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The European Union is looking at ways to bypass patent protections and make it easier to make generic drugs in cases of emergency such as the Covid-19 pandemic, a new document says.

Normally, under WTO regulations, the practice known as compulsory licensing is allowed in exceptional circumstances and could be applied as a waiver to bypass patent holders. Wednesdays document was published as part of the EUs plan to shore up the intellectual property rights of its member states.

The Commission sees the need to ensure that effective systems for issuing compulsory licences are in place, to be used as a means of last resort and a safety net, when all other efforts to make IP available have failed, the document said.

Reuters was the first to report on the plan, writing Wednesday that some legislators have urged the EU to use the WTO waiver to gain access to potential vaccines and drugs for Covid-19, but the bloc has resisted until this point. Instead, the European Commission and other governments on the continent have been purchasing prospective vaccines and therapies in bulk.

But Covid-19 is causing the EU to rethink its strategy, given the extraordinary nature of the pandemic and need for treatments.

The EU outlines how a procedure closely linked to patents, known as supplementary protection certificates, are also hampering European patent holders. The certificates provide an extended IP protection for products that undergo clinical trials and regulatory approvals, but due to inconsistent implementation across Europe, both generic and drug makers have had a difficult time implementing a cohesive Covid strategy.

Earlier this week, Reuters had previously reported that the bloc was considering making access to generics easier altogether. The goal of the plan is to make drugs more affordable while preventing the supply and manufacturing shortages seen during the early stages of the pandemic this spring.

A draft of the document reviewed by Reuters appeared to discuss a plan to apply antitrust policies more rigorously against pharmaceutical companies, though that does not appear in the final plan released Wednesday. The draft also mentioned the possibility of cracking down on drugmakers that delay the approval of generics, limiting patent protection for drugs that arent made available in all 27 EU countries, and aiming to prevent drug shortages across the continent.

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European Union aims to establish patent workaround in case of emergencies while trying to strengthen its own IP - Endpoints News

LONDON (Reuters) - Londons dominance of the multi-trillion dollar global derivatives market is at risk after a regulator said on Wednesday banks in the EU will have to use trading platforms within the bloc after the completion of Brexit on Dec. 31.

FILE PHOTO: The City of London financial district is seen amid the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) outbreak in London, Britain, November 24, 2020. REUTERS/Peter Nicholls/File Photo

The City of Londons unfettered access to the European Union, its biggest customer, ends when the Brexit transition arrangements expire, and Brussels wants trading in euro-denominated derivatives to remain within its jurisdiction or in a country with equivalent standards to the bloc.

The Paris-based European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) on Wednesday confirmed that from Jan. 1 EU investors would have to use a swaps platform inside the bloc, or based in a non-EU country such as the United States that has already been granted equivalence or permission.

This means that branches of EU banks in London will face conflicting EU and British requirements on where to trade derivatives.

The City of London touts itself as the go-to location globally for trading derivatives - the life blood of financial markets, allowing investors to bet on a swathe of assets and hedge risk.

The decision is a starting gun for a fight between the UK and the EU for the location of international derivatives trading in Europe, said Michael McKee, a financial services lawyer at DLA Piper law firm, adding that France and Germany hoped to pick up the spoils.

Banks have already been moving some positions in derivatives from London to the new EU hubs ahead of Brexit.

While the rules would not create the sort of systemic disruption of areas such as clearing the contracts, which has already been smoothed over with temporary equivalence, it does signal that the EU is prepared to play hardball as Brexit injects a sense of urgency into reducing its reliance on the City of London for core financial services for its economy.

ESMA acknowledges that this approach creates challenges for some EU counterparties, particularly UK branches of EU investment firms, the watchdog said.

Britains Financial Conduct Authority said it would not be adjusting its approach to derivatives trading at this time.

Mutual equivalence would be the best way to avoid market disruption and meet international G20 commitments. We continue to monitor market developments, the FCA said.

The derivatives industry has urged Brussels to avoid a clash in rules through a quick fix legal workaround, but it now appears this was not possible.

The rules mean British counterparties will have to use a UK authorised platform, while EU counterparties have to use an EU authorised platform, making a trade between the two sides impossible. You cant tick both boxes, a derivatives sector official said.

Again, this is the EU telling the UK - this is your mess, you can sort it out, said Jake Green, a regulation lawyer at Ashurst law firm.

The ESMA said it did not see room for providing different guidance based on the current legal framework, and in the absence of an equivalence decision by the European Commission.

The ongoing trade talks between the EU and Britain do not cover financial services, though a deal could help the mood music towards financial services access.

The International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA) said no equivalence would mean fragmenting liquidity, raising costs and probably a negative effect on pricing of contracts for end-users.

It means EU and UK firms would not be able to trade derivatives that are subject to both EU and UK trading obligations unless they trade on a U.S. swap execution facility, but that may not be practical or even possible for some, said Roger Cogan, ISDAs head of European public policy.

Given the rules on trading venues in the EU and UK are virtually identical, we think equivalence is justified and necessary, Cogan said.

Reporting by Huw Jones; Editing by Carmel Crimmins, Alison Williams and Gareth Jones

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EU derivatives decision leaves London in the lurch - Reuters

GENEVA (AP) The European Union, the United States and other donors on Tuesday pledged billions in new funds for Afghanistan, hoping to salvage years of work aimed to foster peace and stability in the country and coax along uncertain peace talks between the government and Taliban rebels at a time when Islamic State extremists have increasingly caused havoc and bloodshed.

A largely virtual pledging conference for Afghanistan, co-hosted by Finland and the United Nations in Geneva, drew representatives from nearly 100 countries and international groups in the first such event in four years. It comes as the COVID-19 crisis has commanded worldwide attention, and its outbreak in Afghanistan has compounded persistent ills like corruption and extremist violence.

Many countries set conditions for their future commitments, mostly on progress toward peace and demands for better governance to foster democracy and root out corruption.

Donors pledged more than $3 billion for the first year of the upcoming quadrennial, with annual commitments expected to stay at the same level year on year, said Ville Skinnari, Finlands minister for development, cooperation and foreign trade.

That $12 billion was a rough estimate extrapolated from the pledges for next year alone, officials said, adding that donors would review their commitments each year. Even at $12 billion, it marked a drop from the more than $15 billion drummed up at the last such conference in Brussels in 2016.

Mohammad Haneef Atmar, Afghanistans foreign minister, hailed an impressive figure tallied on Tuesday, adding: Its more important because it comes at a time when there is hardly any nation that has not been affected by COVID-19 in its economy and revenue.

That represents an enormous amount of generosity when every nation has had its own challenges, that on top of that, it did not forget about our shared responsibility to succeed in Afghanistan, he said.

Countries like Britain, the Netherlands, Germany, the U.S. and Canada offered hundreds of millions in pledges, which came after speeches from officials like Afghan President Ashraf Ghani and U.N. Secretary-General Antonio Guterres, who hailed the countrys ambitious agenda for development and reform.

The United Nations stands with the people of Afghanistan on the path toward peace, development and self-reliance, Guterres said, expressing hope that donor pledges will translate into real progress and concrete improvements for the people of Afghanistan.

That was a familiar refrain about Afghanistan, where progress has been underpinned by international support and remains fragile, amid perennial hopes that peace and stability can emerge.

Nearly 20 years after a U.S.-led international coalition toppled the Taliban government that supported al-Qaida, Afghanistans woes remain complex and its future uncertain. Violence has increased in recent months, Taliban rebels and the government are currently taking part in peace talks in Doha, Qatar; and the Trump administration recently announced a further drawdown of U.S. forces.

Even as the meeting took place, a roadside bomb exploded in the central Afghan city of Bamyan, killing at least 13 civilians and a traffic police officer, and wounding 45 others, an Afghan official said. No one immediately claimed responsibility. But the IS affiliate has claimed responsibility for the most recent attacks in Afghanistan, including two that killed at least 50 people mostly students.

While hoping to help along the peace talks, donors pointed to their own commitments both with forces and funds over the years, and warned that their continued help would be contingent on efforts by Afghans themselves and no backsliding on progress. Many of the commitments were for a four-year span from 2021 to 2024. others were for just one year.

The EU pledged 1.2 billion euros ($1.43 billion) in assistance to Afghanistan over the next four years but joined others by making its support conditional on the strife-torn countrys commitment to democracy, the rule of law, human rights and gender equality.

Afghanistans future trajectory must preserve the democratic and human rights gains since 2001, most notably as regards womens and childrens rights, EU foreign policy chief Josep Borrell said. Any attempt to restore an Islamic emirate would have an impact on our political and financial engagement.

Germany pledged another 430 million euros (about $510 million) per year through 2024, Foreign Minister Heiko Maas said.

U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said the Doha talks offered a new and unprecedented opportunity set for peace and prosperity, but noted that Afghanistan faced challenges such as the pandemic from Wuhan, and unacceptably high levels of violence, alluding to the COVID-19 outbreak that began in China.

I want to be clear that the choices made in peace negotiations will affect the size and scope of future international support and assistance. The United States looks forward to reviewing progress in the areas I mentioned in one years time, Pompeo said.

U.S. Undersecretary for Political Affairs David Hale added that Washington would pledge $600 million for Afghanistan in 2021, but only half would come now with the remaining $300 million available as we review progress in the peace process.

Hale cited significant progress in negotiations in Doha on Tuesday including a tentative agreement on rules and procedures that should allow the negotiators to move ahead to start setting an agenda. But he also said the U.S. was monitoring disturbing reports about unspecified efforts to delay, disrupt and for the progress for which the negotiating teams have worked so hard.

Hales comments signaled the first sign of progress since the two sides in the Afghan talks sat down in Doha on Sept. 12. The government team was likely to demand the first item on an agenda be a cease-fire a prospect that the Taliban have until now refused to accept.

Atmar, the Afghan foreign minister, said the two sides had reached an agreement on 20 points but one on the legal basis for the negotiations remained unresolved. He expressed hopes that if the logjam is resolved in the coming days, it would mark a huge step in the peace process.

Deborah Lyons, the U.N. secretary-generals special envoy for Afghanistan, said the country was facing a time of unprecedented opportunity but also deep uncertainty and rising anxiety, and said Afghans were committed to preserving the gains of recent years but needed ongoing support from abroad.

Now is not the time to walk away, said Lyons. In the past, she has said that despite some progress, Afghanistan remains one of the worst places in the world to be a woman or a child. She has criticized a sharp rise in casualties in the fighting, both from Taliban assaults and U.S. and Afghan bombing raids.

Statistics in Afghanistan are still grim after decades of help. The poverty level during the COVID-19 pandemic has shot up to 70% up from 54% last year. Despite billions of dollars that have poured into the country in the last two decades, more than half the population lives on $1.14 a day. A U.S. watchdog has said over $19 billion of U.S. money alone had been lost to abuse, fraud and waste.

Ghani touted a strategic plan for Afghanistan, acknowledged lessons learned from abroad, pointed to the development of a robust civil society and free press, among other gains

A new Afghanistan has emerged over the past two decades, and with it, an entirely new set of expectations from our citizens, Ghani said by video. The main theme of our development agenda is to meet these new expectations by doing much more with much less in the face of daunting challenges.

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US, European Union, other donors step up with funds to help Afghanistan - FOX40

On 12 October 2020, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2020/1466[1].

The Council Decision renewed the existing restrictive measures until 16 October 2021, and updated one entry on the list of natural and legal persons, entities and bodies subject to restrictive measures as set out in the Annex of Decision (CFSP) 2018/1544.

The Candidate Countries the Republic of North Macedonia, Montenegro and Albania[2], the country of the Stabilisation and Association Process and potential candidate Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the EFTA countries Iceland and Norway, members of the European Economic Area, as well as Ukraine and Georgia align themselves with this Council Decision.

They will ensure that their national policies conform to this Council Decision.

The European Union takes note of this commitment and welcomes it.

[1] Published on 13.10.2020 in the Official Journal of the European Union no. L 335. p.16.

[2] The Republic of North Macedonia, Montenegro and Albania continue to be part of the Stabilisation and Association Process.

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Declaration by the High Representative on behalf of the EU on the alignment of certain third countries concerning restrictive measures against the...

Swedish Prime Minister, Stefan Lfven, holding a press conference during the European Council Meeting in June 2017. Photo: European Council

As the final piece of our series on Swedens Arctic strategy, this article seeks to shed light on two key characteristics of Swedens EU policy in general. In doing so, it, where applicable, seeks to use Arctic related examples in order to demonstrate or support its arguments.

For Sweden, joining the European Union (EU) was more than just joining an economic club. The EU was portrayed as a political union that would not only allow Sweden to play a more active role in global affairs. Rather, it would also enable Stockholm to regain and strengthen its European identity while simultaneously influencing the EUs institutional and doctrinal developments. Conservative politicians were particularly relentless in their promotion of discourses which essentially equated neutrality with isolationism and the EU membership as a sign of active internationalism.1)Agius, C. (2011), Transformed Beyond Recognition? The Politics of Post-Neutrality. Cooperation and Conflict. Vol. 46(3), pp. 370395

As such, and to further boost their chances of a desired transition to post-neutrality, a concerted and well-orchestrated campaign of media leaks and agenda setting took place which effectively helped to de-mythify the delusion of neutrality.2)Agius, C. (2011), Transformed Beyond Recognition? The Politics of Post-Neutrality. Cooperation and Conflict. Vol. 46(3), pp. 370395 Not only did newspapers begin reporting on Swedens secret arrangements with Western powers but many pundits and politicians alike were now arguing that states can never be truly neutral and hence it (neutrality) had a false relationship to the identity of the nation state.3)Agius, C. (2011), Transformed Beyond Recognition? The Politics of Post-Neutrality. Cooperation and Conflict. Vol. 46(3), pp. 370395

Once in the bloc, Stockholms policy stances and its broader conduct have been largely dual in nature: to play a leading role in setting policy norms4)Bjrkdahl, A. 2008. Norm Advocacy: A Small State Strategy to Influence the EU. Journal of European Public Policy. Vol. 15(1), pp. 135-154 while retaining a high degree of strategic independence so it can go its own way when its interests clash with those of other EU Member States.5)McCallion, M, S. and Brianson, A. (2017). How to Have Your Cake and Eat It Too: Sweden, Regional Awkwardness, and the European Union Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region. Journal of Baltic Studies. Vol. 48(4), pp. 451-464 And in spite of the common belief, it has not, at least not systematically, sought to form and lead a common Nordic block within the EU. On the contrary, it has been in a soft competition over status and influence with its Nordic counterparts.6)Gebhard, C. (2013). Soft Competition: Finland, Sweden and the Northern Dimension of the European Union. Scandinavian Political Studies. Vol. 36(4), pp. 365-390

Starting with its decision to stay out of the Monetary Union, Sweden has demonstrated a persistent determination to follow its own path in the EU and that it has not shied away from revealing policy preferences that differ from the majority of EU members on issues of the environment, social policy, and defence.7)McCallion, M, S. and Brianson, A. (2017). How to Have Your Cake and Eat It Too: Sweden, Regional Awkwardness, and the European Union Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region. Journal of Baltic Studies. Vol. 48(4), pp. 451-464 Its response to the COVID pandemic is the latest example of this tendency for independence.

This attitude, in turn, has its root in Swedens initial reluctance to join the bloc, its desire for the preservation of its strategic and decision making autonomy, and a sense of, albeit narrowing, uniqueness all of which collectively have earned it the reputation of awkward partner.8)McCallion, M, S. and Brianson, A. (2017). How to Have Your Cake and Eat It Too: Sweden, Regional Awkwardness, and the European Union Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region. Journal of Baltic Studies. Vol. 48(4), pp. 451-464 In other words, Swedish awkwardness, or its awkward attitude towards regional integration processes within the EU, has both ideational and material underpinnings.

Moreover, some scholars claim that Swedens conduct within the EU and its general attitude towards the bloc is best described as one revolving around a solid logic of quid pro quo or delicate balancing; that is, it seeks to contribute to certain initiatives or policies in order to stay outside certain others without opening itself to criticism.9)Von Sydow, G. (2004). Frn Ordfrandeskap Till Utanfrskap. Stockholm: SNS Frlag For instance, Von Sydow10)Von Sydow, G. (2004). Frn Ordfrandeskap Till Utanfrskap. Stockholm: SNS Frlag claims that Sweden participated in and contributed to the EUs common foreign and security policy framework in order to cushion its rejection to join the Monetary Union.

With regard to the Arctic, it has been consistent in its call for the articulation and implementation of common European environmental policy frameworks11)Khorrami, N. (2019). Reviewing Stockholms Strategy for Sustainable Regional Development in the Arctic. Available from https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/stockholm-strategy-sustainable-regional-development-arctic/ but it has resisted initiatives, such as the Northern Dimension (ND), which facilitate a strong and active role for Brussels in the regions defence and security sectors.12)Gebhard, C. (2013). Soft Competition: Finland, Sweden and the Northern Dimension of the European Union. Scandinavian Political Studies. Vol. 36(4), pp. 365-390

Put briefly, the main disagreement between the two with regard to ND boils down to their opposing view on and the weight they assign to the EU and its role within the Baltic Sea and Northern Europe. While Finland prefers a wide-ranging and expanded role for Brussels in the region, Stockholm has traditionally favoured a limited role for the EU and instead has sought to put in place a distinctively regional mechanism for the management of regional affairs with itself at the realm.13)Gebhard, C. (2013). Soft Competition: Finland, Sweden and the Northern Dimension of the European Union. Scandinavian Political Studies. Vol. 36(4), pp. 365-390

Sweden has been commonly identified as a staunch norm entrepreneur within the EU.14)Bjrkdahl, A. 2008. Norm Advocacy: A Small State Strategy to Influence the EU. Journal of European Public Policy. Vol. 15(1), pp. 135-154 Given its lack of military and economic power, Stockholm has consistently utilised its normative credentials to influence, and contribute to, the development of the EUs normative power ever since its joining of the bloc.

As a world leader in environmental sustainability and home to an environmentally conscious population, for example, Stockholm has sought to influence the EUs climate change and Arctic strategies by contributing to the articulation and implementation of detailed measures aimed at reducing global emissions of greenhouse gases.15)Khorrami, N. 2019. Swedens Arctic Strategy: An Overview. Available from https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/sweden-arctic-strategy-overview/ Similarly, it has been relentless in its efforts to ensure that EUs Arctic policies are, at least partly, reflexive of its own ideals of individual rights to security and prosperity, and thus enough attention is paid to the needs and interests of local communities and their resiliency.16)Khorrami, N. 2019. Swedens Arctic Strategy: An Overview. Available from https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/sweden-arctic-strategy-overview/

To this end, it has used various techniques and tactics, including framing, agenda setting, and use of presidency, in order to promote its own values and interests and align EU foreign and strategic decision making with its own. The EU is an ideal platform or arena for such undertakings since there is a natural synergy between its norms and values as a peace project and those of Stockholm as a liberal democracy.17)Bjrkdahl, A. 2008. Norm Advocacy: A Small State Strategy to Influence the EU. Journal of European Public Policy. Vol. 15(1), pp. 135-154

For a small state like Sweden in particular this is of paramount importance because it enables it to exercise power and yield influence by transferring its own domestic norms into the decision making procedures of a larger and more powerful actor. Norms and their wide adaptation do influence action and decision making and thus one can gain authority if its norms and values guide conduct and behaviour.18)Bjrkdahl, A. 2008. Norm Advocacy: A Small State Strategy to Influence the EU. Journal of European Public Policy. Vol. 15(1), pp. 135-154

There is a common assumption outside academic circles that Nordic members of the EU act in tandem, and that they tend to coordinate their policy stances at the EU. Their common history, close socio-cultural links, and geographical proximities are commonly singled out as the key facilitating factors.

However, a closer look at their conducts demonstrate a rather wide-ranging and substantial level of soft competition and disagreement over numerous issues.19)Gebhard, C. (2013). Soft Competition: Finland, Sweden and the Northern Dimension of the European Union. Scandinavian Political Studies. Vol. 36(4), pp. 365-390

Part of this soft competition is due to their differing historical trajectories as well as political and national identities. This creates differing threat perceptions and interests with regard to the role of the EU in their region and how best to address security and commercial challenges.20)Gebhard, C. (2013). Soft Competition: Finland, Sweden and the Northern Dimension of the European Union. Scandinavian Political Studies. Vol. 36(4), pp. 365-390

However, it is also due to their rivalry over status whereby these very similar nations small and well functioning democracies seek to outcompete one another over both the attainment of leadership pole in their own subregion and greater strategic worth in the eyes of their mightier European counterparts.21)Wohlforth, W, C, Carvalho, B, D, Leira, H, and Neumann, I, B. (2018). Moral Authority and Status in International Relations: Good States and the Social Dimension of Status Seeking. Review of International Studies. Vol. (44)3, pp. 526546 In fact, the nature of this status rivalry is particularly fierce amongst relevant comparison or ideational groups simply because they all have similar attributes and thus differentiating oneself from others could become a complex, and at times controversial, affair.22)Wohlforth, W, C, Carvalho, B, D, Leira, H, and Neumann, I, B. (2018). Moral Authority and Status in International Relations: Good States and the Social Dimension of Status Seeking. Review of International Studies. Vol. (44)3, pp. 526546

This is best demonstrated if one analyses Finland and Sweden. Given their common EU membership and close historical and communal ties, one might assume that they both pursue a similar strategy towards the Arctic. Until very recently, however, this had hardly been the case.

While Finland prefers a wide-ranging and expansive role for Brussels in the Arctic that include defence and security,23)Heininen, L. (2014). Foreign Policy Interests of Finland in the Arctic in Spruds, A and Rostoks, T. (2014) Perceptions and Strategies of Arcticness in Sub-Arctic Europe. Riga: SIA Hansa Print Stockholm has traditionally favoured a limited role for the EU when it comes to security policy. Instead it has sought to put in place a distinctively regional mechanism for the management of regional affairs with itself at the realm.24)Gebhard, C. (2013). Soft Competition: Finland, Sweden and the Northern Dimension of the European Union. Scandinavian Political Studies. Vol. 36(4), pp. 365-390 This explains why Stockholm persistently sought to frustrate Brussels and Helsinki efforts in implementing the Nordic Dimension. 25)Gebhard, C. (2013). Soft Competition: Finland, Sweden and the Northern Dimension of the European Union. Scandinavian Political Studies. Vol. 36(4), pp. 365-390

Overall, given its track record on Arctic related policies and initiatives at the EU as well as the minimal mentioning of the EU in its 2011 Arctic Strategy Document,26)There are only five sentences on the role of EU in the Arctic it is fair to suggest that Stockholms policy towards the block as an Arctic player has been traditionally ambivalent at best and unarticulated at worst. By a way of analogy, its attitude towards the EU in the Arctic has been akin to an individual who desires both having a committed partner and being in an open relationship simultaneously.

This, in combination with its soft competition with other Arctic states of the EU, in turn, have been a complicating factor in EUs efforts to develop a coherent Arctic strategy even though Brussels has, arguably, benefited from the Nordic states soft competitions; they have had the effect of halting the emergence of a united Nordic bloc.

Based on its recently released Arctic Strategy, however, it appears that Stockholms attitude towards the EU is softening; that is, it is now, similar to Helsinki, calling for a strong EU presence in the region.

A resurgent Russia, a declining America, and an overall increase of commercial and military activities by both Arctic and non-Arctic states seem to have convinced Swedish decision makers that the EU provides the least bad option in their search for a reliable economic and defence/security partner; at the very least, they can influence decision making in Brussels. Both Nordic cooperation as well as old in case of the US and new in case of Canada bilateral relations are still deemed as essential. However, it is the EU which is now at the centre-point of the countrys Arctic strategy. And the fact that its new Arctic ambassador is a veteran EU diplomat adds a degree of cogency to this observation.27)Raspotnik, A. 2020. The Great Illusion Revisited: The Future of the European Unions Arctic Engagement. Available from https://www.kas.de/en/web/nordische/single-title/-/content/the-great-illusion-revisited-the-future-of-the-european-union-s-arctic-engagement

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Partnership with a Healthy Dose of Distance: Sweden's Changing Attitude towards the EU as an Arctic Player - The Arctic Institute