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On May 21, in Republic of Moldova's capital, Chiinu,will take place theNational Assembly "Moldova European." This presidential initiative aims to engage all citizens with pro-European views and foster a sense of unity and commitment towards Moldova's European integration. Following this event, on June 1st 2023, Moldova will be the host country for the Summit of the European Political Community which will bring together 47 heads of states, governments as well as European Union leaders. These events aim to reinforce Moldova's aspirations for EU membership and demonstrate its compatibility with European values.

The creation of the European Political Community in the region was prompted by the Russian Federation's unwarranted aggression in Ukraine. Due to security concerns, organizing a summit in Ukraine was not feasible. Instead, Moldova, as a non-EU country, situated in the Eastern Neighborhood, emerged as the most accessible location to convene the Summit. Moldova's commitment to its European course has been evident ever since the election of President Maia Sandu (a staunch pro-European advocate) in November 2020, as well as the overwhelming pro-European majority in Parliament. Moreover, Moldova swiftly obtained the candidate country status for EU accession, primarily influenced by the war in Ukraine.

The upcoming Summit of the European Political Community, carries an adamant message to the Russian Federation: "Hands off the Republic of Moldova, Ukraine, Georgia, and the Western Balkans." This message reflects the collective determination of not just the European Union, but all European states, to safeguard countries aspiring for reforms, values, and freedom against any unwanted interference from Russia.

The participation of 47 heads of states and governments in this summit marks a momentous occasion for the Republic of Moldova, an ex-Soviet republic that has grappled with geopolitical uncertainties since gaining independence more than three decades ago. The country's foreign policy stands out as a significant asset, providing a solid foundation for its resilience amidst the economic challenges resulting from the war in Ukraine.

The visit of French President Emmanuel Macron to Chisinau on June 15, 2022, held significant importance in the context of the European Union applications of the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine. It took place prior to the examination of these applications and played a crucial role due to the close relationship between President Macron and the Moldovan President. It's worth noting that France, along with Romania and Germany, has been a key advocate for Chisinau in advancing the European integration process for the country.

The upcoming Summit of the European Political Community, carries an adamant message to the Russian Federation: "Hands off the Republic of Moldova, Ukraine, Georgia, and the Western Balkans.

The collaboration among France, Romania and Germany has been instrumental in championing the interests of the Republic of Moldova and advancing its path towards European integration. President Macron's visit served to reaffirm this alliance and highlight the importance attached to Moldova's European journey.

Specifically, during his visit to Chisinau in June 2022, Emmanuel Macron announced the establishment of a new dialogue platform and provided assurances that this European Political Community is not intended to replace the process of accession to the European Union. The joint initiative of France, Germany and Romania yielded significant success in organizing donor conferences, resulting in a financial support package exceeding 1.43 billion euros. During the conferences held in Berlin, Bucharest, and Paris, Republic of Moldova's budget received funding amounts of 700 million euros, 600 million euros, and 130 million euros, respectively, in the specified order.

The international community's timely assistance to the Republic of Moldova came at a critical moment, when the country was struggling with multiple challenges. These challenges included an economic crisis marked by an inflation rate of over 35%, a security crisis due to remnants of missiles dropped on its territory, a gas energy crisis resulting from exorbitant prices and limited supply of Russian gas, as well as an electricity crisis caused by the termination of the energy supply contract from the MGRES plant located in the area controlled by the self-declared Transnistria.

This financial support made a substantial contribution in addressing the pressing issues faced by Moldova and demonstrated the commitment of the international community in assisting the country in its time of need. It helped addressing the economic, security, and energy-related challenges, fostering stability and resilience in the Republic of Moldova.

The allocation of a budget for the European Community Summit signifies the tangible implementation of this concept as a functioning institution. It is essential to recognize the security concerns surrounding the Summit, particularly considering that Moldova has also experienced missile incidents caused by the Russian aggression. The event is taking place in the village of Bulboaca, a mere 30 km from the so-called capital of the separatist regime, Transnistria, further emphasizing the need for solid security measures.

It is probable that the European leaders will arrive bearing gifts, as they are expected to announce new grants aimed at supporting development efforts and mitigating the impacts of the war. Ukraine, the country that is defending its sovereignty, and the Republic of Moldova, being the second most affected country due to the war in Ukraine, stand to benefit from these initiatives first of all. The provision of financial assistance will not only aid in addressing the immediate consequences of the conflict, but will also contribute to long-term stability and recovery in these regions.

The hosting of this event presents as well an exceptional opportunity for the Republic of Moldova to gain significant international visibility.

The selection of security and energy as the main topics for the European Political Community (ECP) Summit is of utmost importance, given their significance as vulnerable areas for the Republic of Moldova. It is worth mentioning that the EU recently established a civilian mission in April of this year, aimed at enhancing the resilience of Moldova's security sector and countering cyber and hybrid attacks. This mission marks the second EU civilian mission after the war, the first being the civilian mission in Armenia, which strives for peacefully resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. These initiatives reflect EU's efforts to strengthen its influence in security and foreign policies, as outlined in the priorities of the European Commission for the 2019-2024 mandate.

The hosting of this event presents as well an exceptional opportunity for the Republic of Moldova to gain significant international visibility.Despite its limited resources, Moldova has proved to be a true European country to the European community due to its impeccable management of over 100,000 Ukrainian refugees.The country's exemplary response to the refugee crisis (receiving the most Ukrainian refugees per capita compared to rest of Europe) including the provision of food, shelter, and medical services by its mobilized civil society, has not only enhanced Moldova's reputation, but has also showcased its unwavering commitment to the European values. It's significant to point out that this support extended to Ukraine was accompanied by the implementation of Western sanctions against Russia and a clear condemnation of the war, emphasizing Moldova's alignment with the international community's position.

Furthermore, for the European Political Community (ECP) to transcend from its current role as a mere dialogue platform, it needs to adopt a more proactive approach. This requires taking concrete steps, particularly with the involvement of Eastern European states that have historically experienced hostility from the Russian Federation. The ECP provides a valuable platform for countries such as Ukraine and Moldova to contribute their perspectives on the thinking of the Russian Federation. This, in turn, enables Western European states to enhance their vigilance and undertake a comprehensive reassessment of their approach in a pragmatic manner that duly recognizes the post-war realities.

Firstly, the European Political Community (ECP) should serve as a catalyst to expedite EU enlargement policies and revitalize the neighborhood policy, which has witnessed significant stagnation in recent years. It is noteworthy that the most recent accession to the European Union was Croatia in 2013, resulting in a ten-year gap during which these policies failed to address the aspirations of countries such as Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova, Georgia and those in the Western Balkans. Regrettably, this inaction has created an opportunity for Russia's propaganda to undermine the stability of these states, consequently fostering Eurosceptic sentiments within the region.

Secondly, to become a truly institutionalized entity, the ECP should establish bureaucratic structures, including a dedicated budget and governing bodies. This will ensure a clearer understanding of its functions and differentiate it from institutions such as the European Union, the European Council, and the Council of Europe. Without proper institutionalization, the ECP may appear as nothing more than a dialogue platform, duplicating the efforts that can be undertaken within existing institutions like the Council of Europe, which shares identical member states with the ECP.

Thirdly, given its focus on security and energy, the ECP should initiate a comprehensive work plan aimed at safeguarding the European states involved from the potential risks of dependence on and influence by Russia. Concrete solutions must be devised to counteract the adverse effects of complete reliance on Russian gas, especially for non-EU states that are more vulnerable than EU member states. By adopting such a proactive approach, the region can fortify itself against potential vulnerabilities and effectively mitigate the risks associated with Russia's energy dominance.

In conclusion, it is crucial for the European Political Community to reposition the Republic of Moldova as a "success story" and a compelling case study for aspiring integration into the European Union, emphasizing the challenges encountered on the path to necessary European reforms. The upcoming Summit presents an opportunity to establish a more determined accession perspective, addressing the previous lack of clarity. President Maia Sandu's firm declaration of a strong desire to integrate the Republic of Moldova into the European Union by 2030, along with a concrete action plan, calls for an assessment of the European states' willingness to enlarge the European Union and the need for more focused discussions on specific issues regarding the future of Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova, Georgia, and the Western Balkans.

Read more here:
Assessing the Implications for Moldova in Hosting the European ... - German Marshall Fund

The European Parliaments committees for Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) and for Internal Market and Consumer Protection (IMCO) adopted a report setting out the Parliaments vision for the proposed EU Regulation for artificial intelligence (the AI Act) on 11 May 2023.

The proposed AI Act has already been recognised as the first of its kind and as landmark piece of legislation that would tackle the risks arising around the creation and use of artificial intelligence (AI) systems. However, it has also been criticised for having the potential consequence of stifling innovation in the EU and putting the EU technologically behind other world economies. The European Parliament aims to address these concerns and ensure that AI is trustworthy, human-centric and respects fundamental rights and values.

Allen & Overy's summary of the European Commission's original proposal is available here.

The European Parliament proposes stepping away from defining AI as software, as in the original text of the AI Act. It instead proposes adopting a universal, technology-neutral and future-proof definition. It defines an AI system as a machine-based system that is designed to operate with varying levels of autonomy and that can, for explicit or implicit objectives, generate outputs such as predictions, recommendations, or decisions that influence physical or virtual environments. This definition better aligns with the OECD approach, but deviates from the definition proposed by the Council of the European Union.

The European Parliament also proposes substituting the term user (that counter-intuitively means an entity or person under whose authority the AI system is operated) to deployer, which should create clarity in interpreting the provisions of the AI Act.

Article 3 of the AI Act includes other new definitions, for instance:

Under new Article 4a, operators (including developers and deployers) in scope of the AI Act are required to use best efforts to develop and use AI systems or foundation models in accordance with a number of general principles to promote ethical and trustworthy AI, such as:

Article 4a explains that these general principles are in turn translated into specific requirements set out in the Act as applicable to AI systems and foundation models

The report maintains the European Commission's risk-based approach, which classifies AI systems depending on the level of risk the AI can generate, but expands the list of prohibited AI practices significantly and introduces significant changes to the categorisation of high-risk AI. New prohibitions concern, among others, placing on the market, putting into service or use of an AI system for:

In relation to high-risk AI systems, the Annex III listing high-risk AI systems has been fine-tuned and expanded. For instance, biometric-based systems, including systems for biometric identification or for inferences about personal characteristics of individuals based on biometric and biometric-based data (eg emotion recognition systems) are designated as high-risk, with some narrow exceptions. One exception from the high-risk AI list exists for AI systems used for detecting financial fraud. Annex III has also been expanded to include new instances of high-risk AI, for instance, AI systems used for public elections or AI-based content recommender systems of very large online platforms (VLOPs) under the Digital Services Act.

In addition, an AI system will no longer automatically be high risk if listed in Annex III; the AI system will also have to pose a significant risk to peoples safety, health or fundamental rights or in some cases a significant risk of harm to the environment.

The new Article 29a provides for a fundamental rights impact assessment prior to putting a high-risk AI system into use for the first time. It includes requirements for what the impact assessment must cover and, other than where the deployer is an SME, requires the deployer to notify national supervisory authorities and relevant stakeholders (for example, equality bodies, consumer protection agencies, social partners and data protection agencies) and, to the extent possible, obtain their input (a six week period for response is to be allowed). Certain entities deploying AI will be required to publish the summary of the results of this impact assessment. The Article also provides that if a data protection impact assessment is required to be conducted under the GDPR, it should be done in parallel with the fundamental rights assessment and attached as an addendum.

The European Parliament included new obligations on the providers of AI foundation models (AI foundation models being in essence pre-trained AI systems that can be used as a basis for developing other AI systems). The new article 28b requires the providers of foundation models to register these models in an EU database; to ensure that the models comply with comprehensive requirements for their design and development; to produce and keep for 10 years certain documentation; to draw up extensive technical documentation and intelligible instructions for downstream providers, and to provide information on the characteristics, limitations, assumptions and risks of the model or its use.

A new Article 4d will require the providers and deployers of AI systems to ensure a sufficient level of AI literacy of their staff and other persons dealing with AI systems on their behalf, taking into account their technical knowledge, experience, education and training and the context the AI systems are to be used in.The proposal explains that AI literacy refers to skills, knowledge and understanding that allows various stakeholders to make an informed deployment of AI systems and gain awareness about the opportunities and risks of AI and its possible harms. Such literacy measures could include learning notions and skills required to ensure compliance with the AI Act.

The report amends the provisions on the proposed European Artificial Intelligence Board, which was modelled on the example of the European Data Protection Board under the GDPR, to introduce an EU AI Office. The EU AI Office would still have a wide range of powers to monitor implementation of the AI Act, provide guidance and coordinate of cross-border issues.

The European Parliament is expected to vote on the report in a plenary session (currently scheduled for 12-16 June 2023), then the trilogue negotiations between the European Parliament, the Council of the EU and the European Commission can commence. The Council of the EU adopted its position in December 2022, which we summarised in a blog post here. These negotiations usually take several months.

The press release is available here and the preliminary consolidated version of the adopted report here.

Excerpt from:
European Parliament committees adopt their vision on the AI Act ... - JD Supra

TheEuropean Commission is having objections to the proposed acquisition ofAsiana Airlines by Korean Air. Although it hasnt made a final decision, the EC says in a Statement of Objections that the merger of the two airlines will reduce competition in the passenger and cargo market in certain countries. European Commission objects to Korean Air/Asiana merger.

Already in February, Brussels raised concerns about the proposed merger, which is pending since Korean Air formally announced the acquisition in November 2020. Since February, the European Commission has completed an in-depth investigation into the effects of the merger on competition. Specifically, if a combination of Korean Air and Asiana will restrict competition between Europe and South Korea. Korean Air intends to take a 63.9 percent share in Asiana.

The investigation concludes that the merger will result in reduced competition for passenger transport services on four routes between South Korea and France, Germany, Italy, and Spain. Competition in the provision of cargo transport services between all of Europe and South Korea will also be affected.

Korean Air and Asiana compete head-to-head in carrying passengers and cargo between the EEA and South Korea. Together, they would be by far the largest carriers of passengers and cargo on these routes and the merger may remove an important alternative for customers, the European Commission said in a media statement on May 17.

Other competitors face regulatory and other barriers to expanding their services and may be unlikely to exert sufficient competitive pressure on the merged entity. The merger may therefore lead to increased prices or decreased quality of passenger and air transport services.

The EC says that the Statement of Objections is a formal step in an investigation and does not prejudge the outcome of the investigation. Korean Air now has the opportunity to reply to the Commissions Statement of Objections, to consult the Commissions case file, and to request an oral hearing. The Commission has until August 3 to make a final decision.

The acquisition proposal needs approval from various countries. Turkey, Taiwan, and Vietnam already granted mandatory approval in 2021, followed by South Korea in February 2022, and China in December 2022. Mandatory approval from the US, European Union, and Japan is still pending.

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Active as a journalist since 1987, with a background in newspapers, magazines, and a regional news station, Richard has been covering commercial aviation on a freelance basis since late 2016.In 2022, he has gone full-time freelance. Richard has been contributing to AirInsight since December 2018. He is also writing for Airliner World and Aviation News. From January 2023, he will add a part-time role with Dutch website and magazine Luchtvaartnieuws. Twitter: @rschuur_aero.

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European Commission objects to Korean Air/Asiana merger - AirInsight

New Delhi: A new report by Strategic Perspectives on Tuesday described the potential socio-economic effects of achieving the European Union's climate target for 2030.

The potential benefits can turn into reality if governments implement the laws to reach a net emission reduction of at least 55 per cent by 2030.

Strategic Perspectives is a new think-tank founded last year by Linda Kalcher and launched recently by two senior climate experts, Linda Kalcher and Neil Makaroff.

The findings show that European laws will set in stone major transformations of the European economy by 2030: Wind and solar power will be the main sources of electricity, accounting for 55 per cent of total electricity consumption; at least 58 million heat pumps will have been installed; around 29 million electric passenger cars will be on European roads; gas consumption will fall by at least 31 per cent across the EU, almost equivalent to Germany's yearly gas consumption before the Russian war in Ukraine; and coal will no longer be cost-competitive and will be phased out according to the analysis.

continued below

The analysis reveals that, on average, European households will see their spending dedicated to energy and fuel reduced from 8.6 per cent of their budget in 2022 to 6.1 per cent in 2030. By that year, average electricity prices are forecast to decrease by seven per cent.

"Turning the European Green Deal into reality will bring greater energy security and economic prosperity. Solar and wind energy will be deployed over three times faster than in the last 20 years. This will reduce electricity prices for industry, improving its competitiveness," said Linda Kalcher, Executive Director of Strategic Perspectives.

"The European Green Deal acts as a shield against the high cost-of-living. With its green laws, Europe is protecting the wallets of households and businesses as they provide all the solutions to cut energy bills and move away from gas, oil and coal, which are the main drivers of high inflation," said Neil Makaroff, Director of Strategic Perspectives.

By 2030, say Strategic Perspectives, coal will no longer be cost-competitive and will be phased out, with coal imports reduced by 73 per cent.

Gas and oil consumption will have reduced by 31 per cent and 34 per cent, respectively, compared to 2019. Conversely, if all laws are implemented correctly and on time, they will lead to a doubling of renewable energy capacity compared to 2021: renewables will be the main source of electricity in Europe.

Already this year, record renewable generation helped the EU weather a turbulent winter, dispelling fears of a coal comeback and reducing gas demand.

In 2022, wind and solar generated a record fifth of EU electricity (22 per cent), for the first time overtaking fossil gas (20 per cent), and remaining above coal power (16 per cent).

Coal power fell by 11 per cent (minus 27 TWh), and of the 18 countries in the EU that continue to use coal for power, 15 reduced coal generation over winter 2022 compared to the same period the previous year.

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Originally posted here:
Energy transition in European Union is irreversible: Report - ETEnergyWorld

Just over a year into Russias invasion of Ukraine, there is a growing sense that Europes reawakening on defense policy has already faltered. Germanys much-hypedZeitenwende, which promised a significant boost in defense spending, has so far yielded few tangible new investments in military capabilities and been overshadowed by the governments various perceived prevarications on arming Ukraine. European militaries stores of critical munitions and equipment have been found wanting amidst the rush to support Ukraines resistance, and its defense industrial base faces significant challenges in ramping up production to replenish, let alone grow, its customers stockpiles.

As disappointment sets in over Europes perceived inability or unwillingness to increase defense spending, the question of who is to blame for this state of affairs has crept into the public debate. One trendy culprit has been the United States.

It is true that the United States has long sought to cajole or berate its European allies into bolstering defense budgets, albeit with limited success. But according to some analysts, it is the United States that bears a large responsibility for Europes defense dependency, having nurtured it for years by expressing skepticism of E.U.-led defense initiatives. Washington, they claim, is sacrificing European defense self-sufficiency in favor of American access to the continents market.

Max Bergmann of the Center for Strategic and International Studies and Sophia Besch of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace recently argued every American weapons sale to Europe weakens the European defense industrial base, thereby contributing to long-term dependence on the United States. The United States would go a long way to strengthening European defense, they argue, if only it would put a leash on its own defense companies and instead promote Europes defense integration efforts. This would help to generate a European defense industrial base capable of fulfilling the continents requirements.

Its a seductively easy explanation and solution, especially because U.S. defense strategy explicitly prioritizes the Indo-Pacific region. As a an international business development specialist at Boeing Defense, Space & Security, a U.S. defense company, I have a personal interest in this issue. But I personally have a lot of experience in this field. In theory, Bergmann and Beachs approach would only require the United States to throttle back on its own defense of Europe while relying on the power of its diplomacy to inspire its European allies to put their sovereignty and faith into an E.U.-led defense agenda that has proceeded only in fits and starts for decades.

For reasons both political and practical, such proposals will fail to achieve the shared objective of the United States, European Union, and European governments, strengthening Europes defense capacity and capability. Therefore, in the midst of the most significant armed conflict on the continent since World War II, the European Union and advocates of integrated European defense should not pursue initiatives that emphasize buy European policies focused on industrial base development if they come at the expense of current defense needs. Such an approach would limit the capabilities available to European militaries at a time when they badly need to restock and recapitalize. A stronger Europe is in the interest of both Americans and Europeans, but the path toward that goal lies in deeper collaboration that benefits both sides of the trans-Atlantic alliance rather than an unrealistic pursuit of strategic autonomy in defense.

Political Obstacles Are Paramount

The harsh reality with which advocates of European defense must contend is that pursuing deeper defense integration under European Union auspices is controversial within Europe itself and is unlikely to succeed for three main reasons. First and foremost, the European Unions own internal political divisions make further integration of European defense unlikely to succeed in the near- to medium-term. The Russian invasion of Ukraine has revealed divergent threat perceptions that has exacerbated mistrust between eastern frontline states and France and Germany. Second, the E.U. member states that are the strongest from a defense-industrial standpoint have given no indication that they are prepared to shift toward the more collaborative approach to strategy and acquisition that would be required to realize a more integrated European defense. Finally, while European defense firms are highly capable and enjoy the support and advocacy of their home nations, they cannot address the continents defense requirements alone in a time of crisis.

Advocates of E.U.-led defense initiatives often cite the United States as the major barrier to their success. They trace U.S. hostility back to then-Secretary of State Madeleine Albrights 1998 comments that there should be no decoupling from, duplication of, or discrimination of NATO in any future European defense arrangements.

Nevertheless, the European Union proceeded with the establishment of the European Defense Fund, Permanent Structured Cooperation, and an alphabet soup of other programs and initiatives intended to help bolster European defense integration. U.S. officials have voiced concerns about some aspects of these initiatives but ultimately have taken no tangible actions to stop these efforts. President Joe Biden has twice validated in joint statements with French President Emmanuel Macron the importance of a stronger and more capable European defense that contributes positively to transatlantic and global security. The concept of a stronger and more capable European defense is not controversial in Washington. The question is how to make it a reality.

Despite the broad unity of the European Union and NATO in the face of Russias aggression, the war has also exacerbated significant divisions in threat perceptions and strategic priorities between European nations that will make deeper defense integration, and particularly buy European policies, difficult to impose.

For Poland and the Baltic states, the invasion of Ukraine represents the realization of the countries worst fears: a reckless and revanchist Russia seeking to re-impose its sphere of domination in Eastern Europe by force. Even though the Russian military has far underperformed prewar expectations, it is still a force that is capable of inflicting immense damage on its neighbors.

For France and Germany, the Russian invasion is certainly a cataclysmic event warranting major policy shifts on defense and energy. However, the threat seems much less immediate and there remains a hope of an eventual return to more constructive relations. Macron, for examples, has repeated warnings that Russia should not be humiliated or crushed and calls for a new European security architecture in which Russia would have a stake. However well-intentioned, such statements are at odds with how many Eastern European nations view the conflict and how to end it. Similarly, Germanys apparent foot-dragging in supplying arms (particularly tanks) to Ukraine, even as it has become one of the countrys largest European providers of military assistance, has engendered significant mistrust and criticism in the East.

As advocates of buy European approaches recognize, major international defense procurements have a multi-decade-long tail of sustainment and training. But what those advocates sometimes elide is the need for the procuring nation to have confidence that it will have the support it needs from the supplier to actually operate and sustain their weapons. This is where Germanys reticence over supplying Ukraine with tanks and other weapons hinders the cause of European defense integration. If a country like Poland believes that it fundamentally cannot trust France or Germany to share the same view of the Russian threat then the leadership is not likely to prioritize support for a continental defense-industrial policy. This is one reason why, for example, Polands massive post-invasion defense spending spree has focused on procuring new weapons systems from the United States and South Korea.

This East-West division within the European Union is the most prominent fault line, but it is also not the only one that limits the prospects for greater defense integration in Europe. It is far from clear that the major defense exporting nations of western Europe can agree on the mutual sacrifices of sovereignty and potential losses for domestic industry that would come with more integrated E.U.-led defense. If, as many analysts argue, Europe needs to pool its resources more to develop and acquire common equipment, that will entail many even more complicated challenges associated with picking winners and losers.

So far E.U. defense initiatives like the European Defense Fund and Permanent Structured Cooperation have largely dodged this challenge because they are relatively small-scale and focused on research and development projects that enable all the major industrial players to remain in the game. But the defense industry of Europe tends to be dominated by a handful of national champion corporations, some of which are at least partially state-owned, and as a result industrial disputes between companies tend to quickly become political disputes between governments. Marquee cooperative European defense programs like the Future Combat Air System and Main Combat Ground System have already been delayed due to intellectual property and workshare disputes between the primary French and German defense contractors that required government intervention to resolve. All of this indicates that any path to European defense integration will not necessarily be smoothed over by simplistic calls to buy European. Much deeper cultural and structural reforms will be needed in order to increase political will to make the dream of a more unified European defense a reality.

Why Buy American?

The final primary reason Europe cannot go it alone on defense is that the continents defense industry on its own is not sufficiently prepared to address the near-term requirements for European militaries to recapitalize, particularly against the backdrop of the war in Ukraine.

While it is true that the European defense market is fragmented across national borders, Europe has substantial defense-industrial capacity and capability. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, four of the top eight global arms exporting nations are E.U. member states (France, Germany, Italy, and Spain), with the United Kingdom also among the top 10. European companies produce a broad spectrum of weapons systems well-known around the world, from missiles to fighter jets to warships. Despite perceptions that the United States dominates the European defense market, key segments are dominated by European companies. For example, 14 E.U. nations operate the German-made Leopard 2 tank, while no E.U. member had procured the American M1 Abrams prior to Polands 2022 order. European navies do not operate American-built warships.

Through U.S.-based subsidiaries and partnerships, European industry has also made some notable inroads into the American market. The U.S. Navy selected the American subsidiary of Italian firm Fincantieri for its next frigate, based on a design already in service with the Italian and French navies. Key U.S. weapons systems such as the Naval Strike Missile and National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile System were designed by Norways Kongsberg and produced in partnership with Raytheon. Boeing partnered with Italys Leonardo and Swedens Saab to win the U.S. Air Force competitions for the MH-139 helicopter and T-7A jet trainer, respectively.

However, the European defense industry is not able to fulfill all of the capability needs of the continents military forces, some of which have become more urgent in the face of Russias invasion of Ukraine. Certain platforms and capabilities are not available from European suppliers. For example, there is no current E.U.-based manufacturer of heavy-lift helicopters or rocket artillery systems (such as the High-Mobility Artillery Rocket System, or HIMARS, which has become so well-known for its exploits in Ukraine that it now features in internet memes). A country with an urgent requirement for such systems would naturally pursue a U.S.-produced solution.

In some cases, frustration with the performance of an existing system or supplier leads to the selection of a new U.S. supplier. For example the Norwegian and Swedish governments abandoned the NH90 multirole helicopter, produced by a European industry consortium, in favor of the American Blackhawk over system performance and reliability issues. In certain other cases, European industry also simply loses government competitions on cost and capability. In 2021 both Switzerland and Finland selected the F-35 fighter jet over European alternatives like the Eurofighter, French Rafale, and Swedish Gripen following open competitions that required in-country flight evaluations and in which evaluation criteria, including procurement and sustainment costs, were well defined for prospective bidders.

One can quibble with individual nations decisions on defense procurements or selection criteria or their sense of their own defense requirements, but these realities raise a number of questions for advocates of a primarily buy European approach. Part of the reason why European industry is not as well positioned to address the urgent capability gaps as that of the United States is that its most significant multi-national modernization efforts remain fixated on the more distant future. For example, some analysts, including Paula Alvarez-Courceiro in these pages, criticized Germany for opting to procure F-35s to replace a portion of its decades-old Tornado fighter-bomber fleet rather than prioritizing the Franco-German-Spanish Future Combat Air System. But this fighter program, one of the European analogs to the U.S. Next-Generation Air Dominance program, will not be operational until the 2040s. The view that Germany (which has continued funding Future Combat Air System development anyway) should not have filled this urgent requirement with an existing platform but instead prioritized a new development program that is two decades away from delivery is fundamentally unserious, particularly in the current European security environment.

Similarly, the Franco-German Main Combat Ground System program, intended to produce a common future tank, was established in 2012 but isnt projected to deliver any actual capability until the 2030s. Unsurprisingly, nations along the European Unions eastern frontier like Poland arent holding their breath. The Maritime Airborne Warfare System for future European maritime patrol aircraft remains on the drawing board with operational capability targeted for 2035, and Germany moved ahead in 2021 with an acquisition of P-8s to fill the gap created by the retirement of its P-3s.

Furthermore, the idea that the procurement of U.S. systems brings no value to European industry is simplistic. Formal and informal industrial participation requirements are a feature of the global defense marketplace, and Europe is no exception. U.S. firms frequently partner with European counterparts for defense sales on the continent and the extent to which U.S. firms shape substantive roles for European industry can be a key competitive discriminator when trying to close a deal. This can include everything from the provision of specific subsystems to production (such as the F-35 wing assembly and final assembly and checkout line in Cameri, Italy) to sustainment and training services. These participation opportunities may be limited by U.S. government policies, and European governments and companies will naturally be inclined to press for more industrial benefit than they may ultimately receive. But this reality is a far cry from the assertion that every U.S. arms sale in Europe represents some kind of theft from European industry.

The Way Ahead

Stronger European defense capabilities and the industrial base to support and sustain them are in Americas interest, particularly as U.S. policymakers focus on the Indo-Pacific as the critical theater. But the way to achieve that objective is not by leaving Europe to its own devices, but rather ensuring that European nations, most of whom the United States is treaty-bound to defend, have access to the capabilities they need to enhance their ability to defend themselves, whether built in Europe, America, or another allied state like South Korea.

The extent to which the European Union or other multilateral arrangements can help to facilitate that through joint procurement or pooled funding mechanisms redounds to the benefit of U.S. strategy, provided that they focus on addressing current capability gaps or generating industrial capacity that will quickly fill those gaps. But it does not make sense for the United States to endorse efforts that prioritize European industrial development at the expense of the near-term capabilities needed to rebuild and restock Europes militaries. As of now, this approach is simply not feasible given the absence of internal E.U. consensus. Some European governments recognize this reality: European parliamentarians representing multiple nations have pushed back on buy European provisions in proposed E.U. legislation to promote multinational procurements through an incentive fund. Similar concerns have been raised around the European Commissions 1 billion proposal to supply artillery ammunition to Ukraine and rebuild the stockpiles of contributing European nations.

There are, however, opportunities for the United States to expand its defense cooperation with Europe in ways that promote a truly trans-Atlantic industrial base equal to the challenge of supporting Ukraine today and ensuring the defense of NATO and the European Union tomorrow. With the Administrative Agreement between the United States Department of Defense and the European Defense Agency now concluded, there is a range of innovative options for cooperation with the European Union that could be explored. For starters, the U.S. government should step up its efforts to actively promote co-production of key equipment, particularly munitions, through partnerships between U.S. and European firms. There have already been promising signs on this front with reported progress toward the manufacture of HIMARS in Germany, but many other weapons could be candidates for similar arrangements. The Department of Defense should, in coordination with the European Defense Agency, identify key components, subsystems, munitions, and potentially even platforms where the establishment of additional production capacity in Europe would enhance U.S. and European security. Where necessary, the Department of Defense should develop incentives to encourage U.S. firms to pursue partnerships that enable co-production of those priority items and also take a proactive approach to assisting industry with the necessary export licensing and legal arrangements to make these partnerships a reality.

In addition, both the United States and Europe would benefit strategically and economically from displacing Russia as a leading global arms exporter, particularly in key regions like south and southeast Asia. The European Defense Agency and U.S. State and Defense Departments could establish a coordination, advocacy, and financing mechanism to help jointly identify and support the best industrial candidates, whether American or European, to help drive Russia from key defense markets. This would deprive the Russian government of a key source of income and strategic influence while improving relationships and interoperability with emerging global partners.

The U.S. government should also take steps to make it easier for European industry to do business with the U.S. defense establishment. It should, for example, ease the burden of export controls on NATO allies to enable more information sharing and cooperation between U.S. and European industry. This issue has gained a renewed salience as the AUKUS agreement on defense technology-sharing is implemented, but the process cannot end with the United Kingdom and Australia. Serious efforts to create carve-outs for NATO nations similar to those being considered to support AUKUS will help to strengthen trans-Atlantic defense-industrial partnerships by enabling the sharing of advanced technologies and removing some of the risk that European-developed capabilities would fall under the cumbersome and restrictive U.S. International Traffic in Arms Regulations, one of the major concerns that drives U.S. allies to avoid co-development of key capabilities.

Ultimately, the way for the European Union and its institutions to demonstrate value and credibility to its member states on defense issues and thereby advance European defense integration is to establish itself as a trusted interlocutor with the continents indispensable defense partner rather focusing on trying to stand up alternatives to the United States. This means that in the near term it should prioritize bolstering European capabilities to respond to Europes current security crisis, not exclusionary industrial policies and long-term developmental projects. Finding ways to be relevant today in collaboration with the United States is a more productive direction for the European Unions defense agenda.

Brian M. Burton previously served as a defense and national security staffer in the U.S. Senate and a fellow at the Center for a New American Security. He is now an international business development specialist at Boeing Defense, Space & Security and a term member of the Council on Foreign Relations. The views expressed in this article are his alone and do not represent those of his employer.

*Correction: Due to an editor error, this piece was not specific enough about the authors interest in the argument until his biography at the bottom.

Image: U.S. Air Force photo by Airman 1st Class Jennifer Zima

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Europe Should Not Try to Go It Alone on Defense - War On The Rocks