Archive for the ‘Fifth Amendment’ Category

‘Assure the right to life’: Lewis urges Southern Baptists to support pro-life amendment in US Constitution – The Pathway

EDITORS NOTE: This article includes reporting by Tom Strode of Baptist Press.

JEFFERSON CITY Longtime Missouri Southern Baptist statesman and pro-life advocate Larry Lewis is calling Southern Baptists to lead out in support of a pro-life amendment to the United States Constitution.

Lewis was among many Southern Baptist pro-life advocates who rejoiced, June 24, when the high court overruled its 1973 Roe v. Wade opinion as well as the 1992 Planned Parenthood v. Casey ruling that affirmed Roe and returned abortion policy to the states.

JEFFERSON CITY Longtime Missouri Southern Baptist statesman and denominational leader Larry Lewis and his wife, Creeda, greet Missouri Baptist Directors of Missions and other guests, March 29, during the dedication of the Larry Lewis Strategy Room at the Missouri Baptist Conventions building here. (Pathway photo by Benjamin Hawkins).

The Supreme Courts opinion in Dobbs v. Mississippi Womens Health Organization brought an end to an abortion rule established by Roe that cost the lives of more than an estimated 63 million preborn children.

The Supreme Courts reversal of Roe was a decision for which Lewis had long prayed. He was pastor of Tower Grove Baptist Church in St. Louis when he wrote and defended from the platform as a member of the 1980 Resolutions Committee the first pro-life resolution approved by messengers to the SBCs annual meeting. After his election as president of the Home Mission Board (now North American Mission Board) in 1987, the board inaugurated the same year under his leadership the Alternatives to Abortion Ministries to help churches and associations establish crisis pregnancy centers.

He is delighted the Roe v. Wade ruling has been overturned, Lewis said. Roe v. Wade is probably the worst decision ever rendered by the [U.S.] Supreme Court, with the possible exception of Dred Scott, the high courts 1857 opinion that said free and enslaved Black Americans were not U.S. citizens, he said.

Never in the history of our republic has any court ever found in the Constitution a right for a mother to kill her children, either born or unborn, he wrote in a statement for Baptist Press.

Of course, reversing Roe v. Wade doesnt assure the right to life for the unborn but simply transfers the issue to the states to fashion whatever laws they think appropriate, Lewis said. Fortunately, there are several states that will likely prohibit or strictly regulate abortion except for extreme circumstances, such as where the life of the mother is seriously threatened. Unfortunately, many others will freely allow abortions with few or any restrictions.

[W]e have a fight for life on our hands! We must fight hard to assure our state legislatures fashion strong right-to-life legislation. We must fight equally as hard against those who will undoubtedly seek to amend the Constitution to assure the right to abort is constitutional. Instead, we should seek to amend the Constitution to assure the right to life, already clearly embedded in the Constitution, applies to the unborn as well as to anyone else.

This month, Lewis delivered to The Pathway a statement calling for an amendment to the U.S. Constitution. His statement is based on an appeal he previously made in 1981, while serving as a board member for Southern Baptists for Life. Read the statement below:

When our founding fathers drafted the United States Constitution, they wisely included a provision whereby it could be amended. The persuasive arguments of James Madison convinced the others that providing a means to amend the constitution was not only desirable but imperative. Madison observed, in framing a system which we wish to last for ages, we should not lose sight of the changes which ages will produce.

Since that time the constitution has been amended many times for many reasons. To be exact, there have been 27 amendments in the nearly 250 year history of our republic, an average of at least one per decade! I believe most have been for the good of the country.

If it were not for amendments to the constitution our cherished right to worship would not be secure. It is the first amendment (not the constitution itself) that gives us the right to worship, freedom of speech, freedom of the press, and the right to peaceable assembly.

If it were not for amendments, women would not have a right to vote and black men and women would still be slaves. In fact, most of the cherished rights we enjoy in America today are provided through amendments to the constitution, rather than by the constitution itself. Perhaps most important of these are the first ten, commonly called The Bill of Rights.

But why is there a need for yet another amendment to secure the right to life for the unborn? Doesnt the constitution speak eloquently of certain unalienable rights, among these the right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness? Unfortunately, this beautiful rhetoric found in the Declaration of Independence never made it into the constitution. The constitution itself says nothing about a right to life for either the born or unborn. Thank God for the fifth and fourteenth amendments or there would be no right to life assured by the United States Constitution!

The fifth amendment states that a person cannot be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. Life, liberty, and property can be taken, but only by due process of law. Also, this provision applies only to persons.

In the infamous Dred Scott decision the obvious rights of black men and women were abridged in order to sustain slavery. The Supreme Court ruled that since black men and women were slaves, they should be classified as property rather than as persons. Therefore, the right to own slaves, abuse slaves, and even kill slaves was sustained on the grounds that they were not really persons and therefore could not enjoy any rights provided by the constitution and the fifth amendment. Does this not remind one of the muddled reasoning the Supreme Court used in Roe v. Wade in 1973 concluding that the unborn were not protected by the constitution because they were not persons?

The twisted thinking of the Dred Scott case was rectified several years later with the passage of the fourteenth amendment. This amendment specifically states that all persons born or naturalized in the United States are citizens of the United States and the state in which they reside and prohibits any state from depriving any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.

For years it was assumed that the right to life thus secured by the fifth and fourteenth amendments applied not only to citizens of the United States but to their unborn offspring. History is replete with countless instances where large monetary awards were given parents of unborn offspring who were damaged as a result of accident or violence. Abortion was prohibited by law in every state of the Union except in cases where the life of the mother was in danger or (in a few states) in cases of incest and/or rape. The idea that a mother would want to destroy her unborn baby was abhorrent.

This all changed in January, 1973. In the infamous Roe v. Wade decision, the Supreme Court concluded (1) a womans right to privacy included her right to decide to terminate her pregnancy and (2) states interest in unborn life is not sufficiently compelling to permit regulation of abortion (at least prior to viability). The court considered the argument that even if the unborn are not persons, they are at least human beings and that the state has a compelling interest in protecting the life of human beings. However, the court concluded that the unborn baby possessed only potential life and the interest of the state in protecting potential life is not compelling.

Thus the Supreme Court, the highest deliberative body in the land, concluded there was no right to life secured by the United States Constitution for the unborn. They question whether or not the unborn child is really a human being and they definitely conclude the unborn is not a person. Therefore, since he is not a person the fifth and fourteenth amendments provisions cannot apply since they are explicitly attributed to persons. They further conclude that since the rights secured by the constitution apply only to citizens of the United States and a citizen is defined as one who is born or naturalized in the United States they cannot apply to the unborn since they have neither been born or naturalized.

To say the unborn baby is not a person is the exact antithesis of the testimony of Jeremiah, before thou comest forth out of the womb I sanctified thee and I ordained thee a prophet unto the nations (Jer. 1:5). Likewise the Psalmist declared (referring to himself in the first person), I will praise thee, for I am fearfully and wonderfully made; and that my soul knoweth right well. My substance was not hid from thee when I was made in secret, and curiously wrought in the lowest parts of the earth. Thine eyes did see my substance, yet being unperfect; and in thy book all my members were written, which in continuance were fashioned, when as yet there was none of them (Ps. 139:14-16).

To imply, as did the Supreme Court in 1973, that the unborn is not a human being is absurd! If the unborn child is not a human being, what kind of being is it? From the moment the child is conceived it has every attribute of a human being. From that point it merely grows and develops.

Opposition to Roe v. Wade was immediate, even among the Justices themselves. In his dissent Justice White observed: I find nothing in the language or history of the constitution to support the courts judgement. The court simply fashions and announces a new constitutional right for pregnant mothers. Likewise, Justice Rehnquist stated in his dissent: To reach its result the court necessarily has had to find within the scope of the fourteenth amendment a right that was completely unknown to the drafters of the amendment.

Since that infamous decision in 1973, over 65 million unborn babies have been killed by abortion in the United States alone. Every 20 seconds we delay in correcting this terrible decision, another unborn baby is destroyed and discarded as so much trash!

If in 1964 it was important to amend the constitution so that the poll tax could be eliminated, is it not at least equally important to amend the constitution now so the senseless slaughter of unborn babies can be restrained?

In 1971 we amended the constitution so 18-year-olds might have the right to vote. Is it not just as important now to amend the constitution so that unborn babies may have the right to live?

In 1951, we amended the constitution so the President of the United States would be prohibited from serving more than two terms. Is it not just as important to amend the constitution now so a mother may be prohibited from destroying her unborn child?

Baptists should be at the forefront leading the effort to secure a human life amendment. Just as we have been quick and forceful in leading the effort to oppose gambling, the lottery, pornography, alcohol and drugs, we should be leading the effort to oppose the abortion holocaust in America today.

Southern Baptists are firmly on record in support of a human life amendment. Most resolutions on the issue passed by the Southern Baptist Convention since 1980 have included a strong statement supporting an amendment.

Likewise, most of our outstanding Southern Baptist leaders are outspoken in their support of this cause. Former SBC President, Dr. Adrian Rogers, identified abortion as the most important issue in our contemporary list of social concerns, and was a longtime supporter of those who sought to get a human life amendment approved by Congress. To my knowledge, all of our former Southern Baptist presidents since 1979 have been opponents of abortion and supporters of a human life amendment.

A human life amendment is imperative even though the muddled reasoning of Roe v. Wade has been corrected. Even though there has been a change in the consistency of the Supreme Court and more conservative, pro-life Justices have been appointed and even though the new court reversed Roe v. Wade, the potential for disaster still remains. An amendment is needed to make it explicitly clear that the right to life provided through the fifth and fourteenth amendments applies not only to the mother but to the unborn offspring as well.

I personally favor an amendment designed to return to the states the authority to make laws governing abortion. I do not believe it is the role of the constitution to become a criminal code, but rather to protect and secure those laws of the people, by the people, and for the people, enacted by the Congress and the state legislatures. Also, from the standpoint of political expediency, I believe this type of amendment has greater possibility of passage in Congress and ratification by the states.

For many years now in our state conventions and in our Southern Baptist Convention we have debated the abortion issue and we have passed strong resolutions opposing abortion and affirming the sanctity of human life. From our pulpits we have condemned the abortion clinics and opposed abortion vociferously. But the carnage continues!

Resolutions and eloquent preachments alone will not stop the abortion holocaust. Although not the total solution, a human life amendment is imperative if this avalanche of human carnage is to be stemmed.

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'Assure the right to life': Lewis urges Southern Baptists to support pro-life amendment in US Constitution - The Pathway

Should There Be a Cost-Benefit Exception to Miranda’s Exclusionary Rule? – Reason

On Monday, the Fifth Circuit decided an interesting Miranda case, allowing admission of a suspect's unwarned statements. And Judge Jones provided an even more interesting concurring opinion, suggesting that voluntary statements should be admitted in situations where it was debatable whether the Miranda rules were applicable. Judge Jones makes a compelling cost-benefit argument against suppressing statements in such circumstances, and I hope that her approach in followed in future cases.

Here are the facts, as recounted in the decision: A lone police officer performed a traffic stop on Braylon Coulter in the middle of the night. Having been given reason to suspect that Coulter, who revealed an aggravated robbery conviction, had a gun, the officer handcuffed him and asked where it was. Coulter answered, and the officer's partner arrived later to find a .40 caliber pistol and .37 ounces of marijuana in Coulter's backpack between the front seats of the van he drove. Before Coulter divulged that information, the officer did not provide Miranda warnings. The admissibility of Coulter's unwarned statements therefore depended on whether he was "in custody" as contemplated by Miranda at the time he offered them.

The Fifth Circuit held that a reasonable person in Coulter's position would not havethought that he was in custody for Miranda purposes. Moreover, the officer questioned Coulter in an environment that was not tantamount to a station house interrogation as contemplated by Miranda. As a result, the Fifth Circuit (in a 2-1 decision authored by Judge Jones) held that all of Coulter's unwarned statements were admissible.

Judge Jones went on, however, to file a concurring opinion to her own majority opinion. She argued that, where the issue of Miranda compliance was debatable, it would be appropriate to weigh the costs and benefits of suppressing a voluntary statement:

The panel is deeply divided on the application of the "custody" test. Under such circumstances, it seems to me, we ought to recall that "[t]he Miranda rules are prophylactic rules that the Court found to be necessary to protect the Fifth Amendment right against compelled self-incrimination." Vega v. Tekoh, 597 U.S. __, __, 2022 WL 2251304, *8 (June 23, 2022). Moreover, "when [the Supreme] Court creates a prophylactic rule to protect a constitutional right, the relevant 'reasoning' is the weighing of the rule's benefits against its costs." Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778, 793 (2009). The Miranda rule is therefore "justified only by reference to its prophylactic purpose, . . . and applies only where its benefits outweigh its costs[.]" Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98, 106 (2010) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) . When three judges cannot agree on whether a suspect in a traffic stop is "in custody," then we ought to consider the costs and benefits of suppressing incriminatory statements.

Judge Jones then went on to conclude that, in cases such as this one, the cost-benefit calculation tips decidedly against suppressing a voluntary statement. She explained that "the costs of suppressing Coulter's unwarned statements would be substantial, namely, hindering the prosecution of a convicted felon who voluntarily admitted to possessing a firearm and drugs." She also noted that "the videotape of this entire encounter compellingly shows there was no improper compulsion or restraint."

What about adopting a flat rule that police must always give Miranda warnings when they handcuff someone? Judge Jones explained that "[o]fficers might be put to the choice of ensuring their own safety or conducting routine investigations. One potential price of premature Mirandizing would be to require broader vehicle searches, and thus broader invasions of privacy, because officers would likely lack voluntary admissions from suspects. Prematurely requiring Miranda warnings during traffic stops would also inhibit questioning that could assist in time-sensitive investigations, e.g., for kidnapping victims or terrorists."

Judge Jones concluded that "suppressing Coulter's unwarned statements under these circumstances would also yield no meaningful societal or judicial benefits. '[U]nlike unreasonable searches under the Fourth Amendment or actual violations of the Due Process Clause or the Self-Incrimination Clause, there is, with respect to mere failures to warn, nothing to deter.' United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 642 (2004) (plurality opinion) (emphasis added). Here, under applicable law, there was nothing to deterand therefore no justification for suppressing Coulter's un-Mirandized statements."

I think Judge Jones' concurrence is very persuasive. As I have discussed at length in my various articles on Miranda (the most recent of which can be found here), that decision imposes significant costs of law enforcement. In cases such as this one, where a suspect's statements are not, in fact, compelled and the only issue is one of Miranda compliance in a debatable situation, it is hard to see the justification for suppressing a suspect's statements. I hope that Judge Jones' concurring opinion attracts wide attention and is followed in future cases.

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Should There Be a Cost-Benefit Exception to Miranda's Exclusionary Rule? - Reason

Two More Men Convicted Of Murder Have Been Exonerated After 23 Years In Prison Due To Allegations Of Police Misconduct – BuzzFeed News

Two Chicago men who have each spent 23 years in prison had their murder convictions tossed out based on the police work of a detective accused of framing more than 70 people for homicides they did not commit.

Eruby Abrego, 43, and codefendant Jeremiah Cain, 47, became the 27th and 28th people exonerated and the seventh and eighth cleared within the last 12 days based on allegations that retired detective Reynaldo Guevara routinely beat suspects and witnesses, coerced confessions, and used threats in order to close murder investigations.

I want to scream to the world, Abregos sister, Debbie Daniels, told BuzzFeed News about her brothers release. They slandered our family name.

A 2017 BuzzFeed News investigation documented widespread reports of corruption by Guevara.

Abrego and Cain were convicted of the 1999 murder of 46-year-old Jose Garcia and wounding 20-year-old Julio Lugo. Garcia had been sitting in the passenger seat of a parked car with his nephew, Ramon Torres, in the drivers seat. Lugo, along with his 10-year-old cousin, was chatting with Garcia and Torres when a young Latino with a hood pulled low over his face called out a rival gang taunt, then opened fire from across the street. Lugo had bullet wounds in his shoulder and buttocks but survived. Garcia suffered a shot to his head.

Witnesses at the scene described the shooter as 57 with dark skin. Abrego measured 54 with light skin.

One man, who had already been acquitted of Garcias murder, testified at a recent hearing that he had been the one to fire the gun. Torres, the witness in the drivers seat, cried inconsolably during a hearing earlier this year, testifying that Guevara told him whom to select out of a lineup.

Guevara has invoked his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent when asked about allegations of misconduct.

Yet Guevara isnt the only police officer accused of misconduct in this case.

Abrego said that one of Guevaras colleagues, Detective Anthony Wojcik, punched Abrego 20 to 25 times, like I was a punching bag, while he was chained to the wall. Abrego said detectives denied him food for more than 24 hours. When Wojcik later appeared in the interrogation room, Abrego complained of feeling queasy and needing to vomit. According to court documents, Abrego vomited blood, and when he asked Wojcik to take him to the hospital, the detective said, Just tell me what I want to hear and Ill take you wherever you want to go.

A scared, hungry Abrego then falsely confessed to killing Garcia.

Cains statements to Wojcik change over the course of his interviews. He alleged Wojcik beat him into making false statements until they fit the polices narrative of the crime: That Abrego was the shooter. Police claimed they found a handgun linked to the Garcia murder, but Cain said he had no knowledge it had been used in a crime.

Lawyers for Abrego and Cain called witnesses to testify that Wojcik, like Guevara, has a pattern of brutalizing suspects. In 2014, when Chicago police fired 16 bullets into the body of a 17-year-old Black boy named Laquan McDonald, Wojcik approved police reports that contained lies in an attempt to cover up McDonalds murder. A Department of Justice investigation into the Chicago police cited the reports Wojcik approved in the McDonald case as evidence of highly troubling procedures within the department.

Wojcik denied wrongdoing in the case. BuzzFeed News left messages with his attorney but did not receive an immediate response.

Wojciks name is not a name that a lot of people have heard yet but its a name that people will hear because he has done systematic efforts to coerce and torture people into confessing to crimes against their constitutional rights, said David B. Owens, one of Abregos attorneys.

This is an all-star cast of detectives with troubled backgrounds.

The states attorneys office dropped charges months into hearings in which a parade of witnesses testified to being abused by Wojcik and Guevara. Tossing the convictions rather than allowing a judge to issue a decision in the case eliminates the possibility that the court would issue an unfavorable ruling involving Wojcik. That unfavorable ruling could then open legal pathways and buttress claims of more than a dozen men who have already filed in court claiming they were beaten into false confessions.

Karl Leonard, another Abrego attorney, doesn't buy that hypothesis.

"If the state wanted to avoid making a record made in this case in other Wojcik cases they could have made this decision years ago before the other victims took the stand," he said. "I dont think its convenient timing."

In a statement, the states attorneys office said that in the matters of Abrego and Cain, "our review concluded that these convictions were not in the interest of justice, and today we withdrew our opposition to the post-conviction petition and dismissed the case."

Cains brother, Alexander, who has only been able to give his brother a thumbs up from across the courtroom for the last few decades, said, I want to give the guy a hug.

Abrego returns home to his mother, Oralia Cerna, 78, whom doctors last month declared free of breast cancer. He will also be greeted by Juan and Rosendo Hernandez, two brothers exonerated last week, who went shopping to buy Abrego clothes for his release.

But Abregos sister said her work isnt over with her brothers release.

Wojcik, she said, Im coming for you.

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Two More Men Convicted Of Murder Have Been Exonerated After 23 Years In Prison Due To Allegations Of Police Misconduct - BuzzFeed News

Democrats should use 14th Amendment insurrection clause to keep Trump off the ballot in 2024 – The Hill

After the testimony of former White House aide Cassidy Hutchinson, is there any doubt that Donald Trump fomented the insurrection on Jan. 6, 2021?

There are no longer any innocent explanations for what he did that day. Select Committee testimony has demonstrated that he knew he had no good factual or legal basis for his claim that the election was stolen, that he knew Vice President Mike Pence was not going to save him and that his only chance to remain in the White House was to stop the final ratification by Congress on Jan. 6. The testimony has also demonstrated that he knew some in the crowd assembled to hear him speak were armed, that a mob was heading to the Capitol, and that it was clearly in his power to call off the insurrection but instead of trying to stop the violence, he chose to do nothing.

The question is: Can anything be done, short of a criminal conviction, to prevent Trump from seeking to recapture the presidency?

Section 3 of the 14th Amendment disqualifies a person from being president who, while holding a federal office, participated in an insurrection against the United States.

That prohibition must surely apply to Donald Trump, and that is what the House sought to establish in Trumps second impeachment; however, because the impeachment trial was held before a full investigation of the insurrection charge had taken place, much of the most damning evidence uncovered by the Select Committee was not available. Thus, while the House will not get a second chance, there are other means of achieving Trumps disqualification, although they have never been tested in a court before now.

Whether President Biden runs in 2024, it is certain that there will be a Democrat on the ballot, and thus the Democratic Party, on behalf of all of its candidates, could bring suit in federal court right now, seeking a ruling that Donald Trump participated in the Jan. 6 insurrection and an order precluding him from even being a candidate for president.

Trump would first have to decide whether to fight the lawsuit, which would mean saying whether he was running in 2024, something he would prefer to announce at a time and place of his choosing, not when and where he is sued.

After making some procedural motions in an effort to have the case dismissed, the former president would then have to respond to discovery, including being subjected to a deposition in which he would have to answer questions under oath. Unlike the situation with the Select Committee, he would have no arguable claims of presidential privilege, so that if he refused to answer questions, the court could draw adverse inferences against him from his refusals, meaning he could no longer argue that his conduct was justified if he would not provide a factual basis for his repeated assertions that the election was stolen.Moreover, ifthe suit were filed now, there would be plenty of time for discovery, a trial, and an appeal before the primaries start in early 2024.

Like every other American, Trump would have the option of claiming the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. That path would be rather awkward for any candidate for public office, but especially for him in light of what he said during the 2016 campaign about employing that tactic:The mob takes the Fifth If youre innocent, why are you taking the Fifth Amendment?

Unlike most laws, section 3 provides a special means to avoid disqualification, which the Democrats might like as much as the trial: Two thirds of each House can vote to grant him amnesty that would require Republican Senators and Representatives to go on the record on whether Trump should be entitled to be a candidate for president, despite having been found to have been part of the insurrection.

Will this lawsuit succeed? No one can know for sure, but it seems as if there is nothing to lose, or at least not if the Department of Justice does not indict Trump for inciting the Jan. 6 insurrection.

Alan B. Morrison is an associate dean at George Washington University Law School where he teaches constitutional law.

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Democrats should use 14th Amendment insurrection clause to keep Trump off the ballot in 2024 - The Hill

Dissecting the Justice Department’s Prosecutorial Decisions on Navarro, Meadows, and Scavino – Lawfare

On June 3, the Department of Justice revealed an indictment charging former Trump adviser Peter Navarro with contempt of Congress for his refusal to comply with a subpoena issued by the House select committee on the Jan. 6 attack on the Capitol. That announcement mirrored the departments November 2021 decision to bring the same charges against Steve Bannon, whose trial began recently. But later that same day, the department informed the committee that it would not bring contempt charges against Trumps former chief of staff, Mark Meadows, or his former deputy chief of staff for communications, Dan Scavino. The House had referred all of these former Trump advisers to the department for prosecution for contempt after each refused to comply with subpoenas for documents and testimony issued by the Jan. 6 committee. The committee found the departments decision puzzling and expressed its hope that the department would provide[] greater clarity about its rationale in the future. Committee member and former prosecutor Rep. Adam Schiff called the departments decision not to prosecute Meadows and Scavino deeply troubling. Schiff explained that all three former officials had relevant information about the events of Jan. 6 and had similarly refused to cooperate with the committee.

On July 15, the Justice Departments decision became even more perplexing. Meadows earlier filed a civil suit against the committee seeking to justify his noncomplianceand at the invitation of the judge overseeing the suit the department filed a brief on the controversial doctrine of testimonial immunity for senior presidential advisers. The brief sets forth the Justice Departments position that Meadows is not immune from compelled testimony, thus undermining the principal defense he and his attorney had proffered against a contempt charge. The departments brief emphasizes the critical importance of the committees work and the importance of [Meadowss] testimony to the Select Committees investigation. Yet, the departments earlier decision not to prosecute Meadows or Scavino appears at odds with these exhortations. The failure to prosecute Meadows and Scavino rewards the former advisers disregard for the committee and its mission. And it renders the maxim at the heart of the committees investigationNo one is above the lawempty rhetoric. Unsurprisingly, the Justice Departments decision has also reportedly led to tension with the committee. Some members have adopted a less cooperative stance toward sharing information with the department because of its refusal to vindicate the committees subpoenas through criminal contempt.

What explains the Justice Departments mixed decision on prosecuting Navarro, Meadows, and Scavino? How should Congress and the country understand the departments actions when considering future actions? Individuals such as Pat Cipollone, Trumps former White House counsel, have undoubtedly weighed the Justice Departments actions in their calculus of how to respond to the committees subpoenas, as will future congressional subpoena recipients. And even though he ultimately decided to comply, mostly, with the committees subpoena, Cipollone likely could have refused to comply without fear of prosecution given the precedent set with Meadows and Scavino. But more than a month later, there is still little to no direct information about the basis for the decision, aside from the Justice Departments cryptic statement in its letter to the committee that its decision was based on the individual facts and circumstances of their alleged contempt.

Prior to the Justice Departments recent brief, we theorized about the departments decision. We thought perhaps the nuances of the doctrine of testimonial immunitydeveloped and expanded by the Justice Departments Office of Legal Counsel (OLC)could alone explain the split decision based on a conclusion that Meadows and Scavino enjoyed immunity but Navarro did not. We were wrong. That explanation may still form part of the decision. But in light of the Justice Departments filing concluding that Meadows is not immune (an analysis that applies equally to Scavino), the immunity doctrine alone cannot explain why Meadows and Scavino were not prosecuted.

Instead, given the evidence from the recent brief on immunity, past OLC experience, and ongoing arguments in the Bannon trial, the distinction between Navarro and Meadows/Scavino may be driven not by obscure constitutional doctrines about the power of Congress to subpoena White House advisers, but by the foundational question all prosecutors ask before bringing a case: Can we convict this defendant? Our best guess is that the Justice Department prosecutors thought Meadows and Scavino had a viable affirmative defense to prosecution for contempt of Congress. But Navarro did not.

The reason Navarro lacked a viable defense could be grounded solely in OLCs immunity doctrine. We discuss this as the potential plausibility distinction below, a theory that the department concluded that Navarro had no plausible claim to immunityand thus no defensebut that Meadows and Scavino did have such a claim. But the more likely explanation, what we call the directive distinction, is far simpler. Navarro never hired an attorney to represent him in his interactions with the committee. As a result of that failure, no one ever took the steps to protect Navarro from a contempt prosecution that the attorneys for Meadows and Scavino took to protect their clients. Navarro, unlike Meadows and Scavino, never received a letter from Trumps lawyer purporting to direct him not to comply with the committees subpoena on the basis of immunity. He never hired a lawyer to recognize the value of such a letter. Meadows and Scavino did. That may have made all the difference, providing Meadows and Scavino with a defense that they reasonably relied on the authority of a former president to direct them to assert immunity (an authority that remains unsettled) and leaving Navarro defenseless.

If our theory is correct, the Justice Departments clear statement in its Meadows brief that testimonial immunity does not apply means that, from this point forward, no senior adviser to Trumpincluding Meadows or Scavinohas a viable defense to contempt for refusing to comply with the committees subpoenas. They can no longer make any plausible claim that a government official or entity has authorized their actions. In other words, if Meadows and Scavino had been held in contempt after the department filed its brief, they would have no defense. Thus, if the committee reissued subpoenas for Meadows and Scavino and they again refused to comply and were again held in contemptthe Justice Department would now be willing to refer them to a grand jury for prosecution for contempt of Congress.

That rationale is our best guess about the legal explanation for the departments decision. We may be, and likely are, wrong again. Prosecutorial decisions are not always based on legal defenses; pragmatic considerations play a role as well. As discussed later on, there is an open and disputed question about how much discretion the Justice Department has to decline to prosecute an individual for contempt of Congress, particularly when that decision is based on pragmatic considerations. And, to our knowledge, the Justice Department has never declined to prosecute for contempt of Congress absent a constitutional bar to such a prosecution, such as executive privilege, testimonial immunity, or the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. The departments decision not to prosecute Meadows and Scavino thus breaks new ground. And if that decision was based not on potential legal defenses but, instead, on pragmatic reasons, the departments decision stretches its discretion to decide whether to prosecute individuals for contempt of Congress even further and raises significant questions about the departments role in prosecuting contempt cases.

Assuming such pragmatic considerations do play a role, however, two considerations in particular may have informed the departments decision. First, the team at the Justice Department working on criminal prosecutions related to Jan. 6 may have considered the usefulness of a criminal contempt charge against Navarro, who has been subpoenaed to testify before the grand jury investigating those potential charges. The recent revelation of a plea deal offer to Navarroone he rejectedmay offer some additional evidence in favor of this consideration. Second, the coming election and the looming specter of subpoenas issued by new Republican committee chairs demanding the testimony of Bidens current or former advisers about everything from the Afghanistan withdrawal to the administrations coronavirus response to Hunter Biden may haveconsciously or notswayed the administration in favor of proceeding more cautiously to ensure Biden officials retain viable defenses to contempt charges if the tables are turned in 2023.

OLCs Immunity Doctrine and a Potential Legal Rationale for Nonprosecution

OLCs immunity doctrine has two requirements: First, the individual at issue must be a senior or immediate presidential adviser, a person in a high enough position to be seen as the presidents alter ego. Second, the immunity exempts senior advisers from testifying only about matters related to their official duties. If those requirements are satisfied, a senior adviser is absolutely immune from compelled congressional testimony. In other words, an adviser does not even have to show up and assert privilege in response to a congressional subpoena. Despite confusion in news accounts, the immunity doctrinenot executive privilegeis at the core of the contempt charge and potential prosecution for Navarro, Meadows, and Scavino. All three refused to appear before the panel and testify, and not even the broadest conception of executive privilege supports that kind of total noncompliance with a testimonial subpoena. Instead, a witness must appear and assert privilege with respect to specific questions. Indeed, the district court overseeing Bannons criminal trial recently chided Bannons attorney about his inattention to that fundamental principle. Only the immunity doctrine allows a witness not to show up at all.

In the past, OLC has extended absolute immunity to current and former advisers to a sitting president, including Trumps former White House counsel, Don McGahn. But in its recent filing, the Justice Department made clear for the first time publicly that advisers to former presidents do not enjoy that absolute immunity. Instead, the department informed the court that senior advisers to a former president are entitled only to a kind of qualified immunity that, unlike absolute immunity, must take into account the interests and needs of Congress. Applying judicial precedents weighing the balance of power between the executive and legislative branches, the department concluded that the qualified immunity Meadows enjoyed was overcome by the extraordinary circumstances of Jan. 6 and the committees compelling need for information that only Meadows could provide. As a result, the Justice Department informed the court that it did not matter what authority Trump, as a former president, had to direct former advisers not to testify, though it did suggest that a former president lacked such authority. Because Meadows enjoys only qualified immunity that is overcome by the committees need, he has no immunity and no basis on which to refuse to testify even if Trump, as former president, retained authority to instruct immune advisers not to testify and had instructed Meadows not to do so.

The Justice Departments brief resolved the question of whether Meadows and Scavino escaped prosecution because OLC considered them immune under its precedents. OLC did not regard them as immune. That eliminates what had been, prior to the departments brief, one potential rationale for the prosecutorial decision. That leaves at least two possible legal reasons the department would prosecute Navarro but not Meadows and Scavino:

1. Navarros claim to immunitylike Bannons but unlike Meadowss and Scavinosis completely implausible such that Navarro could not have reasonably relied on the past OLC immunity opinions when deciding not to testify (the plausibility distinction)

or, more likely,

2. Navarrounlike Meadows and Scavinodid not receive a direction from the former president not to testify and thus had no basis on which to claim that he had been directed to assert immunity by a government official and reasonably followed that direction (the directive distinction).

Both of these rationales turn not on the constitutional inability of the department to prosecute Meadows and Scavino but on the prospects for success in such a prosecution. If, by contrast, OLC had opined that Meadows and/or Scavino were immune, then, according to past OLC opinions, the department could not bring a contempt charge without violating its constitutional responsibilities. But because the department, presumably OLC, concluded that Meadows, and by implication Scavino, were not immune, there is no constitutional impediment to prosecution. Instead, the criminal side of the department had to consider whether a prosecution would be advisable and successful. In other words, the department had to consider whether the witnesses had any viable defenses.

In making this decision, the Justice Department has the benefit of its experience pursuing Bannons prosecution for contempt of Congress and addressing the various defenses he has raised. Bannon, like Navarro, refused to engage with the committee or cooperate in any manner, claiming that he was protected by executive privilege. As Lawfare senior editor Roger Parloff has exhaustively cataloged and tracked, Bannons defenses to his contempt prosecution have all rested to some extent on the argument that it would violate constitutional due process for him to be prosecuted by the Justice Department when he was only following the past opinions of the Justice Department, namely the opinions on immunity and executive privilege. The judge in Bannons case roundly rejected his arguments, and found that the opinions Bannon cited did not even plausibly apply to him, a private citizen at the time of the relevant events. Nor did any of those opinions purport to authorize complete noncompliance on the basis of executive privilege. Only the immunity that attaches to senior White House advisers would authorize that, and Bannon had been a private citizen during the period about which the subpoena sought information. (Bannon left the White House in August 2017, and the committees subpoena sought information only about events that began in April 2020.) Obviously, these arguments would be much different if brought by Meadows, Navarro, or Scavino in defense of a contempt prosecution, and those differences appear to have led the department to reach the result it did.

The Plausibility Distinction

With respect to the first potential reasoncall it the implausibility rationaleit is difficult to see an argument that Navarros claim to immunity was materially less plausible than Meadowss or, especially, Scavinos. Meadows, Scavino, and Navarrounlike Bannonheld positions in the Trump White House on and in the run-up to Jan. 6. Moreover, all held the formal title of assistant to the president, which is the highest level of commissioned officer within the White House and the officials who receive the highest pay under the applicable statute. Past OLC opinions that have concluded that senior presidential advisers were immune from compelled congressional testimony have emphasized that title, in part, to demonstrate that the official was in fact senior enough to constitute an alter ego of the president and thus be entitled to absolute immunity. A position as assistant to the president is not itself sufficient to render an individual immune, however. OLC opinions have limited immunity to the senior-most advisers who customarily meet with the president on a regular and frequent basis and who assist[] him on a daily basis in the formulation of executive policy and [the] discharge of his constitutional responsibilities. During the Trump administration, and particularly during the first Trump impeachment, OLC extended the immunity doctrine to cover a significantly wider group of individuals, including a deputy national security adviser who did not report directly to the president. That expansion arguably began with the Obama administrations claim of immunity for David Simas, an important but relatively unknown political adviser. OLC has not withdrawn any of the Trump-era immunity opinions to our knowledge. Nor has it withdrawn the lengthy OLC opinion on congressional oversight of the White House, an opinion that seems to foreclose almost any testimony by a White House official. Accordingly, it does not seem likely that the Justice Department found that Meadows and, particularly, Scavinoa deputy chief of staffcould have reasonably concluded they were immune based on their positions, but that Navarro could not have.

There is a possibility that the Justice Department concluded Navarros claim to immunity was implausible because of the second prong of OLCs immunity doctrinethe requirement that the testimony relate to the advisers official duties. Navarros official role in the White House was more defined and narrow than either Scavinos or Meadowss. Navarro served as a senior trade adviser to Trump and director of the now-defunct Office of Trade and Manufacturing Policy. His role as an adviser was specific to the area of trade and commerce and, at some point, the response to the coronavirus pandemic. The committees subpoena to Navarro asked for information about his effort to delay or overturn the results of the 2020 election and his interactions with private individualssuch as Bannonand legislatorssuch as Ted Cruz. The letter accompanying the subpoena suggested the committee also wanted information about a so-called election report that Navarro released on his personal website, which repeat[ed] many claims of purported fraud in the election that have been discredited in public reporting, by state officials, and courts. The Houses contempt report on Navarro contends that the committees subpoena did not seek any information about Navarros performance of his official duties as a trade adviser but was concerned exclusively with obtaining information about events in which Mr. Navarro participated or witnessed in his private, unofficial capacity.

Meadows, by contrast, was the presidents chief of staff, the head of the Executive Office of the President, and the most senior presidential aide. He advised Trump on the entire scope of the presidents responsibilities and was likely involved in almost every decision Trump made in office. Scavinos roledeputy chief of staff for communicationswas neither as sweeping nor as senior as Meadowss. But, in that role, he would likely have a role in advising the president about a wider range of matters than Navarro. Working in communications, he would need to have information about everything happening in the White House in order to tailor messages to the public. Unofficially, Scavino was also long known to be one of Trumps most trusted advisers and potentially advised the president on matters even beyond his official title.

Unlike the subpoena to Navarro, the committees subpoenas to Meadows and Scavino explicitly seek information about their knowledge of Trumps activities and communications in the lead-up to and on Jan. 6. In a letter accompanying the subpoena to Scavino, select committee chair Rep. Bennie Thompson writes, [I]t appears that you were with or in the vicinity of former President Trump on January 6 and are a witness regarding his activities that day. You may also have materials relevant to his videotaping and tweeting messages on January 6. The letter also references reporting indicating that Scavino was with Trump on Jan. 5, 2021, when he and others were considering how to convince Members of Congress not to certify the election for Joe Biden. The select committee requested even more information from Meadows. It points to several instances of Meadowss communication with Trump, including on Jan. 6, as well as Meadowss engagement in planning of efforts to contest the presidential election. A letter accompanying the subpoena also notes that Meadows communicated with the highest officials at the Department of Justice requesting investigations into election fraud matters in several states and contacted state officials to encourage investigation of allegations of election fraud.

Accordingly, it is possiblethough unlikelythat the Justice Department concluded that Navarros claim to immunity was completely implausible based on the fact that the subpoena sent to him did not relate to his narrower White House duties. But also that Meadowss and Scavinos claims were plausible and could support a due process defense based on existing OLC opinions because of the type of information sought from them and their broader official duties. The difference between Navarros and Meadowss/Scavinos claims, however, depends on extremely nuanced readings of somewhat ambiguous past OLC opinions as well as a particular interpretation of the committees somewhat vague subpoenas. Given that ambiguity, it would be quite surprising if the department felt there was a sufficiently material distinction between Meadowss and Scavinos belief that the subpoenas implicated their official duties and Navarros belief that the subpoena for his testimony related in some way to his official duties. Moreover, recent OLC opinions have taken a broad view of official duties, concluding that actions taken that were determined to be illegal were part of Trump adviser Kellyanne Conways official duties. As one of us has argued previously on Lawfare, the committee could have limited the scope of its subpoenas in a manner that eliminated this ambiguity, asking only about actions unrelated to their official dutiesa step the committee later took in the civil litigation with Meadows. But the subpoenas to Navarro, Scavino, and Meadows had no such limitation.

The Directive Distinction

We now know that, in the Justice Departments view, Navarro, Meadows, and Scavino are not immune under OLCs doctrine. And it also seems clear that there is insufficient distinction among the three to claim that Navarro previously had no reasonable belief he was covered by OLCs doctrine, but that Meadows and Scavino did. Why prosecute only Navarro then? The only remaining possibility seems to be hinted at by the conclusion of the departments brief in the Meadows case. Justin Clark, the attorney for former president Trump, sent a letter to the counsel for both Meadows and Scavino instructing them to assert any immunities you may have with respect to compelled testimony. Neither the committee nor Navarro himself have ever reported receiving such an instruction. It seems possible, in the departments view, that instruction combined with the previous ambiguity about the advisers immunity gives Meadows and Scavino a defense to contempt that Navarro lacks. They can argue that the government, in the form of former president Trump, authorized their actions. Navarro has no such defense.

Why would such a minor detail as whether or not a potential defendant received a letter from Trumps counsel matter in the determination whether to pursue a contempt prosecution? Consider again Bannons defenses to his criminal prosecution. He contends that past positions in OLC opinions represent the government granting him the actual, implied, and apparent authority to refuse to comply with the subpoena and to stop the government from prosecuting him for conduct that it had authorized. Bannon has arguedunsuccessfully so farthat he should be able to present evidence that prosecuting him for reasonably relying on governmental positions regarding executive privilege violates due process. The judge rejected the proffered defenses and prohibited Bannon from submitting them to the jury because he found any purported reliance on the OLC opinions unreasonable given that the governmental positions taken in those opinions are inapplicable to Bannon. But the same cannot be said of Navarro, Scavino, and Meadows. Past OLC opinions established that immediate presidential advisers, including former advisers, are absolutely immune from compelled testimony concerning their official duties while in office. Bannon, though a former adviser, was not subpoenaed to testify about his time in that role. Thus, even though he too received an instruction to assert any immunities he had, he did not have any viable claims to assert them. Navarro, Scavino, and Meadows were senior presidential advisers. As noted, each could likely make an argument that the subpoenas related to their official duties, at least in part. But only Meadows and Scavino could reasonably believe that they had been authorized to assert that immunity by someone with authority to give such a direction: former President Trump.

That is not to say that Meadows and Scavino can assert they acted in good faith and Navarro cannot. In the Bannon prosecution, the Justice Department has successfully argued that the defendants good-faith belief that he does not have to comply with a subpoena does not matter in the context of a contempt prosecution. The only statutory requirement is that the defendant acted willfully in defying the subpoena; that is, he purposefully chose not to show up at the required deposition. As the judge in Bannons case recently articulated, the defendant could argue that his failure to show up was not willful because he did not believe the date on which he was supposed to show up applied to him. But he cannot argue that his failure was not willful because of a good-faith belief that he was immune.

Under various formulations of the public authority defenseincluding the specific claim of entrapment by estoppel on which Bannon has relieda defendant can argue, however, that due process prevents a guilty verdict because the government authorized the very conduct in which the defendant engaged. Basic notions of fairness prohibit the government from prosecuting an individual for engaging in an act the government itself authorized. That is the one area where Meadows and Scavino conceivably differ from Navarro. Both had been authorized by a former president to assert immunity, the act for which they face prosecution. All three had been directed to testify by the current president, of course. But no law, OLC opinion, or judicial precedent established that a former president lacked the authority to direct a former senior adviser not to testify. Accordingly, until the department filed its brief establishing that Meadows and Scavino were not immune, they could argue that they reasonably believed the governmentthat is, the OLC opinions plus the former presidents directionhad authorized their actions.

The departments brief casts considerable doubt on the proposition that a former president has any authority to make such a direction, particularly when the sitting president has declined to assert immunity. But the brief stops short of taking the firm position that a former president lacks such authority. Instead, the department tells the court it need not decide the issue since the immunity is qualified and overcome by the committees need, regardless of who has the authority to assert it. Moreover, the Supreme Court recently went out of its way to leave open the question of whether a former president has the authority to assert executive privilege, vacating a thorough opinion by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit rejecting a former presidents authority and instead ruling against former President Trump on alternative grounds. As a result, a former presidents authority to direct his former advisers to invoke immunity remains an open question. In light of that ambiguity, it appears the Justice Department may have concluded that Meadows and Scavino could rely on that instruction as a directive from a government official not to appear based on their potential immunity. Because Navarro received no such direction, however, he cannot argue that a governmental official sanctioned his noncompliance. Ironically, it may be that the only reason Navarro never received such a direction is that he never asked for oneor, more precisely, he, unlike Meadows and Scavino, did not, in his interaction with the committee, hire a lawyer who knew to ask for one.

Implications

If either of these rationales explains why the Justice Department did not prosecute Meadows and Scavinoand we are hard pressed to think of other potential legal rationalesthen it has enormous implications for the Jan. 6 committee going forward. The Justice Departments brief in the Meadows case establishes firmly that neither Meadows nor Scavino is immune from testifying before the committee. And even though the brief reserves the question of a former presidents authority to direct an adviser not to testify, it removes any doubt thatin the governments viewformer President Trump lacks authority to issue any directive to Meadows and Scavino. In the governments view, because Meadows and Scavino are not immune, no presidentformer or sittinghas authority to direct them not to testify. They therefore cannot reasonably rely on any such direction from Trump or any prior OLC positions given the departments brief.

Accordingly, if the committee were to again subpoena Meadows or Scavinoor any other former senior Trump adviserand they again refused to testify and again were held in contempt, the Justice Department would likely reach a different decision about proceeding with prosecution next time. They would no longer have any defense. And they would thus be in the same position as Navarro and Bannon.

Pragmatic Prosecutorial Considerations and the Departments Duty to Prosecute Contempt of Congress Referrals

The legal rationale proffered above is the best we can construct for the departments decision. But we acknowledge both that it may be wildly off base and that other, more pragmatic considerations may have either driven or contributed to the departments decision to prosecute Navarro but not Meadows and Scavino. Beyond those potential pragmatic reasons lies a more fundamental question, however: Are those types of considerations appropriate when considering whether to prosecute an individual who has been referred to the department by the House of Representatives for contempt of Congress?

Based on the executive branchs understanding of executive authority, informed largely by the unitary executive theory, OLC concluded in 1984 that the Justice Department retains prosecutorial discretion as to whether or not to take a contempt referral before a grand jury. As noted, the Justice Department has exercised that discretion not to pursue contempt of Congress charges when there has been an assertion of executive privilege or testimonial immunity. OLC reached a similar conclusion during the Obama administration with respect to a witnesss invocation of her Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, concluding the U.S. attorney had discretion not to bring the contempt referral of a former IRS official, Lois Lerner, before a grand jury.

But those historical precedents have each involved a purported constitutional defense to the subpoenaexecutive privilege, testimonial immunity, and the Fifth Amendment. The Justice Department has never, to our knowledge, simply told Congress that it does not want to pursue a contempt of Congress charge because of pragmatic concerns, though it has never disclaimed such discretion either. The 1984 opinion does express a robust view of executive power and prosecutorial discretion that grants the executive branch ultimate discretion over any prosecution, regardless of what language a statute uses. But the Biden administration has decried some of the robust claims of executive power made under Trump.

Thus, one of the most interesting questions to consider is whether the Justice Department concluded that it could not prosecute Meadows and Scavino because they had a viable legal defense or whether it decided against prosecution solely on the basis of pragmatic considerations. The former plausibly aligns with past decisions not to prosecute contempt referrals, though it does extend them beyond solely constitutional prohibitions on prosecution. If the department decided not to prosecute solely on the basis of pragmatic considerations, howeverperhaps concluding that the prosecution would be too unwieldy given what has occurred with Bannon to date or, more problematically, that it might undermine future claims of immunity by Biden officialsthat would be an significant expansion of the departments prosecutorial discretion. In light of the departments brief and conclusion that Meadows is not immune, the decision not to prosecute him and Scavino already establishes a new historical precedent about the departments duty to prosecute under the contempt of Congress statutes. If the decision rests solely on pragmatic, as opposed to legal, considerations, this new precedent represents an even more substantial expansion of the departments role in enforcing contempt.

Cooperation With the Committee

One clear difference between Meadows and Scavino, on the one hand, and Navarro as well as Bannon, on the other, lies in their level of engagement with the committee. In the immediate aftermath of the Justice Departments decision, some observers speculated that the difference in cooperation among the three led to the differential outcomes. Meadows and Scavino both engaged in negotiations with the committees lawyers for several weeks before they both ultimately stopped cooperating. In his negotiation period, Meadows turned over thousands of documents to the committee, including text messages and emails, and at one point reached a deal to sit for a deposition. There is less information about the exact communications between Scavino and the committee, butafter initially evading service of the committees subpoenaScavino and his attorney engaged in discussions with the committee rather than spurn the committee entirely.

By comparison, Navarro publicly defied the committees request from the outset, citing executive privilege. Even after the committee said their questions would not broach potential privileges related to Navarros work in the White House, he refused to appear before the panel or even negotiate with them. Without providing any supporting evidence or explanation, Navarro told the committee that President Trump has invoked [e]xecutive [p]rivilege in this matter; and it is neither my privilege to waive or Joseph Bidens privilege to waive and directed the committee to negotiate with Trump. Part of that response likely resulted from Navarros failure to hire an attorney to represent him in the matter. By contrast, Scavino and Meadows both had lawyers steeped in matters of congressional oversight and executive privilege who engaged with the committees staff and lawyers on their behalf. In that respect, Navarros case mirrors that of Bannon, whothough represented by counselfought the committees subpoena from the start, similarly claiming that executive privilege absolutely precluded him from turning over documents. Through his post-indictment attorneys, Bannon raised a number of additional issues in defending against his criminal contempt prosecution. But he, like Navarro, never raised most of them with the committee directly before rebuffing the committees subpoena.

One pragmatic consideration that went into that decision might be the perceived severity of the contempt and the posture the individual referred to the Justice Department had taken with respect to the committees authority. Meadowss and Scavinos engagement and incomplete compliance with the committee, however limited, could be a consideration in deciding not to prosecute them and to proceed only against Bannon and Navarro, the two witnesses who disclaimed any legal duty whatsoever to respond to the committees subpoena. In that respect, it likely helps that the lawyers for Meadows and Scavino understood from experience that disputes between Congress and the executive branch are typically back-and-forth negotiations involving compromise and accommodation. On their clients behalf, their attorneys adopted language and used arguments that resonated with the Justice Department, particularly OLC, while Bannons and Navarros outright defiance made them easier targets. Ultimately, each of the three was referred for prosecution by the House after refusing to appear for a deposition and refusing to provide all the documents required by the subpoena. It is thus difficult to understand why the prior, partial cooperation or negotiation by Meadows and Scavino would be sufficient to excuse their ultimate refusal to cooperate with the committee, particularly when the committee itselfas well as the full House of Representativeshad determined they were in contempt of their obligations to Congress.

Collateral Proceedings

Navarro, like Meadows, filed a civil suit seeking to quash the committees subpoena. In that suit, he disclosed a fact that mayor may notrepresent a material difference between him and the other witnesses. Navarros filing disclosed that he received a separate subpoena from a grand jury investigating the events of Jan. 6 seeking the same information from him that the committee sought. This grand jury is investigating potential criminal charges against unknown defendants related to Jan. 6, andas a result of the secrecy of grand jury investigationsvery little is publicly known about what they are doing. The target of a grand jury investigationthat is, the individual who the grand jury is considering indicting on criminal chargesis typically not subpoenaed by the grand jury to testify. That person will have the opportunity to defend themselves at trial if indicted.

The grand jury that subpoenaed Navarro is thus likely seeking Navarros testimony as part of its consideration of criminal charges against someone else in the administration or in Trumps circle, possibly high-level White House officials or outside individuals involved in the planning of Jan. 6, including Bannon. Accordingly, the Justice Department likely wants the information Navarro has for use in investigations of other people. Perhaps this is true of Meadows and Scavino as well. There is no way of knowing for sure. But assuming this is a difference between Navarro and Meadows/Scavino, it may have informed the departments decision to treat them differently. The Justice Department obviously wanted information that Navarro had as part of one of its criminal investigations relating to Jan. 6, and a pending contempt charge could certainly give prosecutors more leverage in forcing him to cooperate in that investigation. Indeed, the department offered Navarro a plea deal in the contempt prosecution, part of which would have required him to comply fully with the committees subpoena (information that presumably would have then been shared with the Justice Department). It is not at all clear if the Justice Department is seeking the same type of cooperation from Meadows and Scavino, though it may be.

Self-Interest and Future Republican Oversight of the Biden Administration

More problematic is an additional consideration that is undoubtedly salient to some people in the Biden administrationthe looming midterm election and the possibility of being inundated with indiscriminate congressional investigations if Republicans control the House in 2023. If OLC concluded that Meadows and Scavino had a plausible claim to immunity, but did not conclude they were in fact immune, could the Justice Department refuse to prosecute them because it wanted to preserve the opportunity to assert a broader immunity in the face of hostile investigations into the White House next year? Are those types of pragmatic, political considerations appropriate in considering whether to follow the contempt of Congresss statutory mandate to bring a contempt referral before a grand jury?

The Justice Department often considers institutional interests. And conversations about those interests lead political appointees to support or take actions that they otherwise might not. Recent examples include the Obama administrations support of Bushs claim of immunity for his former counsel Harriet Miers and the Biden administrations adoption of a number of positions supporting Trump-era litigation. It thus seems possible that the Justice Department found it to be in the institutional interests of the executive branch not to pursue prosecutions that would limit or undermine future claims of immunity or foreclose future assertions of authority by Biden when he leaves office. And that institutional interest would appear all the more salient given the high likelihood of clashes over privilege and immunity beginning in 2023.

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Dissecting the Justice Department's Prosecutorial Decisions on Navarro, Meadows, and Scavino - Lawfare