Editors note: While the Stimson Center rarely publishes anonymous work, the author of this issue brief is an analyst who has requested anonymity out of legitimate concern for their personal safety. The writer is known to appropriate staff, has a track record of reliable analysis, and is in a position to provide an otherwise unavailable perspective.
February 1, 2024, marked the third anniversary of the military coup in Myanmar. During the past three years, Myanmar has experienced major conflict nationwide, and the social, economic, and political situations in the country have worsened each year. The World Bank reports that nearly 60 percent of the population is now living below the poverty line, and has issued warnings about food security across the country. In addition, the black-market rate for the U.S. dollar is 3,900 Myanmar kyats, a 300 percent decline in currency value since the coup.
The conflict has intensified since October 2023, when the Three Brotherhood Alliance launched Operation 1027 to end the military regime. Operation 1027 was supported by ethnic armed organizations and others among the National Unity Governments allied ethnic resistance organizations. In December 2023, U Myint Shwe of the military regime, the acting president of Myanmar, even stressed his concern that the country could fall apart if conflicts nationwide continued. As of January 22, 2024, the United Nations was reporting that there were 2,587,100 internally displaced people within Myanmar since the coup began.
The militarys main reason for the coup was the accusation of fraud in the 2020 election. As the military states in its road map to restore democracy, the first priority of the regime is to hold a free and fair election. Therefore, it is crucial to look at how far the military regime has progressed toward the likelihood of holding a free and fair election amid extreme conflicts in different parts of Myanmar between the regime and the Peoples Defense Forces and ethnic armed organizations. Further, it is crucial to understand and analyze the views of various political parties on their perspectives about and hopes for a general election.
The author of this paper, who writes under a pseudonym to protect their identity, explores and studies the existing political and conflict situations in Myanmar. The author has consulted with three different groups of political parties: registered parties, parties in the process of registration, and unregistered parties or those which refuse to be registered. All representatives of the political parties consulted decided to remain unidentified.
Despite many challenges and extreme conflicts occurring across the nation, the junta, the State Administration Council (SAC), still has a plan regarding an election. Although it has not announced an election date, the SAC sent officials from the Union Election Commission (UEC) to India in December 2023 to study the election management and digital voting system there.
Since January 26, 2023, however, divisions increased both within and between political parties over whether to register or be dissolved as a result of a new Political Party Registration Law announced by the UEC. According to the new law, union-level parties (i.e., parties that would compete in a nationwide election) were required to have at least 100,000 party members within 90 days of registration and to open offices in half of the 330 townships in Myanmar within six months. In addition, the law required union-level political parties to possess a party fund of at minimum 100 million kyat (USD 47,000) and at least 10 million kyat (USD 4,700) for smaller state- and regional-level parties.
Leaders of political parties raised concerns and challenges regarding restrictions imposed in the law to the chairman of the SAC in October 2023, and in response, the SAC relaxed three major clauses in the party registration law on January 30, 2024. These included decreasing the membership requirement of union-level parties to 50,000 party members within three months prior to the election or a notification date from the UEC, and reducing the number of offices required for union-level parties to open to one-third of the nations 330 townships. However, a number of party leaders claim that the changes were made as a result of the regimes inability to control and stabilize the conflict situation in many townships across the country rather than as a genuine show of goodwill through leniency.
Despite the restrictive legal requirements for party registration under the new law, 50 political parties applied for the right to continue to exist during the two-month application window. Of the 50 applicants, 47 parties had been granted registration as of January 2024. Among them, 24 registered political parties are from ethnic regions, and the other 23 are from lowland Burman areas. Apart from the military proxy Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), a couple of other lowland Burman parties, and a few ethnic parties that have previous track records of successfully elected candidates, the rest of the registered parties are weak or small and do not have track records of any election victories for members of Parliament (MP) candidates.
The UEC announced that another 40 existing political parties did not apply for registration within the specified time frame, which means the UEC considers them automatically dissolved; among these is the National League for Democracy (NLD), the ruling party prior to the coup. As of January 2024, according to the UECs announcement, there were 80 political parties regarded as disqualified for registration under the SACs new law. A list of registered and unregistered political parties can be seen on the UEC website. The majority of unregistered parties (53) are from ethnic groups, and the rest are from lowland Burman regions. Many of the unregistered parties include those that have strong support from their constituents and have successfully elected MPs in previous elections.
The 40 political parties that chose not to register claim a lack of trust in the de facto authorities to conduct a free and fair election. Of the parties that have registered, some contend that elections are the only credible solution to a political and security crisis in which three years of armed revolution have not succeeded in forcing the military out of power.
In this context, some parties see elections as a way to de-escalate the current crisis, and also as a potential way to make gains under a system of proportional representation that would enable them to demand political concessions from the military on behalf of their constituents. Others have registered out of fear of reprisals by the military, or out of pressure to avoid being dissolved from their own constituencies, where they have spent years building the ability to advocate on behalf of their communities.
A few leaders of parties have revealed that many of the registered parties are pro-military. In addition, many received either financial support for their registration, or other incentives such as land, both provided by the SAC. One party leader stressed that he does not believe an election would be fair since many parties registered with the support of the government, and thus their interests are not in supporting the people but rather the regime. He added that his party would not be working with those kinds of political parties as they would never work for the interests of the people.
Apart from the Mon and Rakhine political parties, the registered political parties do not include many elected MPs from their constituents in the 2020 election. That suggests that these parties are not being supported by people in their respective areas, and likely lack influence. Another implication is that these parties are not in a position to compete at any level with the military proxy USDP.
The SAC imposed additional restrictions on some strong and influential political parties that had firm support from their constituents when they applied for registration. These include making serious inquiries into the history and business of each party committee member, including their families. A leader from a political party that elected an MP in the 2015 and 2020 elections stressed that this is one way the SAC made registering more difficult for such parties. Many small and new parties received their registrations quickly, as they support the military and have no restrictions. The implication is that there is no equal treatment of political parties in relation to party registration.
Some leaders from unregistered political parties also do not accept the SAC as a legitimate government, meaning any actions the regime has taken are not official in their view. For example, these leaders perspective is that their parties do not need to be registered under the military regimes governance. They added, We initially did not trust or believe that the SAC can do a better or fairer election since they took power in early 2021. The party leaders added that their parties are still genuinely supported by the general public, without any registration under the regime. Many of their parties MPs won several seats in the 2015 and 2020 elections.
One ethnic party leader further objected to the process, saying the majority of the politicalparties who have registered, apart from a few ethnic political parties, are the ones who tend to be opportunists who reluctantly believe that the SAC would win the game at the end of the day, or the ones who choose to be silent and follow the path that the SAC created.
Interestingly, most of the political parties consulted see no major conflicts between the registered and unregistered political parties on the matter of registration. Although unregistered parties generally do not want any parties to be registered under the SACs new law, representatives stated they also think that the choice is the decision of each party and that neither choice should be condemned. Similarly, a member from a registered party stressed that parties that do not want to be registered are also making a free political choice.
The SACs actions have imposed unfair burdens on political parties to move toward the election process, limited the ability to express alternatives to the SACs agenda, disregarded their own constitution, and installed a system of governance that further weakens democracy in Myanmar.
Regarding the election process, the SACs party registration law created challenges and burdens for many political parties through requirements of party size and member mobilization, number of offices, safety and security, and the registration fee. Furthermore, the process was not fair to many political parties as the SAC easily granted registration to its supporters, whereas some stronger or more influential political parties were given much narrower pathways to registration.
Interestingly, both the registered and unregistered parties believe that the regime will not be in a position to hold an election anytime soon. Some of the challenges include the safety and security issues of holding an election during extreme conflict. Many townships are controlled by resistance groups, and many are regarded as active conflict zones. It is a difficult time to gain party members through mobilization across the country, as well as to manage an election with a shortage of staff members (a large number of government staff have joined the civil disobedience movement). Furthermore, the attention of the public at the moment is less on politics than on their safety and livelihoods.
Recently, spokesperson of the National Unity Government (NUG) Kyaw Zaw claimed that the NUG has established interim administration in more than 170 townships across the country and is working to enhance the rule of law, development, education, health care, and the economy. Some party leaders have indicated that registered parties will be hindered in mobilizing people from these 170 townships and opening their required offices in different states and regions. Moreover, leaders of many parties believe that even if the SAC holds an election, it will be neither free nor fair.
Regarding civil liberties, the SAC has strictly prohibited any form of freedom of expression, including media, religion, and assembly. According to the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (Burma), as of February 2024, there were 25,940 political prisoners arrested, 4,474 killed, and 20,002 people still detained, including those sentenced by the SAC.
One party leader mentioned that apart from pro-SAC media and groups such as Ma-Ba-Ta, the Buddhist extremists, and pro-military groups, none of the democratic media and groups are able to function or express their views. Whereas the military scrutinizes, captures, and tortures any media groups and individuals who oppose them or support democratic values, the Ma-Ba-Ta launched the pro-military campaign in Pin Oo Lwin in late December and even criticized Min Aung Hlaing, but the SAC has taken no action against them. Other civil movements and campaigns are only possible in the so-called liberated areas, where the ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) or Peoples Defense Forces (PDF) are in control in central Myanmar and various ethnic areas. According to a Christian leader based in Yangon, other religious institutions such as Christian communities are forced to attend meetings with SAC officials, receive Min Aung Hlaing at religious events, and release statements in support of the work of the SAC. These actions clearly illustrate the SACs repressive treatment of other religions, freedom of expression and media, and freedom of assembly. In addition, the SAC has also targeted civilians and their property, based on the data collected by Data for Myanmar and Assistance Association for Political Prisoners, with more than 4,197 people killed, including 200 children and more than 76,932 homes nationwide burned and razed by the military from May 2021 to October 2023.
In relation to judicial independence and equality before the law, the SAC does not respect the 2008 constitution that the military itself established. According to views expressed by some party leaders, the SAC will play with the law based on its own interest to stay in power, overriding the constitution to extend the coup period. In addition, one party leader mentioned that the military is now forcing recruitment from villages in the Bago and Ayeyarwaddy regions; failure to comply with the militarys order results in a fine of 2 million kyats (about USD 950). A media source also confirmed that at least 50 people per village have been forced to form militias in the Bago region. The junta announced the recruitment drive after reportedly losing more than 600 bases in northern Shan and Rakhine states to the Three Brotherhood Alliances Operation 1027 offensive since the end of October. A party leader stressed that this act of forced recruitment is a complete disorder of the law.
Quite a number of political parties consulted for this paper expressed their concerns with the SACs approach to peace and dealing with the resistance and the current conflict. In particular, the regimes response to the resistance with violence and torture has been interpreted by political parties, the public, and the majority of the EAOs as leaving no other options for moving toward peace.
In addition, the decision to conduct the coup in response to claims of election fraud was an unconstitutional act for the military. For the past 70 years in Myanmar, the militarys mindset is that they may steer and shape the countrys political situation based on their own interests. As the strongest institution in Myanmar during this period, military officials see themselves as safeguarding Myanmars political space.
Yet the majority of the political parties consulted concluded that they do not believe in any plans that the military has initiated. The military coup and the actions of the SAC for the past three years can be clearly interpreted as an indication that the military would only understand and listen to absolute armed resistance. Although many unregistered political parties believe that armed resistance is not and should not be a political solution for the people of Myanmar, resistance is one option that could drive a bargain with the regime for future political dialogue and resolution.
Therefore, some party leaders stressed that the SAC itself is not a legitimate government, that it is not in a position to hold any elections, and that its capacity to hold a free and fair election is limited. Since the coup, the military does not appear to have made any progress toward an election.
Nevertheless, political parties have been a source of organized pluralism and debate as units of political representation in Myanmar. The coup has had an alarming effect on the political space, leaving parties with almost no room for opposition. Political parties interviewed for this research grieved the absence of a space for debate. Some parties had largely turned their organizational work into the provision of services, including health care, education, and humanitarian assistance for those displaced by conflict. Many unregistered political parties inside the country in areas controlled by the SAC provide humanitarian services to internally displaced internally displaced people (IDPs). Many of the unregistered parties inside resistance-controlled areas or liberated areas, or outside of the country, are working either with the resistance armed groups or with the NUG, and also help IDP issues in many ways, though this is not their main work. With additional restrictions from the SAC on their ability to organize, the space for political operation in Myanmar has dwindled drastically and threatens the operation of democracy both now and into the future.
Based on perspectives and views expressed by various political parties, the SAC has completely failed to hold a free and fair election, leading the country nearer to a failed state. Since the coup, the SACs actions have made the countrys situation worse, and the SAC has continued to oppress freedom of media, religion, and assembly, overriding the 2008 constitution to prolong the coup period. The regime has targeted and tortured the public, and there is, at best, extremely limited political space for political parties and the public to debate.
The SACs election plan, ongoing arrangements, and policy in preparation for the election will remain a major challenge even for registered political parties as a result of requirements for party members, opening offices, ensuring the safety and security of candidates and voters, and mobilizing party members amid intensified conflict on the ground. In addition, these results indicate the SACs inability to control the conflict situation around the country, as well as the strengthened movement of the resistance from various armed organizations, including Operation 1027, that control 35 towns and populations of the country. According to the U.S. Institute of Peace, starting from October 2023 through February 1, 2024, more than 5,500 junta troops had been killed or captured, including 10 brigadier generals, and more than 30 towns had been taken by the resistance; overall, the junta had lost no less than 30,000 soldiers since the coup, a major blow toa military of 150,000 troops.
In addition, the SACs plan to hold a future election will not be a political solution for the people in Myanmar. Although armed resistance is not the desired political solution for many ethnic armed groups, political parties, and PDFs on the ground, there are no other feasible options that armed organizations can agree to choose. For the EAOs and other PDF wings, armed resistance remains the only option to deal with the current regime.
The hope and prospect of a majority of the registered political parties solely relies on the regimes capacity to handle the ongoing conflict across the country, whereas unregistered political parties have sided strongly with other revolutionary forces to end the military dictatorship and restore peace and democracy in the country.
Last but not least, for many unregistered political parties, an election is no longer an absolute political solution to address the current conflict in Myanmar. For these parties, instead, their ultimate goal is the elimination of the 2008 constitution and the rebuilding of a concrete and genuine federal democratic union without the involvement of the military.
The anonymous writer is a researcher based in Singapore.
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Challenges and Perspectives of Political Parties on Democracy and Elections in Myanmar Stimson Center - Stimson Center
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