prosecutions of police officers.

Even so, that hasnt stopped some professors who have given her book a test run from using it in their criminal procedure courses. Harmon said that the book was not conceived with that purpose in mind, but she has grown more comfortable with the idea that it can be used to teach an alternative version of criminal procedure, one in which the police are front and center.

Harmon is a member of the American Law Institute and serves as an associate reporter for its project on Principles of the Law of Policing. She advises nonprofits and government actors on issues of policing and the law, and served as a policing expert for the independent review of the white supremacist events of Aug. 11-12, 2017, in Charlottesville.

In December she wasco-author of a report, Policing Priorities for the New Administration, advocating for a stronger regulatory approach. The report, produced in collaboration with Barry Friedman and the Policing Project at the New York University School of Law, urged the White House to appoint a policing czar and require that all of the more than 80 federal law enforcement agencies meet basic standards for transparency, among other clear and actionable measures.

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Professor's New Casebook Is First to Look at Law of the Police - UVA Today

No Hearing? No Money: Second Circuit Holds the Government May Not Keep Illegally Seized Rent – JD Supra

The Second Circuit has recently held that the Government must account for rental income it denied a property owner during a period of illegal seizure even though the Government was able to establish probable cause at a post-seizure hearing. The appeal stemmed from a decades-long sanctions and civil forfeiture action in which the U.S. Department of Justice has sought to forfeit, among others, a 36-story skyscraper located at 650 Fifth Avenue in Midtown Manhattan co-owned by the Alavi Foundation, an entity accused of laundering money for Iran.

The Government brought the civil action seeking to forfeit Alavis assetsincluding the building, valued at nearly $1 billionto distribute proceeds to victims of bombings and other attacks linked to Iran. The Government alleged that the property was traceable to violations of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, money laundering statutes, and Iranian sanctions promulgated by the U.S. Department of Treasurys Office of Foreign Assets Control.

The case has been vigorously litigated for more than 13 years, involving extensive motion practice and years of discovery among hundreds of litigants, and producing several appeals, including an appeal from a judgment for the Government following a month-long jury trial that the Second Circuit vacated in 2019.

In the latest appeal, Alavi challenged the district courts finding of probable cause for the forfeiture, and argued that, even if probable cause existed, Alavi was entitled to the rental income the Government seized before the district courts determination of probable cause. The Second Circuit affirmed the probable-cause finding but agreed with Alavi on the second point.

18 U.S.C. 983 sets forth the [g]eneral rules for civil forfeiture proceedings. It permits courts to issue a protective order to seize, secure, maintain, or preserve the availability of property subject to civil forfeiture, and such orders may be entered prior to judgment. Id. 983(j)(1). 18U.S.C. 985, however, states that real property that is the subject of a civil forfeiture action shall not be seized before entry of an order of forfeiture. Id. 985(b)(1)(A), (f)(1). Section 985 contains two exceptions to this prohibition on pre-judgment seizures of real property: (1) where, on the Governments application, the court conducts a pre-seizure probable cause hearing in which the property owner has a meaningful opportunity to be heard or (2) where the court determines that there is probable cause for the forfeiture and that there are exigent circumstances that permit the Government to seize the property without prior notice and an opportunity for the property owner to be heard. Id. 985(d)(1)(B)(i)-(ii).

The Government argued that the specific provisions in 985 that require a pre-seizure hearing or showing of exigent circumstances apply only to seizures of real property and not, as here, to a seizure of rental income, and thus the protective order at issue was governed by 983, not 985. The Court disagreed. It held that a seizure of rental income is subject to the statutory due process restrictions in 985 as well as the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Because the Governments seizure of the rental income without a pre-deprivation notice and hearing violated constitutionally protected due process rights, the Court found no need to reach the statutory due process issue, describing it as academic. The Court thus concluded that the building had been unlawfully seized until the district courts hearing on probable cause in October 2020.

The Court then turned to the remedy for the period of illegal seizure. The Government argued that as long as a court eventually determines that probable cause for forfeiture exists, previously unlawfully seized rental income should not be released. The Court disagreed, joining a majority of other circuits holding that the remedy for an illegal seizure where the Government fails to provide pre-deprivation notice and hearing but the property is later found to be subject to forfeiture after due process has been afforded is return of rents or lost profits during the period of illegal seizure. Because the district court did not hold a hearing on probable cause until October 13, 2020, all rental income seized by the Government before that date must be released to Alavi.

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No Hearing? No Money: Second Circuit Holds the Government May Not Keep Illegally Seized Rent - JD Supra