The cadres in charge of controlling the media in Chinaand    importantly over the last several years, influencing the media    outside of Chinahave a crucial job to perform, necessitated by    the internal logic of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) rule: On    the one hand, they must show that the Party is the rightful and    successful ruler of China; on the other, they must deal with    those who would say otherwise.  
    As Sarah Cook, a researcher for Freedom House, puts it in her    recent report: For the partys narrative to be convincing to    audiences inside and outside China, reportingespecially    investigative reportingabout the darker sides of CCP rule at    home and Chinese activities abroad must be suppressed.  
    According to two new reports published on Oct. 22, Chinese    communist propaganda and censorship officers have over the last    few years developed a rich and nuanced set of practices and    tactics aimed at affecting these outcomes.  
    Anne Nelson, another researcher, published a report on the    international expansion of China Central Television, the    broadcast mouthpiece of the Chinese Communist Party, on the    same day. Both reports were sponsored by the National Endowment    for Democracy, a U.S.-funded agency that supports democracy    around the world.  
    Cooks report methodically peels back the layers of the Partys    censorship apparatus, examining each to see how it functions,    who it targets, and what effect it has: there is direct    action by Chinese diplomats, officials, and security    personnel, who simply obstruct reporters and punish    recalcitrant media outlets; there are economic inducements and    punishments; there is indirect diplomatic, political, and    economic pressure, transmitted through advertisers or    governments; and then simply cyberespionage or even physical    attacks.  
    There was, for example, the time that the chief editor of    Bloomberg was approached by a top Chinese diplomat, who    attempted to have him kill a story about the finances of the    family of Xi Jinping, at the time the incoming general    secretary of the Chinese Communist Party. The story ran, but    Bloombergs English website was blocked soon afterward.  
    That did not have a significant impact on Bloombergs business    because its English-language readership in China is limited.    The New York Times, however, was hit somewhat harder. After it    ran an investigation that sought to show how the family of Wen    Jiabao had gained vast wealth, the Chinese authorities shut    down its Chinese-language website, which had just opened. The    stock dropped 20 percent overnight, Cooks report says.    Reprisals of this kind are meant as a warning to others who    would transgress against the Partys reporting preferences.  
    Journalists on the ground in China can find that the face of    censorship is a little more sharp-toothed. In February of this    year, thugs believed to be dispatched by the local government    of a village near Beijing intercepted the vehicle of a German    film crew and smashed their windshield in with baseball bats.  
    The former chief technical officer of Epoch Times in 2006 was    also a recipient of the kinetic approach: a group of men made    their way into his home in Atlanta, tied him up, and beat him    about the head with a gun handle. There is no direct evidence    that the men were associated with the Chinese Communist Party,    but Mr. Yuan believed it to be the case. Two of my file    cabinets were pried open. Two of my laptop computers were taken    away, but the more expensive items, such as cameras, were not.  
    More subtle forms of influence are almost ubiquitous. Eutelsat,    a French satellite company, was one of the more disturbing    examples of undue influence, Cook said at an Oct. 22 National    Endowment for Democracy forum in Washington, D.C.  
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Chinese Censorship Under the Microscope