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Joe Biden has defeated President Trump to become the next president of the United States. And hes gotten the most votes of anyone ever to run for the US presidency.

With more than 75 million votes so far, Biden broke the record previously set by President Barack Obama, who received about 69.5 million votes to win in 2008. The 75 million number puts Biden at more than 50 percent of the popular vote, with President Trump taking 48 percent. Trump has now also broken Obamas record, having passed the 70 million mark.

The 2020 election is on pace for a record turnout, with at least 159.8 million Americans voting, according to NBC. Thats the highest turnout rate among eligible voters since 1900. This has bolstered both candidates.

Both parties will surely parse the meaning of Tuesdays results in the days and weeks ahead, but one thing is clear: Even in the midst of a pandemic, American voters came out in unprecedented numbers to make their voices heard.

Biden paid tribute to that fact in a speech to the American people on Wednesday. Yesterday once again proved that democracy is the heartbeat of this nation, he said. Here the people rule. Power cant be taken or asserted. It flows from the people, and it is their will that determines who will be the president of the United States and their will alone.

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Joe Biden broke Obamas total vote record in the 2020 election - Vox.com

When Joe Biden is sworn in as president on January 20th, 2021, the U.S. could be approaching 500,000 lives lost to COVID-19. As the rest of the world has already proven, these deaths were not inevitable, but the result of the science-denying Trump administration and GOP, which failed to control the pandemic.

Biden has acknowledged the need for immediate COVID-19 response. But theres a catch. While hes taken the presidency, Democrats may be unable to flip the Senate (Democrats have 46 seats, Republicans have 48 seats, and two seats may go to a runoff in January). So while Biden can propose bills, and the Democrat-controlled House is likely to pass them, they could still face the same, aggressive vetoing of Mitch McConnell and the rest of the Republicans in the Senate, which has ground policymaking to a halt.

What can Biden do in this situation to design and implement a response for curbing the spread of COVID-19? I asked Andy Slavitt, the former Acting Administrator of the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services appointed by President Obama, just this question. Slavitt made his name saving America from a previous healthcare crisis, when he was part of the team that repaired the fledgling Healthcare.gov website. And over the past year, hes been advocating for practical COVID strategies on his podcast, Twitter, television, and even directly to our government itself.

I asked Slavitt: Andy, you are Joe Biden. Its day one, and you dont have the Senate on your side. How do you design and implement COVID response without them?

Unfortunately, hes not positive about the possibilities. Theres nothing to be optimistic about right now. I will tell you, having someone in charge [Biden] who manages it, who wont sleep at night until the problem gets fixed, will be better, says Slavitt. [But] we have a scary winter coming up. Im nervous for the winter. Theres a lot of people who travel for Thanksgiving who are at risk.

That said, here are the steps Slavitt would take if he were in Bidens shoes.

The first step for Biden is to work with the tools you have, says Slavitt. Specifically, hes referring to executive power. Experts agree its probably not legal for a president to mandate a national quarantine. However, a president can enact the Defense Production Actand Biden has actually said that he will.

You probably heard about the Defense Production Act already this year, as many speculated that Trump could turn to the policy to produce ventilators and distribute supplies. Its a law that allows the president to command American companies to create necessary supplies in times of critical national defense, but Trump never used it. In this case, Slavitt would like to see American companies producing PPE. Gloves. Masks. Gowns. You name it.

While PPE shortages are rarely in the news these days, they continue to be a real problem for ICUs in the U.S. Outside hospitals, PPE is something well need in excess to reopen our country safely rather than haphazardly, experts agree.

The other thing we need more of are testing kits, and the Defense Production Act could spur that along, too. As of now, most of us view testing kits as something you get when you think you have COVID-19, and you go to a walk-up or drive-up facility to get swabbed in your car. But thats only a baseline of what we can do with the right support. Slavitt imagines more people testing themselves at home, and pretty much all the time before they enter public spaces. This would make gathering safer, since you can spread COVID-19 for nearly a week before symptoms show up.

There are all kinds of technologies, like [a COVID] breathalyzer, that could make entrance to school safe, says Slavitt. But they require significant production challenges. The technology is good, but you have to find the production capacity to develop those things.

The Defense Production Act would allow President Biden to mandate mass-production of the best safety technologies we already have, and make them available in numbers that could help drive down new infection rates.

One problem with controlling COVID-19 today is that people have to work to make money, and that means they have to leave the house. They also might be sick without a place to quarantine.

In April 2020, Slavitt, alongside Scott Gottlieb, a former FDA chief under Trump, proposed a plan for a $46 billion COVID-19 response. Of that gargantuan number, $30 billion was actually set aside for 18 months of financial assistance (or a $50/day stipend for people who voluntarily self-isolate), and $4.5 billion was set to convert motels and hotels to COVID self-quarantine centers. The remaining $12 billion was to hire a 180,000-person contact tracing team.

But to secure this money, you need the support of Congress, which requires the Senate. If youre Biden, you spend some political capital to work with McConnell to get that done, says Slavitt.

When I scoff, pointing out that this compromise seems impossible after more than a decade of the Senate shutting down the policies presented by Democrats, Slavitt doesnt budge. You do need Congress for these things, and its not an ideological issue as much as a public health issue, he says. Think about it. Around the world, the thing you measure the most if you want to slow down the virus is what percentage of people who have the virus pass it on to other people, and what percentagedont spread it. In countries with better safety nets, people can stay home and not lose income. Thats what you need here.

Biden would also need the Senates support to shunt critical funds to individual states if they are to distribute an eventual COVID-19 vaccine, which both Slavitt and state health officials are saying is necessary to roll out vaccines effectively. Right now, those costs are set to fall on states themselves. But a recent audit found that the 50 states already had debts of $1.4 trillion in 2019, a figure that has only grown during COVID-19. States need government funding to optimize vaccine delivery. Slavitt recommends that Biden check in with scientists to understand how to best administer and distribute vaccines en masse. Then states will need funds to implement the plan.

As for implementing contact tracing, thats necessary but a back burner issue, relatively speaking. Its useful. Its not going to solve the problem by itself, says Slavittlargely because contact tracing isnt effective when we have the infection rates that we do in the United States. Once we get cases down and we want containment, contact tracking will be very important.

The last suggestion Slavitt offers is something Biden could start right now, before hes even sworn in. Its the most difficult challenge in front of Biden of them all, Slavitt says.

The hardest step is the bully pulpit, you need to start that immediately, communicate with people in a way that brings the temperature down on the issues. And that will be the most challenging thing, says Slavitt. Its a divisive election. Theres a lot of healing that has to go on.

Since March, the GOP and its constituents have framed COVID-19 as a partisan issue, when in reality, its a public health issue. Viruses do not care who weve voted for or what we believe about medicine or media bias; they attack the population indiscriminately. And we have 230,000 Americans who have died in terrible proof of this point already.

Biden is addressing our country divide already, having urged unity and the need for a rapid COVID response in his address Saturday night.

This is a sociological problem, not a technological problem, Slavitt concludes. Africa has 1.3 billion people. They only have 35,000 deaths. This is not about a high tech silver bullet. Its a harder challenge. We know the answer, dont breathe near one another or get to crowded spacesthats what we have to face, and that requires society to come together.

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Biden has won. But does he have the power to stop COVID-19? - Fast Company

This fall, it took the European Union almost two months to impose sanctions against Aleksandr Lukashenkos regime in Belarus after a clearly rigged presidential election and the governments heavy-handed crackdown of mass protests. Although the EU was quick torefuseto recognize the results when they were released in August, stated that Lukashenkos new presidential mandate lacked any democratic legitimacy, and called for an inclusive national dialogue and responding positively to the demands of the Belarusian people for new democratic elections. Cyprus blocked concrete action for weeks, as it used its veto as a bargaining chip in its own dispute with Turkey.

Then, in September, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyenannouncedwith great fanfare that the EU was stepping up its efforts to combat climate change. As part of that plan, by 2030 the bloc would seek to reduce its carbon emissions 55 percent below 1990 levels. It would also aim to spendover half a trillion euros over the next seven years on climate-related efforts. Again, not everybody was on board. Poland, which relies heavily on coal and lignite (a cousin of coal),has openly defiedthe ambitious emissions goals. Meanwhile, across Central and Eastern Europe new natural gas infrastructure, including the infamous Nord Stream 2 pipeline and several liquified natural gas terminals, is springing up. While cleaner than coal, an addiction to natural gas would run counter to von der Leyens plans.

Both situations raise the question of whether the EU is the right venue to address issues including European geopolitics, climate change, and others. In theory, the answer is a resounding yes. But reality is more complicated.

True, dealing with climate change requires a high degree of international coordination in order to prevent carbon leakage from countries that have committed themselves to reducing their carbon footprint to jurisdictions that have taken a lax approach. And no European country, not even Germany or France, can sit as an equal with the worlds great powers. But the EU collective, with a population of 450 million, can. Meanwhile, actions like cutting Lukashenkos elite off from the EUs entire financial and real estate market would be more consequential than sanctions by individual countries.

Yet, in both cases, the EU lacks the policy toolbox to act effectively. This mismatch was long supposed to be remedied by the blocs gradual evolution toward an ever closer union. According to the logic advocated by many of the EUs founding fathers, successive policy decisions and crises would lead to the gradual completion of the EUs institutional architecture. The euro, for example, would make genuine fiscal union inevitable. Schengen would lead sooner or later to a common visa and asylum policy.

But the political culture of total optimism, as the Italian political scientist Giandomenico Majone called it, is unsustainable. Over the past decade, marked by a multiplicity of crises threatening the very existence of the European project, the bloc responded with improvised make-do fixes, agreed by national leaders outside the scope of European treaties. When faced with the prospect of a chaotic unraveling of the eurozone, in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, only then did European leaders agree, reluctantly, on the creation of a rescue fund for countries in financial distress. And only when the wave of Syrian asylum-seekers risked overwhelming the Schengen Area did German Chancellor Angela Merkel decide to strike a bargain with Turkeys Recep Tayyip Erdogan to halt the migratory flows.

Oftentimes, both acute and chronic problemssuch as rule of law in Poland and Hungary, the China challenge, and the turmoil in Syrialinger unaddressed. The reason is twofold. First, the not-quite-federal institutional setup of the EU requires states to meet a high threshold of agreement, often unanimity, on consequential decisions, especially to changes to its treaties. Second, EU member states tend to have widely different views on how various policy challenges ought to be resolved and also about the future of the European project, including the desirable depth of political integration, future enlargements, and the role and size of European institutions.

The underlying assumption of the ever closer union is that, for all their differences, all EU members are moving toward the same destination. But that is not true. Poles, Czechs, and Swedes may never adopt the euro, in spite of their formal commitment to eventually do so. Climate goals set by Brussels might go ignored by national policymakers, just as the ambitious economic goals articulated in the Lisbon Strategy and Europe 2020 once were. And Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban-style populism might not be aone-off aberration but apermanent state of affairs in places such as Poland and Hungary.

Perhaps such frictions could be overcome if the threshold of agreement required for action in the European Council were lowered so that decisions were made by qualified majorities, not by unanimity. After Brexit, however, even the most ardent Eurofederalists should think twice before giving member states the prospect of being systematically outvoted.

Fortunately, there is another path. Prior to the Maastricht Treaty, the European project was commonly referred to as the EuropeanCommunities. There was the European Coal and Steel Community, the European Atomic Energy Community, and the European Economic Communityall governed by the same set of Brussels-based institutions. If, 30 years in, the bundling of these groups into the EU has not produced greater unity, perhaps it is time to start thinking about the EU in pluralistic terms again. It may not be onemonolithic entity but a multiplicity of only partially geographically overlapping projects of economic and political integration.

The idea of unbundling is not newMajonearticulatedit in a book analyzing the EUs travails during the financial crisisbut the case for it has grown stronger over the past decade as the EU has relied more and more on intergovernmental responses to events in Europe and abroad.

The idea is by no means radical. The EU has long featured a single market, in which several nonmembers take part. There is also the Schengen Agreement and the currency union, which both include subsets of EU members and somenonmembers. While the EU strives to make its lowest common denominator attempts at common security and foreign policies viable, member states,largeandsmall, often act on their own. Explicit and implicit carve-outs and special accommodations exist in many other areas, including the Irish protocol on the Lisbon Treaty, Denmarks opt-outs from the Maastricht Treaty, and Polands opt-out from the Charter of Fundamental Rights.

Such special treatment does not have to be a threat to European unity. If used well, it can be a tool keeping the European edifice together while different blocs of countries deepen their cooperation in various policy areas. When Cyprus refused to sanction Lukashenko, the remaining 26 member states should have proceeded on their own. True, doing so would raise legal questions, since sanctioned entities could still reach the EUs financial and real estate marketsviaCyprus. But that is not an unsurmountable problem given the scrutiny that the union has devoted to such questions in its anti-money laundering directives. If a subset of EU members are truly serious about addressing climate change, they should not be held back by naysayers. And if most but not all eurozone members want to pool their public debt into a common debt instrument, why shouldnt they?

To become a global foreign and security policy player, Brussels has launched a number of formal, institutionalized initiatives, most prominently the Permanent Structured Cooperation and the European Defense Fund. Yet, in order for such efforts to succeed, it will be critical for the United Kingdom to be heavily involved, in spite of the British decision to formally leave the EU. The U.K. might no longer be an EU member state, but it is one of the few remaining military powers in Europe.

Embracing the reality that the European project is a plurality of initiatives that run in parallel and involve different sets of actors would inevitably de-emphasize the role of common European institutions, such as its parliament and the commission, and put member states firmly in the drivers seat. But that has already started happening over the past decade.

There are practical limits to the EUs unbundling, which have to do with the problems of free-riding and adverse selection, where those countries most interested in remaining in the union are the same who require the most from it, whether in investment, fiscal transfers, security, or otherwise. If most but not all of the EUs members embrace ambitious climate goals, there may indeed be carbon leakage to countries such as Polandand available tax remediesmight well beinadequate. If only a subset of eurozone countries moves to build the fiscal union needed to make the currency union sustainable over the long term, other member states will benefit from the added degree of financial stability without bearing any of the costs.

Yet the world is necessarily an imperfect place. The frictions entailed by the EUs bow to its pluralistic, multifaceted nature should not be compared against an optimal mix of policies and institutions in an ideal European federation but against the unions current, highly imperfect realityin which desirable initiatives are constantly held back and derailed.

An unbundling of the EU would be a simple acknowledgment of reality today. Its alternative, namely obstinate insistence on European unity and one-size-fits-all solutions, will not lead to an ever closer union. Instead, it is the surest path to the blocs paralysis and ultimate irrelevance.

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The Case for Disaggregating the European Union: It Has Never Acted as One Body, and It Will Work Better if Treated as Such - Foreign Policy

BRUSSELS/WASHINGTON (Reuters) - The European Union is poised to move next week to impose tariffs on $4 billion of U.S. imports in retaliation for U.S. subsidies for planemaker Boeing, EU diplomats said, teeing up an eleventh-hour showdown with U.S. President Donald Trump.

European Union flags flutter outside the European Commission headquarters in Brussels, Belgium August 21, 2020. REUTERS/Yves Herman/File Photo

A majority of EU governments have backed imposing the widely expected tariffs once EU trade ministers meet next Monday - the latest twist in a transatlantic trade saga that has spanned 16 years and four U.S. presidents.

Democratic presidential candidate Joe Biden is edging closer to victory in the U.S. election, but Republican Trump would remain president until Jan. 20 and has plenty of leeway to increase U.S. tariffs on Europe that were imposed in a parallel case over subsidies for Airbus.

U.S. Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer last month warned any EU tariffs would force a U.S. response and Trump has threatened to strike back harder..

Brussels views its own tariffs - authorized by the World Trade Organization last month - as important leverage in negotiations to end a dispute that began in 2004.

I would expect the tariffs to be imposed next Tuesday or Wednesday, an EU diplomat said.

In October 2019, Washington imposed tariffs on Airbus planes and other European products from cheese to olives and single-malt whisky. Combined, the two cases represent the worlds largest ever corporate trade dispute.

Washington argues there is no legal basis for EU tariffs because underlying subsidies to Boeing have been repealed. European officials argue it is only the WTO that can decide on compliance and that last months green light stands.

Both sides accuse the other of failing to obey WTO rulings but are seen as determined to maximize their positions ahead of probable negotiations.

If Biden wins, the avowed transatlanticist is expected to work quickly to mend fences with Brussels on a host of issues, and could use talks over the aircraft subsidies as a gesture of goodwill as he tries to build a more united front against China.

After holding off on tariffs to avoid clashing with the U.S. presidential campaign, EU governments formally cleared tariffs on Tuesday, Election Day, but must now decide their timing.

Tariffs will hit U.S. planes and parts, fruits, nuts and other farm produce, orange juice, some spirits and other goods from construction equipment to casino tables, diplomats said.

The European Commission said it was fine tuning what it regards as its retaliation rights in case no agreed solution could be found with Washington, including an immediate suspension of U.S. tariffs.

Lighthizers office had no immediate comment. One senior U.S. source said Trump was not expected to feel constraint about expanding U.S. tariffs, even if he loses the election.

The United States is authorized to impose tariffs on $7.5 billion of European goods, but has not used the whole quota. It could raise duties on various goods or expand the target list.

Chris Swonger, president and CEO of the Distilled Spirits Council of the U.S., said any EU tariffs on spirits would further devastate an industry that has already seen a 41% drop in U.S. whisky exports to Europe due to previous EU tariffs.

European producers have voiced similar complaints about U.S. tariffs. Politicians on both sides of the Atlantic are under mounting pressure to prevent the aircraft feud hurting other industries.

New EU tariffs will also hand Britain, which left the bloc this year, delicate decisions about whether to join neighbours in imposing tariffs at a time when it is caught between trade negotiations with both the United States and EU.

Britain, a partner of France-based Airbus, has pledged to keep all options open.

Reporting by Philip Blenkinsop in Brussels, Andrea Shalal in Washington, Tim Hepher in Paris; editing by Grant McCool

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EU set to impose tariffs on $4 billion U.S. goods next week - Reuters

On September 23, the European Commission launched the New Pact on Migration and Asylum, proposing to overhaul the European Unions long ailing policies in this area. European Union Vice President Margaritis Schinas likened the pact to a building with three floors, comprised of: an external dimension (centered around strengthened partnerships with countries of origin and transit), robust management of external borders, and firm but fair internal rules. The commission proposal must still make its way through the legislative process in the European Parliament and European Council.

The problem is: The pact needs a foundational basement, in the form of recognizing that an overwhelming majority of the worlds refugees are hosted in developing countries. Without a basement, the whole edifice is undermined. The EU must incorporate policy ideas from the Global Compact on Refugees (GCR) to rectify this.

The pacts external dimension which calls for strengthening partnerships with countries of origin and transit in the EUs immediate neighborhood and beyond is its ground floor. The second floor relates to policies to fortify and improve the management of the EUs external borders. The third floor proposes rules to resolve the long-standing challenge within the EU to achieve a more balanced distribution of responsibilities and promote solidarity among EU members in dealing with asylum seekers and refugees.

At all three levels, the pact has faced intense push-back. With respect to the third floor, the commission has been criticized for catering to the priorities of the more conservative and anti-immigrant member states such as Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia. The pact allows members to opt out from participating in the relocation of asylum seekers and refugees within the EU by offering them the possibility to instead provide administrative and financial support to other member states. Serious doubts have been expressed about the viability of this scheme.

On the second floor, the big concern is that once again border security has been prioritized over access to asylum. While emphasizing the principle of non-refoulement as enshrined in international refugee law, the pact at the same time introduces measures that are clearly meant to complicate the possibility that individuals fleeing persecution and conflicts can seek or obtain protection in the EU. A former director of the Center for Refugees Studies of Oxford University sees these measures as aiming to harden and formalize the Fortress Europe. Migrants and refugees were to be kept out of Europe at all costs.

The emphasis on protecting Europes borders becomes most evident at the ground floor. Here the pact calls for revamping partnership with third countries and reflects the EUs long-standing policy of externalizing the cost and responsibility of managing its external borders. Tying policy issues such as development assistance, trade concessions, security, education, agriculture, and visa facilitation for third-country nationals to those countries willingness to cooperate on migration management has long been criticized as asymmetrical. The pact takes this relationship to a new coercive level by suggesting the possibility of apply[ing] restrictive visa measures to third countries unwilling to be cooperative.

Time will tell whether these problems on each floor will be addressed as the commission proposal makes its way through the legislative process. However, there is a deeper structural problem to the pact, resulting from the missing basement. This is because the pact fails to account for two major global realities confronting the EU.

The first problem is that the pact is so inward-oriented that it fails to recognize the policy implications of the dire state of forced migration globally. The number of forcibly displaced persons has increased dramatically, reaching almost 80 million. According tothe U.N. Higher Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the number of refugees alone has gone up from roughly 15 million a decade ago to 26 million today. And77%of the refugees find themselves in a protracted situation defined as having remained displaced without a durable solution (such as voluntary return to their home countries following the resolution of conflicts, resettlement, or local integration) for more than five years. Because of persistent conflicts, only 3.9 million refugees were able to return to their homesbetween 2010 and 2019, compared to roughly 10 million between 2000 and 2010 and 15.3 million in the 1990s.

Secondly, the pact makes little allowance for how the COVID-19 pandemic is going to impact EUs migration and asylum policies. The pandemic has profoundly affected the capacity of host countries to manage the presence of refugees and ensure their protection. Already fragile health infrastructures are stretched in helping local populations, let alone refugees. The pandemic has also eroded income from trade, tourism, and crucial revenue from remittances. The pact should recognize the dire forced migration picture, the impact of COVID-19, and the associated expected rise in poverty. The Economistand theU.N. have noted that the pandemic risks undoing the gains made against poverty in the past two decades.Most affected will be developing countries, according to the World Bank, where more than 85% of these refugees are hosted.

This picture is likely to erode the capacity of these countries to cope with the presence of refugees and manage public resentment as competition for scarce resources between refugees and locals intensifies. Under these circumstances it would not be unrealistic to expect pressures for secondary movements towards the EU to build up, reminiscent of the ones that occurred during 2015 and 2016. The EU has an interest in recognizing the reality presented by the basement floor, and should supplement policies on the first floor and above accordingly.

The pact hardly makes any reference to the GCR, as a former UNHCR official points out, but it could be an inspiring source of policy ideas. The idea of the GCR emerged from the September 2016 U.N. summit in New York that was held to address the challenges resulting from the European migration crisis. Adopted in December 2018, the GCR recognizes that the traditional refugee protection system based on the 1951 Geneva Convention is under duress, if not broken. Against this reality, it calls on the international community to work together in the spirit of burden- and responsibility-sharing to improve the self-reliance of refugees and the resilience of their host communities, as well as help hosts transform refugees from being a humanitarian burden to a development and economic opportunity. All EU member countries, apart from Hungary, have endorsed the GCR.

Though the pact fails to acknowledge the GCR, Vice President Schinas promises to seek global solutions and responsibility-sharing with international partners on migration, as well as proposesto establish a Union Resettlement and Humanitarian AdmissionFramework Regulation[that] would provide astable EU framework for the EU contribution to global resettlement efforts.These reflect at least the spirit of the GCR. However, the EU needs to go beyond this, and heed to the GCRs call to promote economic opportunities, decent work, job creation and entrepreneurship programs for host community members and refugees in refugee hosting countries. Only than can the EU enjoy a solid basement floor for the rest of the pact.

The GCR offers a rich array of innovative policy suggestions that the EU can take into consideration when negotiating partnerships with countries hosting large numbers of refugees. One such policy idea calls for a more active involvement of the private sector in supporting self-reliance of refugees through decent and sustainable employment. In its partnership agreements, the EU could include terms incentivizing companies to offer such opportunities for refugees. This could be enabled by extending preferential trade arrangements for countries hosting large numbers of refugees, which is something the GCR mentions. Such partnerships with the EU could be conditioned to refugees being offered sustainable employment opportunities.

The advantage of all this is that the resulting economic growth would also benefit host communities, support social cohesion, and help empower already fragile economies coming out of a COVID-19-induced economic recession. It would also give the partnerships that the EU is advocating for at the ground floor of the pact a much more solid foundation, based on a cooperative spirit rather than the current formulation. In this way, the New Pact would help create a win-win-win outcome benefiting refugees, host countries, and the EU.

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The EUs New Pact on Migration and Asylum is missing a true foundation - Brookings Institution