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The ideas of decolonizing Ukraine, and of decolonizing Russia, are both in the air. They are also two entirely different things.

Like many postcolonial scholars, Ukrainian intellectuals have a pretty good idea of what decolonizing Ukraine means: it means national self-determination on a political level, accompanied by some measure of cultural revitalization. The details of the latter are debated, but some measure of Ukrainization in education, language, law, and the likeechoing what took place in the 1920s (and was subsequently and violently negated in the 1930s)is part of the picture, if only because cultural change helps to consolidate political change. (For a sense of this, see these articles in Krytyka, the writing of Timothy Snyder, and the long list of sources on the Ukrainian Institutes Decolonization page.)

Thats not to say that Ukrainian intellectuals are united in acknowledging Ukraines colonial status. Ukrainian historian Yaroslav Hrytsak argued in 2015 that within the Russian empire and the Soviet Union, Ukraine was more core than colony, and that the postcolonial paradigm was of little relevance in explaining the events of 2014s Maidan Revolution and what led up to it. Still, the cultural dimension of decolonization has been prominent in the years since 2014, and it concurs with a view wed get from any number of sub-state or neo-national peoplesthink of the Qubecois, the Catalans, the long-established (statified) Irish, et al.that culture and language matter. By the same token, looking to India should suffice to remind us that culture, in a multiethnic state (no matter how successfully postcolonial), will always remain tricky and challengingand given Ukraines historical as well as contemporary multiethnicity, may always remain so.

But what might decolonizing Russia mean? (Similarly, what could decolonizing the worlds other massive, historically imperial stateChinamean?) And what forms could global solidarity with such a decolonial project take?

If decolonization, by definition, is a collective self-liberation, a freeing from the perverse effects of colonization, its important to note that there can be perverse decolonizations, in which reactions against alleged colonial harm are replaced by new harms, or old harms in new guises.

And there is the question of whose decolonization is the real decolonizationwhen Russians present themselves as decolonizers and de-imperializers, purportedly decolonizing themselves, their New Russian compatriots, and the Russkii mir from the liberal West; when Ukrainians see themselves as decolonizing and de-imperializing from imperial (or neo-imperial) Russia; when supporters of the Donetsk and Luhansk peoples republics see themselves as decolonizing (if not de-imperializing) from Banderite Ukraine; and so on. As Nikolay Smirnov writes in Crisis of Decoloniality and Inevitability of Decolonization: Elements of imperial and decolonial ideologies are woven together into an irrational combination of geocultural neurosis that turns into military-political psychosis.

One could at this point throw up ones hands and say, We cant possibly know who is right here. But like most debates skewed by layers of misinformation and counter-propaganda, this would be neither honest nor helpful. To get at its dishonesty, however, its not enough to provide simple factual correctives. In what follows, Id like to argue that unraveling the decolonization puzzle will involve assessing the role of two other key features of the world at large: capitalism and democracy.

My starting assumption is that the global decolonization movement, which exploded across the Global South in the middle decades of the twentieth century, has hardly fulfilled its mission in these remaining mega-states. In this, Russia and China are little different from the colonial settler-states of the Americas and Oceania (the US, Canada, Australia, et al.); in some respects, they are worse.

To think through what decolonizing Russia (or China) may involve requires thinking through the similarities and differences between these remaining mega-states and the Euro-colonized states around the world that have been decolonized to various degrees, including external colonies like those that made up much of Africa and parts of Asia for centuries, as well as the mentioned settler-colonial states. But it also, crucially, requires thinking through the forms of economic neocolonialism that global capitalism has enabled to continue around the world to this day. These processes are related and cannot be thought apart from each other today.

Decolonization and Russia

The idea of decolonizing Russia has become popular in some places, for good reason. Among others, the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Sergej Sumlenny of the pro-NATO Center for European Policy Analysis, The Atlantics Casey Michel, Polands Lech Walesa, the European Parliaments European Conservatives and Reformists Group, and any number of Ukrainians and many Poles have argued on behalf of it. The Forum of the Free Peoples of Russia has published a Declaration on the Decolonization of Russia, with signatories from Buryatia, Bashkortostan, Tatarstan, Siberia, Ichkeria, Velky Novgorod, Kolomna, and various other parts of what is still the Russian Federation. (For those like me living in Berlin, its well worth seeing the Kunstraum Kreuzbergs current exhibition entitled [ome], a Bachqort word meaning collective self-help practices, consisting of work by artists from the many ethno-national groups historically colonized by Russia and united by the vision of decolonizing Russia.)

Urging caution, on the other hand, Russia (and fascism) expert Marlene Laruelle writes that

a collapse [of the Russian state] would generate several civil wars. New statelets would fight with one another over borders and economic assets. Moscow elites, who control a huge nuclear arsenal, would react with violence to any secessionism. The security services and law enforcement agencies would crush any attempts at democratizing if that meant repeating the Soviet Unions dismemberment. Although decolonization sounds like liberation, in practice it would likely push the whole of Russia and ethnic minority regions even further backward.

The University of Exeters Kevork Oskanian adds that

falling empires have a tendency to crush smaller peoples underneath their weight, and pushing for Russias dismemberment may achieve exactly that. A guided dismemberment would require the defeat of a nuclear power, and social engineering over territories over a vast scale with a probably unwilling majority population. As for an uncontrolled implosion, all it takes is imagining multiple mini-Russias with their own nuclear devices to get a sense of what could ensue: the 19181920 civil war, but with armed-to-the-teeth reds, whites, and greens, with ethnic minorities stuck in between. The 1990s Balkans, but much, much more violentand genocidal. As so often in International Affairs, one has to be careful what one wishes for.

Oskanian advocates for a change in governmentality away from the Imperial, authoritarian, hierarchical power vertical, but without setting much of Eurasiaand perhaps the worldon fire in the process.

The existence of Russias nuclear weaponsthe largest stock of such weaponry in the world, by most estimatesserves here as a trump card by which even the prospect of a Ukrainian victory in the war could seem threatening if it would result in the collapse of Russia as we know it. If the latter were to happen, it would take an extraordinary efforta united front of the rest of the world, presumably organized through the UN Security Council (minus Russia)to secure the nukes and prevent their falling into the wrong hands. (Imagine the Wagner Groups Yevgeni Prigozhin getting his hands on some nukes.) And with US-China antagonism growing, anything resembling the kind of global unity this would require looks extremely elusive these days.

In an insightful piece called What Kind of Decolonization Do We Need? Russian political theorist llya Budraitskis recently argued that real decolonization is possible only if Russians rewire their own consciousness and reconsider their past and present, the imperial and chauvinistic foundations of which paved the way to the current war. But this still leaves many questions unanswered. Budraitskis critiques the epistemic disobedience narratives of theorists like Walter Mignolo, which have in fact supported Putins own pseudo-decolonial anti-Westernism, but offers only the vaguest sense of what an adequate decolonization may look like.

Asking who should decolonize whom and for what? Budraitskis ends the piece with another question: Decolonization invokes the need to recreate the country and raises the question: what binds us to each other, if not a centralized state and its attributesa uniform education and culture, a unified language? Everyone must answer that question for themselves.

Fortunately, some of the historically colonized peoples of the Russian Federation are already asking themselves this question. This is evident in last years Appeal to Decolonize the Russian Federation, which, for security reasons, was put forward anonymously by a working group with participants from Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, Armenia, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and the regions of the contemporary Russian Federation, including Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, Buryatia, the Republic of Sakha, Kalmykia, Udmurtia, and relied on the existing appeals of the indigenous peoples of Russia. The appeal demanded regional autonomy in decision-making and local self-governances instead of a vertical, repressive-centering apparatus of power, new autonomies formed along territorial lines, and inclusion and a radical acceptance of diversity. It also mentioned the risk of global ecocide and the suffering of Indigenous peoples from the climate crisis and the exploitation of nature.

It is also evident in the creation of the International Committee of Indigenous Peoples of Russia (ICIPR), intended to counter the propaganda (as they see it) of the Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North (RAIPON). The ICIPRs (and Memorials) recent report on Influence of Putins Aggression Against Ukraine on Indigenous Peoples of Russia details the disproportionate impacts of the war on Indigenous communities, as well as ongoing effects of Russian extractive industries, intimidation of Indigenous activities, and victimization of civil society initiatives connected to Russian imperial aggression. The report deserves to be widely read and shared.

Seen in the light of Indigenous cultures on the territory of the Russian Federation, academic decolonialism may appear somewhat of an elite concern. But let us consider some of the forms it takes.

The Austrian Academy of Sciences Paolo Sartori, an Islamicist and Eurasianist scholar, distinguishes between three trajectories of Russian decolonialism. The first, directed at Russians nostalgic for the imperial past, he sees as a somewhat lost cause (even if it is the most important one, in the long run). The second, directed toward the broadening of academic Russian and East European studies departments so that they are more inclusive of non-Russian, non-Slavic, and non-European histories and voices, he sees as successfully proceeding with something of an urgency today.

And the third, targeted at historians of Central Eurasia, he argues, has actually succeeded over the last few decades, such that no one in the West today would be able to publish an academic work on these regions without reflecting on the process of historical erosion produced by Tsarist and Soviet archives and emphasizing the historical agency of Central Asians and Caucasians. The post-colonial approach, he continues, is such a widespread phenomenon that not only in the West, but also in Russia original scholarship is debunk[ing] the myth of Tsarist and Soviet Sonderweg, itself hidden behind the figleaf of modernizing projects.

The problem is that academic work, produced in elite, metropolitan institutions, does not necessarily translate into policy changes at the local and subnational levels where that work is most relevant (or, in this case, in Moscow, where it is even more relevant, but is currently constrained by censorship and propaganda).

Taking all of these views into consideration, it becomes evident that decolonization is something of a wild card with many potential meanings, not all of them promising. Whats missing from many of these discussions, I want to argue, is an analysis of the relationship between colonialism/coloniality and at least two other forms of political-economic asymmetry shaping the world today: capitalism and democracy. Fortunately, they are related (though not in the way some popular voices assume). This makes it easier for us to think of the three together. Let me explain.

What about Capitalism? And Democracy?

Capitalism, when its unfettered by democracy or the state, privileges the wealthy over the poor. Those who have wealth are able to make more of it; those who do not have it, cannot.

Making more of it involves commodifying what has heretofore been uncommodified (and therefore common): people are turned into labor (their potential as workers for capitalist enterprises); land and nature become real estate and property (buyable, sellable, commodifiable); behavior is turned into data for surveillance capital, and so on (see Polanyis The Great Transformation and Zuboffs The Age of Surveillance Capitalism on these processes). Wealth is grown at the expense of community and social self-sufficiency, which are broken up (including over centuries of colonialism); of ecological integrity, which is similarly dismembered and scrambled (resulting in the current Anthropocene climate and eco-crisis); and of the futurethese are all capitalisms externalities. To render capitalism sustainable requires internalizing all of them. (All of this is rudimentary environmental economics, and not even the more radical ecological economics.)

To be managed in the public interest, capitalism requires a state that is willing to rein it in so that its benefits (public or private) dont outweigh its public costs. And to ensure that the state actually does that requires some form of democracy, or at least democratic accountability. (The difference between democracy as such and democratic accountability allows us to talk about how nondemocratic states, like China, Iran, or todays Russia, can maintain their power structures over time. If they retain some accountability to a sufficient proportion of their population, they prevent revolt. As any good student of Chinese history will tell you, however, that never lasts.)

Anti-imperialists on the political left like to say that the Russia-Ukraine war is a proxy war between the worlds most powerful imperial forcethe US-led Westand Russia, which threatens it. This is the inter-imperial vector of the current war, as Svitlana Matviyenko has referred to it. That some of these anti-imperialists fail to criticize Russia tells us that they see the US as the global empire and Russia as something like the inheritor of the anti-imperialist Soviet Union.

But this position, today, is untenable. Russia is no less capitalist than the US. If anything, it is more nakedly capitalistit is klepto-capitalist and petro-capitalist to the max. It is so because it is now almost completely unencumbered by democracy. Similarly, China, Iran, and most other non-Western states (think Venezuela) are thoroughly capitalist. They capitalize on the world (people, land, behavior, et al.) to grow their own economic power, for the benefit of the power holders, sharing their wealth to the extent that it helps them retain their power. They work on capitalist vectors, and to the degree that those are expansionist (as in the case of todays Russia and China), they are also imperialist (or neo-imperialist).

That those vectors do not always align with the vectors of Western-led capitalism does not make them any less capitalist; it only makes capitalism multi-vectoral. Just as Ukraine for years oscillated between rival oligarchic groupsthe Donetsk, Dnipropetrovsk, and Kyiv clans, among othersso is the world today becoming a territory fought over between rival international oligarchies. (Some of these happen to align with the vectors of fossil-fuel capitalism versus green capitalism, which are relevant to the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the EUs response to it. But thats a topic for another day.)

The only force we know of that is capable of keeping capitalism in check today is not socialism (if it ever was), and certainly not anti-Western autocrats like Putin or Xi. It is democracy. But lets get a little more precise than that.

To the extent that democracy involves redistribution of wealth (whether produced by capitalism or otherwise), it is socialism. But socialism can take state-capitalist forms, as it has in many of the historical forms of actually existing socialism, such as the USSRs. While democracy could take socialist (i.e., social-democratic) forms, it could also be developed on anarcho-communalist (radically democratic) lines, as in Kurdish Rojava today; on traditionalist lines, as in Zapatista-controlled southern Mexico or, historically, among many Indigenous peoples; or on purely liberal-democratic lines, with enough of a nations population receiving, or perceiving, enough benefit from the capitalist economy that resistance to it is minimized. It is mixtures of the liberal and the socialist forms of democracy that flourish across much of Europe today. Perhaps these are the best we can come up with, on the scale of todays nation-states.

Democracy alone, however, does not necessarily contain capitalisms externalities, or even those of fossil-fuel capitalism (as we see in Norway today). To truly do that, it must be ecologicalwhich is the next looming challenge for the democratic world.

But if Ani DiFranco was able to sing, resignedly, about capitalism gunning down democracy so many years ago (during the plague of Reagan and Bush), it should be clear today that democracy at least existscontentiously and sometimes fitfully, but also visibly and palpablyin the US and much of Europe, but not at all in Putins Russia of 2022. In Ukraine, its growth in the last thirty years has been particularly volatile and episodic, but also unmistakable, with elements of self-organization unseen in many other places.

But whats the relationship between democracy and decolonization? Heres where a little more history can be helpful.

Decolonizing Democracy

The concept of democracy thats become most widespread is a concept built on the assumption that what makes us human is language, discourse, reason, and deliberation, and that therefore what is most significant for politics is the ability for all to voice their reasoned opinions and choose their mode of governance by exercising that voice. Democracy is that which happens in the speech acts of those who speak in the rarified arena of the polis, where the demos becomes political in order to exercise its rights to govern (kratos) itself. Democracy, in this sense, is a product of the European Enlightenment tracing its origins to ancient Athens.

But as we know, that kind of democracy has always been limited to those who could, and were allowed to, voice their opinions. The lines of demarcation between the included and the excluded have shifted over the centuries, with women and minorities being allowed inor, rather, asserting their way in through heroic strugglesbut with young people and noncitizens still relegated to the sidelines.

But there is another model of democracy emerging in many social movements today, which questions the boundaries both of the demosthe peopleand of the kratos, or the ways in which those people are ruled. Embodied in intellectual movements such as the affective, material, ontological, decolonial, and nonhuman turns, this emergent model takes ruling to mean the governance, including the self-governance, of how we livewhich means how we eat, love, breathe, organize ourselves, and relate to the world around us. Democracy in this sense is social, affective, ecological, and intergenerational; it involves relations with many othershumans and nonhumans, living and no-longer- or not-yet-living, who may or may not be able to participate in our deliberations, but whose interests can and should be accounted for. The people, then, are never just those who vote, and the rule is not restricted to those whose voices are represented.

This democracywhich like 4EA cognition is physically embodied, socially and materially embedded, extended in time and in space, enacted in practices, and affectively primed and shapedis decolonial democracy, or at least decolonizing democracy, in at least two senses.

The first is that it is not bestowed from above by those who bring it from outside (from Europe to the colony, from the core to the periphery, from civilization to the wilderness). Rather, it emerges from within the body of society. This makes it somewhat inchoate and unpredictable, with effects that may not always be laudatory, but whichand this is the second senserevive something that is essential to the experience of democratic agency. It is decolonial because it revives the memory of agency that has existed before: in traditions of commoning, of resistance, of place-based inhabitation, and of self-determination.

This is the kind of democracy seen in mobilizations of recent years like the Arab Spring, todays Iranian womens-rights movement, and the multiple mobilizations that have marked Ukraines recent historythe 1991 Granite Revolution, the 2004 Orange Revolution, and the 201314 Maidan Revolution. It is very much in evidence in the self-organization of resistance to the current Russian invasion. It decolonizes because it enables, confers, embodies, and gives shape to the agency of the demos. It expands the scope and scale of that agency whilst eliminating some of the barriers for expression and governance that had existed up to that point.

There are no guarantees that the results of these temporary expansions will get formalized into long-term, institutional democracies. In this, I agree with political scientists Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson, who suggest there is a narrow corridor of relations between society and the state that can lead to sustainable prosperity. Democracy in the sense I am using it represents society at its most active, but not necessarily most organized form; either way, the responsiveness of the state to that society will remain a work in progress once the war is ended. But even if the political results of the current mobilization are not evident, the memory of those expansions of agency will linger and, like earthquakes, will produce aftershocks in years to come.

By contrast, Russia today is a society tensing up for a seismic release of some kind. Laruelle, Oskanian, and the other voices of caution are quite correct, I think, that this could result in violence and suffering on a scale that dwarfs what we are seeing now. This is where its necessary to prepare for whats to comeby working on a more accurate understanding of the Russian situation, and strengthening the coalitions that will be needed to bring international support for the decomposition process (lets call it that) when it comes.

Europes other colonial powers have already had their explosive climaxes, primarily in the shape of two World Wars. They and the United States, for all the existing tensions still to be found there (racial and cultural ones being especially obvious in the US), have sufficient institutional means to blow off steam democratically. Their own decolonizations have proceeded variably, and far from completely, with plenty of room for further decolonization.

Russia has had none of that, and it has a long way to fall once it begins genuinely decolonizing. That process should not be resistedfor instance, by negotiating for Putin to save face and reconsolidate his power. But we do need to prepare to manage it when it comes.

First published on Adrian Ivakhivs blog.

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Russia, Decolonization, and Democracy - Notes - E-Flux

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The winds of change are sweeping Iran as the Woman Life Freedom protests, provoked by the killing of 22-year-old Mahsa Amini last September, continue. Here, four Iranian disruptors talk about their struggles, their acts of solidarity for the pro-democracy movement, and their hopes for the future of their country.

Marjane Satrapi, who was 9 years old when Ayatollah Khomeini came to power in 1979, recalls taking to the streets with her politically active parents to protest against the imposition of the hijab. My mum went to demonstrate, and I went too, and so did my dad, recalls the graphic novelist and filmmaker. He was one of the very few men; they didnt understand at the time that womens rights are societys rights.

Satrapis parents sent her to Europe to study as a teenager and encouraged her to make her permanent home there. Satrapi captured these experiences in the graphic novel series Persepolis, which she turned into an animated feature in 2007. Having lived in exile in Paris since the early 1990s, Satrapi has often received threats and slurs from the regime over her work.

Ive been called a liar and a spy. Ive learned in life not to be scared, she says. Its not that you dont feel fear; you feel the fear, but then you decide whether you care about it or not. Its not that Im fearless or careless but there are kids in my country who are being shot and they are 17 years old, while I have lived for more than half a century.

Satrapi recently organized a flash mob in front of the Iranian embassy in Paris in solidarity with five Tehran teenagers who were arrested for posting a TikTok dancing to the Rema and Selena Gomez track Calm Down. She is also working behind the scenes with a team of young diaspora lawyers looking at ways to go after members of the regime through the courts.

We artists must be humble but doing nothing is worse, being indifferent is worse. I dont think what Im doing is huge or immense but I have a voice, I have a face and Im known in France, Im just doing what I have to do, she says.

She would like to eventually make a film about what happened to her country under the Islamic Republic regime. I need time to understand how this happened and what made these people do the things they did to their own population. I hope everyone will go to court. You cant wash blood with blood. You need clean water. This is called putting people on trial, to understand where it comes from, to really cut the roots.

The filmmaker is convinced that the protests herald the end of the Islamic Republic government: Im not a psychic. Its not six months, but its not five years. Its somewhere in between We have a saying in Farsi about cutting somebodys head off with a silk thread. Instead of cutting with a knife, you take a silk thread and slowly, slowly, little by little. This is what the Iranian people are doing at first, nothing happens, its a little bit red and then at a certain point, you cut off the head.

Rasoulof has been in the crosshairs of Irans hard-line Islamic Republic government throughout his career for challenging its draconian rule with his work.

Once a Cannes regular with award-winning films such as Manuscripts Dont Burn and A Man of Integrity, he has not been allowed to leave Iran since 2017. The 2020 Berlinale Golden Bear for his last film, There Is No Evil, was awarded in his absence.

He is currently home after a six-month stint in Evin Prison after being arrested with fellow filmmakers Jafar Panahi and Mostafa Al-Ahmad. The trio were detained prior to the ongoing Woman Life Freedom protests for signing a petition titled Lay Down Your Arms calling on security forces to exercise restraint in relation to popular protests.

Following his release, Cannes had hoped to get him to France this year to participate in its Un Certain Regard jury, but Iranian authorities kept his travel ban in place.

While in prison, Rasoulof contracted a gastrointestinal illness due to the poor sanitary conditions from which is still recovering. I was sent to the hospital for surgery out of necessity. I was in a hospital bed for two weeks, under 24-hour prison guard watch, he says. They handcuff and shackle sick prisoners.

News of the Woman Life Freedom protests, which broke out after his imprisonment, percolated into the prison. We would receive the news via official and unofficial sources. Family members of prisoners would deliver the censored news which you couldnt find in the papers or on TV to us, during their visitation times or by phone calls. We would even secretly see photos of protests sometimes. We were truly impressed by this young and defiant generations activities, he says.

Some of the young protesters who were arrested by the authorities were transferred to our wing. We would talk to them to figure out whats happening outside. There was obvious excitement among all the political prisoners.

This excitement was tempered with more level-headed discussions with prominent political commentator and journalist Saeed Madani, who is serving a nine-year sentence in Evin, he reveals. We would talk together about the social upheavals from a realistic point of view, away from emotions and sentiments.

Despite everything, Rasoulof says he has no regrets. Ive never regretted that even in the worst situations, even when I was in solitary confinement or during the interrogations, I felt no remorse. I wish the political situation could allow different voices and criticisms to be heard on a variety of issues to achieve some sort of reform. But we all know that such a political situation does not exist. The regime is corrupted and dysfunctional. This kind of cinema might not be what I like the most, but its my priority.

Actress Golshifteh Farahani fled Iran in her late 20s after she got on the wrong side of the government for appearing in Ridley Scotts 2008 spy thriller Body of Lies without a hijab.

After 15 years, I feel like I lost an arm, and this arm, it will never grow back, she says.

Remaking her life in exile was a struggle she recounts: Its like being reborn again. You have to learn a new language, a new culture. You have to learn everything from zero.

The actress has since rebooted her career in Europe and the U.S. and now uses her fame to highlight the struggles of her people back home.

A few years into her time in Europe, Farahani told The Guardian newspaper that she hated politics. Now, a decade on, she has come to terms with the fact that politics is part of her life.

As a person coming from the Middle East, whatever you do, becomes political. You walk, its a political walk. You talk, its a political talk. But sometimes, its just what it is. Its not a message. Its not a symbol. Its just what it is, she says.

But, of course, recently with what has happened in Iran, I took a very clear position for the first time after 15 years, to directly stand with the people of Iran on their side, and somehow be the reflection of their voice, to translate it, scream it We need bridges between the West and East because there has been so much separation and we, the people, need to find a way to connect.

Farahani says she is impressed with the new generation of youngsters leading the protest, which differs from her own, which grew up in the shadow of the revolution and during the 1980 to 1988 Iran-Iraq war.

We were fearful, very, very fearful. If we are seeds planted in the soil, we prepared the soil and they managed to break through and grow towards the light. They are just fearless and courageous. I look at them with a feeling of appreciation and awe. I cant describe it. It makes me emotional when I see their courage.

Last October, Farahani joined Coldplay on stage in Buenos Aires for a performance of Grammy-winning Iranian protest song Baraye by imprisoned singer-songwriter Servin Hajipour.

That was one of those moments that really changed my destiny in life, that I never chose or asked for, like working with Ridley Scott or my departure from Iran. I got a phone call. It was very complicated. I was in South Africa but there were no direct flights to South America, so I had to fly via Europe and got there without time.

The irony is that Coldplay was the soundtrack of our teenage years, she says. When I was 15 or 16, this is all we were listening to. I have so many videos of myself singing those songs, so going there and singing in Farsi was as if this revolution had somehow given me back my language and the Iran I lost in these 15 years. It was one of the most remarkable experiences of my life. Chris Martin and his crew, it was wonderful and incredible that they made this gift to the people of Iran.

Zar Amir Ebrahimi, who won best actress in Cannes last year for her performance inHoly Spider,has been busy on the festival circuit these last few months participating in panels on the future of Iranian cinema in the light of the Woman Life Freedom.

However, the actress and director, who fled Iran nearly 20 years ago, wants to move the discussion onto the more practical matters of fund-raising to support Iranian filmmakers who are trying to boycott film funds backed by the Islamic Republic.

Were asking people in Iran not to work with the money of the government and the Revolutionary Guard, but we need to find a solution for them, she says.

The protests have brought to light that nearly all Iranian cinema and TV was financed directly or vicariously by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corp, which has interests in nearly every aspect of the Irans economy.

Making films and TV shows outside of this system is very hard. Amir-Ebrahimi says some film professionals are leaving the business rather than tap into state funding citing the example of Payam Dehkordi.

The popular actor announced last October that he would not appear in any new television or cinema shows out of solidarity for the protest and has recently opened a bakery.

In the meantime, indie films, which received funding prior to the protests, are now in the crosshairs of festival bans on Iranian government-backed films.

We need to start talking about fund-raising, she says. Thats what I am trying to do. Sometimes I feel alone but I am trying to talk to colleagues outside of Iran, to see if we can find solutions.

Amir-Ebrahimi also highlights the struggle of Iranian diaspora film professionals as they build new lives outside of Iran and try to continue working in cinema. She cites the example of Holy Spider cast member, the veteran actor Mehdi Bajestani, who has been living in exile in Germany since the films Cannes premiere.

Holy Spider would have been difficult to make without his participation, she says.

He was so brave. When I asked him, Why are you doing this? Do you know youre taking this big risk? He said, You know Zar, I think for once in my life, I need to do something good without censorship, without control. I managed to finally do something important. Anything that comes after I dont mind, even if I lose my life in Iran.

The veteran actor, who had a career back home, is now finding it impossible to secure parts in Europe.

The diaspora community in Europe also needs help. What can we do with empty hands, we need to do more than just talk and participate in panels, she says.

Amir-Ebrahimi notes her own difficulties in getting her own directorial debut, about her final year in Iran, off the ground.

Its been years and years that Im working on it and I just cant get the budget together. Its in the Persian language and there are no funds for these kinds of projects, she says.

There is this new generation of cineastes outside of Iran, now almost everybody is out. We need this solidarity to find a way to make movies.

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Top Iranian Filmmakers Strike A Blow For Womens Rights And Democracy Movement - Deadline

Sunday May 21 is election day in Timor-Leste, when voters decide on 65 members of parliament to represent them. Each election is a reminder of the successful regional and international cooperation that led to Timor-Lestes independence. Its also a reminder of the importance of Timor-Leste as an exemplar of democracy, peace and human rights as foundational values.

It is in Australias interest that this be nurtured.

As a small state facing many challenges, maintaining these values has regional and global resonance. Timor-Leste is an important voice both in the Pacific and Southeast Asia. It is a successful state that, despite difficulties, has been able to be peace-loving and sustain relations with Indonesia.

By contrast, democratic regression, or the worst-case scenario of a failed state, would be an enormous setback for the entire region.

What role should Australia play in keeping this democracy strong?

The history of the Australia-Timor-Leste bilateral relationship is complicated. It includes the vital Timorese assistance during the second world war and Australias tacit approval of Indonesias 1975 annexation. It also includes Australia leading the United Nations International Force East Timor (INTERFET), which in turn led to Timor-Lestes transition to independence following a referendum in 1999.

The two nations have been complexly intertwined through Timor-Lestes journey to independence and democratic development.

There have been instances of unease between the two countries. The most notable was the allegation of Australian spying during negotiations on the Greater Sunrise oil fields. This remains an ongoing issue with the potential to derail ties again.

But there have also been positive steps, such as Operation Astute, an Australian-led military and police deployment. This operation helped stabilise the country during the 2006-2008 political turmoil that culminated in the attempted assassination of President Jose Ramos-Horta and his medical evacuation.

In 2018, Australia and Timor-Leste concluded a treaty establishing their maritime boundaries following a United Nations conciliation process.

The complexity of the relationship means Australia needs to be respectful in relations, but it should not stop Australia from being a partner to support Timor-Lestes democratic processes and institutions.

A recent report outlines how Australia can support Timor-Lestes governance in ways that ensure effective, capable and legitimate institutions that are responsive to people.

Australia has a track record of such programs. The eight-year, $72 million Governance for Development Program supported Timor-Leste agencies to develop good policy and improve systems as well as helping civil society engage with government decision-making. The program worked in areas including public financial management, economic policy, enabling business, public service administration, law reform and financial services.

The Partnership for Inclusive Prosperity (PROVISU) will continue to support good governance and economic policy by providing support to Timor-Lestes central government agencies and economic ministries. Through programs like this, Australia can offer meaningful support to Timor-Leste.

Good governance that responds to citizens needs is a perennial problem. Timor-Lestes nascent bureaucracy makes this a priority issue. Australia should continue to develop partnerships that strengthen institutions so they are able to deal with problems.

An example of this is PARTISIPA, a ten-year $80 million program to improve access to quality basic infrastructure and services. It works in partnership with national and subnational governments to improve the delivery of decentralised services and village-level infrastructure, such as rural water. It continues Australias long-term support for the national village development program and its community-driven processes.

Another area where Australia can contribute is in media.

Timor-Leste has a vibrant media landscape that is among the freest in the region. Australian can support Timor-Leste to ensure its media are strong and robust as well as free, with public interest is at its core. It can also work with local media to strengthen their ability to educate the general public on governance issues, to hold power to account and to promote the rule of law.

An example of this is a recent memorandum of understanding between the ABC and Timor-Lestes public broadcaster RTTL, which includes media development programs. The agreement recognises the vital role both organisations play in informing audiences and contributing to democracy. The ABC will work with RTTL to establish a new English-language news service, helping staff enhance their journalism and content-making skills.

Another priority Australia can engage with is the justice system.

Consultations with Timorese civil society organisations, conducted by The Asia Foundation for the Asia-Pacific Development, Diplomacy & Defence Dialogue (AP4D) report, revealed a particular concern about rebuilding trust in the judicial system. Its an area with which Australia has not been greatly involved compared to Portugal.

Australia should also engage with Timorese political parties, recognising the important structural role they play in governance. This can complement continued engagement with formal government institutions and the national parliament. Australia should continue to invest in the protection and promotion of human rights.

Finally, Australia should be a partner for youth civic and political engagement, given the reality of a future political transition from independence leaders to younger generations.

Timor-Leste today lives with a legacy of conflict, which has far-reaching implications. There is significant pressure on government to meet the needs and expectations of the Timorese people. Australia can be a partner to support these goals.

By helping to build a stronger, resilient and prosperous Timor-Leste, Australia is investing in a more secure and stable immediate neighbourhood, which will reap mutual benefits.

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As Timor-Leste heads to the polls, here's how Australia can support its democracy - The Conversation

Despite promising to shore up the medias role as a pillar of Czech democracy, PM Petr Fialas track record in office is questionable. In fact, after his government announced plans to raise VAT on newspapers to 21 per cent, hes being forced to defend himselfagainst accusations that hes actually weakening the countrys quality media by drivingthe last nail in the coffin of Czech newspapers. EU Commissioner Vera Jourova warned over the weekend that the hike of the VAT rate to a European peak risks liquidating Czechias print media, and contradicts an EU trend amid the fight against disinformation to slash rates. Even countries like Poland or Hungary have not taken such steps, she noted. But Fiala appears unconcerned. He doesnt believe the move will kill off any newspapers, and anyway, people get access to information through internet sources, and public media are freely available, so there is no threat of disaster, he shrugged in a TV interview.

At the same time, its notable that the main victims of the higher tax will be the oligarchs that have over recent years bought up most of the Czech press, in a bid to add political influence to their economic power. The leading example of this trend is, of course, former PM and leader of the opposition ANO party, Andrej Babis. And with that in mind, the governing coalition will on Friday convene an extraordinary parliament sessionto discuss a bill that would tighten up the ban on media ownership by members of the government. The ban was introduced in 2016 as part of aConflict of Interest Act, which also banned companies owned by officials fromreceiving state subsidies.Lex Babis, as it was dubbed, forced the billionaire to cede control of his business empire theoretically at least by putting it into trust during his time in government. But the coalition now wants to amend the legislation so that it applies to ownership. Unsurprisingly, ANO has been delaying discussion of the bill for months. The governing parties, which insist the amendment is absolutely not aimed specifically at the ANO leader, say that if the obstruction persists, they will bypass any debate and force a vote next month. In 2021, the EU suspended subsidies to Czechia and demanded it tighten up legislation after finding that Babis had conflicts of interest.

Another bill due in the Chamber of Deputies soon will amend regulations governing the division of publicly-traded companies, which all sounds very dry but it paves the way for a fundamental transformation of Czechias energy sector.Approved by the government on Wednesday, the bill dubbed lex CEZ would reduce the required votes to split companies from 90 per cent of shareholders to 75 per cent, as well as the required quorum. This would allow the government to push through its plans to take control of the production assets of CEZ. Minority shareholders and financing complications have been blocking the energy group, in which the state holds 70 per cent, from building new nuclear reactors the main pillar in the governments energy strategy for years.

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Democracy Digest: EU Mission to Hungary Sees No Reason to ... - Balkan Insight

Ever since taking office four months ago, Brazils President Luis Incio Lula da Silva, more commonly known as Lula, has faced the arduous task of rebuilding the countrys institutions, as well as its international image, following the chaotic Bolsonaro administration.

So far, this challenge has generated a mixed bag of successes and failures, with a number of stumbles that have tested Lulas reputation as a political miracle worker. With issues ranging from a conservative-dominated Congress to an antagonistic central bank, the seventy-seven-year-old former union leader is finding governing a harder task than ever as he sets about his third term as president.

Lula campaigned mostly on the idea of a return to more prosperous days for Brazil particularly those of his previous administration. Having left office in 2010 with record-high approval ratings, Lula now relied on voters remembering the 2000s, when Brazil had a strong economy and a rapidly growing middle class that was partly a product of his governments social policies, as well as favorable international relations with both China and the United States.

After winning his third term by a narrow margin last year, Lula tried to carry this idea that happy days are here again into his administration. Brazil is back, he proclaimed in his inaugural speech. It was at the same time a promise to the world and a condemnation of the past four years of Jair Bolsonaro.

Lulas rhetoric to date has been consistent with this view. His focus on growing the economy, increasing social spending, and rebuilding Brazils diplomatic standing come right off his 2000s playbook. However, the president has been forced to confront the fact that Brazil and the world are both in radically different situations than the ones he faced on first taking the presidential seat in 2003.

While every Brazilian government since the end of the military dictatorship in the 1980s has ruled through some form of coalition, Lulas grand alliance has tested the limits of Brazils multiparty system. It brings together parties ranging from far-left socialists to center-right neoliberals, generating more than a few dissenting voices and directions within the new government.

This big-tent approach was effective as a United Front for Democracy when confronting Bolsonaro in the 2022 election. Yet the many political forces it contained soon cashed in the promises and concessions they had obtained from the Lula campaign, in many cases receiving high-ranking positions within his administration.

Out of the thirty-seven cabinet positions in his government, only ten are held by Lulas own Workers Party (PT). Simone Tebet of the center-right Democratic Brazilian Movement, who came third place in the presidential election campaigning on a neoliberal platform, became minister for planning and budgets after supporting Lula in the second round of the election.

There were some more controversial appointments. Minister of Communications Juscelino Filho, from the conservative Unio Brasil, came under fire when it was revealed that he had millions in undisclosed assets.

Tourism Minister Daniela Carneiro, who belongs to the same party as Filho, is linked to militias in Rio de Janeiro. Militias allegedly connected to the Bolsonaro family were responsible for the 2018 killing of activist Marielle Franco, whose sister Anielle Franco currently sits in the same cabinet as Lulas minister of racial equality.

Most shocking were the revelations that General Gonalves Dias, minister of the institutional security bureau, played an active part in the January 8 attack on government buildings by disgruntled Bolsonaro supporters who rejected the legitimacy of Lulas election. Dias resigned as minister to date the only member of Lulas cabinet to do so.

This relative stability at cabinet level, even when faced with controversial revelations, might be attributed in part to the need of Lulas government to convey a steady image. When contrasted to Bolsonaros revolving-door cabinet, with ministers resigning or being fired on a routine basis, Lulas unchanging lineup might transmit the message of a return to order and normalcy that he has been clamoring for in speeches.

On a more pragmatic level, Lulas ruling coalition at the moment has razor-thin margins in Congress. The president simply cannot afford to fire ministers from parties whose support he needs not only to pass legislation, but also to prevent political maneuvers against his own person. The impeachment of Dilma Rousseff in 2016 set a precedent for the removal of unpopular presidents if they lose the support of Congress. The significant victories of far-right candidates in the 2022 legislative elections have only worsened this danger for Lula.

Lulas weak base in Congress also explains the lack of any major legislation passed in the last few months. While on paper the president has the numbers needed to pass laws, when it comes to specific examples of reform, congressmen from parties such as Unio have vocally insisted that they will not vote along party lines to support Lula. On the other hand, members of non-coalition parties like the Progressives have suggested they would be willing to back Lulas legislation in some instances.

In practical terms, this balance of forces has discouraged the Lula administration from pursuing any immediate votes on major issues. A defeat in Congress might damage the already fragile state of the new government in such a polarized political setting.

Unforeseen events have dominated the first four months of Lulas presidency. First and foremost, Lula had been attempting to rebuild regulatory institutions that were stripped clean by the Bolsonaro administration. Agencies such as Brazilian Institute of Environment and Renewable Natural Resources (IBAMA) and National Indian Foundation (FUNAI), which are respectively responsible for the struggle against deforestation and indigenous protection, were virtually defunded in the past four years. Lula has committed to empower these bodies.

This was already a hot topic during the election campaign. But the revelation in January of numerous human rights abuses against the Yanomami people, which some have gone so far as to call purposeful extermination, increased the need for government focus on the issue.

During the opening months of 2023, the southeast of Brazil was hit by record levels of rainfall which generated intense floods as well as landslides. Flooding is a frequent problem for Brazilian infrastructure. Coming right in the middle of Carnival season, when many people were traveling to the most vulnerable coastal areas, this episode caught governmental officials unawares and led to debates about infrastructure reform. The national tragedy brought Lula together with the Bolsonarist governor of So Paulo, Tarcsio de Freitas, as both men coordinated efforts to provide aid to the affected areas.

The attack on Braslia by Bolsonaro supporters on January 8 galvanized the administration to address the issue of national security and the role of the military. Investigations of the event have revealed extensive knowledge of and support for the attack in the Brazilian armed forces. The relationship between the military and Brazils democratic government, which is complex and uneasy at the best of times, is remarkably tense at present.

During Lulas first and second terms in office, the possibility of a military intervention against the executive had been virtually nonexistent. Yet now, after what we can only categorize as a coup attempt, albeit a remarkably disorganized one, the president has to tread carefully when dealing with the military leadership. The government response to the attacks was immediate, with the justice minister, Flvio Dino, promising swift justice and arrests, going so far as to call those involved terrorists.

As the role of the military in the events of January 8 comes more and more to light, it is yet to be seen whether Lula will pursue a more conciliatory or a more punitive stance toward Brazils military institutions. While he dismissed General Dias from his post following the exposure of his involvement, no charges have been brought forward against the general.

Lulas first major goal is his economic plan, which has brought him into direct conflict with the current president of the Central Bank of Brazil, the Bolsonaro-appointed Roberto Campos Neto. Under Campos Netos guidance, the Central Bank has committed itself to high interest rates, much to the consternation of Lula who believes that lowering the rates might stimulate the economy.

Historically, the Central Bank of Brazil has been autonomous of the elected government, and Campos Neto has the authority to keep interest rates high. However, Lula has expressed indignation at the political leanings of a supposedly neutral figure and the fact that his monetary policy might hasten a recession later this year.

Throughout March, the president issued critical statements about Campos Neto, in a gesture that many considered a breach of protocol. There was intense criticism of Lula from the Brazilian financial sector, which seems to be content with the position of the Central Bank.

There has also been division within the ranks of the PT, as two of Lulas closest advisors, Fernando Haddad and Gleisi Hoffmann, clashed over the economic plan. Haddad, the current Treasury minister who ran as the PT candidate in the 2018 presidential election, has argued for a moderate stance, while Hoffmann, the party president, has called for a more expansive approach to social spending in education and health care.

Lulas comments over the last few months seemed to lean more toward Hoffmann, as he reiterated his classic slogan that education is not an expense, but an investment. Haddads Treasury ministry criticized this argument. The Haddad Plan, as it is known, aims to establish certain caps on expenditure in order to increase the budgetary surplus for the coming years. Whatever Lula thinks about the matter, it seems that the plan will go to a vote in the first congressional semester of 2023 the first major legislative challenge for Lulas government.

On foreign affairs, Lula has attempted to turn back the clock to the 2000s, when Brazils diplomatic goal was to pursue a multilateral global arrangement through the framework of BRICS (the economic partnership of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and later South Africa).

He has reestablished the governments commitment to the Chinese market and recently taken steps toward severing the countrys reliance on the dollar. On April 12, the first direct transaction between Brazil and Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC), Chinas largest bank, was conducted using the renminbi instead of the dollar, signifying a clear move by Brazil away from the US economic sphere.

The global context, however, is not as benign as it was in the 2000s, when amicable relations between the United States, China, and Russia still appeared feasible. Brazils policy toward Russia, for example, has proved controversial in view of the war in Ukraine: Lulas statement, later retracted, that both countries were equally responsible for the conflict generated intense criticism in the West.

Brazils historic position of benign multipolarity as it was described under the government of Rousseff or the Lula Doctrine as some have referred to it more recently traces its roots back to the time when the country played a key role in the Non-Aligned Movement during the Cold War. Brazilian foreign policy rejected the idea of taking an ideological side in favor of pragmatic relations to strengthen regional powers.

After the end of the Cold War, this doctrine rejected the US role as a hyperpower, instead favoring trade with emerging markets such as those of China and India. This was an approach that Lula wholeheartedly embraced during his first two terms. Yet it has become much more difficult to follow in an increasingly polarized world. For Lulas government, preserving a relationship with Russia and approaching the Chinese market might mean distancing oneself from the US and European spheres, even inadvertently.

Thus far, Lulas administration has had to deal with environmental, human rights, and political crises that have in many ways detracted from its long-term policy proposals. However, that situation is rapidly changing, as the government has brought forward its new economic plan and begun clarifying its foreign policy agenda. Over the coming months, Lulas ability to articulate his agenda through such a troublesome Congress, prevent an economic recession, and preserve a multipolar diplomatic relationship for Brazil will be put to the test.

Read more:
Lula Is Working to Revive Brazil's Democracy Against a Powerful Far-Right Bloc - Jacobin magazine