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The Congressional Progressive Caucus released aslate of policy prioritiesthey believe President Joe Biden can implement by taking executive action, including canceling federalstudent loan debt, lowering drug prices for insulin and inhalers, and creating a path for child care workers to unionize.

The proposals echo components of the languishing Build Back Better agenda, Bidens sweeping $1.8 trilliondomestic economic agendathat included climate mitigation proposals and policies intended to support working women such as universal pre-kindergarten, subsidized child care for most American families and an extension of the expanded child tax credit.

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Members of the Congressional Progressive Caucus (CPC) began discussing what Biden could accomplish by executive action in December as plans for a Senate vote on Build Back Betterfell apart Democratic Sen. Joe Manchin of West Virginia said he would not vote for it, tanking its chances in the evenly divided chamber. CPC Chair Rep. Pramila Jayapal of Washington said that progressives understand that our mandate in this governing moment is to deliver for working people and to leave no one behind.

To that end, we have been pursuing a strong legislative strategy, and we will continue to do that, and that includes numerous conversations with senators, with the White House, with our own leadership, about how to move any piece of our originally called Build Back Better agenda through, Jayapal told reporters.

At the same time the Biden administration has taken a strategy of executive actions since President Biden came into office, and we are now releasing a slate of steps that the administration can take in that same mode of executive action that will have an immediate and meaningful impact for families, she added.

The CPC is made up of 97 left-leaning House Democrats, along with Sen. Bernie Sanders of Vermont, an independent who caucuses with the Democrats in that chamber. There have already been discussions at the staff level between CPC offices and the White House, as well as with the Congressional Hispanic Caucus, and the Congressional Black Caucus, which are also expected to make recommendations on potential executive actions to the president.

The push by the caucuses is coming ahead of Novembers midterm elections, when all 435 House seats and roughly a third of the Senate are on ballots. Bidens approval rating hassteadily declinedover the past year, with an aggregate of available polling putting him at about 42 percent approval. A presidents partynearly always suffers lossesin the midterm congressional elections, and Democrats, who hold a small House majority and currently control the Senate due to the vice presidents tie-breaking authority, are bracing for defeats. Some believe delivering on the stalled portions of Bidens agenda could help stanch Democrats losses and allow them to hold onto control of one or both chambers.

Every single thing we can deliver between now and November helps us, right? Every single thing that we can deliver between now and November helps us to continue to build the momentum, and also to bring in constituencies that are still waiting for more action on particular areas, Jayapal said.

Executive orders arewritten directivesthat presidents provide to their administrative agencies that arepublished in the Federal Register. As of this week, Biden has signed 84 executive orders, as well as 64 presidential memoranda, which are similar in function but not published in the Federal Register. Presidents use of executive orders has gained attention as Congress has become deadlocked, but Donald Trump issued fewer than Barack Obama, who issued fewer than George W. Bush. Franklin Roosevelt, with 3,721 executive orders, holds the record. Executive orders can be challenged in federal courts if parties believe a president has exceeded their authority. Presidents can, and often do, undo the executive orders of their predecessors.

Jayapal said the recommendations the CPC has sent to the White House for action were developed to fall under the legal scope of a presidents authority. The CPC is urging Biden to cancel federal student loan debt under existing administrative authority established in the Higher Education Act of 1965; expand the countries for which immigrants are eligible for Temporary Protected Status; ensure at least 40 percent of benefits from federal clean energy investments are reinvested in economically disadvantaged communities; and fully implement the Medicaid Equal Access Rule.

Jayapal acknowledged that the CPC struggled with how to bolster funds for the caregiving economy via executive action and not legislation passed by Congress, which controls the federal governments purse strings.

But there are ways to grow strong child care unions that we think can also be a driver of stronger labor standards, including pay, she said.

The way were thinking about it is: if we can build those strong child care unions, you can push for stronger standards. Its sort of a ground-up approach, but obviously for the federal government to invest money into this area, its going to be the best path, Jayapal added.

This story was originally published March 17, 2022, by the 19th.

The rest is here:
House progressives urge Biden to support caregiving workforce and execute other Build Back Better priorities - The Connecticut Mirror

Margot Paez is a Fellow at the Bitcoin Policy Institute specialising in Renewable Energy and Environmental Studies. In this interview, we discuss the Occupy movement, a broken capitalist system, and a pragmatic approach to our energy future.

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Bitcoin is often labelled as being a currency for libertarians. But, it is increasingly clear that Bitcoin appeals to a wide range of people with a myriad of political leanings. This includes a growing number of progressives who see in the protocol a means of enabling a fairer and less economically stratified society.

That Bitcoin appeals to such disparate communities speaks to both the strength of Bitcoin, but also the weakness of the current system. If those on both the right and left are disenchanted with the status quo, that is obviously a strong signal that a major societal change is warranted. Further, it means we have to assess why were so polarised if we fundamentally agree with each other.

There is a debate to be had regarding language, labels, unconscious bias, and manipulation of opinions. The issue is that these false divisions are affecting reasoned consideration of all the major issues affecting modern civilisation, particularly in relation to climate change.

The practical implication is that both sides of the climate change debate are resistant to effective and pragmatic measures. Is it possible to view these issues without a political lens?

Read this article:
A Progressive View of Bitcoin with Margot Paez - What Bitcoin Did

2:45 P.M. EDT

MS. PSAKI: Hi, everyone. Okay, we have a very special return guest today, Deputy National Security Advisor Anne Neuberger, who is here to provide a brief update on cyber. You probably have seen the statement from the President we issued, as well as a factsheet; shell talk about that. Has a little bit of time to take some questions, and then well do a briefing from there.

With that, Ill turn it over to Anne.

MS. NEUBERGER: Thank you, Jen. Good afternoon, everyone.

This afternoon, the President released a statement and factsheet regarding cyber threats to the homeland, urging private sector partners to take immediate action to shore up their defenses against potential cyberattacks.

Weve previously warned about the potential for Russia to conduct cyberattacks against the United States, including as a response to the unprecedented economic costs that the U.S. and Allies and partners imposed in response to Russias further invasion of Ukraine.

Today, we are reiterating those warnings, and were doing so based on evolving threat intelligence that the Russian government is exploring options for potential cyberattacks on critical infrastructure in the United States.

To be clear, there is no certainty there will be a cyber incident on critical infrastructure. So why am I here? Because this is a call to action and a call to responsibility for all of us.

At the Presidents direction, the administration has worked extensively over the last year to prepare to meet this sort of threat, providing unprecedented warning and advice to the private sector and mandating cybersecurity measures where we have the authority to do so.

For example, just last week, federal agencies convened more than 100 companies to share new cybersecurity threat information in light of this evolving threat intelligence. During those meetings, we shared resources and tools to help companies harden their security, like advisories sourced from sensitive threat intelligence and hands-on support from local FBI field offices and sister regional offices, including their Shields Up program.

The meeting was part of an extensive cybersecurity resilience effort that we began in the fall, prompted by the President. Agencies like Energy, EPA, Treasury, and DHS have hosted both classified and unclassified briefings with hundreds of owners and operators of privately owned critical infrastructure. CISA, NSA, and FBI have published cybersecurity advisories that set out protections the private sector can deploy to improve security.

The President has also directed departments and agencies to use all existing government authorities to mandate new cybersecurity and network defense measures. Youve seen us do that where we have the authority to do so, including TSAs work that mandated directives for the oil and gas pipelines following the Colonial Pipeline incident that highlighted the significant gaps in resilience for that sector.

Our efforts together over the past year has helped drive much-needed and significant improvements. But theres so much more we need to do to have the confidence that weve locked our digital doors, particularly for the critical services Americans rely on.

The majority of our critical infrastructure, as you know, is owned and operated by the private sector. And those owners and operators have the ability and the responsibility to harden the systems and networks we all rely on.

Notwithstanding these repeated warnings, we continue to see adversaries compromising systems that use known vulnerabilities for which there are patches. This is deeply troubling.

So were urging, today, companies to take the steps within your control to act immediately to protect the services millions of Americans rely on and to use the resources the federal government makes available. The factsheet released alongside the Presidents statement contains the specific actions that were calling companies to do.

I would be remiss if I didnt reiterate the Presidents thanks to Congress for its partnership in this effort, including making cybersecurity resources available in the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law and, most recently, for working across the aisle to require companies to report cyber incidents to the federal government. That will ensure federal resources are focused on the most important cyber threats to the American people.

We welcome additional congressional work to identify new authorities that can help address gaps and drive down collective cybersecurity risk.

Bottom line: This is about us the work we need to do to lock our digital doors and to put the country in the best defensive position.

And there is them. As the President has said: The United States is not seeking confrontation with Russia. But he has also said that if Russia conducts disruptive cyberattacks against critical infrastructure, we will be prepared to respond.

Thank you.

MS. PSAKI: All right. Let me just first ask, for those of you in the aisles, if youre not a photographer, theres plenty of seats. So if you could sit down, that would be great, and not crowd the others in the seats.

So, we dont have unlimited time, so if people we just want to get to as many people as possible.

So, go ahead.

Q Thank you, Jen. Hi, Anne. Just a quick question on the Viasat attack that happened on the 24th of Feb, the day Russia attacked Ukraine. Weve obviously seen that impact satellite communication networks in Eastern Europe. And since then, the FBI and CISA have issued warnings that similar attacks can happen against U.S. companies.

Is the U- is the U.S. in a position to perhaps identify who is behind the hack at this moment?

MS. NEUBERGER: Its a really good question. So, first, I want to lift up: FBI and CISA and NSA also highlighted protective security measures that U.S. companies can put in place to protect against exactly that kind of attack. We have not yet attributed that attack, but were carefully looking at it because, as you noted, of the impact not only in Ukraine but also in satellite communication systems in Europe as well.

Q Does the sophistication of the attack, perhaps the timing of it, suggest that its a state actor? I mean, are you willing to

MS. NEUBERGER: Those are certainly factors that are were looking at carefully as we look at who is responsible for them.

MS. PSAKI: Phil.

Q The evolving intelligence, it doesnt mean that its a certainty theres going to be an attack. Can you explain for the layman what youre seeing right now that precipitated this statement today, and what the evolving intelligence may be now compared to on the 24th or prior to the invasion?

MS. NEUBERGER: Absolutely. So, the first part of that is: Youve seen the administration continuously lean forward and share even fragmentary pieces of information we have to drive and ensure maximum preparedness by the private sector.

So as soon as we learned about that, last week we hosted classified briefings with companies and sectors who we felt would be most affected, and provided very practical, focused advice.

Todays broader, unclassified briefing is to raise that broader awareness and to raise that call to action.

Q So there was something specific you saw last week that was raised to the industries that it would have affected, is what youre saying?

MS. NEUBERGER: So I want to reiterate: There is no evidence of any of any specific cyberattack that were anticipating for. There is some preparatory activity that were seeing, and that is what we shared in a classified context with companies who we thought might be affected. And then were lifting up a broader awareness here in this in this warning.

MS. PSAKI: Major?

Q Hey, Anne. When you say a call to action, many who hear you say that might believe that something is imminent. Is it?

MS. NEUBERGER: So, first, a call to action is because there are cyberattacks that occur every day. Hundreds of millions of dollars were paid in ransoms by U.S. companies just last year against criminal activity happening in the U.S. today. Every single day, there should be a call to action.

Were using the opportunity of this evolving threat intelligence regarding potential cyberattacks against critical infrastructure to reiterate those with additional focus specifically to critical infrastructure owners and operators to say, You have the responsibility to take these steps to protect the critical services Americans rely on.

Q And as a follow-up: Critical infrastructure is a broad term. Is it as broad as you typically mean it when the government speaks about critical infrastructure, or is there something youve seen that you can be more a little bit more specific within that large frame of critical infrastructure?

MS. NEUBERGER: I wont get into specific sectors at this time, because the steps that are needed to lock our digital doors need to be done across every sector of critical infrastructure. And even those sectors that we do not see any specific threat intelligence for, we truly want those sectors to double down and do the work thats needed.

MS. PSAKI: Jacqui.

Q You guys, the administration, successfully declassified a lot of intelligence about what the Russians were planning leading up to the invasion to prebut what they might do. Can you do that a little bit here and at least list some of the industries that might be the biggest targets so that they can have a heightened awareness about what might be coming?

MS. NEUBERGER: As we consider declassifying intelligence, to your excellent point, that really has been the work that has been done the last few weeks and was driven by a focus on outcomes. It was driven by the Presidents desire to avoid war at all costs, to really invest in diplomacy.

So, as we consider this information, the first step we did was we gave classified, detailed briefings to the companies and sectors for which we had some preparatory information about. And then for those where we dont, thats the purpose of todays unclassified briefing: to give that broad warning. And I want to lift up the factsheet, which is really the call to action for specific activities to do.

Q So you believe the people, the industries that need to know about this risk know?

MS. NEUBERGER: We believe the key entities who need to know have been provided classified briefings. I mentioned, for example, just last week, several hundred companies were brought in to get that briefing.

MS. PSAKI: Peter.

Q Does the U.S. have any evidence that Russia has attempted a hack, either here in the U.S., in Europe, or in Ukraine, over the course of the last several weeks since this offensive began?

MS. NEUBERGER: So, we certainly believe that Russia has conducted cyberattacks to undermine, coerce, and destabilize Ukraine. And we attributed some of those a couple of weeks ago.

We consistently see nation states doing preparatory activity. That preparatory activity can pan out to become an incident; it cannot. And thats the reason were here.

Q So, specifically in the U.S., as there was an assessment early on that we thought that we would be a likely target here, why do you think we have not seen any attack on critical infrastructure in the United States to this point so far?

MS. NEUBERGER: I cant speak to Putin or Russian leaderships strategic thinking regarding how cyberattacks factor in.

What I can speak to is the preparatory work weve been doing here in the U.S. and the fact that as soon as we have some evolving threat intelligence regarding a shift in that intention, that were coming out and raising the awareness to heighten our preparedness as well.

Q So you cant say declaratively that we stopped an attack, I guess Im saying, to this point on critical infrastructure?

MS. NEUBERGER: Correct.

Q Okay. Thank you.

MS. PSAKI: Colleen.

Q Can you explain a little bit more what preparatory activity on the part of the Russians would be? What does that look like?

MS. NEUBERGER: So, preparatory activity could mean scanning websites; it could be hunting for vulnerabilities. Theres a range of activity that malicious cyber actors use, whether theyre nation state or criminals.

The most troubling piece and really one I mentioned a moment ago is we continue to see known vulnerabilities, for which we have patches available, used by even sophisticated cyber actors to compromise American companies, to compromise companies around the world. And thats one of the reasons and that makes it far easier for attackers than it needs to be.

Its kind of you know, I joke I grew up in New York you had a lock and an alarm system. The houses that didnt or left the door open clearly were making it easier than they should have. Right? No comment about New York. (Laughter.)

So, clearly what were asking for is: Lock your digital doors. Make it harder for attackers. Make them do more work. Because a number of the practices we include in the factsheet will make it significantly harder, even for a sophisticated actor, to compromise a network.

MS. PSAKI: Go ahead.

Q Sorry, just to be clear: The warning today, is this in response to some of these more desperate tactics weve seen from Russia on ground? Are you now fearing that there might be more of a cyber risk because of what were seeing on the ground in Ukraine?

MS. NEUBERGER: So, weve given a number of threat intel- of threat warnings over the last number of weeks that Russia could consider conducting cyberattacks in response to the very significant economic costs the U.S. and partners have put on Russia in response. This speaks to evolving threat intelligence and a potential shift in intention to do so.

Q And do you have a message for individuals? Youre talking a lot about private companies. What about households? Should they be worried about cyberattacks here?

MS. NEUBERGER: The items in the factsheet apply to companies and individuals as well. Im specifically speaking to companies because theres a responsibility to protect the critical services Americans rely on. But every individual should take a look at that fact sheet because its a truly helpful one. We only put in place the things that we really try to practice and work to practice ourselves.

MS. PSAKI: Jordan.

Q Thanks. As part of this preparatory activity, do you have evidence that Russian hackers have infiltrated the networks of U.S. companies already and just havent carried out the attacks?

MS. NEUBERGER: There was as I noted, we frequently see preparatory activity. Whenever we do, we do sensitive warnings to the individual companies and provide them information to ensure they can look quickly at their networks and remediate what may be occurring.

Q So have you seen any evidence that there have been infiltrations as part of that activity?

MS. NEUBERGER: We routinely see information about infiltrations. Right? Technology is not as secure as it needs to be. I mentioned the ransomware activity. There are multiple nation-state actors. Its a line of work for the intelligence community and the FBI to knock on a companys door and say, Weve seen some evidence of an intrusion. Well work with you. Well make these resources available via a regional office to work with you to help you recover. Thats thats pretty routine practice.

What were seeing now is an evolving threat intelligence to conduct potential cyberattacks on critical infrastructure. And that raises up a point because were concerned about potential disruption of critical services.

MS. PSAKI: Ken.

Q Anne, you did a briefing for us about a month ago. Do you think the U.S. banking system is more vulnerable, less vulnerable since the briefing, given the warnings that the government has produced?

MS. NEUBERGER: The U.S. banking sector truly takes cyber threats seriously, both individually and as a group. Treasury has worked extensively with the sector to share sensitive threat intelligence at the executive level, at the security executive level, repeatedly at the classified and unclassified level. So, I do not believe theyre more at risk, but it is always important for every critical infrastructure sector to double down in this heightened period of geopolitical tension to carefully look at any threat.

MS. PSAKI: Go ahead.

Q Can you paint a worst-case scenario picture for us? What exactly are you most worried about if people the private sector chooses to not take these steps?

MS. NEUBERGER: Clearly, what were always I wont get into hypotheticals, right? But the reason Im here is because critical infrastructure power, water, many hospitals in the United States are owned by the private sector. And while the federal government makes extensive resources available I mentioned FBIs 56 regional offices you can just walk in; CISA has offices near most FEMA sites in the United States. Theyve had their Shields Up program. We can make those resources available. For those sectors where we can mandate measures like oil and gas pipelines, we have. But its ultimately the private sectors responsibility, in our current authority structure, to do those steps, to use those resources to take those steps.

So, the purpose here is to say: Americans rely on those critical services. Please act. And were here to support with the resources we have.

MS. PSAKI: Kayla, last one.

Q Thank you. Anne, are you still seeing the Russians carrying out cyberattacks inside Ukraine? Its been a few weeks since weve been discussing that in particular.

And as financial tools levied by the West have proven ineffective, what cyber tools does the West have that it can possibly utilize?

MS. NEUBERGER: We do continue to see Russia conducting both as you know, right? significant malicious activity in Ukraine; major kinetic attacks, which have disrupted and killed lives; as well as cyber activity. And we believe the unprecedented economic costs the United States and partners have levied is significant in that way.

With regard to your question about whether cyberattacks would change that: I think the President was very clear were not looking for a conflict with Russia. If Russia initiates a cyberattack against the United States, we will respond.

MS. PSAKI: Thank you, Anne, so much for joining us.

MS. NEUBERGER: Thank you. Thank you for having me.

Q Thanks, Anne.

Q Thank you, Anne.

MS. PSAKI: All right. I just had two brief items for all of you at the top.

There was a scheduled meeting today that Secretary Yellen, Secretary Raimondo, Jake Sullivan, and Brian Deese had with 16 CEOs this afternoon. The President also dropped by for about 20 minutes and provided them an update on Russia, Ukraine. Im sure we can get you a list of the attendees at that meeting as well.

Also wanted to note a number of you have asked about whether the President would be watching the hearings today. One scheduling note is the Quint meet- call he had this morning was at exactly the same time as her opening statement, but he did request regular updates or has been requesting regular updates from members of the team on how the hearing is going.

And he also called her last night to wish her good luck this week at the hearings.

And I would also note that hes very grateful to Judge Tom Grif- Thomas Griffith, as well as Lisa Fairfax, for introducing her today.

So with that, I will stop. And, Colleen, why dont you kick us off.

Q Okay. So, do you can give us a readout of the call with the European leaders from earlier? Just sort of what was discussed, what happened.

And then I have one other question after that.

MS. PSAKI: Absolutely. If you havent already there should be a readout going out shortly, but let me give you a few of the preview points of this call:

Read the original:
Press Briefing by Press Secretary Jen Psaki and Deputy NSA for Cyber and Emerging Technologies Anne Neuberger, March 21, 2022 - The White House

Image courtesy of General Dynamics Mission Systems.

In this Q&A with Brian Morrison, Cyber Systems vice president and general manager for General Dynamics Mission Systems, we discuss cost-effective strategies for crypto mod, how Layer 2 encryption will enable missions such as the Joint Warfighting Cloud Capability, and how organizations can keep cryptographic systems compliant with NSA requirements.

Breaking Defense: Lets set the scene. What is the steady state right now in cryptographic solutions? Where is modernization needed?

Brian Morrison, Cyber Systems vice president and general manager for General Dynamics Mission Systems.

Morrison: At a threshold level, NSA is the standard-setting organization and the certifier for all cryptographic equipment across the National Security Enterprise. Its fair to say that crypto modernization for NSA has always been viewed as a continuous process.

That is to say, you and I have email accounts that we originally set up with a strong password. But since then, maybe we used that password on other accounts, or there was a penetration somewhere, or compute power has increased such that password crackers are more capable today. So what was once a strong password ends up being a really weak one and a vulnerability.

Thats an oversimplification, but whats true for passwords is true for crypto gear. You can build the strongest crypto gear that exists but over time the security of that device, of the algorithms that underlie that device, of the protections that are wrapped around that device, all erode over time. Our adversaries get better at doing what they do. And were seeing new, persistent attacks due to network vulnerabilities.

Under the leadership of the NSA, we, as a National Security Enterprise, must continually refresh our crypto gear. That means discreet gates for Advanced Cryptographic Capability prescribed by NSA. It also means continuing to patch, maintain, and update all of our gear over time. And then at certain points in time, NSA says a particular family of cryptographic gear has to come offline because it has aged out; it cant be secure anymore.

Thats the way I look at crypto modernization: from new crypto boxes to upgrading existing crypto boxes, to removing legacy crypto boxes from a network. All of that is the process of crypto mod. Our reason for being at General Dynamics Mission Systems is to make sure that our customers and the national security establishment have the most secure crypto that American ingenuity can provide.

Breaking Defense: How should organizations approach crypto mod? Is it akin to a software patch or a new iOS update that downloads in the background while were asleep?

Morrison: I wish it were that easy. There are two aspects. One is we know, without speaking to crypto gear specifically, that the overwhelming majority of cyber-security penetrations happen because somebody has not patched and updated, or they have been phished.

Our customers operate in vast networks, widely dispersed networks, high-latency networks, and in tactical, DIL (disconnected, intermittent, limited) environments. Its very difficult for those networks with many pieces of gear to stay patched and updated all the time. At General Dynamics Mission Systems, we have what we call the GEM One Encryptor Manager, which is a software package that manages and updates all of the Type 1 crypto in the enterprise, including crypto devices made by other manufacturers. Remote management improves the health of the network and eases maintenance.

The second part of the problem is that our customers have thousands and thousands of cryptographic units in their inventory. The ongoing process of crypto mod, including the periodic deadlines that the NSA rightfully imposes, is difficult to manage from both a budgetary and a logistics perspective.

So were encouraging our customers to think proactively about what their needs are going to be for crypto in 6, 12, 18, 24, 36 months out. That helps them plan from a budget perspective so that we are able to plan from a manufacturing-capacity perspective so that when the time comes to switch out boxes, theyve got the budget for it and were ready to satisfy their demand on time and within their budget. Thats easy to say and hard to do because theyre substantial investments. At the same time, theyre investments in the security of the most important secrets the nation has.

Breaking Defense: Is crypto mod more of a hardware or a software modification, or both?

Morrison: When we talk about crypto mod, were normally talking about updates to the hardware. But there are major software updates that we can do to provide compliance with crypto mod gates from the NSA. For example, our TACLANE-FLEX, TACLANE-10G, TACLANE-Nano, TACLANE-Micro, and Sectra vIPer phones have all been software upgraded to the NSAs Advanced Cryptographic Capabilities standard of modernization.

Breaking Defense: What is involved in keeping data-protection solutions up to date. Im assuming were talking about NSA requirements and certifications.

Morrison: Yes, the NSA is the certification authority for Type 1 crypto. If you want to pass classified information across the network, youve got to do it over a piece of crypto that the NSA has certified. For the vendors and programs that develop new crypto, that certification process is every bit as rigorous, complicated, and demanding as you would imagine. And, frankly, as rigorous as you would hope as these are high-stakes networks. For the missions that consume the crypto, the fact that NSA has certified the encryptor makes the long-term management of the crypto infinitely simpler and more stable.

Today, the NSA is in the midst of introducing a new specification for what we call Layer 2 encryption. This is a new standard for encryption at a different network layer that is intended to deliver much higher speeds over the next few years. Were very much a part of that effort and have made significant investments in delivering some mind-boggling speeds.

Breaking Defense: Speeds for what exactly?

Morrison: For the defense and intelligence establishments migration to the cloud. With defense networks operating in cloud environments, you have data center to data center transfers that have to happen at a very high rate of speed because those data center to data center transfers are aggregated traffic.

These transfers must be as bandwidth efficient as possible while keeping high security standards. When you move to Layer 2, you open up the possibility of much higher speeds at any given compute power. At the same time, we are pushing the boundaries of what compute power is available. Were always looking for more compute power to deliver higher and higher speeds.

As we address the data center market for government data centers, we need to be able to deliver speeds that there isnt even a market for today, but we know there will be tomorrow.

Breaking Defense: It almost sounds like the future of cloud computing in the DoD, particularly the Joint Warfighting Cloud Capability, is dependent on Layer 2 encryption. Is that an oversimplification?

Morrison: I dont think it is. The cloud providers likely can, with their existing or soon-contemplated infrastructure, handle what is already within the boundaries of their clouds. But as we know, defense customers are going to require hybrid clouds. Theyre going to require data transitioning from cloud to cloud, and thats where we really need those higher speeds.

Breaking Defense: What do you see as hindrances to proper crypto modernization?

Morrison: Im always sympathetic to the fact that the business Im in, the crypto business, is often perceived by some of our customers as an unfunded mandate. Its a real challenge.

That often stands in the way, even though nobody wants their systems to not be secure. Their number one concern is the life of their soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines. That necessitates the security of national security information traveling across their networks. But for many missions, crypto is not the core mission, its the thing that enables the mission.

As new requirements come online and as standards for crypto mod continue to evolve, tactical units might want to upgrade their crypto but just dont have the budget or logistics bandwidth. In response to that, we have added more remote management features to ease the logistics burden of crypto mod. And a couple of years ago, we introduced the smallest, lightest, least expensive Type 1 crypto in its class the TACLANE-Nano which brought affordable crypto to the tactical market.

Breaking Defense: Your point about crypto enabling the mission and not being the mission is well taken. Can you offer a scenario where TACLANE-Nano is particularly valuable to a warfighter and also an affordable and effective crypto solution?

Morrison: Sure. The last decade or more has seen a large increase in the use of unmanned and unattended systems. The nice thing about the TACLANE-Nano is that it is at a price point where you can put it on an unmanned or unattended system, insert it into your adversarys territory, for example, and not worry if it is lost or you lose connectivity; you can remotely zeroize that device. That means that if the cryptographic unit falls into the hands of our adversaries, it cant be used against us.

You cant do that with a big, heavy piece of crypto or one that costs $60,000 because thats not the way those types of unmanned missions run by and large. Were talking about much smaller, lighter airframes. We dont think of those classes of UAVs as attritable, but it may be approaching the attritable market.

Breaking Defense: Final thoughts?

Morrison: Any customer in the national security space has to be thinking about, worrying about, and planning for crypto mod. It is not something that any of us can ignore and then play catch up later on. The planning and logistics behind replacing legacy gear and modernizing a network cryptographic solution is complicated and long tailed.

Thats what General Dynamics Mission Systems is all about. We are a leader in crypto mod and are ready for both todays gates and tomorrows gates from the NSA. Our goal is to partner with our customers, help them understand and implement their modernization needs, and ensure their networks and communications are as secure as anyone can keep them.

More here:
Modernization of crypto isn't the core mission for DoD and the IC, it's what enables the mission - Breaking Defense

There has been much in the news lately about censorship. The major media have been reporting on Vladimir Putin's efforts to keep the Russian people from hearing the truth about his war against Ukraine and what President Biden has called war crimes.

Dictionary.com offers this definition of a censor: "an official who examines books, plays, news reports, motion pictures, radio and television programs, letters, cablegrams, etc., for the purpose of suppressing parts deemed objectionable on moral, political, military, or other grounds." That "official" can be a head of state, like Putin, the head of a news operation, or even an individual reporter. Anyone who chooses to suppress a story or fails to investigate one because it does not conform to their worldview could be labeled a censor.

Which brings me to the Hunter Biden laptop storyby The New York Times that his laptop and its contents are real, after all. Not only did the Times and other major and social media ignore the story, in some cases the story was deemed fraudulent and blocked on several platforms.

I think the more accurate explanation as to why the story was censored by these entities is that it was broken by The New York Post, which the mainstream media deem a "conservative" newspaper and, by their standard, unreliable. The line favored by much of the suppression press was that the laptop story was Russian "disinformation."

The real unreliable purveyors of disinformation (or no information) are those who failed to do their journalistic duty and investigate. That the story was not followed up on during the 2020 presidential campaign adds to the suspicion, especially among many conservatives, that the information suppression was deliberate. NPR last year "corrected an online article that falsely asserted that documents from first son Hunter Biden's laptop had been 'discredited by U.S. intelligence.'" The correction came after the election. It took the Times and others until this year to fess up. According to the NY Post, 51 intelligence officers who signed a public letter claiming the laptop story was Russian disinformation have so far refused to apologize.

"Fact-checkers" published what they said were lies told by Donald Trump. The Washington Post calculated Trump had lied or uttered misleading statements 30,573 times during his four years in office. No such diligence has been conducted by the major media of Hunter Biden and his family's alleged business and personal relationships with nefarious individuals and corrupt governments.

For years the legacy media has seen itself as the only "legitimate" source of news. In a type of "if a tree falls in the woods and no one is around, does it still make a sound?" scenario, if The New York Times, The Washington Post, broadcast and some cable news networks don't report it, is it still news? Yes, it is and the source whether it be The NY Post, UK Daily Mail, or talk radio should not matter so long as the story can be independently verified.

That The New York Times failed to do so until now is a dereliction of newspaper's journalistic duty. Had the information been known before the election, it conceivably might have changed votes in some states where Joe Biden won by narrow margins.

The tardy tacit admission by the Times that the NY Post was right will add to the view of many that today's journalism is driven mostly by agendas and not facts and when information goes against the worldview of reporters and their bosses it is to be ignored.

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Hunter Biden and the many forms of censorship - theday.com