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May 2, 2024

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The Directive extends the list of criminal offenses to the environment on EU level. EU Member States have two years to transpose the directive into national law after the its entry into force on May 20, 2024.

On April 30, 2024, the European Union (the EU) published directive 2024/1203 on the protection of the environment through criminal law (the Directive) in its official journal.[1] The Directive was adopted by the European Parliament (the Parliament) on February27, 2024[2] and by the European Council (the Council) on March26, 2024[3].

The goal of the Directive is to combat environmental offenses more effectively. To this end, it introduces (i) new environment-related criminal offenses, (ii) detailed requirements regarding sanctioning levels for both natural and legal persons and (iii) a variety of measures that Member States must take in order to either prevent or effectively prosecute offenses.

The Directive will come into force on May20, 2024[4], after which the Member States (with the exception of Ireland and Denmark[5]) will have 24 months to transpose it into national law.[6] Importantly, the Directive by its nature only establishes minimum requirements. Member States may choose to go beyond those minimum requirements and adopt stricter criminal laws when implementing the Directive.

A. Background

In its founding treaties, the EU has committed itself to ensuring a high level of protection of the environment.[7] To this end, in 2008, the EU adopted the Directive on the protection of the environment through criminal law, obligating Member States to criminalize certain environmentally harmful activities. A subsequent evaluation of the effectiveness of the Directive identified considerable enforcement gaps in all Member States. Further, it concluded that the number of cross-border investigations and convictions in the EU for environmental crime had not grown substantially as expected.[8] Since environmental crime is growing at annual rates of 5% to 7% globally[9], creating lasting damage for habitats, species, peoples health, and the revenues of governments and businesses, the European Commission concluded the current directive to be insufficient and proposed a new directive.

The Directive should be seen in the context of other recent EU regulations that have already been passed or are still in the legislative process, which aim at protecting the environment in the context of the EUs transition to a climate-neutral and green economy (Green Deal[10]). For example, the Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive (CSRD), which has come into force on January5, 2023, requires certain companies to report on impacts as well as risk and opportunities related to sustainability matters.[11] On April24, 2024, after lengthy negotiations and several postponements, the Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive (CSDDD) which sets out due diligence obligations for companies regarding actual and potential adverse impacts on the environment and human rights in their value chains was finally passed by the Parliament.[12]

B. Environmental Crime Defined

The Directive provides for 20 basic criminal offenses addressing various ways of conduct.[13] Conduct in this respect relates, for example, to

Unlawful Conduct Conduct in Breach of the Unions Policy on the Environment

The offenses defined by the Directive require unlawful conduct, i.e. either (1) a breach of Union law contributing to the pursuit of at least one of the objectives of the Unions policy on the environment or (2) a law, regulation or administrative provision of a Member State or a decision taken by a competent authority of a Member State that gives effect to such Union law.[21] Pursuant to Article191 (1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), Union policy on the environment shall contribute to pursuit of the following objectives:

Importantly, the Directive makes clear that conduct shall be deemed unlawful even when it is carried out under an authorization if such authorization was obtained fraudulently or by corruption, extortion or coercion, or is in manifest breach of relevant substantive requirements.[22] The recitals suggest that in manifest breach of relevant substantive legal requirements should be interpreted as referring to an obvious and substantial breach of relevant substantive legal requirements, and is not intended to include breaches of procedural requirements or minor elements of the authorization.[23]

Common constituent element

The majority of the offenses described by the Directive require that the conduct causes or is likely to cause the death of, or serious injury to, any person or substantial damage to the quality of air, soil or water, or substantial damage to an ecosystem, animals or plants[24]. While the Directive provides for elements that should be taken into account when assessing whether the damage to the quality of air, soil or water, or to an ecosystem or to animals or plants is substantial[25], the recitals stipulate that this qualitative threshold as well as the term ecosystem should be generally understood in a broad sense suggesting a possibly wide scope of application.[26]

Qualified Offenses

The Directive introduces qualified offenses with more severe penalties consisting of (a) the destruction of, or widespread and systematic damage, which is either irreversible or long-lasting to, an ecosystem of considerable size or environmental value or a habitat within a protected site, or (b) widespread and substantial damage which is either irreversible or long lasting to the quality of air, soil, or water.[27] In its recitals, the EU describes such offenses as comparable to Ecocide.[28] The term ecocide was originally coined in the 1970s during the Vietnam war and was eventually recognized as a war crime under the Rome Statute[29].[30] The language of the Directive further resembles the definition of crimes against humanity.[31]

Intentional or Serious Negligence Required

As a general rule, the offenses set out by the Directive require that the conduct is intentional.[32] For 18 modalities, Member States must ensure that the respective conduct constitutes a criminal offense where that conduct is carried out with at least serious negligence.[33]

Complicity and Inchoate Offending

Pursuant to the Directive, Member States must ensure that inciting, and aiding and abetting the commission of an intentionally committed offense are punishable.[34] For 16 modalities of conduct, the Directive instructs that attempts be a crime.[35]

Penalties

Criminal penalties for individuals must be effective, proportionate and dissuasive.[36] The Directive stipulates that these must include maximum terms of imprisonment of at least ten, eight, five, or three years depending on the specific offense.[37] Accessory criminal or non-criminal penalties or measures may include the (a) obligation to restore the environment or pay compensation for the damage to the environment; (b) fines; (c) exclusion from access to public funding; (d) disqualification from holding, within a legal person, a leading position of the same type used for committing the offense; (e) withdrawal of permits and authorizations; (f) temporary bans on running for public office; (g) where there is a public interest, following a case-by-case assessment, publication of all or part of the judicial decision that relates to the criminal offense committed and the sanctions or measures imposed.[38]

C. Corporate Liability

The Directive not only addresses individual misconduct, but also criminal offending on behalf of legal persons. In this respect, Member States must ensure that legal persons can be held liable for offenses conducted by any person who has a leading position within the legal person concerned, either based on a power of representation, an authority to take decisions, or an authority to exercise control within the legal person.[39] Liability must also include the lack of supervision or control by a person who has a leading position when it has made possible the commission of an offense for the benefit of the legal person by a person under its authority.[40]

In terms of sanctions, Member States must ensure that liable legal person can be punished by effective, proportionate and dissuasive criminal or non-criminal[41] penalties or measures.[42] This is supposed to include fines which shall be proportionate to the seriousness of the conduct and to the individual, financial and other circumstances of the legal person concerned.[43] Member States are to ensure that the maximum level of fines is, depending on the specific type of offending, not less than

Beyond that, the Directive obliges Member States to take the necessary measures to ensure that legal persons held liable for ecocide are punishable by more severe penalties or measures.[47]

Further measures or sanctions with respect to legal persons may include (a) the obligation to restore the environment or pay compensation for the damage to the environment; (b) exclusion from entitlement to public benefits or aid; (c) exclusion from access to public funding, including tender procedures, grants, concessions and licenses; (d) temporary or permanent disqualification from the practice of business activities; (e) withdrawal of permits and authorizations to pursue activities that resulted in the relevant criminal offense; (f) placing under judicial supervision; (g) judicial winding-up; (h) closure of establishments used for committing the offense; (i) an obligation to establish due diligence schemes for enhancing compliance with environmental standards; and (j) where there is a public interest, publication of all or part of the judicial decision relating to the criminal offense committed and the penalties or measures imposed, without prejudice to rules on privacy and the protection of personal data.[48]

D. Jurisdiction

Member States have jurisdiction over an offense, (a) if the offense was committed either in part or in whole within its territory, (b) on board a ship or an aircraft registered in the Member State concerned or flying its flag, (c) the damage which is one of the constituent elements of the offense occurred on its territory or (d) the offender is one of its nationals.[49]

In particular the establishment of jurisdiction when the damage that is one of the constituent elements of the offense occurred on the territory of a EU Member State, may lead to a wide applicability of the Directive and may even lead to multiple prosecution and in return to a further enhancement of the cooperation between enforcement authorities in different states.[50] By way of example, if a national of a non-EU Member State disposed waste illegally in a river that runs through both a non-EU Member State and one or more EU Member States and the waste killed a substantial part of the fish population, the Member States jurisdiction could be triggered.

In addition, a Member State may exercise jurisdiction if (a) the offender is a habitual resident in its territory, (b) the offense is committed for the benefit of a legal person established in its territory, (c) the offense is committed against one of its nationals or its habitual residents or (d) the offense has created a severe risk for the environment on its territory.[51]

Where an offense falls in the jurisdiction of more than one Member State, those Member States are required to cooperate to determine which Member State shall conduct the criminal proceedings.[52]

E. Preventive and Other Measures

The Directive stipulates a variety of measures that Member States must take in order to either prevent or effectively prosecute offenses.

[1] See EU Official Journal April 30, 2024 and the legislative text.

[2] See Press Release of the Parliament (February 27, 2024).

[3] See Press Release of the Council (March 26, 2024).

[4] Pursuant to Article 29 the Directive will come into force on the twentieth day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

[5] Recitals 69, 70.

[6] Article 28 of the Directive.

[7] Art. 3 (3) of the Treaty on European Union and Art. 191 TFEU.

[8] See the European Commissions Proposal for the Directive (COM (2021) 851 final), p. 1.

[9] See https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_23_5817.

[10] See Communication from the Commission on the European Green Deal, COM/2019/640 final.

[11] See European Unions Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive What Non-EU Companies with Operations in the EU Need to Know and European Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive (CSRD): Key Takeaways from Adoption of the European Sustainability Reporting Standards.

[12] See the Letter of the Chair of the JURI Committee of the European Parliament of March 15, 2024..

[13] Article 3(2) of the Directive.

[14] Recital 15.

[15] Article 3(2)(a) of the Directive.

[16] Article 3(2)(b) of the Directive.

[17] Article 3(2)(c) of the Directive.

[18] Article 3(2)(f) of the Directive.

[19] Regulation (EU) 2023/1115.

[20] Article 3(2)(p) of the Directive.

[21] Article 3(1) of the Directive.

[22] Article 3(1) of the Directive.

[23] Recital 10.

[24] See e.g. Article 3(2)(a) of the Directive.

[25] Article 3(6) of the Directive.

[26] Recital 13.

[27] Article 3(3) of the Directive.

[28] Recital 21.

[29] Rome Statute, article 8(2)(b)(iv);

[30] European Law Institute Ecocide.

[31] Rome Statute, article 7(1).

[32] Article 3(2) of the Directive.

[33] Article 3(4) of the Directive.

[34] Article 4(1) of the Directive.

[35] Article 4(2) of the Directive.

[36] Article 5(1) of the Directive.

[37] Article 5(2) of the Directive.

[38] Article 5(3) of the Directive.

[39] Article 6(1) of the Directive.

[40] Article 6(2) of the Directive.

[41] Depending on whether the Member States national law provides for the criminal liability of legal persons; see recital 33.

[42] Article 7(1) of the Directive.

[43] Article 7(2), (3) of the Directive.

[44] Either in the business year preceding that in which the offense was committed, or in the business year preceding that of the decision to impose the fine.

[45] Article 7(3)(a) of the Directive.

[46] Article 7(3)(b) of the Directive.

[47] Article 7(4) of the Directive.

[48] Article 7(2) of the Directive.

[49] Article 12(1) of the Directive.

[50] Regarding the application of the double jeopardy-/ne bis in idem-principle between multiple jurisdictions, see also Extraterritorial Impact of New UK Corporate Criminal Liability Laws.

[51] Article 12(2) of the Directive.

[52] Article 12(2) of the Directive.

[53] Article 10 of the Directive.

[54] Article 13 of the Directive.

[55] Article 16 of the Directive.

[56] Article 17 of the Directive.

[57] Article 18 of the Directive.

[58] Articles 19, 20 of the Directive.

[59] The intervals should be no longer than 5 years.

[60] Article 21 of the Directive.

[61] Article 22 of the Directive.

The following Gibson Dunn lawyers prepared this client alert: Benno Schwarz, Katharina Humphrey, Andreas Drr, and Julian Reichert.

Gibson Dunns lawyers are available to assist in addressing any questions you may have regarding these developments. If you wish to discuss any of the matters set out above, please contact the Gibson Dunn lawyer with whom you usually work, any member of Gibson Dunns White Collar Defense and Investigations practice group, or the following authors in Munich.

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EU Enhances Protection of the Environment Through Criminal Law - Gibson Dunn

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With the announcement of its latest investigation of a global social media company this time, Meta the European Union is providing an illuminating lesson on how to regulate tech behemoths without threatening free speech. One would like to think that U.S. politicians and policymakers are taking notes. Unfortunately, thats probably a fanciful hope.

On April 30 the European Commission, the E.U.s executive arm, said in a press release that it has opened formal proceedings to assess whether Metas Facebook and Instagram platforms have breached the Digital Services Act (DSA), a Europe-wide law that took full effect in February 2024 and is designed to deter online manipulation and force tech companies to take greater responsibility for their impact on elections and other aspects of civic life.

Specifically, the Commission said it is investigating suspected infringements related to deceptive advertising and political content on Metas platforms, as well as the companys diminishment of CrowdTangle a tool that formerly provided outsiders, including journalists and researchers with insight into how content spreads on those services. The Commission added that, based on preliminary assessments, it suspects that Metas external and internal mechanisms for flagging illegal content are not compliant with the requirements of the Digital Services Act and that there are shortcomings in Metas provision of access to publicly available data to [outside] researchers.

European regulators are clearly trying to pressure Meta to invigorate its self-policing of disinformation, including content generated by artificial intelligence. The timing is no accident. In early June, the E.U.s 27 member States will hold elections for representatives serving in the European Parliament. The Kremlin has been targeting many of those countries with political disinformation and is expected to step up its online propaganda efforts in an attempt to discourage support for Ukraine in its defensive war against Russian President Vladimir Putins forces.

Commission President Ursula von der Leyens written statement about the investigation is worth quoting at length:

This Commission has created means to protect European citizens from targeted disinformation and manipulation by third countries. If we suspect a violation of the rules, we act. This is true at all times, but especially in times of democratic elections. Big digital platforms must live up to their obligations to put enough resources into this and todays decision shows that we are serious about compliance.

The DSA has teeth. The Commission can fine companies up to 6 percent of their global revenue and has the authority to interview company officials and even raid corporate offices. E.U. regulators are already investigating the content policies and practices of TikTok and X, formerly known as Twitter.

In its response to the Commissions announcement, Meta said in a statement that: We have a well established process for identifying and mitigating risks on our platforms. It added: We look forward to continuing our cooperation with the European Commission and providing them with further details of this work.

In contrast to their European counterparts, U.S. lawmakers, with one striking exception, have failed for over a half-dozen years to pass any of the myriad laws that have been proposed to rein in major tech companies in this country. The exception is the bill that U.S. President Joe Biden signed into law on April 25 that requires ByteDance, the Chinese parent of TikTok, to sell the short-video platform within nine months under threat of a sweeping ban of the service in the United States.

The highly unusual TikTok sale-or-ban law reflects heightened geopolitical tension between Beijing and Washington, as well as the Chinese governments practice of exerting influence over tech companies operating in China. The U.S. State Department issued a reportlast year finding that China employs a variety of deceptive and coercive methods, including propaganda, disinformation and censorship, to influence the international information environment.

TikTok has vowed to challenge the new U.S. law as an unconstitutional government restraint on free speech under the First Amendment. That argument is at least plausible, if not necessarily one that the U.S. judiciary will embrace when it weighs the governments claim that China could use the platform to try to interfere in U.S. elections. Past attempts to ban TikTok by the Trump administration and the state of Montana have been blocked by federal courts.

But setting aside the rather unique dispute over TikTok, the striking thing about U.S. regulation of social media at the national level is its absence. This regulatory vacuum is typically ascribed to two conditions: the extreme political polarization that renders the U.S. Congress dysfunctional on so many fronts and the First Amendments instruction that Congress shall make no lawabridging the freedom of speech.

European nations do not operate under as rigid a prohibition of government regulation of speech, an important factor explaining how the E.U. managed to enact the DSA. But the newly unveiled investigation of Meta illustrates that, possibly with modest modification, European-style regulation could pass muster under the First Amendment.

Forming the foundation of the DSA are a range of provisions requiring that social media platforms disclose how they address problems like deceptive political advertising and other kinds of misleading or hateful content. The European Commission noted in its Meta investigation announcement that the opening of the probe was based on a risk assessment report that Meta (and all other large social media companies) were required to file in 2023, as well as on the companys responses to the Commissions follow-up requests for additional information.

First Amendment absolutists might be skeptical of this sort of mandatory disclosure, seeing it as a precursor to intrusive regulatory action. But theres a strong argument under existing free speech doctrine that requiring businesses to reveal factual information about how they operate does not constitute censorship or anything close to it. Companies in numerous regulated industries from airlines to chemicals are routinely subjected to disclosure requirements, so using this approach would not be novel.

In fact, from what we know so far, nothing about the E.U. investigation of Meta would violate First Amendment strictures. The regional bodys regulators are not dictating that Meta or other social media companies adopt particular policies, let alone specific content practices or decisions. Instead, the E.U. appears to be interested in whether these companies, in general, are providing the kind of resources, personnel, and digital tools that are needed to mount a vigorous defense against manipulation by the likes of Russia or China.

It may be that one or another E.U. demand might turn out to stray over the First Amendment line if it were examined in a U.S. court. But in the main, the European authorities seem concerned about whether powerful social media companies are providing procedurally adequate protections against disinformation and other harmful content that the companies themselves profess not to want on their platforms.

In this sense, early efforts to enforce the DSA shed light on what is at least theoretically possible in the U.S. The NYU Stern Center for Business and Human Rights, where I work, has advocated for Congress to enhance the consumer protection authority and resources of the U.S. Federal Trade Commission so that the FTC could demand procedurally adequate safeguards by social media companies, based on a disclosure regime roughly similar to that imposed by the DSA. If the FTC were restrained from dictating substantive policies or content decisions, this approach ought to be able to survive First Amendment scrutiny. Full disclosure: Less ambitious versions of this idea have appeared in some proposed U.S. legislation, but havent made much progress toward passage.

Under our approach, the U.S. government would not tell platforms what content they could host. Instead, it would require them to institute procedures that follow through on promises they have made in their terms of service and community standards to protect users and society at large.

It is too soon to tell whether the DSA will prove to be a successful experiment in regulation. Meta, TikTok, and X doubtless will push back and appeal any adverse findings. Its not clear whether in this process the European Commission will demonstrate the courage of its convictions. Keeping 27 member States on board wont be easy. But the Commission seems to be trying to make the DSA meaningful, and that alone is something policymakers in Washington could learn from.

Congress, Democracy, Digital Services Act, Disinformation, elections, European Commission, European Union, Facebook, Instagram, Meta, Misinformation, Russia, Social Media Platforms, Technology, TikTok, Twitter, United States

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What U.S. Policymakers Can Learn from the European Union's Probe of Meta - Just Security

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I am following the situation in Georgia with great concern and I condemn the violence in the streets of Tbilisi.

Georgia's citizens are demonstrating their strong attachment to democracy.

The Georgian government should heed this clear message.

The European Union has also clearly expressed its concerns regarding the law on foreign influence.

The Georgian people want a European future for their country.

In recognition of these aspirations, the European Council in December gave Georgia candidate status and set out a clear path to the opening of accession negotiations.

We expect the Georgian government to take swift action on the measures they have committed to take as a candidate country.

Georgia is at a crossroads. It should stay the course on the road to Europe.

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Statement by President von der Leyen on the situation in Georgia - European Union

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Over the past 20 years, the EU has invested substantially in infrastructure to make Europe a better place to live and work - from highways to pipelines, public transport, connectivity, data centres and cross-border infrastructure.

Our integrated energy market has helped us to weather crises, for instance when Russia cut gas deliveries. EU countries have worked together to source more secure and sustainable energy supplies, driving the clean energy transition and reducing our dependence on Russian fossil fuels.With substantial EU investments, coverage of high-speed broadband networks and internet access have surged across the EU. Digital leaders such as Estonia, are helping to pioneer e-government services. In all parts of Europe, millions of people have gained access to the 5G network.

Today, we are taking things further with NextGenerationEU. Worth 800 billion, it is funding hundreds of projects, from offshore wind farms to electric trains, from top-notch digital services to world-class medical centres, creating quality jobs in all 27 Member States.

As the strategic environment around us continues to change and Europe needs to step up on defence, all Member States are taking part in the effort - from Estonian defence research to Swedish aircraft development and Polish ammunition production.

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20 years together: Facts and figures about the benefits of the enlargement for the EU - European Union

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The EU has achieved much in the last term and faces big challenges in the next. Its citizens can set the priorities in June.

Twenty twenty-four is being billed as the ultimate election year, with almost half the worlds population having the chance to vote. When it comes to the European Parliament elections this Junethe second largest democratic exercise in the worldwhat will motivate Europes citizens to take to the polls?

Some say the European Union should sell itselfbe proud of what it has managed to achieve in the face of numerous crises. Others say that lauding the key achievements of the EU over the last five years is not the way to go.

What should spur voters is a belief that a united Europe can achieve remarkable results, focused on a desire to tackle the very real challenges it faces. Policies at EU level have far greater potential than national measures to tackle common crises, in line with values we all share, making the union stronger.

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What follow are five social-policy successes of the past five-year EU term and five key challenges that only a strong Europe, supported by an active electorate, can hope to solve.

First, the SURE instrument(Support to mitigate Unemployment Risks in an Emergency) kept employment rates high during the pandemic. With resources borrowed from the financial markets and channelled to the member states, some 31.5 million workers and self-employed and 2.5 million businesses received support during the Covid-19 lockdowns. Sustained employment served as a macro-economic anchor and economic recovery took less than two years.

Support independent publishing and progressive ideas by becoming a Social Europe member for less than 5 Euro per month. Your support makes all the difference!

Compare the six years of austerity implemented after the financial crisis of 2007-08. Recovery then was slow and unstable, marked by declining EU gross domestic product in three out of the five years between 2009 and 2013, with a 4.3 per cent fall in 2009 alone. Yet the record 5.6 per cent fall in GDP in 2020 was compensated in just over a year, with rapid recovery in 2021 and 2022. The lesson is simple: preserving jobs pays offaccelerating recovery, reducing potential poverty and preventing deep negative economic and social consequences.

Secondly, the 2022 minimum-wages directive now safeguards workers with a wage floor. A few years back, it would have been unthinkable to address minimum wages and wage setting at EU level. The directive leaves sufficient room for adaptation to the national context during transposition while bringing union-wide benefits: it increases transparency, levels the playing field in a competitive cross-border labour market, stimulates a more prominent role for social partners and limits the precarious jobs that restrain EU competitiveness.

Thirdly, the new platform-work directive will protect workers in a context, particularly after the pandemic, of evolving digital tools and new forms of work, including platforms. Innovation and flexibility in labour markets should be welcomed but there are risks: of circumventing labour regulation, disadvantaging existing businesses, depriving a large number of workers of adequate social protection and decent working conditions, and challenging social systems and the integrity of societies. These motivated the EU legislature to forge a directive, striking a balance between digital development and preservation of basic rules, principles and rights in labour markets.

Fourthly, the 2023 pay-transparency directive addresses the fact that, still, women in the EU are paid on average 13 per cent less than men. There are of course countries where the gap is much smallerincluding most of the central- and eastern-European member states, where women and men have worked and been paid equally for decades. But there are also countries where this flagrantly unjust differentiation is even greater. After years of consultations and negotiations, the directive provides much stronger instruments to defend the rights of all workers.

Fifthly, a new, enhanced mechanism to boost social partners participation at national and EU level is unfolding. Social dialogue ensures accountability in decision-making: any key decisions for the future of the economy are sustainable as long as the social partners are involved. Amid deep transformation in the world of workcaused by digitalisation, demographic trends, geopolitical developments and the green transitionemployers and workers have to be part of the decision-making process at corporate, sectoral, national and EU levels.

Social partners can however only participate as far as legislation allows. Over the last few years, the European Commission and the Council of the EU have made substantial efforts to promote social dialogue, to increase the capacity of the social partners and to involve them in important discussions, such as over the National Recovery and Resilience Plans and achieving the collective-bargaining coverage required to uphold minimum wages.

These are not the only success stories of the EU over the last five years but they are landmark achievements. Social policies are mainly the competence of the member states, yet in many cases the European public looks to Brussels for solutions: the EU has far greater potential to generate resources quickly and to apply measures, avoiding the disastrous race to the bottom where labour-market regulation is lax. This is beneficial for businesses, for workers and for economies and societies across Europe.

Of course, there are also challenges where the EU is expected to do more. But these expectations are often not matched by adequate budgetary resources or decision-making powers. If the EU is to do more, it needs to be equipped with more than todays budgetthe sum of member states budgets is about 40 times as big. But these challenges represent another five reasons for voters to make their voice heard at EU level.

First, the future of work is very much to the fore. While the EU is an attractive place to work and live, which helps in the global competition for talent, these advantages should be enhanced. Job quality is critical. Not just wages but the balance between demands (work intensity, physical and psychological risks, job insecurity, irregular working hours and so on) and resources (including autonomy, possibilities for training and promotion, work-life balance and support from managers and colleagues) is what makes a job attractive. Focusing on job quality can provide tools to address labour shortages, promote mobility, improve productivity and make the EU labour market even more competitive, as well as boosting quality of life more generally.

Of course, the new world of work must also address the challenges associated withhuman-machine interaction, including the role of algorithms and artificial intelligence. The rapid development of digital technologies does not only necessitate rapid and large-scale upskilling and reskilling but also clear rules in terms of ethics, data protection and individual and collective rights. To reap the benefits from these technologies requires human-centric regulation.

Secondly, unaffordable and inadequate housing is a hot political issue in almost all member states, while careformal and informalis an issue in almost every family. On the former, at this point there is not much that can be done at EU level beyond sharing experience and best practices. But as the negative impacts on demography, labour mobility and work-life balance emerge, a common EU approach will almost certainly be foreseen. On the latter, today in Europe we have about six million official and 60 million unofficial domestic carers. Addressing their conditions is of wide European interest and could also affect demography, labour supply and quality of life.

Thirdly, ensuring access to these and other public services will be a critical element in trying to address the variousinequalities in our societies. These encompass those between rich and poor, young and old, men and women, and urban and rural.

This will in turn be fundamental, fourthly, to a truly just transition. The ambitious climate goals of the EU are timely and relevant. Still, a constant analysis and swift response should guarantee that the public benefits it brings are balanced by affordable efforts on the part of different social groups, in terms of age, income, location and so on. The green transition is a top-down policy that will be realised only if society consciously supports the political decisions. It should not lead to widening gaps in society.

All of these, not least the last, will be best addressed in a context, finally, of improvedtrust in institutions across the EU: between people, in their legal systems, the police, the media, their governments and the EU itself. Without trust social cohesion crumbles and efforts, at EU or national level, to implement the goals set out above are severely hampered. (Re)building trust is a crucial challenge in its own right.

The European Union has created one of the worlds largest economiesa leader in areas such as the environment and attractive working and living conditions. These achievements cannot be ignored. But of course, we all want more, and better. That is why the elections for the European Parliament are so critical. This is one of these pivotal moments, where EU citizens can have a direct say on the priorities to be addressed and the solutions to be expected. The union can and does add value, above and beyond national specificities, and works for the benefit of all European citizens.

It is for these ten reasons (though there are many more) that everyone should use their vote come June.

Additional resources related to this article are available ateurofound.europa.eu

Ivailo Kalfin is executive director of Eurofound. A qualified economist, he has served twice as deputy prime minister of Bulgaria and is a former MEP.

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